U. S. TRIPATHI, J. This appeal has been sent from Jail against the judgment and order dated 29-4-1997, passed by IV Addl. Sessions Judge, Aligarh in Sessions Trial No. 850 of 1994, convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. The prosecution story briefly stated was that Smt. Kamlesh (28) deceased was wife of the appellant. It is alleged that the appellant was demanding dowry from the parents of the deceased and was treating her with cruelty on account of demand of dowry. The appellant was also suspecting the character of the deceased. A daughter was also born out of the wedlock of the appellant and the deceased. 3. On the afternoon of 7-3-1994 the deceased and appellant were in their house. Priti aged about five years the daughter of the appellant and the deceased was playing out side the house with other children. At about 3. 00 p. m. the appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on the deceased and bolted the door from inside. He set the deceased at fire with the help of match sticks saying that she was bad character lady. However, when the deceased sustained burn injuries. The appellant took her to Malkhan Singh Hospital, Aligarh, and admitted her there. Her dying declaration was recorded in the said hospital on 7- 3-1994 at 7. 30 p. m. by Sri Chandra Pal Singh, SDM Etah (PW 8 ). The parents of the deceased got information about burning of the deceased on 7-3-1994. Pyare Lal (PW 1), the father of deceased and Smt. Kalawati (PW 2) the mother of the deceased came to hospital, where the deceased was admitted in injured condition. The deceased told to her father and mother that her husband had set her at fire by sprinkling kerosene oil. Pyare Lal (PW 1) then prepared report of the occurrence Ext. Ka-1 and lodged the same at police station Gandhi Park on 8-3-1994 at 8. 45 p. m. on the basis which a case was registered against the appellant under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC. The investigation of the case was taken up by Sri Prem Narain (PW 7), who interrogated the witness, visited the place of occurrence, took into possession the clothes of the deceased and on completion of investigation submitted charge sheet against the appellant under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC. 4. The investigation of the case was taken up by Sri Prem Narain (PW 7), who interrogated the witness, visited the place of occurrence, took into possession the clothes of the deceased and on completion of investigation submitted charge sheet against the appellant under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC. 4. Subsequently the deceased died in the hospital on 19-3-1994 at 11. 25 p. m. The inquest of the dead body was conducted and the dead body was sent for post mortem. 5. Autopsy on the dead body of the deceased was conducted on 20- 3-1994 by Dr. R. C. Gupta (PW 4) who found thermal burn injuries on the whole of the body except some part of abdomen and lower part of front legs. The burn was 100% of grade I. The internal examination showed that both the lungs, liver, spleen and both kidneys were congested and death was due to shock as a result of burn injuries. 6. On the death of deceased the case was altered under Section 304-B IPC and was again investigated by Circle Officer, Sri Gurmeet Singh (PW 5), who interrogated Pyare Lal (PW 1), Smt. Premvati (PW 2) and other witness. Thereafter he was transferred and the remaining investigation was conducted by Sri J. P. Singh (PW 6), who an completion of investigation submitted the charge sheet against the appellant under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC. 7. Cognizance of the case was taken by the Magistrate, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions. 8. The appellant was charged with the offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC and in the alternative he was further charged with the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The appellant pleaded not guilty and contended that the deceased herself set her at fire by sprinkling kerosene oil. When she cried he rushed to extinguish fire and also got burn injury on his left hand. He took her to hospital and admitted her. He came to know after 14 days that she died. 9. The prosecution in support of its case examined Pyare Lal (PW 1), Smt. Premvati (PW 2), Constable Chandra Pal (PW 3), Dr. R. P. Gupta (PW 4), Gurmeet Singh Dy. S. P. (PW 5), Jai Pal Singh (PW 6), Prem Narain Singh, IO (PW 7) and Chandra Pal Singh SDM (PW 8 ). The appellant did not adduce any evidence in his defence. 10. R. P. Gupta (PW 4), Gurmeet Singh Dy. S. P. (PW 5), Jai Pal Singh (PW 6), Prem Narain Singh, IO (PW 7) and Chandra Pal Singh SDM (PW 8 ). The appellant did not adduce any evidence in his defence. 10. Learned Sessions Judge on considering the evidence of the prosecution held that the prosecution has established the guilt of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. With these findings he convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. 11. Notice of appeal was served on the appellant through Jailor Central Jail, Agra, but he did not engage any counsel. Therefore, we appointed Sri Raj Kamal Srivastava, Advocate as amicus curiae to argue the appeal on behalf of the appellant. 12. We have heard Sri Raj Kamal Srivastava, learned amicus curiae for the appellant, learned AGA for the respondent and have perused the evidence on record. 