JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been filed for declaring the proceedings of "No Confidence Motion" against the petitioner by the notice dated 14-10-2002, bad being contrary to the provisions of Section 37 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (for short, "the Act, 1994") and Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 (for short, "the Rules, 1996") and for quashing the notice dated 14-10-2002 for holding the meeting on 28-10-2002. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner had been elected as Up-Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Nokha Chandawata, District Nagaur. A notice for considering No Confidence Motion against him was signed by the Members and submitted to the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Nagpur, alleging that the petitioner misbehaved in the meeting and abused the persons whoever came to him having any grievance and even misbehaved with the lady Panchas and did not permit them to speak. In pursuance thereof, notice dated 14-10-2002 was issued to hold the meeting for considering the No Confidence Motion on 28-10-2002 and notice thereof was served upon the members. Hence, this petition. 3. Vide order dated 22-10-2002, this Court allowed the meeting to be held but directed that the result shall not be declared. The voting took place by raising the hands and four members had voted in favour of the petitioner while eight members voted against the petitioner and as such the No Confidence Motion was carried on by 8:4 votes, i.e. ⅔ majority. Subsequently, that order was modified vide order dated 18-12-2002 that the result may be declared but it shall not be given effect to. 4. Mr. G.R. Punia, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the meeting had been convened in flagrant violation of the provisions of Section 37 (2) of the Act, 1994, which provides that a copy of the proposed motion be sent along with notice and while submitting notice for considering No Confidence Motion, copy of proposed motion had not been filed. The Chief Executive Officer had no competence to serve the notice to consider the proposed motion. Instead of having the secret ballot, voting by raising hands was not permissible. The Chief Executive Officer had no competence to serve the notice to consider the proposed motion. Instead of having the secret ballot, voting by raising hands was not permissible. Moreso, Rule 21(2) of the Rules, 1996 provides that notice of the meeting shall be sent by the Chief Executive Officer not less than 15 clear days before the meeting and, thus, it was not a notice for 15 clear days. As the mandatory provisions have not been complied with, all the proceedings stood vitiated. 5. Mr. L.R. Chaudhary and Mr. I.R. Chaudhary, learned counsel for respondents, have submitted that the conduct of the petitioner had been such that it does not warrant any interference by this Court while exercising the writ jurisdiction as being the Up-Sarpanch, he had given false affidavit that he had not been served a copy of the proposed motion; if the petitioner, in the meeting held on 28-10-2002, has lost the confidence by 8:4 votes, i.e. of ⅔ majority, the question of entertaining the person, against whom majority has lost the faith, does not arise. Moreso, petitioner is not supposed to work smoothly if there had been only ⅓ members with him. Along with the application for considering the No Confidence Motion (Annx. P/3), the Proposed No Confidence Motion had also been served upon the petitioner and if there was some other trivial technical defect, the Court, in a matter where democratic system of Governance requires faith of majority, must brush aside such technical flaws. The proceedings of No Confidence Motion had been conducted strictly in accordance with law and the petition is liable to be rejected. 6. Respondents No. 1 to 3 the Statutory Authorities have also filed the reply stating that the proceedings had been conducted strictly in accordance with law and even if there was any flaw of technical nature, it has not caused any prejudice to the cause of the petitioner. The copy of the Proposed Motion was submitted by the persons not at the stage of submitting the application for considering the No Confidence Motion but later on and the same had been served upon all the members and, therefore, it cannot be held that the provisions of the Act, 1994 had not been complied with. The copy of the Proposed Motion was submitted by the persons not at the stage of submitting the application for considering the No Confidence Motion but later on and the same had been served upon all the members and, therefore, it cannot be held that the provisions of the Act, 1994 had not been complied with. Notice dated 14-10-2002 was well in time and the provisions have been complied with as Section 37(3) (iii) requires that the notice should be given to the members before not less than 7 days of the meeting and the requirement of Rule 21 (2) of the Rules, 1996 had been that the notice should not be for less than 15 days of the meeting so that the same could be received by the members and they can get 7 days time before the meeting to deliberate and consider the pros and cons of such a meeting. As the notice had been received within the time, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. 7. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. At the time of argument, Mr. Punia has restricted his case only to the requirement of the provision of Section 37(2) of the Act, 1994, which reads as under:- "A written notice of the intention to make the motion in such form as may be prescribed, signed by not less than ⅓ of the directly elected members of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned, together with a copy of the proposed motion, shall be delivered in person by any one of the members signing, to the Competent Authority." 