S. P. MEHROTRA, J. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, praying for quashing the order dated 5-12-2002 (Annexure 5) to the writ petition) passed by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court/civil Judge (Junior Division), Badaun and the order dated 19-9- 2003 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) passed by the learned Additional District Judge/special Judge (E. C. Act), Badaun. 2. The dispute relates to a shop situated in Babu Ram Market, Badaun, the details whereof are given in the plaint of suit referred to hereinafter. The said shop has hereinafter been referred to as "the disputed shop. " 3. From a perusal of the averments made in the writ petition and the annexures thereto, it appears that the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 (contesting respondents) filed a suit against the petitioner for ejectment, arrears of rent damages etc. in respect of the disputed shop. The respondent No. 6 herein was impleaded as the proforma defendant No. 2 in the said suit. The said suit was registered as SCC suit No. 5 of 1999. 4. It further appears that the petitioner contested the said suit and filed written statement dated 9-12- 1999, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. 5. It further appears that the evidence of both the sides was recorded in the said suit. 6. It further appears that on 19-4-2002, the arguments of the parties were heard, and 27-4-2002 was fixed for judgment. 7. Thereafter, it appears that the petitioner filed an amendment application (No. 61 Ga) seeking amendments in the written statement filed in the said suit. Copy of the said amendment application has been filed as Annexure 3 to the writ petition. 8. It further appears that the objections were filed on behalf the contesting respondents against the said amendment application filed on behalf of the petitioner. Copy of the said objections has been filed as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. 9. It further appears that by the order dated 5-12-2002 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition), the learned Judge, Small Cause Court/civil Judge (Junior Division), Badaun dismissed the said amendment application (No. 61 Ga) filed on behalf of the petitioner. Copy of the said objections has been filed as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. 9. It further appears that by the order dated 5-12-2002 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition), the learned Judge, Small Cause Court/civil Judge (Junior Division), Badaun dismissed the said amendment application (No. 61 Ga) filed on behalf of the petitioner. It was, inter alia, held in the said order dated 5- 12-2002 that the said amendment application (No. 61 Ga) had not been filed bona fide, but the same had been filed after the completion of the entire proceedings in the suit, merely with the object of keeping the suit pending. 10. Thereupon, the petitioner filed a Revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The said Revision was registered as SCC Civil Revision No. 2 of 2003. 11. By the order dated 19-9-2003 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition), the learned Additional District Judge/special Judge (EC Act), Badaun dismissed the said SCC Civil Revision No. 2 of 2003. It was, inter alia, held in the said order dated 19-9-2003 that the learned Judge, Small Cause Court/civil Judge (Junior Division), Badaun had not committed any mistake in passing the said order dated 5-12-2002) and no interference was called for with the said order dated 5-12-2002. 12. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking the reliefs mentioned above. 13. I have heard Shri S. A. Shah, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri R. P. Agrawal, learned Counsel for the caveator/respondent Nos. 3 to 5 at length. 14. Shri S. A. Shah, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the amendment application filed on behalf of the petitioner seeking amendments in the written statement ought to have been allowed on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is submitted that the Courts below have rejected the said amendment application merely on the ground of delay and, therefore, the impugned orders are illegal. It is submitted that the Courts below have rejected the said amendment application merely on the ground of delay and, therefore, the impugned orders are illegal. It is further submitted that the amendments sought by the petitioner were necessary for proper adjudication of the controversy in the suit, and, therefore, the amendments ought to have been allowed by the Courts below, Shri Shah has placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267 (paragraph 5) (2) Swami Durrkeshranand Saraswati Ji Maharaj v. Jagatguru Shri Shankarcharya Jyotish Peethadhiswar and others, 1983 All LJ 1270 (paragraph 15) (3) Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, AIR 1985 SC 817 (paragraph 16) (4) Gauri Bala Dutta v. IIIrd Addl. Civil Judge Varanasi and another, AIR 1991 Alld. 216 (Paragraphs 9 and 10) (5) B. K. N. Pillai v. P. Pillai and another, 2000 (1) JCLR 333 (SC) : AIR 2000 SC 614 : 2001 (1) ARC 5 (SC ). (6) Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and another, 2002 (2) ARC 594 (SC) (Paragraph 9) (7) Ganpat Lal Gupta and others v. Vth Additional District Judge, Deoria and others, 2003 (1) JCLR 710 (All) : 2003 (1) ARC 562. 15. In reply, Shri R. P. Agrawal, learned Counsel for the caveator/respondent Nos. 3 to 5 submits that the Courts below have found that the amendment application had been filed by the petitioner for keeping the proceedings pending, and the same was malafide. In view of the said finding, the amendment application filed by the petitioner has been rejected. No illegality has been committed by the Courts below in rejecting the said amendment application (No. 61 Ga ). Shri Agrawal has placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) B. K. N. Pillai v. P. Pillai and another, 2000 (1) JCLR 333 (SC) : AIR 2000 SC 614 : 2001 (1) ARC 5 (SC) (paragraph 3) (supra ). (2) Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and others, 2001 (1) JCLR 657 (All) : 2001 (1) ARC 393 (SC) (paragraphs 5 and 6 ). (3) Punjab National Bank v. Naresh Kumar Bajaj, 2002 (2) JCLR 936 (SC) : 2002 (2) ARC 501 (paragaph 8 ). 16. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 17. (3) Punjab National Bank v. Naresh Kumar Bajaj, 2002 (2) JCLR 936 (SC) : 2002 (2) ARC 501 (paragaph 8 ). 16. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 17. n Before proceeding to deal with the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, it is relevant to refer to certain judicial decisions dealing with the principles governing the amendment of pleadings. 18. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon case (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as under (paragraph 5 of the said AIR): "5. The order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained. Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensed for by an order of costs. However, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. " 19. In Swami Durrkeshranand Saraswati Ji Maharaj v. Jagatguru Shri Shankaracharya Jyotish Peethadhiswar and others (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, a learned Single Judge of this Court held as follows (paragraph 15 of the said All. L. J.): "15. On the facts of the present case, it is obvious that the applicant is entitled to make the amendment in the written statement in view, in particular, of the stand taken by the plaintiff in this Court. The case of the plaintiff would not be any the worse for him even if the present defendant applicant is permitted to take the amendment plea. The mere fact that a co-defendant may be prejudiced in some other litigation on account of the amendment sought is not really relevant for disposing of the prayer for amendment made in this suit. The case of the plaintiff would not be any the worse for him even if the present defendant applicant is permitted to take the amendment plea. The mere fact that a co-defendant may be prejudiced in some other litigation on account of the amendment sought is not really relevant for disposing of the prayer for amendment made in this suit. Courts, it is settled law, are generally liberal in permitting the amendment of pleadings unless any irretrievable harm is caused to the opposing party. Such is not the position in the instant case. " 20. In Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed follows (paragraph 16 of the said AIR): "16. Normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the cause of action. But it is well recognized that where the amendment does not constitute an addition of a new cause of action, or raise a new case, but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on the record, the amendment would be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation. . . . " 21. In Gauri Bala Dutta v. IIIrd Addl. Civil Judge, Varanasi and another, case (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, a learned Single Judge of this Court held as follows (paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said AIR): "9. Stressing on the observations of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal, AIR 1969 SC 1267 , (supra) Sri Verma contended that the parties cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistakes, negligence, inadvertence or even infrection of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated by an order of costs. However, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however, respondent late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. The Honble Supreme Court also observed (at p. 1269 of AIR): "the rules of procedure are intended to be handmaid to the administration of justice. " 10. . . . . . . . The Honble Supreme Court also observed (at p. 1269 of AIR): "the rules of procedure are intended to be handmaid to the administration of justice. " 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . These circumstances and facts required that for doing substantial justice, between the parties, the amendments should have been allowed by the Court below and in allowing such amendments, the Court should always approach the problem with an angle to see as to whether the amendment is necessary for deciding the real dispute between the parties or not. . . . . " 22. In B. K. N. Pillai v. P. Pillai and another case (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the parties, their Lordships of the Supreme Court opinion as follows (paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the said AIR): " (3) The purpose and object of Order VI, Rule 17, CPC is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleading in such manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and this Court. It is true that the amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances. But it is equally true that the Courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt hypertechnical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the Courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. (4 ). . . . . . . . . The principle applicable to the amendments of the plaint are equally applicable to the amendments of the written statements. The Courts are more generous in allowing the amendment of the written statement as question of prejudice is less likely to operate in that event. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment other side should not be subjected to injustice and that any admission made in favour of the plaintiff is not withdrawn. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment other side should not be subjected to injustice and that any admission made in favour of the plaintiff is not withdrawn. All amendments of the pleadings should be allowed which are necessary for determination of the real controversies in the suit provided the proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of action on the basis of which the original lis was raised or defence taken. Inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of facts should not be allowed to be incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings. Proposed amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs. No amendment should be allowed which amounts to or relates in defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite part on account of lapse of time. The delay in filing the petition for amendment of the pleadings should be properly compensated by costs and error or mistake which, if not fraudulent, should not be made a ground for rejecting the application for amendment of plaint or written statement. (5) In the appeals the appellant defendant wanted to amend the written statement by taking a plea that in case he is not held a lessee, he was entitled to the benefit of Section 60 (b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Learned Counsel for the appellant is not interested in incorporation of the other pleas raised in the application seeking amendment. The plea sought to be raised in neither inconsistent nor repugnant to the plea already raised in defence. The alternative plea sought to be incorporated in the written statement is in fact the extension of the plea of the respondent-plaintiff and rebuttal to the issue regarding liability of the appellant of being dispossessed on proof of the fact that he was a licence liable to be evicted in accordance with the provisions of law. The mere fact that the appellant had filed the application after a prolonged delay could not be made a ground for rejecting his prayer particularly when the respondent-plaintiff could be compensated by costs. The mere fact that the appellant had filed the application after a prolonged delay could not be made a ground for rejecting his prayer particularly when the respondent-plaintiff could be compensated by costs. We do not agree with the finding of the High Court that the proposed amendment virtually amounted to withdrawal of any admission made by the appellant and that such withdrawal was likely to cause irretrievable prejudice to the respondent". 