13. It is not disputed that Smt. Kamlesh deceased was wife of the appellant. It is also not disputed that Smt. Kamlesh deceased sustained burn injuries on 7-3-94 and died in the hospital on 19- 3-1994 on account of above burn injuries. Dr. R. P. Gupta (PW 4) who conducted autopsy on the dead body of deceased found 100% thermal burn injuries of first grade on the whole of the body except lower part of abdomen and lower part of front of legs and both feet. He also stated that internal examination showed that brain both lungs, spleen, liver and both kidneys were congested and caused of death was shock as a result of burn injuries. 14. The appellant was not challenged the above medical evidence and according to suggestion given to the prosecution witnesses and statement of appellant under Section 313 Cr. P. C. the deceased committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil on her. As such the prosecution has established that the deceased died on account of burn injuries. 15. The appellant was also charged with the offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC but the learned Sessions Judge has held that the demand of dowry and cruelty on account of it has not been established. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC on the basis of dying declaration. 15. The appellant was also charged with the offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC but the learned Sessions Judge has held that the demand of dowry and cruelty on account of it has not been established. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC on the basis of dying declaration. It is settled that there can be conviction on the basis of dying declaration and it is not at all necessary to have corroboration provided the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is truthful and was not vitiated in any other manner (Vide Khusal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 552 ; Harbansh Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 (Supp) (1) SCR 104; Gopal Singh v. State of M. P. , AIR 1972 SC 1557 and State of U. P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416 ). 16. In the instant case the prosecution has relied on three sorts of dying declaration; (i) recorded by the Magistrate in the hospital on 7-3-94, (ii) recorded by the IO during investigation on 8-3-1994 and, (iii) oral dying declaration given by the deceased to her father Pyare Lal (PW 1) and mother Smt. Premvati (PW 2 ). Therefore, we have to consider whether the above dying declarations are reliable. 17. The first dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by Chandra Pal Singh the then Addl. City Magistrate II, Aligarh (Executive Magistrate) (PW 8) on 7-3-94 at 7. 15 p. m. in the District Hospital Aligarh. In the above dying declaration the deceased had stated that on the said date at about 3. 00 p. m. she was inside her house. Her husband Har Swarup sprinkled kerosene oil on her from a stove and tried to set fire. He had closed the door from inside. She extinguished three match sticks but he told that he would finish her because she was of bad character. When she used to sit on the chabootra he was saying her prostitute and when she used to go out side her house he talked ill of her. She had not set fire herself. Her husband (Gharwala) had burnt her. There was no one else in the house at that time. Her daughter Preeti who had completed five years was playing outside with the children and she had not complained to her father and mother due to fear. She had not set fire herself. Her husband (Gharwala) had burnt her. There was no one else in the house at that time. Her daughter Preeti who had completed five years was playing outside with the children and she had not complained to her father and mother due to fear. Her marriage was performed 7-8 years ago. Her husband was harassing her since then. She had nothing to say more and she was burnt on account of above enmity. 18. The above dying declaration was proved by Sri Chandra Pal Singh (PW 8), who has stated that before recording statement of deceased the doctor attending her had given certificate that Smt. Kamlesh was in a fit condition to give statement and was also in a position to understand the questions put to her. Thereafter he recorded the statement of deceased. After recording statement he read over it to her and obtained her thumb impression, which was identified by the doctor attending her. 19. Learned amicus curiae contended that the doctor who allegedly certified the mental condition of the deceased at the time of recording dying declaration was not examined and, therefore, it has not been proved that she was in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration. As held by Apex Court in the case of Laxman v. State of Maharasthra, 2003 (1) JIC 30 (SC) ; JT 2002 (6) SC 313, the Magistrate being a disinterested witness and a responsible officer and there being no circumstance or material to suspect that the Magistrate had any animus against the accused or was in any way interested in fabricating a dying declaration the question of doubt on the declaration recorded by the Magistrate does not arise. The Apex Court had further held in the case of Harjeet Kaur v. State of Punjab, JT 1999 (5) 317, that wherein the Magistrate in his evidence has stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application is not rendered the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. The decision of the Apex Court in the earlier case Paparambaka Rosamma and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1999 (2) JIC 574 (SC) : JT 1999 (6) SC 585, was held not correctly decided and was accordingly over ruled. 20. As mentioned above in this case the Magistrate has stated that he has obtained certificate of the attending doctor, who annexed certificate about fitness of the mental condition of the deceased and after being satisfied that she was in a fit state of mind to give statement, recorded the statement of deceased. Therefore, the non-examination of the doctor who certified mental condition of the deceased is not fatal. 