JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. By this petition, which is in essence, one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioners have questioned the maintainability of the proceedings in Misc.(J) case No. 58/2002 and Misc. (J) case No. 45/2003 arising out of Misc(Arb) case No. 95/2000 pending in the court of the learned District Judge, Jorhat as well as the legality and validity of the orders dated 26.3.2002 (Annexure-IX), dated 5.4.2003 (Annexure-XV) and dated 10.4.2003 (Annexure-XVI) to the petition respectively. The Petitioners seek the intervention of this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction to prevent, what they perceive to be an abuse of the process of the Court due to continuance of the said proceedings and the orders rendered therein. 2. I have heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. S. Shyara Advocate for the Petitioners and Mr. S.S. Dey, Advocate for the Respondents. 3. The matrix of facts from which the controversy arises has to be laid at the outset. It was as early as in the year 1981 that the Petitioner Authority by its letter dated 28.9.81 had awarded a licence to the Respondent for running the Airport restaurant at the Guwahati Airport for a period of two years w.e.f. 1.10.1981 to 30.9.1983. An agreement dated 1.10.1981 was thus entered into between them. During the currency of the agreement, certain disputes arose between them and eventually this Court by order dated 1.7.1991 passed in MA(F) No. 82/87 referred the disputes to arbitration. Sri Thek Chandani, Executive Director, Airport Authority of India, Delhi Region was thereafter appointed as the Sole Arbitrator who upon entering the reference gave his award on 20.4.1993 which was subsequently made the Rule of the Court by a decree dated 14.6.1993 in terms of the said award the Petitioner Authority was required inter alia to grant a licence to the Respondent for the restaurant premises for a total period of 5 years from 1.6.93 to 31.5.1998. The licence fee was fixed at the rate of Rs. 43,150.20 per month for the first three years i.e. 1.6.93 to 31.6.96 and for the next two years i.e. 1.6.96 to 31.5.98 at the rate of Rs. 51,780.25 per month. The claim of the Respondent regarding a reduction in the licence fee due to ban on the entries of visitors was allowed @ 25% rebate of monthly licence fee from 1.10.87 to 31.5.1993. 51,780.25 per month. The claim of the Respondent regarding a reduction in the licence fee due to ban on the entries of visitors was allowed @ 25% rebate of monthly licence fee from 1.10.87 to 31.5.1993. 4. According to the Petitioners, in terms of the said award a licence in favour of the Respondent for a period of 5 years was granted subject to the terms and conditions mentioned in the draft agreement forwarded with the letter of sanction dated 20.4.1993. The Respondent, however, did not execute the said agreement and continued to operate the Airport restaurant on the strength of an order of injunction obtained by it in title Suit No. 42/1994. As in terms of the award, the Respondent was entitled to run the Airport Restaurant upto 31.5.1998, the Petitioner Authority on the expiry of the said period issued a notice inviting tender dated 6.4.1998 on settling the Airport Restaurant on the basis of competitive bids. This NIT was challenged by the Respondent by filing Misc. (J) case No. 12/1998 in Title Suit No. 42/1994 in which, a civil right to operate the Airport Restaurant was claimed by the Respondent till 31.5.2002. This NIT was also challenged before this Court by the Respondent as well as one M/s. Guddy Enterprise. 5. A Single Bench of this Court set aside the NIT dated 6.4.1998 in Writ Appeal No. 33/1998 that was filed by the Petitioners, a Division Bench of this Court, by judgment and order dated 15.2.2000 granted the liberty to the Petitioners to issue a fresh NIT observing further that the Respondent would also be entitled to apply for the allotment of the contract. A fresh NIT was thereafter issued by the Petitioner Authority on 15.3.2000 inviting bids from eligible bidders for settling the Airport restaurant at LGBI Airport at Guwahati. 6. In the meantime, the Title Suit No. 42/1994 had been decreed by the learned Trial Court at Jorhat by its judgment and decree dated 4.4.2000 inter alia observing therein that the parties may settle their disputes through arbitration. Being aggrieved, the Petitioners preferred an appeal before this Court which was registered as RFA No. 49/2000. 7. 6. In the meantime, the Title Suit No. 42/1994 had been decreed by the learned Trial Court at Jorhat by its judgment and decree dated 4.4.2000 inter alia observing therein that the parties may settle their disputes through arbitration. Being aggrieved, the Petitioners preferred an appeal before this Court which was registered as RFA No. 49/2000. 7. During the pendency of the aforesaid appeal, the Respondent filed an application under Sections 8, 9 and 22 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') in the Court of the learned District Judge, Jorhat being Misc(Arb) Petition No. 95/2000. In the said application, the Respondent inter alia referred to a settlement arrived at between the parties on the basis of which it had paid an additional licence fee which was accepted by the Petitioner authority as a consideration for extension of the contract from 1.6.1998 to 31.5.2002. The learned District Judge, Jorhat by order dated 15.5.2000 passed in Misc.(Arb) Petition No. 95/2000 directed maintenance of status quo with regard to the possession of the Airport restaurant. Feeling aggrieved, the Petitioners preferred an appeal against the same before this Court which was registered as FAO No. 66/2000. The NIT dated 15.3.2000 was also separately challenged by the Respondent as well as by M/s. Guddy Enterprise by two writ petitions namely, WP(C) Nos. 974/2000 and 2375/2000 before this Court. Both the writ petitions along with RFA No. 49/2000 and FAO No. 66/2000 were taken up together by the Single Bench of this Court and were disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 18.1.2002. The learned Single Bench set aside the direction issued by the learned trial Court in its judgment and decree dated 4.4.2000 passed in Title Suit No. 42/1994 requiring the parties to settle their disputes through arbitration. The order dated 15.5.2000 passed in Misc.(Arb) Case No. 95/2000 was also set aside for the lack of any finding with regard to the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties and the intention of the Respondent to take the dispute to arbitration. The order dated 15.5.2000 passed in Misc.