9. Thus, the case requires consideration as to what would be the effect if the proposed motion is not filed together with the notice for considering the No Confidence Motion. Undoubtedly, the language provides for that it should be filed together with the notice for considering the No Confidence Motion and the question requires consideration whether this provision is mandatory or directory and what will be the consequence if it is filed at a later stage or not filed at all. 10. Undoubtedly, the language provides for that it should be filed together with the notice for considering the No Confidence Motion and the question requires consideration whether this provision is mandatory or directory and what will be the consequence if it is filed at a later stage or not filed at all. 10. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 , considered the issue as to whether the provision involved in the said case was mandatory and held as under:- "For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature, the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered." 11. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also placed reliance upon the Maxwell on "interpretation of Statutes", 10th Edn. p. 381, wherein it has been observed as under:- "On the other hand, where the prescription of a statute relates to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of the act done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over who have been entrusted with the duty without promoting the social aim of the legislation, such prescription seems to be generally understood as mere instruction for the guidance and governance of those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. The neglect of them may be penal, in deed, but it does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them." 12. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. The neglect of them may be penal, in deed, but it does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them." 12. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. Municipal Board, Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895 ; and State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, AIR 1975 SC 2190 , whether a provision is mandatory or directory, would, in the ultimate analysis, depends upon the intent of the law-maker and that has to be gathered not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature, its design and the consequence which would follow from construing it in one way or the other. 13. In Sharif-Ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 89 of the J & K Representation of People Act, 1957, held that the difference between a mandatory and directory rule is that the former requires strict observance while in the case of latter, substantial compliance of the rule may be enough and where the statute provides that failure to make observance of a particular rule would lead to a specific consequence, the provision has to be construed as mandatory. The Apex Court held as under:- "In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the Court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question is to sub-serve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of the law is required to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory ....... When ever the statute provides that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that the failure to compliance with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow." 14. Similar view has been reiterated in Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, AIR 1985 SC 964 ; M/s. B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, AIR 1987 SC 1010 ; Owners and Parties. Similar view has been reiterated in Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, AIR 1985 SC 964 ; M/s. B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, AIR 1987 SC 1010 ; Owners and Parties. Interested in M.V. "Vali Pero" v. Fernando Lopez, AIR 1989 SC 2206 ; and Lakshmanasami Gounder v. CIT Selvamani, (1992) 1 SCC 91 ; Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1997 SC 3400 ; Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd., (1997) 10 SCC 538 ; and Dinkar Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 1 SCC 354 : ( AIR 1999 SC 152 ) . 15. In M/s. Rubber House v. M/s. Excellsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1160 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of the Haryana (Control of Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1976, which provided for mentioning the amount of arrears of rent in the application and after placing reliance upon large number of judgments, including Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 113 ; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., ( AIR 1965 SC 895 ) (supra); K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, AIR 1958 SC 687 ; Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 ; State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, ( AIR 1961 SC 751 ) (supra); and Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 494 , the provision was held to be directory though the word "shall" has been used in the statutory provision for the reason that non-compliance of the rule, i.e. non-mentioning of the quantum of arrears of rent did involve no invalidating consequence and also did not visit any penalty. 16. In B.S. Khurana v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (2000) 7 SCC 679 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3131 ) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, particularly those dealing with transfer of immovable property owned by the Municipal Corporation. 