JUDGMENT : V.N. Singh, J. The second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 22.2.1993 passed by Sri V.K. Jain, the then Xth Additional District Judge, Bareilly, in Civil Appeal No. 127 of 1989, Purshottam Das v. Hari Kishan Mishra and Ors. Civil Appeal No. 127 of 1989. against the judgment and decree dated 20.10.1989 passed by Shri J.P. Srivastava, IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Bareilly, in Original Suit No. 232 of 1988. 2. Brief facts of the case is that Original Suit No. 232 of 1988 has been filed for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants and their agents/ legal representatives in peaceful possession of the Plaintiff by not constructing anything in the house in dispute. 3. Chheda Lal, grand father of the Plaintiff was the owner of the House No. 505/392, situated in Mohalla Punjabpura, Bareilly. After the death of Chheda Lal, his son Sri Ram became the owner and after his death the Plaintiff and Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 became the owners as heirs of Sri Ram. 4. It has been alleged in the plaint that there is mutual understanding between the parties that none shall disturb the exclusive possession of the house without adopting legal process. It has been alleged by the Plaintiff that Defendant No. 2 without taking consent of the remaining owners wanted to create obstruction in the main passage of the ground and first floor by making construction without approval of the map from Bareilly Development Authority, which is in possession of the Plaintiff for the last 20 years consecutively. As inspite of the repeated requests, Defendant No. 2 did not accede the request of the Plaintiff, not to make any construction, the suit has been filed. 5. It has also been alleged besides other allegation that, Defendant No. 2 is not making any construction in the ground and first floor, nor creating any obstruction. It has also been alleged that walls and beam have been damaged and there is possibility of fall at any time, hence the Defendant wants to get it repaired. If the Defendant No. 2 is restrained from making any construction, then the portion of the Defendant will fall out and family members of the Defendant may die. It has also been alleged that the Plaintiff is only co-sharer, and he has no right to restrain other co-sharers for using the main passage. If the Defendant No. 2 is restrained from making any construction, then the portion of the Defendant will fall out and family members of the Defendant may die. It has also been alleged that the Plaintiff is only co-sharer, and he has no right to restrain other co-sharers for using the main passage. It has been admitted that, no partition has taken place between the parties. 6. Learned trial court dismissed the suit against Defendant No. 2 by his order dated 28.10.1989. 7. Aggrieved by that order, Civil Appeal No. 127 of 1989 was filed, which was dismissed by Sri V.K. Jain, the then Xth Additional District Judge, Bareilly, Civil Appeal No. 127 of 1989 by his judgment dated 22.2.1993. 8. Aggrieved by that decision, the present second appeal has been filed. 9. Heard Sri Arun Kumar Singh holding brief of Sri Navin Sinha, learned Counsel for the Appellant and Sri Dev Raj, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 10. Following points have been raised by the Appellant as substantial questions of law: (i) Whether there is an absolute bar against issue of a permanent injunction against a co-owner at the instance of other co-owner? (ii) Whether there is any bar against issuing of an injunction order against a co-owner who does any act to invade the exclusive possession of a co-owner? (iii) Whether there is any bar against issue of a permanent injunction when it is established that various co-owners are in exclusive possession and enjoyment of different parts of the house with the consent of each other and one co-sharer does an act which can result in the ouster of the other? (iv) Whether the only remedy available to the Plaintiff Appellant in the circumstances of the case was a suit for partition and the suit for permanent injunction did not lie? Main point for consideration in this case is whether any substantial questions of law arise in this appeal? 11. Point for consideration in this case is, whether permanent injunction can be granted against a co-owner at the instance of other co-owners? In this connection, the attention of the Court has been drawn by the learned Counsel for the Appellant towards the decision in Vidya Matri Mandir (Regd.) Meerut Road, Ghaziabad v. Rajinder Nath and Anr. 11. Point for consideration in this case is, whether permanent injunction can be granted against a co-owner at the instance of other co-owners? In this connection, the attention of the Court has been drawn by the learned Counsel for the Appellant towards the decision in Vidya Matri Mandir (Regd.) Meerut Road, Ghaziabad v. Rajinder Nath and Anr. 1991 (2) AWC 786, in which it has been held by a Division Bench that "it is also established by several pronouncements of various courts that in suitable cases, even a co-sharer may be restrained from making any construction over joint property if he is doing so to the detriment of the interest of the other co-sharers. It is also established that while doing so the courts will be guided by the principles of equity, good conscience and consideration of justice. 