23. In Ragu Thilak D. John case (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the caveator respondent Nos. 3 to 5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said ARC): " (5) After referring to the judgments in Charan Das v. Amir Khan, AIR 1921 PC 50; L. J. Leach and Co. Ltd. and another v. Jardine Skinner and Company, 1957 SCR 438 ; Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others, 1974 (2) SCC 393 ; M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, 1978 (2) SCC 91 and various other authorities this Court in B. K. N. Pillai and another, 2000 (1) JCLR 333 (SC) : JT 1999 (10) SC 61: 2000 SCFBRC 32, held: "the purpose and object of Order VI, Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercise at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and this Court. It is true that the amendments cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances. But it is equally true that the Courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt hypertechnical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the Courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. " (6) If the aforesaid test is applied in the instant case, the amendment sought could not be declined. The dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimize the litigation. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. " (6) If the aforesaid test is applied in the instant case, the amendment sought could not be declined. The dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimize the litigation. The plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is arguable in the circumstances of the case, as is evident from the perusal of averments made in paras 8 (a) to 8 (f) of the plaint which were sought to be incorporated by way of amendment. We feel that in the circumstances of the case the plea of limitation being disputed could be made a subject matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for. " 24. In Punjab National Bank case, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent Nos. 3 to 5, a learned Single Judge of this Court held as follows (paragraphs 8 of the said ARC): " (8) After considering the facts of the case, I am of the view that none of the principles mentioned in above cases is of any help to the revisionists. The suit is SCC suit filed in the year, 1995. The evidence of the parties has already been concluded and the revisionists took serveral adjournments for addressing the arguments. The revisionist prior to the present application for amendment get the plaint amended 2-3 times before. In the application, it is alleged that the rent was accepted till 30-6-1995. There is no reason as to why this amendment was moved in the year, 2002. The trial Court has observed that continuous attempt of the revisionist is to delay the disposal of the suit. " 25. In Sampath Kumar case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraph 9 of the said ARC): "9. Order VI, Rule 17 of CPC confers jurisdiction on the Court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as may be just. Such amendments as are directed towards putting-forth and seeking determination of the real questions in controversy between the parties shall be permitted to be made. Order VI, Rule 17 of CPC confers jurisdiction on the Court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as may be just. Such amendments as are directed towards putting-forth and seeking determination of the real questions in controversy between the parties shall be permitted to be made. The question of delay in moving an application for amendment should be decided not by calculating the period from the date of institution of the suit alone but by reference to the stage to which the hearing in the suit has proceeded. Pre-trial amendments are allowed more liberally than those which are sought to be made after the commencement of the trial or after conclusion thereof. In former case generally it can be assumed that the defendant is not prejudiced because he will have full opportunity of meeting the case of the plaintiff as amended. In the letter cases the question of prejudice to the opposite party may arise and that shall have to be answered by reference to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. No strait jacket formula can be laid down. The fact remains that a mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing a prayer for amendment. " 26. In Ganpat Lal Gupta case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, a learned Single Judge of this Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 8 and 28 of the said ARC): "8. It is settled legal proposition that amendment in the pleadings may generally be allowed and the amendment may also be a belated stage. However, it should not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. The amendment sought should be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. Application for amendment may be rejected if the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleadings had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him injury which could not be compensated in terms of cost or change the nature of the suit itself as it cannot be permitted to create an entirely new case by amendment. A right accrued in favour of a party by lapse of time cannot be permitted to be taken away by amendment. Amendment can also be allowed at appellate stage. A right accrued in favour of a party by lapse of time cannot be permitted to be taken away by amendment. Amendment can also be allowed at appellate stage. Introduction of an entirely new case, displacing even admission by a party is not permissible. . . . . . " 28. Thus, in view of the above, the law of amendment of pleadings can be summarized that amendment is found to be necessary for just and proper decision of the controversy between the parties. Application should not be rejected only on the ground of delay. However, such application should be rejected if it altogether alter the nature of the suit or where it take away the accrued right of the opposite party of where the plaintiffs