16. In B.S. Khurana v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (2000) 7 SCC 679 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3131 ) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, particularly those dealing with transfer of immovable property owned by the Municipal Corporation. After considering the scheme of the Act for the purpose of transferring the property belonging to the Corporation, the Court held that the Commissioner could alienate the property only on obtaining the prior sanction of the Corporation and this condition was held to be mandatory for the reason that the effect of non-observance of the statutory prescription would vitiate the transfer though no specific power had been conferred upon the Corporation to transfer the property. 17. In Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh, (2002) 5 SCC 738 : ( AIR 2002 SC 2031 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and held as under:- "Where a statute does not consist merely of one enactment, but contains number of different provisions regulating the manner in which something is to be done, it often happens that some of these provisions are to be treated as being directory only, while others are to be considered absolute and essential; that is to say, some of the provisions may be disregarded without rendering invalid the things to be done but others not ......... The mandate of the law of fresh trial is mandatory whereas the mandate that newly added accused could be tried together with the accused is directory." 18. In State of Haryana v. Raghubir Dayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "The use of the word 'shall' is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the scope of the enactment, on consequences to flow from such construction would not so demand. Normally, the word 'shall' prima facie ought to be considered mandatory but it is the function of the Court to ascertain the real intention of the legislature by a careful examination of the whole scope of the statute, the purpose it seeks to serve and the consequences that would flow from the construction to be placed thereon. Normally, the word 'shall' prima facie ought to be considered mandatory but it is the function of the Court to ascertain the real intention of the legislature by a careful examination of the whole scope of the statute, the purpose it seeks to serve and the consequences that would flow from the construction to be placed thereon. The word 'shall', therefore, ought to be constructed not according to the language with which it is clothed but in the context in which it is used and the purpose it seeks to serve. The meaning has to be described to the word 'shall'; as mandatory or as directory accordingly. Equally, it is settled law that when a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling the doing of something and prescribes the formalities which are to be attended for the purpose, those prescribed formalities which are essential to the validity of such thing, would be mandatory. However if by holding them to be mandatory, serious general inconvenience is caused to innocent persons or general public, without very much furthering the object of the Act, the same would be construed as directory." 19. The real test to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory is, if noncompliance with the provisions renders the proceeding invalid, it would be mandatory. However, the intent of the Legislature is a most relevant factor to determine the issue and not the language used therein. 20. It has been hitherto uncontroverted legal position that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. 20. It has been hitherto uncontroverted legal position that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. (Vide Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) 1 Ch D 426 ; Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 ; Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527 ; Patna Improvement Trust v. Lakshmi Devi, AIR 1963 SC 1077 ; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 ; Nike Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 2077 ; Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, AIR 1975 SC 915 ; Chettiam Veettil Ammad v. Taluk Land Board, AIR 1979 SC 1537 ; State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanna, AIR 1980 SC 326 ; A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab, (1986) 4 SCC 326 : ( AIR 1986 SC 2160 ) ; State of Mizoram v. Biakchhawna, (1995) 1 SCC 156 : (1995 AIR SCW 1497) ; J.N. Ganetra v. Morvi Municipality, Morvi, (1996) 9 SCC 495 : ( AIR 1996 SC 2520 ) ; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagdish Lai, AIR 1970 SC 7 ; and Ballavdas Aggarwala v. J.C. Chakraverty, AIR 1960 SC 576 , In Purtabpur Company Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 1896 ; Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad v. Ghan Shyam Das Utpal, AIR 1962 SC 1110 ; Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 ; Chandrika Jha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1984 SC 322 ; Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422 : ( AIR 1999 SC 1281 ) ; Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad, (1999) 8 SCC 266 : ( AIR 1999 SC 3558 ) and Haresh Dayaram Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 6 SCC 179 : ( AIR 2000 SC 2281 ) . 21. Be that as it may, this Court, in SBCWP No. 2204/2002, Rukmani Devi v. State of Rajasthan & ors., decided on 29-7-2002 , held that the provision providing for that a copy of the proposed motion shall be sent along with the notice, is a mandatory and strict adherence thereto has to be made. 21. Be that as it may, this Court, in SBCWP No. 2204/2002, Rukmani Devi v. State of Rajasthan & ors., decided on 29-7-2002 , held that the provision providing for that a copy of the proposed motion shall be sent along with the notice, is a mandatory and strict adherence thereto has to be made. Similar view has been taken in Laxman Meena v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 (1) Raj LR 466 : (AIR 1998 Rajasthan 306) ; and Radhey Shyam v. Vijay Singh, ILR (1972) Raj 968. 