(Arb) Case No. 95/2000 was also set aside for the lack of any finding with regard to the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties and the intention of the Respondent to take the dispute to arbitration. The two writ petitions were disposed of permitting the Respondent and M/s. Guddy Enterprise to submit their tenders and an observation was made that the Respondents would make a request before the Hon'ble Chief the Justice within 15.2.2002 for passing appropriate orders with regard to its prayer for appointment of an Arbitration under Section 11 of the Act. Further, the parties were directed to maintain the status quo till orders were passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice under Section 11(6) of the Act. However, liberty was granted to the aggrieved party, thereafter to approach the appropriate forum for interim measures under Section 9 of the Act if the situation so permitted. The Petitioner Authority was allowed to proceed with the settlement process only after the request made by the Respondent under Section 11(c) of the Act was disposed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice. 8. The Respondent carried the matter in appeal in the form of Writ Appeal No. 107/2002 which was disposed of by judgment and order dated 18.3.2002 dismissing the same. With reference to the right of the Respondent to continue as a licensee of the restaurant in question, the learned Division Bench while recording the submissions made on its behalf that its said right was till 31.5.2002 allowed the Respondent to enjoy the same till the expiry of the period claimed by it i.e. 31.5.2002. In this connection, the Division Bench placed on record the submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that having regard to the stage of the proceeding, the Petitioners were agreeable to allow the Respondent to continue as a licensee till 31.5.2002 and that any action as per NIT would be made effective after 31.5.2002. The attack with regard to the stipulations contained in the NIT pertaining to the eligibility of the caterers was also turned down by the Division Bench. 9. While the above appeal was pending, the Respondent had filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Act seeking appointment of an Arbitrator. By order dated 16.3.2002, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice disposed of the said petition which was registered as Arb. 9. While the above appeal was pending, the Respondent had filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Act seeking appointment of an Arbitrator. By order dated 16.3.2002, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice disposed of the said petition which was registered as Arb. petition No. 7/2002 by appointing the Director General of Civil Aviation or his nominee to act as the Sole Arbitrator in respect of the disputes between the parties and to decide the same in accordance with law. 10. The Petitioner Authority thereafter opened the tenders received in respect of the NIT dated 15.3.2000 and after completing the necessary formalities on 27.3.2002 made fresh settlement in favour of the successful bidder at a monthly fee of Rs. 1,55,000/- subject to the condition that the settlement would be effective only from 1.6.2002. 11. As contended by the Petitioners, in the meantime, the Respondent had also filed Title Suit No. 2/2002 in the Court of the District Judge, Jorhat praying for a decree inter alia for a declaration that the Respondent was entitled to be accommodated at the earmarked premises of the Airport restaurant of the model Airport terminal building and further that the said premises cannot be settled with any person or persons other than it. An application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule1 and 2 Code of Civil Procedure registered as Misc.(J) Case No. 36/2002 was also filed in which the learned trial Court by order dated 28.2.2002 directed that the status quo in respect of the disputed premises of the Airport restaurant at LGBI Airport be maintained. The Petitioners have contended that this fact with regard to the filing of the aforementioned suit and passing of the order of status quo was withheld from this Court though at the relevant time, the Writ Appeal No. 107/2002 was pending before the Division Bench. The Petitioners have further contended that while processing the tenders received in response to the NIT dated 15.3.2000, the tender of the Respondent having been found to be deficient qua the eligibility criteria, the same was rejected. Challenging the tender process, the Petitioners again filed Title Suit No. 18/2002 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jorhat praying for a decree that the tender process as well as the judgment of this Court and the consequential award of settlement relating to the NIT be declared void. Challenging the tender process, the Petitioners again filed Title Suit No. 18/2002 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jorhat praying for a decree that the tender process as well as the judgment of this Court and the consequential award of settlement relating to the NIT be declared void. A declaration was also sought for to the effect that the Respondent as the sitting and operating lessee should be allowed to run the LGBI Airport Restaurant at Guwahati till finalization of the Arbitration proceeding which had commenced pursuant to the order dated. 16.3.2002 passed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice in Arb. petition No. 7/2002. An application for temporary injunction was also filed being Misc.(J) Case No. 19/2002 and the learned trial Court by order dated 7.5.2002 was pleased to pass an ex parte order of status quo with regard to LGBI Airport, Guwahati. 12. The Respondent separately approached the learned District Judge, Jorhat by filing an application under Section 9 of the Act praying for a direction to maintain of status quo as regards its business at the LGBI Airport Restaurant, Guwahati and to restrain the Petitioner Authority from taking further steps pursuant to the NIT dated 15.3.2000 till disposal of the disputes by the arbitrator. The said application was registered as Misc.(J) case No. 5872002 and the learned District Judge, Jorhat by an ex parte interim order dated 26.3.2002 directed that the status quo as regards the business of the Respondent at the LGBI Airport Restaurant, Guwahati be maintained till hearing and disposal of the disputes by the arbitrator. 13. While the matter rested at that, the learned District Judge, Jorhat by the judgment and order dated 24.1.2003 vacated the order of status quo passed on 28.2.2002 in Misc(J) case No. 36/2002. In the said order the learned trial Court inter alia observed that the Respondent had no civil right to claim continuity of its possession of the Airport Restaurant beyond 31.5.2002. The Petitioner authority thereafter handed over the earmarked premises of the Airport restaurant at LGBI, Guwahati to the successful bidder on 27.3.2003. 14. The Respondents being aggrieved, preferred an appeal being MFA No. 26/2003 before this Court assailing the judgment and order dated 24.1.2003 and an application for stay of the impugned judgment and order was also filed being registered Misc. case No. 68/2003. 14. The Respondents being aggrieved, preferred an appeal being MFA No. 26/2003 before this Court assailing the judgment and order dated 24.1.2003 and an application for stay of the impugned judgment and order was also filed being registered Misc. case No. 68/2003. This Court by order dated 14.2.2003 in the interim, directed that status quo with regard to the respective possession of the Respondent and the new licensee be maintained till 26.2.2003. This Court, however, rejected the prayer for extension of the interim order thereafter. 15. Meanwhile, the Petitioners had taken steps to get the order of status quo dated 26.3.2002 passed in Misc.(J) case No. 58/ 2002 vacated. The learned trial Court heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner but according to the Petitioners the hearing could not be completed because of non-cooperation by the Respondents. It was at this juncture that the Petitioner Authority issued a letter on 7.3.2003 directing the Respondent to close down its operation and remove its belongings from the restaurant premises with a further intimation that the entry passes issued to its employees would stand withdrawn. 