21. The above dying declaration was further criticized by the learned amicus curiae that the dying declaration of the deceased was tutored one as Rajvir, brother in law of Smt. Premvati (PW 2) (mother of the deceased) was present in hospital. But the presence of Rajvir in the hospital does not indicate that he had tutored the deceased as no question was put to the Magistrate who rcorded dying declaration regarding presence of Rajvir or any other relative of the deceased at the time of recording dying declaration. Therefore, in case Rajvir had come to hospital it does not mean that he had tutored the deceased. Therefore, there is noting on record to hold that the dying declaration was tutored one. 22. The next dying declaration was proved by Pyare Lal (PW 1) and Smt. Premvati (PW 2 ). Pyare Lal (PW 1) stated that when he got information about burning of her daughter, Smt. Kamlesh deceased, through his nephew Vinod, he along with his wife Smt. Premvati (PW 2) and nephew Virendra and Jai Ram came to hospital and on enquiry the deceased told that her husband Har Swarup had set her at fire by sprinkling kerosene oil Smt. Premvati (PW 2) also stated that when she came to hospital along with her husband the deceased on enquiry told that her husband Har Swarup had set her at fire. The deceased died after 13 days of the occurrence and on the next date of occurrence she was in a position to tell as to who set her at fire. The above dying declaration was oral one. The deceased died after 13 days of the occurrence and on the next date of occurrence she was in a position to tell as to who set her at fire. The above dying declaration was oral one. The Apex Court held in the case of Potha Kumari Srinivasulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2002 (2) JIC 791 (SC) ; JT 2002 (5) SC 369, as below: "we find no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration made by the deceased to the witnesses PW 1, 2 and 3. They are residents of the same village and are natural witnesses to the dying declaration made by the deceased. No reason is assigned, not even suggested to any of the three witnesses, as to why at all any of them would tell a lie and attribute falsely a dying declaration to the deceased implicating accused/appellant. Though each of the three witnesses has been cross-examined but there is nothing brought out in their statement to shake their veracity. " 23. In the instant case Pyare Lal (PW 1) and Smt. Premvati (PW 2) are father and mother of the deceased. It was but natural for them to visit the hospital when they got information that the deceased was burnt and was admitted in the hospital. It was also natural for the above witnesses to enquiry from the deceased as to how she caught fire. The witnesses were close relative of the deceased and she must have told them the manner in which and how she got fire. There is nothing in the cross-examination of above two witnesses that they were deposing falsely and have attributed falsely a dying declaration to the deceased implicating the appellant. Therefore, the dying declaration given by the deceased to the above two witnesses was natural and we find no reason to disbelieve the same. 24. The next dying declaration was recorded by the Investigating Officer in the hospital during investigation on 8-3-1994. Prem Narain (PW 7) stated that initially a case under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC was registered at the police station in his presence. During investigation he recorded the statement of deceased in the hospital which he proved as Ext. Ka-9. The deceased had also attributed that the appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on her from a plastic container and set her at fire. She ran and fell down in the Angan and became unconscious. During investigation he recorded the statement of deceased in the hospital which he proved as Ext. Ka-9. The deceased had also attributed that the appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on her from a plastic container and set her at fire. She ran and fell down in the Angan and became unconscious. There is also nothing in his cross examination that he had manipulated the above dying declaration specially when the same were disclosed earlier by the deceased before the Magistrate on 7-3-1994 and to her parents on 8-3-1994. In the case of Bhagirath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 234 , statement recorded by Head Constable was held admissible as dying declaration. Similar view was taken in Munna Raja and another v. State of M. P. , 1976 (2) SCR 764 , wherein the statement made by deceased to the Investigating Officer at the police station by way of First Information Report which was recorded in writing was held to be admissible in evidence. Therefore, the statement of deceased recorded by the Investigating Officer during investigation is also admissible as dying declaration. 25. Learned amicus curiae contended that there are some contradictions in the statement of deceased recorded by the IO and that recorded by the Magistrate, because in the statement recorded by the IO the deceased stated that the appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on her from a plastic container, while in her statement before the Magistrate she stated that the appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on her from a stove. But in our opinion this contradiction is not material as those two dying declarations were recorded after a gap of one day and this minor discrepancy is not going to affect the dying declaration specially when in both the dying declarations she had stated that she was set at fire after sprinkling kerosene oil. The container in which the kerosene was kept is not very much material. 