22. As in the aforesaid cases, the view has been taken in spite of the fact that a provision should be declared to be mandatory provided it provides that its non-observance would vitiate the proceedings. As I am bound by the law laid down by the coordinate Benches, it is held that the said provision is mandatory. 23. However, there is a difference in the instant case as it has been categorically stated by the respondent Authorities that immediately after filing the notice to consider the No Confidence Motion, the proposed motion had been filed. Therefore, the case requires to be examined from another angle: as if the proposed motion has been filed after submitting the notice for consideration of No Confidence Motion, what prejudice has been caused to the petitioner ? 24. The validity of an order is to be tested on the touchstone of doctrine of prejudice. (Vide Janki Nath Sarangi v. State of Orissa, (1969) 3 SCC 392 ; K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, AIR 1984 SC 273 ; Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1980 SC 1170 ; G.S. Sodhi v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1617 ; Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Kanunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 : ( AIR 1994 SC 1074 ) ; Krishan Lal v. State of J & K, (1994) 4 SCC 422 ; State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 : ( AIR 1996 SC 1669 ) ; S.K. Singh v. Central Bank of India, (1996) 6 SCC 415 ; State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora, (2001) 6 SCC 392 : ( AIR 2001 SC 2319 ) ; and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. S. Balakrishna, 2001 AIR SCW 2450) . 25. Ltd. v. S. Balakrishna, 2001 AIR SCW 2450) . 25. In Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta, AIR 1956 SC 140 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, placed reliance upon the judgment in Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. Income-tax Officer, Lahore, AIR 1940 PC 230 and held as under:- "We do not think that is right and we deprecate this tendency towards technicality; it is the substance that counts and must take precedence over mere form. Some rules are vital and go to the root of the matter; they cannot be broken; others are only directory and a breach of them can be over-looked provided there is substantial compliance with the rules read as whole and provided no prejudice ensues.......... 26. In State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora, (2001) 6 SCC 392 : ( AIR 2001 SC 2319 ) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "The matter may be examined from another view-point. There may be cases where there are infractions of statutory provisions, rules and regulations. Can it be said that every such infraction would make the consequent action void and/or invalid? The statute may contain certain substantive provisions, e.g. who is the competent authority to impose a particular punishment on a particular employee. Such provision must be strictly complied with as in these cases the theory of substantial compliance may not be available. For example, where a rule specifically provides that the delinquent officer shall be given an opportunity to produce evidence in support of his case after the close of the evidence of the other side and if no such opportunity is given, it would not be possible to say that the enquiry was not vitiated. But in respect of many procedural provisions, it would be possible to apply the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice, as the case may be. Even amongst procedural provisions, there may be some provisions of a fundamental nature which have to be complied with and in whose case the theory of substantial compliance may not be available, but the question of prejudice may be material. In respect of procedural provisions other than of a fundamental nature, the theory of substantial compliance would be available and in such cases objections on this score have to be judged on the touchstone of prejudice. In respect of procedural provisions other than of a fundamental nature, the theory of substantial compliance would be available and in such cases objections on this score have to be judged on the touchstone of prejudice. The test would be, whether the delinquent officer had or did not have a fair hearing. In the case of Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 All ER 109 (CA) it was laid down by the Court of Appeal that the principle of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard-and-fast formulae and the same cannot be put in a strait-jacket as its applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case." 27. Similar view has been reiterated in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. S. Balakrishnan, 2001 AIR SCW 2450 ; and Debotosh Pal Chaudhury v. Punjab National Bank, (2002) 8 SCC 68 : ( AIR 2002 SC 3276 ) . 28. The case requires to be considered in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. A copy of the proposed motion had been filed at a subsequent stage, which has been served upon all the members along with the notice of the meeting. It is difficult to imagine as in such an eventuality what prejudice could have been caused to be petitioner. The petitioner has a right to know as what the proposed motion was and once the copy had been served upon him, he cannot take the plea that any prejudice has been caused to him. The copy of the notice sent to the members concerned clearly shows that the copy of the proposed motion has been annexed with it and the petitioner's denial that he did not receive the copy, is not worth credence for the reason the copy, is not worth credence for the reason that Illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act provides for a presumption that all official acts had been done in a regular manner. 