suit would be wholly displaced by the proposed amendment or the amendment sought has not be made in good faith or suffer from lack of bona fides, or the amendment sought would withdraw the admission made by a party in the original pleadings. If an independent suit is permissible on the subsequent events occurred during the pendency of the suit, the amendment may be allowed in order to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings. " 27. In Banta Singh Ganga Singh and others v. Smt. Harbhajan Kaur and others, AIR 1974 P & H 247 (FB), it was laid down as follows (paragraph 6 of the said AIR): "6. In order to allow an amendment of a plaint or a written statement, the first point to be considered is whether the application has been made bona fide. . . . . " 28. In view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it is evident that an application for amendment filed under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking amendment in the pleadings cannot be rejected merely on the ground of delay. Amendment can be permitted at any stage of the proceedings, and even at the appellate stage. However, in case the application for amendment is found to have been filed not in good faith, but with the object merely to prolong the proceedings, the amendment application may be rejected on the said ground. 29. Amendment can be permitted at any stage of the proceedings, and even at the appellate stage. However, in case the application for amendment is found to have been filed not in good faith, but with the object merely to prolong the proceedings, the amendment application may be rejected on the said ground. 29. In the present case, the learned Judge, Small Cause Court/civil Judge (Junior Divisional) Badaun, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, recorded categorical finding in the said order dated 5-12-2002 that the said amendment application (No. 61 Ga) had been filed on behalf of the petitioner not bona fide, but the same had been filed after the completion of the entire proceedings in the suit merely with he object of keeping the suit pending. The said order dated 5-12-2002 was confirmed in the said order dated 19-9-2003 passed by the learned Additional District Judge/special Judge (EC Act), Badaun in the said SCC Revision No. 2 of 2003. 30. In view of the findings recorded by the Courts below that the amendment application had been filed by the petitioner at the end of the proceedings in the suit not bona fide but merely with the object of prolonging the proceedings in the suit suit, I am of the opinion that the amendment application filed on behalf of the petitioner has been rightly rejected. No illegality has been committed by the Courts below in passing the impugned orders. 31. Even otherwise, on a perusal of the amendments sought to be made by the petitioner in the written statement by the said amendment application No. 61 Ga, it is evident that the necessary pleadings in this regard are already there in the written statement, particularly in paragraph 5 and paragraphs 13 to 17 of the written statement. In view of this also, there was no occasion for the petitioner to file the amendment application. Amendment application has, therefore, been rightly rejected by the Courts below. 32. Shri Shah, learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that by the amendment application, the petitioner wanted to raise the plea of Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short "the Act") also, inasmuch as the petitioner had already complied with the requirements of the said provision. 32. Shri Shah, learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that by the amendment application, the petitioner wanted to raise the plea of Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short "the Act") also, inasmuch as the petitioner had already complied with the requirements of the said provision. It is submitted that the amendment of the written statement to the said extent ought to have been allowed by the Courts below. 33. I have considered the said submission of Shri Shah, learned Counsel for the petitioner. A perusal of the written statement, particularly paragraph 15 thereof shows that the necessary pleadings for claiming the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act have already been made in the written statement. Merely, because Section 20 (4) of the Act has not been specifically mentioned in the written statement, cannot be a ground for not considering the plea of the petitioner for claiming the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act. It is well settled that only the material facts are required to be pleaded in the pleadings. The pleading of law is not to be made in the pleadings. 34. In Kedar Lal Seal and another v. Hari Lal Seal, AIR 1952 SC 47 , it was laid down as follows (paragraphs 41 and 51 of the said AIR): "41. . . . . . . . . . . The method of computation is a matter of law and it is for the Judges to apply the law to the facts stated and give the plaintiff such relief as is appropriate to the case. " 51. I would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleading when the substance of the thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other side, however, clumsily or inartistically the plaint may be worded. In any event, it is always open to a Court to give a plaintiff such general or other relief as it deems just to the same extent as if it had been asked for, provided that occasions no prejudice to the other side beyond what can be compensated for the costs. " 35. In any event, it is always open to a Court to give a plaintiff such general or other relief as it deems just to the same extent as if it had been asked for, provided that occasions no prejudice to the other side beyond what can be compensated for the costs. " 35. In State of Rajasthan v. Rao Raja Kalyan Singh (dead) by his legal representatives, AIR 1971 SC 2018 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as follows (paragraph 6 of the said AIR): "6. Though this issue is not very specific but undoubtedly it covers the plea taken by the respondent in paragraph 1 of his written statement. That apart the plea of maintainability of the suit is essentially a legal plea. If the suit on the fact of it is not maintainable, the fact that no specific pleas were taken or no precise issues were framed is of little consequence. " 36. It may, however, clarified that this Court has not adjudicated upon the question as to whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act or not, as it is for the Court concerned to decide the said question. 37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the writ petition lacks merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed. .