12. The attention of the Court has been drawn towards the decision in Gangubai Bablya Chaudhary and Others Vs. Sitaram Bhalchandra Sukhtankar and Others, AIR 1983 SC 742 , in which it has been held that injunction restraining Defendant from putting up construction on entire land would be justified, if situation might become irreversible by the time dispute, is decided if injunction is not granted. Having given the matter our anxious consideration, we are satisfied that this is not a case in which interim injunction could be refused. Similarly, we are of the opinion that, if Respondents are allowed to put up construction by use of F.S.I. for the whole of the land including the land involved in dispute, the situation may become irreversible by the time the dispute is decided and would preclude fair and just decision of the matter. If on the contrary injunction is granted as prayed for the Respondents are not likely to be inconvenienced because they are in possession of about 9,000 sq. metres of land on which they can put up construction. 13. In this connection, the attention of the Court has been drawn towards the decision in Chhedi Lal and Another Vs. If on the contrary injunction is granted as prayed for the Respondents are not likely to be inconvenienced because they are in possession of about 9,000 sq. metres of land on which they can put up construction. 13. In this connection, the attention of the Court has been drawn towards the decision in Chhedi Lal and Another Vs. Chhotey Lal, AIR 1951 All 199 , in which Full Bench of this Court has held that "The question of the right of co-sharers in respect of joint land should be kept separate and distinct from the question as to what relief should be granted to a co-sharer, whose right in respect of joint land has been invaded by the other co-sharers either by exclusively appropriating and cultivating land or by raising constructions thereon. While a co-sharer is entitled to object to another co-sharer exclusively appropriating land to himself to the detriment of other co-sharers, the question as to what relief should be granted to the Plaintiff in the event of invasion of his right will depend upon the circumstances of each case. The right to the relief for demolition and injunction will be granted or withheld by the Court according as the circumstances established in the case justify. The Court may feel persuaded to grant both the relies, if the evidence established that the Plaintiff cannot be adequately compensated at the time of the partition and that greater injury will result to him by the refusal of the relief than by granting it. On the contrary, if material and substantial injury will be caused to the Defendant by the granting of the relief, the Court will not doubt be exercising proper discretion in withholding such relief. Each case will be decided upon its own peculiar facts and it will be left to the Court to exercise its discretion upon proof of circumstances showing which side the balance of convenience lies. The Court in the exercise of its discretion will be guided by consideration of justice, equity and good conscience and it is not possible for the Court to lay down an inflexible rule as to the circumstances in which the relief for demolition and injunction should be granted or refused. 14. The Court in the exercise of its discretion will be guided by consideration of justice, equity and good conscience and it is not possible for the Court to lay down an inflexible rule as to the circumstances in which the relief for demolition and injunction should be granted or refused. 14. The attention of the Court has been drawn towards the decision in Jagdeo v. Prasad 1965 ALR 122, in which a single Judge has referred the decision of Privy Council in the case of Walson and Company v. Ramchund Dutt ILR 18 Cal 10, in which it has been held that "where a co-sharer is in occupation of land held jointly with other, but in denial of the other title a suit for injunction is not a proper remedy." ILR 18 Cal 10, has not been placed before the Court. Moreover, the learned Counsel for the Appellant has not denied the title of Defendant-Respondents as co-owner. 15. The attention of the Court has been drawn towards the decision in Municipal Board v. Abdul Hameed and Ors. 1981 AWC 68 . This decision is not a decision in connection of the relief claimed by one of the co-owner against the other co-owners, hence not applicable. 16. So far as the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gangubai Bablya Chaudhary and Ors. v. Sitaram Balchandra Sukhtankar and Ors. (supra) is concerned, Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that "if Respondents are allowed to put up construction for the whole of the land including the land involved in dispute, the situation may become irreversible by the time the dispute is decided and would preclude fair and just decision of the matter. If on the contrary, injunction is granted as prayed for, the Respondents are not likely to be inconvenienced because they are in possession of about 9,000 sq. metres of land, on which they can put up construction". In such circumstance, it appears that the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court was based on firstly that, situation may become irreversible by the time the suit is decided and secondly that, as the Respondents are in possession of about 9,000 sq. metres of land, no inconvenience will be caused to the Respondents. 17. In such circumstance, it appears that the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court was based on firstly that, situation may become irreversible by the time the suit is decided and secondly that, as the Respondents are in possession of about 9,000 sq. metres of land, no inconvenience will be caused to the Respondents. 