29. There is a presumption that official acts are regularly performed though such a presumption can be rebutted by adducing sufficient material. (Vide Jhaman Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 Raj 86 ; Somasudarshan Goud v. District Collector, Hyderabad, AIR 1978 Andh Pra 420 ; Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati, AIR 1970 All 446 ; and Saheed Ahmed v. Syed Oumar All, AIR 1973 All 23 ) . 30. (Vide Jhaman Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 Raj 86 ; Somasudarshan Goud v. District Collector, Hyderabad, AIR 1978 Andh Pra 420 ; Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati, AIR 1970 All 446 ; and Saheed Ahmed v. Syed Oumar All, AIR 1973 All 23 ) . 30. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Gopal Narain v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 370 , held that there is a presumption, when a statutory authority makes an order, that it has followed the prescribed procedure and such a presumption can only be rebutted by adducing appropriate evidence. However, the party, which makes an allegation that the act has not regularly been performed, the onus to prove lies upon him that the proper procedure has not been followed or the act has not been performed as was required under the law. 31. In Maharaja Pratap Bahadur Singh v. Thakur Man Mohan Dey, AIR 1966 SC 1931 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act and the question was: whether the Deputy Commissioner, who performed the particular function, had ever been authorised to act. The Court held that if an official act is proved to have been done, it will be presumed to have been done and in such an eventuality and circumstance, the Court can "reasonably presume that the Deputy Commissioner, under appropriate rules, was duly authorised to act" on behalf of the Authority concerned. 32. Another Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 856 , considered the case where the issue had been raised that the consolidation Officer had never been appointed to perform the function of the said office and the order of his appointment had never been produced. The Hon'ble Court held that such an objection can hardly be entertained in the face of presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act and, thus, it was observed that the officers should have acted under the authorization. 33. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang, AIR 1969 SC 903 , dealt with the prorogation issued by the Governor. 33. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang, AIR 1969 SC 903 , dealt with the prorogation issued by the Governor. The Apex Court observed as under:- "We are bound to take judicial notice of the prorogation and presume the regularity of these actions which must be interpreted as far as possible so that the things done may be valid rather than invalid." 34. In Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC.183 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that presumption provided in Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act is based on well-known maxim of law "omnia praesumuntur rite esse act a" (i.e. all acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done). The Court further held that this presumption is, however, one of the fact. It is an optional presumption and can be displaced by the circumstances, indicating that the power lodged in an authority or official has not been exercised in accordance with law. Similar view has been reiterated in Sone Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 SC.1142 ; Municipal Board, Saharanpur v. Imperial Tobacco of India Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 264 : K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510 : ( AIR 1999 SC 3762 ) ; Kiran Gupta v. State of U.P., (2000) 7 SCC 719 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3299 ) ; Suppt. Narcotics Control Bureau v. R. Paulsamy, (2000) 9 SCC 549 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3661 ) ; and the State Government of NCT Delhi v. Sunil, (2000) 1 SCC 652 : (2000 AIR SCW 4398) . 35. Thus, it is clear that in law there is a presumption that official acts have regularly been performed and such presumption can be rebutted only by adding evidence. A mere bald denial of such a performance is not sufficient to rebut the said presumption. The petitioner has failed to rebut the said presumption. 36. 35. Thus, it is clear that in law there is a presumption that official acts have regularly been performed and such presumption can be rebutted only by adding evidence. A mere bald denial of such a performance is not sufficient to rebut the said presumption. The petitioner has failed to rebut the said presumption. 36. While dealing with exactly a similar issue wherein the copy of the proposed motion had not been sent along with the notice to the members, this Court, in SBCWP No. 2308/2002, Hukma Ram v. State of Rajasthan & ors., decided on 12-11-2002 , held as under : "When a legislature has not mandated supply of copy of the motion along with the notice to the candidate or to other candidates of the Panchayati Raj Institution and when petitioner could not prove any prejudice caused to him by the above lapse, the bill of democratic institution by passing No Confidence Motion cannot be interfered with while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution." 