16. On receiving this letter, the Respondent filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Court of the learned District Judge, Jorhat which was registered as Misc.(J) case No. 45/2003. It was alleged that the Petitioners by handing over the possession of a portion of the Airport restaurant to the new lessee on 27.1.2003/ (sic) and by issuing the letter dated 7.3.2002 had acted in violation of the order of status quo dated 26.3.2003. The learned lower Court by order dated 5.4.2003 directed the Petitioners to take immediate steps to restore the status quo ante of the business of the Respondent as on 26.3.2002 and also restore the validity of the entry passes of its workers with immediate effect. According to the Petitioners, this order was passed ex parte. Though an application was filed by the Petitioners on 8.4.2003 seeking 15 days time for preferring an appeal against the said order, the learned Court below by Anr. order dated 10.4.2003 issued directions to the Superintendent of Police, Kamrup, Guwahati to execute the order dated 5.4.2003. 17. It is in this factual background that the Petitioners are before this Court praying for the above reliefs. The Respondent has not filed any affidavit controverting the facts set out in the petition. 18. order dated 10.4.2003 issued directions to the Superintendent of Police, Kamrup, Guwahati to execute the order dated 5.4.2003. 17. It is in this factual background that the Petitioners are before this Court praying for the above reliefs. The Respondent has not filed any affidavit controverting the facts set out in the petition. 18. The principal submission of Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners is that the Respondent has admittedly no right to operate the restaurant beyond 31.5.2002 as claimed by it and thus the impugned proceedings and the orders passed therein are ex facie an abuse of the process of the Court and are therefore liable to be set aside. According to him, the original agreement dated 1.10.81 had long spent its force and that the Respondent had no right whatsoever to operate as the licensee under the Petitioners in respect of the restaurant in question and therefore, the arbitration clause contained in the said agreement did not authorize performance of the contract thereunder. The contract envisaged by the said agreement by efflux of time had become a concluded contract and thus, the learned Senior counsel argued, the Respondent had no subsisting right to continue as a licensee under the Petitioners in any case, it being the clear and categorical stand of the Respondent that it had the right to operate the restaurant only upto 31.5.2002, the impugned proceedings initiated by it contending that it had right to continue beyond 31.5.2002 besides being not maintainable in law are also not bonafide. Consequently, the impugned orders whereby the status quo with regard to the business of the Respondent relating to the restaurant has been maintained beyond 31.5.2002 are thus manifestly illegal and are liable to be set aside. He maintained that the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 107/2002 having decided that the civil right of the Respondent to operate the restaurant was only upto 31.5.2002 and that too, on the basis of the submission made on its behalf, the learned Courts below in entertaining the impugned proceedings and in passing the impugned orders proceeded against the decision of this Court in its letter and spirit and on this ground alone, the same are liable to be set aside. With specific reference to the order dated 26.3.2002, Mr. With specific reference to the order dated 26.3.2002, Mr. Choudhury argued that the order dated 15.5.2000 passed in Misc.(Arb.) case No. 95/2000 granting status quo having been set aside by this Court by its judgment and order dated 18.1.2002, the learned Court below ought not to have passed the said order (dt. 26.3.2002) without any additional material on record and in doing so, it acted against the fundamental principle of law that an order has to be based on the pleadings on record. 19. The learned Senior counsel further argued that the order of this Court appointing arbitrator under Section 11(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter also referred to as the 'Act') by itself did not signify the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties or that they were ready and willing to refer their disputes to arbitration and therefore, the pendency of the arbitration proceeding pursuant to the said order did not clothe the Respondent with any right to continue to operate the restaurant. In any view of the matter, according to the learned Senior counsel, the liberty granted by this Court by its order dated 18.1.2002 to approach the appropriate forum for interim measure under Section 9 of the Act was for approaching the arbitrator for interim relief if any under Section 17 of the Act and thereby filing of applications before the Court below under Section 9 of the Act at one's convenience was not sanctioned. The Respondent willfully interpreted the said observations to its advantage and at its sweet will every now and then approached the courts below with applications under the aforementioned provisions of the act and obtained orders of status quo thereby frustrating the orders passed by this Court to the contrary, on one hand, the stand taken on behalf of the Respondent before this Court was that it had its right to operate the restaurant only upto 31.5.2002 and on the other, it took steps to pursue parallel remedies before the learned Courts below by misrepresenting the facts. Mr. Choudhury seriously contended that the learned lower Courts as well, passed the impugned orders without any application of mind being wholly obvious of the factual background and the orders passed by this Court. Mr. Choudhury seriously contended that the learned lower Courts as well, passed the impugned orders without any application of mind being wholly obvious of the factual background and the orders passed by this Court. According to him, the interim orders of the nature as passed are not supposed to be granted as a matter of charity, more particularly, when the same had the effect of restraining a public authority from doing an act in terms of the orders of this Court. He maintained that the learned Courts below in entertaining the impugned proceedings and passing the orders impugned in the case in hand, had grossly erred in law as well as on facts so much so that intervention of this Court is called for in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. Without prejudice to the above, Mr. Choudhury, further contended that the site at which the Respondent was running the restaurant before shifting to the new terminal building of the airport was an area measuring 3070 Sq. ft. In view of the renovation and modernization work at LGB Airport, Guwahati, the Respondent was required to shift to Anr. space in the new terminal building measuring about 3229 Sq. ft. equal to 300.08 Square meters. Mr. Choudhury submitted that the said space is not a kitchen as alleged by the Respondent, and instead is a portion of the space earmarked in the new terminal building for the restaurant contract. According to him, therefore, the Respondent was not prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. On the other hand, by the notice inviting tender, the Petitioners though had offered a space measuring 745.28 sq. meters for the catering service/restaurant in the terminal building including