JUDGMENT V.K. Gupta, C.J. (Oral): What is under challenge in this petition filed under Section 24 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (Act for short) read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an order passed on 13th March, 2003 by the Rent Controller (11), Shimla, whereby the objections filed by the petitioner against the execution proceedings taken out for the eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question have been disallowed. 2. In terms of Section 17 of the Act a limited tenancy was created between the parties, the petitioner as a tenant and the respondent as a landlord whereby, w.e.f. 1st September, 1998 uptil 31st march, 2001 the petitioner was to remain in occupation of Flat No.4, Block C, Regent House Apartment, Shimla. He was to vacate and hand-over the vacant possession of this flat to the respondent on or before 31st August, 2001. This arrangement was brought about through the medium of an order passed under section 17 (supra) on 19th September 1998 by the Rent Controller. After the period granted by the aforesaid limited tenancy stood expired and at a stage when the respondent had filed an execution application or the execution for the aforesaid order dated 19th September, 1998 and for delivery of possession, the petitioner filed the aforesaid objection petition before the Rent Controller. The petitioners contention before the Rent Controller was that the aforesaid order dated 19th September, 1998 was not properly obtained and that the limited tenancy under Section 17 (supra) was not at all created inasmuch as the petitioner actually was inducted as a tenant in the aforesaid flat No. 4, Block C, Regent House Apartment, Shimla as a sequel to an amicable settlement arrived at between the parties whereby the petitioner in his capacity as a tenant in the other properties being Flat No. 90-A, Cecil Annexe, Shimla-4 was to shift from Cecil Annexe by vacating the same. Dealing with the petitioners case that he was a co-tenant or a joint tenant laongwith his brother in the aforesaid Cecil Annexe, the Rent Controller found this issue against the petitioner as a pure question of fact and very very rightly so because what was brought in evidence was the fact that even though the petitioners brother was a tenant in Cecil Annexe, the petitioner was not and that there was no joint tenancy agreement or a co-tenancy between the petitioner on the one hand and the respondent on the other. I fully agree with the aforesaid finding of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and by endorsing the same affirm the finding. 3. Mr. Kuldip Singh, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner then submitted that contrary to prescription contained in Section 17 (supra) the tenancy had already been created before the order was passed by the Rent Controller on 19th September, 1998. Shorn of all unnecessary details and irrespective of the form, what is of substance before me is that the statement of the petitioner recorded by the Rent Controller on 19th September, 1998 in Section 17 proceedings wherein the petitioner himself has unequivocally admitted that he was to take the premises on rent for a period of three years. The exact English translation of the sentence in the statement recorded in Hindi is as follows:- "I want to take the building for three years on rent." 4. in view of this fact, therefore, reliance placed by Mr. Kuidip Singh, learned Senior Advocate, on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Kumar Lata v. R.C. Chhiba and Another 1988 (2) R.L.R. 772 is totally out of context because in that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court, on a question of fact had found that the tenancy had already stood created on 10th December, 1975 and, therefore, the purported creation of tenancy under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act w.e.f. 1st march, 1976 was a meaningless exercise. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Singh v. Late Amar Singh through the LRs (1998) 6 SCC 686, wherein their Lordship have clearly held that any tenant who wishes or desires to challenge an order of creation of limited tenancy under the relevant provision of the Rent Control Legislation must approach the Rent Controller as soon as the facts and circumstances giving rise to such a plea come to his knowledge and that he should not be allowed to wait till after the period for which limited tenancy is created has already come to an end and in fact the execution proceedings have also already started. After taking a took at some of the previous-judgments on the subject, it was absorbed by their Lordship that tenant who assails the permission under the relevant statute of the Rent Control Act on the ground that it was procured by fraud must approach the Rent Controller during the currency of the limited tenancy and for adjudication of his plea as soon as he discovers the facts and circumstances which according, to him, vitiate the permission. The following observations are apposite and I quote:- 17 The reason why this requirement was built in working the rights and obligations under Section 21 was the need to reconcile and harmonise certain competing claims that arise in administering the scheme of Section 21. This Court, referring to those competing claims observed: (SCC P.723. para 13) What then is the remedy available to the tenant in a case where there was in fact a mere ritualistic observance of the procedure while granting permission for the creation of a limited tenancy or where such permission was procured by fraud practised by the Landlord or was a result of collusion between the strong and the weak? Must the tenant in such cases be unceremoniously evicted without his plea being enquired into? The answer is obviously in the negative. At the same time must he be permitted to protract the delivery of possession of the leased premises to the landlord on a false plea of fraud or collusion or that there was a mechanical grant of permission and thus defeat the very object of the special procedure provided for the benefit of the landlord in Section 21? At the same time must he be permitted to protract the delivery of possession of the leased premises to the landlord on a false plea of fraud or collusion or that there was a mechanical grant of permission and thus defeat the very object of the special procedure provided for the benefit of the landlord in Section 21? The answer must again be in the negative.... 18. The manner in which the court harmonised and reconciled these competing and conflicting claims and interests was by insisting upon the tenant to approach the Rent Controller for adjudication of his pleas as soon as he discovered that the initial grant of permission stood vitiated. This was evolved as a part of policy of law for the reconciliation of divergent and competing claims. It was held: (SCC pp. 723-24, para 13). In our view these two competing claims must be harmonised by insisting upon his approaching the Rent Controller during the currency of the limited tenancy for adjudication of his pleas no sooner he discovers facts and circumstances that tend to vitiate ab anitio the initial grant of permission. Either it is a mechanical grant of permission or it is procured by fraud practised by the landlord or it is the result of collusion between two unequals but in each case there is no reason for the tenant to wait till the landlord makes his application for recovery of possession after the expiry of fixed period under Section 21 but there is every reason why the tenant should make an immediate approach to the Rent Controller to have his pleas adjudicated by him as soon as facts and circumstances giving rise to such pleas come to his knowledge or are discovered by him with due diligence......” The Court proceeded to point out that any appeal to the remedy based on the concept of nullity and collateral attack is inappropriate and that in a collateral challenge, the exercise was not the invalidation of a decision but only to ascertain whether the decision existed m law at all and rely upon incidents and the effect of its non-existence. It was held that the permission granted under Section 21 must be presumed to be valid. ." 6. It was held that the permission granted under Section 21 must be presumed to be valid. ." 6. Viewed therefore from any angle I have no hesitation in holding that this revision petition is totally devoid of any merit The revision petition is accordingly dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 2,000/-. All interim orders shall stand vacated immediately and forthwith. -