37. A Division Bench of this Court, in DBCSA No. 880/2002, Smt. Chandra Kanta Kabra v. State of Rajasthan & ors., decided on 11-12- 2002 , dealing with the same issue and same provisions of the Act, 1994, held as under:- "Even otherwise, on such hyper-technical ground raised by the appellant, we are not inclined to interfere with the No Confidence Motion which has been carried out by a majority of 13 votes out of 15, as it will not be even possible for the appellant to go ahead to function with two members and the decisions, which are taken by the democratic bodies on the basis of majority like the one in the present case, cannot be defeated on such technical and jejune ground of no consequences and causing no prejudice to any party." 38. In Bhure Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 1976 Raj LW 148 , a Division Bench of this Court considered a similar issue of No Confidence Motion, wherein the grievance had been raised of non-compliance of the statutory provisions. The Court held that "in a democracy, a person who has lost the confidence of the members of,the democratic institution, should not be allowed to stay against the will of the members of that institution. The Court held that "in a democracy, a person who has lost the confidence of the members of,the democratic institution, should not be allowed to stay against the will of the members of that institution. The writ of mandamus or certiorari should not be issued as a matter of course but being a remedy of discretionary nature, the Court should be reluctant to interfere in such matters and in absence of any allegation of malafide or bias on the part of the Authorities, the Writ Court should not interfere against the will of majority of the members. The Court should not forget that it was exercising a jurisdiction which is entirely discretionary and the traditions of democratic set-up have to be kept in mind. The jurisdiction, being of an equitable nature, should not be exercised unless there are compelling circumstances requiring to do so." The Court approved the judgment in Radhey Shyam, (ILR (1972) Raj 968) (supra), wherein it has been held as under:- "In order to create healthy conventions for the functioning of democracy in the country, it is unnecessary that this Court should be allowed to help the person who attempts to stick to his elected office even after the unequivocal declaration of majority that he has lost their confidence. The Court should show its reluctance to allow such persons to invoke such extraordinary jurisdiction. In such circumstances, I refuse to interfere even though I am of opinion that in dispatching the notice under sub-section (3) of Section 72 of the Act, the Collector did not comply with the mandatory requirement of that provision of law." 39. Thus, in view of the above, unless a party establishes that by not complying with the provisions, its cause has been prejudiced, there is no obligation on the part of the Court to interfere in the matter and protect a person who has lost the faith of the majority. I also find no force in the submission made by Mr. Punia that the proceedings stood vitiated because, of not giving the notice of clear fifteen days, for the reason that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering an analogous provision of the Mysore Municipalities Act in K. Narasimhiah v. H.C. Singri Gowda, AIR 1966 SC 330 , held that such a requirement is not mandatory. Punia that the proceedings stood vitiated because, of not giving the notice of clear fifteen days, for the reason that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering an analogous provision of the Mysore Municipalities Act in K. Narasimhiah v. H.C. Singri Gowda, AIR 1966 SC 330 , held that such a requirement is not mandatory. While deciding the said case, reliance had been placed upon the judgment in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lai Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 . 40. In Jain Charan Lal Anal v. State of U.P., AIR 1968 SC 5 , while considering a similar provision under the U.P. Municipalities Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in such a matter, crucial date, as per the said provision, is the date of despatch of the notice and not the date of receipt. 41. In the last, it has been submitted by Mr. Punia that the wishes of the members could have been ascertained by resorting to the procedure of secret ballot and not by raising the hands and in support thereof, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jardar Khan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1998 Punj and Har 249 , wherein, interpreting the provisions of Section 10(4) of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, it was held that vote by raising the hand was illegal as the statutory provision provided for secret ballot. The said judgment has no bearing in the instant case as Mr. Punia could not point out any provision under the Act, 1994 or the Rules, 1996 requiring for secret ballot. In the said judgment interpretation of the statutory provision was involved, thus, the same cannot have any application in this case. 42. Moreso, a Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Prabhu Lal v. Gram Panchayat, Guradiya Deeda, AIR 1986 Madh Pra 200 , has held that the wishes of the members cannot be gathered by secret ballot unless it is so required by the statutory provisions. Be that as it may, this issue is not worth determining for the reason that Mr. Punia could not point out any provision providing for any particular mode of knowing the intention of members while considering No Confidence Motion. Be that as it may, this issue is not worth determining for the reason that Mr. Punia could not point out any provision providing for any particular mode of knowing the intention of members while considering No Confidence Motion. The question of secrecy of votes in such a matter is immaterial for the reason that ⅔ of the members had already submitted the notice to the Statutory Authority for considering the No Confidence Motion. Thus, the submission made by Mr. Punia is preposterous. 43. Thus, in view of the above, the petition is dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******