the aforementioned area now in occupation of the Respondent, the successful bidder could be handed over the vacant possession of the remaining space only i.e. 745.28 Sq. meters -300.08 Sq. meters. The learned Senior counsel argued that though the successful bidder has been settled with the contract for the catering service/restaurant for the entire area 745.28 Sq.ft. meters at monthly licence fee of Rs. 1,55,000/-, in view of the impugned orders passed by the learned courts below, the area in occupation of the Respondent could not be handed over to it. The learned Senior counsel argued that though the successful bidder has been settled with the contract for the catering service/restaurant for the entire area 745.28 Sq.ft. meters at monthly licence fee of Rs. 1,55,000/-, in view of the impugned orders passed by the learned courts below, the area in occupation of the Respondent could not be handed over to it. He contended that the tender process had been conducted strictly in accordance with law and as permitted by this Court and on that consideration as well, the impugned proceedings and the orders are liable to be set aside to uphold the sanctity of the process of law. Mr. Choudhury submitted that in any view of the matter, the right of the Respondent under the order the original agreement was that of a licensee and it stood extinguished with the conclusion of the contract and therefore, in any case, even if its claim to operate the restaurant beyond 31.5.2002 is entertainable it is at best entitled to compensation and nothing more. Viewed from that angle as well, the impugned orders permitting it to carry on its business are patently illegal and not sustainable in law. 21. With regard to the letter dated 7.3.2003, Mr. Choudhury has urged that it was issued on a bonafide interpretation of the orders dated 24.1.2003 passed in Misc.(J) case No. 36/2002 by the learned District Judge, Jorhat and the order dated 26.2.2003 passed by this Court in MFA No. 26/2003 and as no case of willful violation of the order dated 26.3.2002 passed in Misc. (J), case No. 58/2002 had been made out, the impugned orders dated 5.4.2003 and 10.4.2003 are clearly misconceived and are thus liable to be set aside. Moreover, as the application for vacating the order dated 26.3.2002 referred to above was then pending, and the Petitioners had been heard in support thereof by the learned court below, it ought not to have entertained the application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the Respondent alleging violation of the order dated 26.3.2002 before disposing of the former application. Without prejudice to the above, the learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Respondent was a mere licensee under the Petitioner Authority and that with efflux of time the licence stood revoked. Without prejudice to the above, the learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Respondent was a mere licensee under the Petitioner Authority and that with efflux of time the licence stood revoked. In that view of the matter, the Respondent has no right to continue in the disputed premises and his possession is that of a trespasser. In such a case, even if the effect of the letter dated 7.3.2003 was the ouster of the Respondent from the said premises, it was not entitled to have its possession thereof restored and could at best claim for compensation. On that consideration also, the learned court below in passing the orders 5.4.2003 and 10.4.2003 had grossly erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction. He relied on Sections 52, 62 and 64 of the Easement Act, 1882 for the purpose. Mr. Choudhury while referring to the factual background of the case strongly contended that though the Respondent in law had no right to carry on its business at the present site, he is enjoying the privilege on the strength of the orders mechanically passed by the learned courts below causing gross abuse of the process of the law and therefore, it is a fit case for this Court to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction, under Article227 of the Constitution of India to remedy the malady as well as to keep the courts below within their bounds. He emphasised that the instant petition is not one to merely correct errors of law or facts, but one seeking intervention of this Court in order to make the learned courts below conscious of the limits of their authority in the face of repeated interim orders passed by them by over looking the conspectus of facts and orders of this Court. He further submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the Respondent, it should be saddled with exemplary cost. Mr. Choudhury, in support of his submissions, placed reliance on the following decisions: i) AIR 1999 SC 565 , M/s. Sundaram Finance Ltd. Appellant v. NEPC India Ltd., Respondent. ii) AIR 1974 SC 158 , Damodar Valley Corporation, Appellant v. K.K. Kar, Respondent. iii) (1999) 2 SCC 377 , Sree Jain Swelambar Terapanthi Vid(s), Appellant v. Phundan Singh and Ors. Respondents. iv) AIR 1962 SC 1893 , M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta and Anr. ii) AIR 1974 SC 158 , Damodar Valley Corporation, Appellant v. K.K. Kar, Respondent. iii) (1999) 2 SCC 377 , Sree Jain Swelambar Terapanthi Vid(s), Appellant v. Phundan Singh and Ors. Respondents. iv) AIR 1962 SC 1893 , M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta and Anr. Appellants v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, Respondent. v) AIR 1961 SC 221 , The State of Bihar, Appellant v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, Respondent. vi) AIR 1954 SC 215 , Waryam Singh and Anr. Appellants v. Amarnath and Anr. Respondents. vii) (1998) 8 SCC 310 , Baby, Appellant v. Travancore Devaswom Board and Ors. Respondents. viii) AIR 1983 All 180 , Sheo Kumar Saxena, Appellant v. Zila Sahkari Vikas Sangh, Gonda and Ors. Respondents. ix) AIR 1978 Delhi 174, Chandu Lal, Petitioner v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Respondent. x) (2003) 1 GLT 403, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., Petitioners v. Flotech Consultants and Services Pvt. Ltd., Respondents. 22. As against this, Mr. Dey, learned Counsel for the Respondent while generally refuting the contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioners argued that the Revision petition is on the face of the record not maintainable and is to be dismissed in limine. He submitted that the impugned orders all are appealable and therefore, no revision lies under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the same consideration, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is also not maintainable in view of the remedy of appeal available to the Petitioners. He further urged that the facts of the case do not disclose any exceptional circumstance warranting exercise of the said extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court and thus resort to the said constitutional provision is not permissible on the grounds envisaged under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 23. Turning to the facts, the learned Counsel argued that the Respondent had to institute Title Suit No. 42/1994 as the Petitioner Authority by letter dated 23.5.1994 required the Respondent to execute an agreement embodying terms and conditions beyond the Tekchandani award (which had been made the Rule of the Court), intimating that in case it failed to do so, the right to run the restaurant would be determined. As the award which had become the Rule of the Court was binding on the parties, it was not permissible on the part of the Petitioner Authority to depart therefrom and in view of the stand taken by them as above, the Respondent had no other alternative but to file a suit and obtain an interim protection in connection with its business. Fie contended that the order dated 15.5.2000 passed by the learned District Judge, Jorhat in Misc.