17. Now in decision of Vidya Matri Mandir (Regd.) Meerut Road, Ghaziabad v. Rajinder Nath (supra), it has to be seen whether another co-sharer is making construction over joint property to the detriment of the interest of the other co-sharers and for determining this fact, the Court will be guided by the principle of equity, good conscience and consideration of justice. 18. Besides it, in view of decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Chhedi Lal and Ors. v. Chhotey Lal AIR 1951 All (Lucknow Bench, Lucknow) 199, it is to be seen whether another co-sharer is exclusively appropriating land to himself to the detriment of other co-sharers, and whether the circumstances of the case justify the relief and whether Plaintiff cannot be adequately compensated and whether greater injury will result to him by the refusal of the relief than by granting it or whether material and substantial injury will be caused to the Defendant by the granting of the relief and in whose favour the balance of convenience lies. 19. Now it has to be seen whether Plaintiff has been able to prove the circumstance, which justify the grant of the injunction. In this connection, the contention of the plaint is material. In paragraph 5 of the plaint, it has been stated that Defendant No. 2 without taking the consent of the other co-sharers wanted to get construction in the main passage and first floor, which is in possession of the Plaintiff for the last 20 years consequently and without approval of the map from Bareilly Development Authority. In this connection, the statement of Purshottam Das P.W. 1 is relevant. He has deposed that: 20. In this connection, the contention of the Respondents in the written statement is material. In paragraph 11 of the written statement, it has been alleged that wall and beam of the room has been damaged and there is possibility that they may fall out. The Defendant wanted to get it repaired. He has deposed that: 20. In this connection, the contention of the Respondents in the written statement is material. In paragraph 11 of the written statement, it has been alleged that wall and beam of the room has been damaged and there is possibility that they may fall out. The Defendant wanted to get it repaired. In paragraph 12, it has been alleged that if the Defendants are restrained from making repair, then the wall will fall out due to which family members may die. The allegations made in paragraph 11 have not been denied by any replication or by any statement of the Plaintiff in the Court, through which it has been alleged that wall and beam has been damaged and there is a possibility that it may fall out and the family members of the Defendant may die. 21. Defendant Gopi Krishna Mishra Defendant No. 2 as D.W. 1 has deposed that beam has been damaged and can fall out at any time. He wants to make the repair. He has also deposed that it is an old roof and can fall at any time due to which there is danger to life and property. In this connection the statement of Defendant is material, who has deposed on page No. 6 that he does not know whether beam and roof of the share of the Plaintiff is in bad condition or not. He has also deposed that he has no objection in repairing of the roof. 22. In view of the above circumstance, it is clear that the condition of the beam, wall and roof is bad and it may fall out at any time and there is danger of life and property. But this fact has not been denied by the Plaintiff either through replication or through statement. 23. In such circumstance, it is clear that the Plaintiff has not been able to prove the circumstances, which justify interference by granting injunction against another co-sharers. Moreover, the balance of convenience also lies in favour of Defendant and no irreparable loss will be caused to the Plaintiff if the injunction is granted. Moreover, the grant of injunction is discretionary and both learned trial court and first appellate court refused to have exercised its discretion in favour of the Plaintiff. 24. Moreover, the balance of convenience also lies in favour of Defendant and no irreparable loss will be caused to the Plaintiff if the injunction is granted. Moreover, the grant of injunction is discretionary and both learned trial court and first appellate court refused to have exercised its discretion in favour of the Plaintiff. 24. Moreover, it has been held by the Supreme Court in P. Rai v. S. Hengsu (D.) 2001 (3) AWC 2314 (SC) in which it has been held that High Court cannot interfere with the erroneous findings of fact, howsoever, gross error seems to be. In view of the above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, no interference can be made in the second appeal as it relates to facts. 25. Moreover, what is substantial question of law has been laid down in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons, Ltd. Vs. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 , in which, it has been held that the proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in a case is substantial, would be whether, it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and, if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by the Supreme Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well-settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or the plea raised is palpably absurd, the question would not be a substantial question of law. In view of the above mentioned facts, and in view of the facts that no substantial question of law arises, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 26. The second appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.