26. Learned amicus curiae further contended that the learned Sessions Judge has described the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate as statement of deceased recorded under Section 164 Cr. P. C. but under Section 164 Cr. P. C. the Executive Magistrate is not empowered to record the statement. Therefore above dying declaration can not be acted upon. 26. Learned amicus curiae further contended that the learned Sessions Judge has described the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate as statement of deceased recorded under Section 164 Cr. P. C. but under Section 164 Cr. P. C. the Executive Magistrate is not empowered to record the statement. Therefore above dying declaration can not be acted upon. We find no force in the above contention, because in the statement of deceased made to a person or a Magistrate is admissible after her death as dying declaration and wrong nomenclature given by the Sessions Judge that it was a statement recorded under Section 164 Cr. P. C. will not affect the nature of the statement, which is undoubtedly relating to cause of death of deceased and is admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. The statement of deceased relating to cause of her death is dying declaration and admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act after her death. In case the deceased making such statement subsequently survives, the statement recorded during investigation or by a Magistrate would be her previous statement and can be used for the purpose of confrontation but after her death it becomes admissible under Section 32 of Indian Evidence Act. 27. In view of our above discussions and observations we find that the above three dying declarations relied on by the prosecution are admissible and are also reliable and, therefore, the conviction can be based on the above dying declaration without any further corroboration. 28. The next contention of the learned amicus curiae was that the case initially set up by the prosecution that the appellant was treating the deceased with cruelty for and on account of demand of dowry has not been established and charge under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC were not proved and therefore, he can not be convicted under Section 302 IPC. We again find no force in the above contention, because the appellant was alternatively charged under Section 302 IPC also and the evidence on record referred to above, fully established that the appellant murdered the deceased by setting her at fire, because he was suspecting her fidelity and therefore the failure of prosecution to prove the charges under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC will not affect the charge under Section 302 IPC which has been established from the dying declarations of the deceased. 29. 29. It is true that the deceased died after 13 days of the occurrence but the evidence of Dr. R. P. Gupta (PW 4) shows that the cause of death of deceased was shock as a result of burn injuries, therefore, the cause of death of deceased was the injury which she sustained on the date of occurrence. In the case of Patel Hira Lal Joita Ram v. State of Gujarat, 2002 SCC (Criminal) 1, that there was interval between the date of incident when the deceased sustained burns and date of her death was a fortnight. The doctor who examined the deceased on the date of occurrence noticed second degree burns on the upper and lower portion of her hand front and back on the neck, ears and fore head. Cause of death was due to shock on account of such burns were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause her death, but she died due to septic and it was contended that such septic condition could have been developed on account of other causes on the above facts the Apex Court held that mere possibility of other cases supervening during her hospitalization is not a safe premises for deciding whether she would not have died due to burns sustained. The cause of death can be determined on broad probabilities. In the case of Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, 1992 SCC (Criminal) 848, the victim was set ablaze on 17-3-79 and she sustained burns due to which she died only 13 days thereafter. The assailant was convicted of murder and conviction was confirmed by the Apex Court. As such the cause of death of deceased was the burn injuries which she sustained on the date of occurrence and, therefore, the interval between sustaining burn injuries by the deceased and her death will not affect the cause of death as there is noting on record that any other cause supervening during hospitalization was cause of her death. 30. In this way we find no force in the appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed and conviction and sentence of appellant under Section 302 IPC awarded by trial Court are confirmed. The appellant is in jail. He shall be kept there to serve out the remaining sentence. A copy of this judgment be sent to C. J. M. Aligarh and Superintendent Central Jail, Agra for information and necessary action. The appeal is accordingly dismissed and conviction and sentence of appellant under Section 302 IPC awarded by trial Court are confirmed. The appellant is in jail. He shall be kept there to serve out the remaining sentence. A copy of this judgment be sent to C. J. M. Aligarh and Superintendent Central Jail, Agra for information and necessary action. Appeal dismissed. .