(Arb.) 95/2000 maintaining status quo with regard to the business of the Respondent was set aside by this Court in FAO No. 66/2000 not on the ground that there was no arbitration agreement or that the parties did not intend to refer their disputes to arbitration. The order was set aside as no finding was recorded by the learned Court below to that effect. This Court, however, while setting aside the directions of the learned court below in Title Suit No. 42/1994 for settlement of the disputes between the parties through arbitration, permitted the Respondent to make an application under Section 11(6) of the Act before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice within 15.2.2002 for appointment of an arbitration and directed maintenance of status quo till the orders were passed thereon. This Court by the judgment and order dated 18.1.2002 also granted liberty to the aggrieved party to approach the appropriate forum thereafter for interim relief under Section 9 of the Act. Admittedly, this judgment and order of this Court was not assailed by the Petitioners and therefore, the same along with the directions contained therein attained finality. According to the learned Counsel, therefore, the Respondent in filing an application under Section 9 of the Act in the court of the learned District Judge, Jorhat which was registered as Misc.(J) case No. 58/2002 did not act in contravention of the aforesaid order of this Court. Similarly, the learned Court below in pursuing the impugned order dated 26.3.2002 on a consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances had not committed any illegality whatsoever. 24. Referring to the judgment and order of this Court in WA No. 107/2002 dealing with the civil right of the Respondent, Mr. Similarly, the learned Court below in pursuing the impugned order dated 26.3.2002 on a consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances had not committed any illegality whatsoever. 24. Referring to the judgment and order of this Court in WA No. 107/2002 dealing with the civil right of the Respondent, Mr. Dey argued that the observations made therein to the effect that the Respondent was allowed to continue its civil right in respect of the restaurant till 31.5.2002 did not constitute an adjudication of its said right more particularly, when the subject matter of the said appeal was dominantly relatable to the notice inviting tender for fresh settlement of the restaurant contract. According to him, Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court by order dated 16.3.2002 passed in Arbitration petition No. 7/2002 appointed the Director General of Civil Aviation, New Delhi or his nominee to act as the sole arbitrator for deciding the disputes between the parties and accordingly the arbitration proceeding has commenced in which the right of the Respondent to continue with the business is an issue and, therefore, there is no room to contend that the Respondent's said right had been concluded by the observations of this Court as recorded in its judgment in WA No. 107/2002. 25. Mr. Dey, argued that by letter dated 7.3.2003, the Respondent was asked to close down its operation of the Airport restaurant under its occupation and this action of the Petitioner authorities being clearly opposed to the order dated 26.3.2002 passed by the learned District Judge, Jorhat in Misc.(J) Case No. 58/2002, it gave rise to a cause of action for filing the application under Order 39 Rule 2A Code of Civil Procedure on which the order dated 05.04.2003 was passed. According to the learned Counsel, the order dated 26.03.2002 was well within the knowledge of the Petitioner authorities as in the meantime, they had filed an application for vacating the same and that the said application was pending for final disposal before the learned court below. Replying to the argument advanced by Mr. Choudhury that the letter dated 7.3.2003 was issued on a bonafide interpretation of the orders dated 24.1.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Jorhat in Misc.(J) case No. 36/2002 and dated 26.2.2003 of this Court in MFA No. 26/2003, Mr. Replying to the argument advanced by Mr. Choudhury that the letter dated 7.3.2003 was issued on a bonafide interpretation of the orders dated 24.1.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Jorhat in Misc.(J) case No. 36/2002 and dated 26.2.2003 of this Court in MFA No. 26/2003, Mr. Dey strenuously contended that those pertained to the portion of the earmarked space of the Airport restaurant of the newly constructed terminal building which was not in occupation of the Respondent, but was being contemplated to be handed over to the successful bidder pursuant to the NIT dated 15.3.2000. He maintained that the letter dated 7.3.2003 on the other hand, required the Respondent to vacate the space in its occupation and therefore, the orders dated 24.1.2003 and the 26.2.2003 were not relevant as a purported defence to the action indicated in the letter dated 7.3.2003. 26. While contending that the NIT dated 15.3.2000 was relatable only to the balance portion of the earmarked space in the new terminal building of the Airport having no connection with the space in occupation of the Respondent, the learned Counsel argued that the Respondent by approaching the learned court below with the application for the interim relief and alleging violation of the order dated 26.3.2002 for the purpose of protecting its possession of the space in its occupation pending adjudication of its right by the arbitrator cannot be said to have committed an abuse of the process of law as alleged. He refuted the contention that the delay in disposal of the application filed by the Petitioners for vacating the order of status quo dated 26.3.2002 was on account of the Respondent. He maintained that the appointment of arbitrator by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice in exercise of his power under Section 11(6) of the Act, presupposed that the arbitration cost contained in the original agreement is still operative and that the Respondent intended to refer the disputes to arbitration. He asserted that one of the items. He maintained that the appointment of arbitrator by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice in exercise of his power under Section 11(6) of the Act, presupposed that the arbitration cost contained in the original agreement is still operative and that the Respondent intended to refer the disputes to arbitration. He asserted that one of the items. of dispute pending before the arbitrator pertains to the right of the Respondent to carry on its business beyond 31.5.2002 and in that view of the matter, this Court in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would not, on the basis of an observation made in the judgment and order in WA No. 107/2002 hold that the said right of the Respondent had culminated on 31.5.2002. He contended that in the above factual premises, this Court would not embark upon an exercise of adjudicating the rights of the parties on an issue pending before the arbitrator. In support of the aspect of maintainability of the application filed under Section 9 of the Act, Mr. Dey argued that as the issue with regard to the right of the Respondent to carry on its business under the Petitioner Authority was pending before the arbitrator, it was permissible for it to apply to a court for an interim measure of protection as contemplated under the aforementioned provisions of the Act and therefore, the impugned proceedings are clearly maintainable in law and on facts. In all, according to the learned Counsel for the Respondent the Petitioners had failed to make out a case warranting interference of this Court either in exercise of its revisional or supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, Mr. Dey relied on the following authorities. i) AIR 1961 SC 221 , The State of Bihar, Appellant v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, Respondent. ii) AIR 1999 SC 565 , M/s. Sundaram Finance Ltd., Appellant v. M/s. NEPC India Ltd., Respondent. iii) (1997) 2 GLT 228, Management of Gauhati Refinery, IOC, Ltd. Appellant v. Mrigen Saikia, Respondent. 27. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, it would be apposite to have a deeper insight in to the factual background leading to the filing of the proceedings impugned in the instant petition. For this, reference to additional documents filed by the parties in course of the arguments would be sufficient. 28. 27. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, it would be apposite to have a deeper insight in to the factual background leading to the filing of the proceedings impugned in the instant petition. For this, reference to additional documents filed by the parties in course of the arguments would be sufficient. 28. Misc.(Arb.) Case No. 95/2000 was filed under Section 9 of the Act in the court of the learned District Judge, Jorhat by the Respondent contending inter alia that in terms of Tekchandani award it had paid an amount of Rs. 6,10,559.92 to the Petitioners within the time prescribed by the award. The award thereafter was made a Rule of the Court. As per the degree passed in terms of the award, the Petitioner Authority was not permitted to impose any condition in addition to those contained in the award. The Respondent contended that it further pledged the Fixed Deposit Receipt of Rs. 1,29,450.60 as the security deposit on 7.1.1994 which was accepted by the Petitioner Authority. They also intimated that they had "no objection" to the running of the Beer Bar at the Airport restaurant. Pursuant to a settlement arrived at between the parties on 24/25.11.1994, the Respondent also paid additional licence fee as a consideration of the extension of the contract from 1.6.1998 to 31.5.2002. According for the Respondent, the Petitioner Authority also, pursuant to the decree/award, awarded the contract from 1.6.1993 to 31.5.1998 and forwarded a draft copy of the agreement containing terms and conditions some of which were beyond terms of the award. Title Suit No. 42/1994 was, thereafter filed and subsequent thereto, following negotiations between the parties it was agreed that the Respondent would continue with the restaurant business subject to the condition that the monthly licence fee would be raised by 20% after every 3 years. After such settlement, the Respondent paid and the Petitioner Authority accepted the enhanced licence fee and other incidental charges including the charge on selling Beer in the restaurant. On that basis, the Respondent contended therein that there was a binding contract between the parties to allow it to continue as a licensee till 31.5.2002. After such settlement, the Respondent paid and the Petitioner Authority accepted the enhanced licence fee and other incidental charges including the charge on selling Beer in the restaurant. On that basis, the Respondent contended therein that there was a binding contract between the parties to allow it to continue as a licensee till 31.5.2002. It also referred to the letter dated 28.6.1999 by which it was asked to shift its place in a business to a place earmarked in the new terminal building wherein it was referred to as a holder of the existing licence. It also referred to the judgment and decree dated 4.4.2000 passed in Title Suit No. 42/1994 whereby the Court below directed the parties to refer their disputes to arbitration. It was alleged that inspite of the fact that there was a binding contract between the parties, the Petitioner Authority had been threatening to dispossess the Respondent from its business premises and therefore, it prayed for an order of status quo with regard to its possession thereof. The order of status quo that was passed on 15.5.2000 was set aside by this Court in FAO No. 66/2002 on the ground that the learned court below while passing the same had not recorded that there was an arbitration agreement between the parties and that they intended to take the disputes for resolution by an arbitrator. 29. As alluded above, the Single Bench of this Court by judgment and order dated 18.1.2002 while disposing of a batch of appeals and writ petitions not only set aside the order dated 15.5.2000 passed in Misc.(Arb.) No. 95/2000, but also declined to uphold the challenge to the NIT dated 15.3.2000 floated by the Petitioner Authority for a fresh settlement of the restaurant contract at the Airport. Liberty, was however, granted to the Respondent to file an application under Section 11(6)of the Act for appointment of an Arbitrator and it was provided that till the final orders were passed in the said application, the parties would maintain status quo. The aggrieved party, was further permitted to approach the appropriate forum thereafter for any interim measure of protection under Section 9 of the Act. The Petitioner Authority was granted the liberty to proceed with the settlement process, pursuant to the NIT after necessary orders were passed on the application under Section 11(6) of the Act. The aggrieved party, was further permitted to approach the appropriate forum thereafter for any interim measure of protection under Section 9 of the Act. The Petitioner Authority was granted the liberty to proceed with the settlement process, pursuant to the NIT after necessary orders were passed on the application under Section 11(6) of the Act. The matter was taken in appeal by the Respondent and a Division Bench of this Court in WA No. 107/2002 while recording the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent that it had the right to operate the restaurant till 31.5.2002 allowed it to enjoy its said right till that date and directed that any action as per the NIT should be made effective after 31.5.2002. The challenge to the NIT was dismissed. 30. The Director General of Civil Aviation, New Delhi was appointed as the sole Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the act with the rider that if the said authority was unable or not willing to act, he may appoint Anr. person to be the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes between the parties, This was on 16.3.2002. 31. In the meantime, the Respondent in the month of February, 2002 had instituted Title Suit No. 2/2002 in the court of the learned Distinct Judge, Jorhat praying for a decree inter alia for a declaration, that the Respondent was a licensee of the earmarked premises of the Airport restaurant and thus, it was entitled to an extension of the period of contract to run the said restaurant. The Respondent contended in the plaint that during the pendency of the Title Suit No. 42/94, the Petitioner authorities filed an application being No. 3486/99 on 20.6.99 mentioning that in order to facilitate the renovation and construction works of the Airport terminal criminal building, steps would be taken to temporarily shift the restaurant to an adjacent space available at the newly constructed portion of the terminal building of the Airport. The Respondent accordingly shifted to the adjacent space on the assurance that as soon as the renovation and the construction works of the new terminal building would be completed, it would be accommodated there and that it would be handed over the complete earmarked space/rooms of the Airport restaurant as shown in the master plan. The Respondent accordingly shifted to the adjacent space on the assurance that as soon as the renovation and the construction works of the new terminal building would be completed, it would be accommodated there and that it would be handed over the complete earmarked space/rooms of the Airport restaurant as shown in the master plan. It alleged that the Petitioner Authority, however, did not handover the earmarked space/rooms of the Airport restaurant though completed inspite of the fact that it had been paying the enhanced licence fee as agreed upon. The Respondent therefore contended that it was entitled to an extension of the contract for the period for which such a coercive situation created by the Petitioner Authority continued to exist. In the application for temporary injunction which was registered as Misc(J) Case No. 36/2002, the learned trial Court initially granted an order of status quo with regard to the balance portion of the earmarked space/rooms (excluding the space in its occupation) in the new terminal building of the Airport. This order was, however, vacated by the learned court below by its order dated 24.1.2003 relying on the observation made by this Court in WA No. 107/2002, that the Respondent was allowed to enjoy its civil right in connection with the Airport restaurant upto 31.5.2002. The order dated 24.1.2003 had been assailed by the Respondent in MFA No. 26/2003 before this Court and eventually by order dated 26.2.2003 this Court refused interim relief. 32. In the meantime, the Respondent had again approached the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jorhat in Title Suit No. 18/ 2002 challenging the decision of the Petitioner Authority rejecting its tender and the contemplated action of processing the tenders of the Defendant Nos. 10 and 12 thereto for settlement of the contract allegedly in contravention of the terms and conditions of the NIT. The Respondent assailed the action of the Petitioner authorities in proceeding with the tender process without appointing an arbitrator in terms of the order dated 16.3.2002 passed under Section 11(6) of the Act and the order dated 26.3.2002 passed by the learned District Judge in Misc.(J) Case No. 58/2002 maintaining status quo with regard to its business of Airport restaurant. The Respondent assailed the action of the Petitioner authorities in proceeding with the tender process without appointing an arbitrator in terms of the order dated 16.3.2002 passed under Section 11(6) of the Act and the order dated 26.3.2002 passed by the learned District Judge in Misc.(J) Case No. 58/2002 maintaining status quo with regard to its business of Airport restaurant. It prayed for a decree for a declaration that the decision of the Petitioner Authority rejecting its tender was void and that it was the sitting and operating licensee and should be allowed to run/operate the airport restaurant till completion/finalisation of the arbitration proceeding. The learned court below by order dated 7.5.2002 granted an order of status quo with regard to the business of the Respondent. 33. It was in this conspectus of facts that when the Petitioner Authority issued the letter dated 7.3.2003 to the Respondent to close down the operation of the Airport restaurant in view of the order dated 24.1.2003 passed in Misc.(J) Case No. 36/2002 and 26.2.2003 passed by this Court in MFA No. 26/2003, that the application was filed under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure alleging violation of the order dated 26.3.2002 which was, registered as Misc.(J) Case No. 45/2003. In the meantime, the Petitioner Authority had filed an application for vacating the order dated 26.3.2002. The order sheet of the Misc. case indicates that the learned Counsel for the Petitioners had already been heard and the hearing thereof was adjourned thereafter on the prayer made on behalf of the Respondent fixing 5.4.2003 for hearing. Incidentally, on that date the learned court below took up the application of injunction violation and passed orders directing the Petitioner authorities to take immediate steps to restore the status quo ante of the business of the Respondent as existed on 26.3.2002. Passes of the workers of the Respondent also were directed to be issued with immediate effect and the Petitioner Authority was also directed to take necessary steps so that the business of the Respondent as on 26.3.2002 was restored. By a subsequent order dated 10.4.2003 in the same proceeding, the learned District Judge, Jorhat issued directions to the Superintendent of Police, Guwahati City to take necessary steps for implementation of the order dated 5.4.2003 with immediate effect. By a subsequent order dated 10.4.2003 in the same proceeding, the learned District Judge, Jorhat issued directions to the Superintendent of Police, Guwahati City to take necessary steps for implementation of the order dated 5.4.2003 with immediate effect. The authorities referred to therein were also directed to render necessary assistance to the police for execution of the order dated 5.4.2003. In the meantime, however, admittedly the successful bidder in the tender process, M/s. Hotel Rajmahal had been handed over the possession of the balance space of earmarked portion/rooms of the new terminal building at LGBI Airport, Guwahati. As it appears therefore, as on date the Respondent is occupying the space as is in its possession since after 28.6.99 and the balance portion of the earmarked space for the restaurant in the new terminal building at the Airport is in occupation of the successful bidder. 34. The judicial precedents, referred to by the parties may now be noticed. 35. In M/s. Sundaram Finance Ltd.(Supra), on which both the parties have placed reliance, the Apex Court inter alia had held that under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a court can pass interim orders also before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings and when a party applies under the said provision, it is implicit that it accepts that there is a final and binding arbitration agreement in existence. It is also implicit that a dispute must have arisen which is referable to the arbitral tribunal. While holding that it was not necessary that a notice invoking the arbitration clause must be issued to the opposite party before an application under Section 9 can be filed. It ruled that if such an application is made, the court will first have to be satisfied that there exists a valid arbitration agreement and that the applicant intends to take the dispute to arbitration and the court will have the jurisdiction to pass orders under Section 9 giving such interim protection as the facts and circumstances warrant once it desires such satisfaction. 36. Damodar Valley Corporation (supra), was pressed into services by Mr. Choudhury to underline the fact that in case a dispute in connection with a contract arising out of repudiation, frustration, breach etc. 36. Damodar Valley Corporation (supra), was pressed into services by Mr. Choudhury to underline the fact that in case a dispute in connection with a contract arising out of repudiation, frustration, breach etc. thereof the performance of the contract come to an end and it survives only for certain purposes in respect of disputes arising under it or in connection with it. In such a case, the arbitration clause contained in the agreement remains operative, but the performance of the contract cannot be insisted. 37. In Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vid(s) (supra), the Apex Court reiterated the fundamental principle that in an adversarial litigation the relief has to be granted to the parties based on their pleadings. No relief should be granted in interlocutory proceedings beyond the scope of the main suit. The Apex Court in that case was dealing with the scope of interference with an order of temporary injunction in a suit by the appellate court. 38. The decision rendered in M/s. East India Commercial Company Limited and Anr. and Baby(supra), deals with the amplitude of the power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The emphasis was on the aspect that the tribunals over which the High Court exercises superintendence under the said constitutional provision cannot ignore the law declared by it and the same being binding on them, they cannot ignore it either in initiating proceedings or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. 39. In Waryam Singh(supra) it has been held that Article 227 of the Constitution confers on the High Court the power of judicial superintendence as well, and the same is to be exercised must sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts which the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. That it was permissible for the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to quash orders passed by the subordinate tribunals if the findings of fact had been arrived at by non-consideration of the relevant and material documents, the consideration of which could have led to an opposite conclusion, has been approved by the Apex Court in Baby(supra). 40. This Court in Management, Gauhati Refineiy (IOC) Ltd. while dealing on the same issue recalled the observations of the Apex Court in Md. Unis v. Md. 40. This Court in Management, Gauhati Refineiy (IOC) Ltd. while dealing on the same issue recalled the observations of the Apex Court in Md. Unis v. Md. Mustaquim, AIR 1984 SC 38 , that in exercise of the powers under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal and is not called upon to review and reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or tribunal is purported to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision. The supervisory jurisdiction is conferred on the High Courts to ensure that an inferior court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. 41. In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. this Court was seized with the question as to whether the proceeding initiated in the Court of the Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.), Sibsagar and an order of injunction passed therein followed by an order directing the police to enforce the same were sustainable or not. The Petitioner had assailed the proceeding and the aforementioned orders by an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Sections 115 and 151 Code of Civil Procedure. A preliminary objection was raised that as the impugned orders were appelable, the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable. This Court while noticing the facts involved therein was of the view that the High Court had made indiscriminate use of the powers or injunction without adhering to fundamental principles of law relatable thereto and resultantly interfered with the impugned orders. While dealing with the scope and ambit of Article 227, it held that the jurisdiction conferred under the said constitutional provision is of supervisory nature and should be exercised rarely, but in appropriate cases, a duty is cast on the High Court to invoke the said jurisdiction in order to keep the subordinate courts within their bounds and ensure that they follow the mandate of law. 42. Mr. 42. Mr. Choudhury has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the State of Bihar, Appellant v. Rani Sanabati Kumari, Respondent (supra) to drive home the point that if an order is ambiguous and is reasonably capable of more than one interpretations and further if a party did not intend to disobey it and had acted on the basis of one of such interpretations, it could not be held to have wilfully disobeyed the order. This, the learned Senior counsel referred to business his arguments pertaining to the letter dated 7.3.2003 whereby the Respondent was asked to vacate the space/room at the LGBI airport, Guwahati. Incidentally, the said decision has also been cited by Mr. Dey to draw assistance from the observations of the Apex Court therein that where the materials before the court do not support that a party had understood an order in a particular manner and had conducted itself in accordance with such a construction, the Court cannot attribute an innocent intention based on presumptions. 43. In Chandu Lal (supra) a Full Bench of Delhi High Court while dealing with the rights of a licensee under the Indian Easement Act, 1882 held that a licensee having no interest in the property cannot maintain an action for his possession and after termination of the licence the licensor is entitled to deal with the property as he likes. It further held that in such circumstances, the Court cannot throw its protection round the trespasser having no vestige of any right whatsoever, and his unlawful act of continuing to occupy the premises, by the issue of a prohibitory order against the lawful owner. 44. The question as to whether after vacation of the order of temporary injunction, it can be enforced or executed, was answered in the negative by the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court in Sheo Kumar Saxena (Supra) holding that consequently no punitive action for its breach can also be taken after the order is vacated. It is in this background, the rival contentions of the parties will have to be tested. 45. The preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the petition may be dealt with first to clear the deck for the other issues. The orders dated 26.3.2002, 5.4.2003 and 10.4.2003 impugned in the instant proceedings are all appealable orders. It is in this background, the rival contentions of the parties will have to be tested. 45. The preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the petition may be dealt with first to clear the deck for the other issues. The orders dated 26.3.2002, 5.4.2003 and 10.4.2003 impugned in the instant proceedings are all appealable orders. Therefore, no application under Section115 Code of Civil Procedure challenging the same is maintainable. The challenge to the order dated 26.3.2002 by way of an appeal is also barred by time. It is pertinent to notice that in the instant case, not only the aforesaid orders have been assailed, but also the legality and validity of the proceedings in Misc.(J) Case No. 58/2002 and Misc.(J) Case No. 45/2003 arising out of Misc. (Arb.) Case No. 95/2000 has also been questioned. From the narration of the facts as set out hereinabove, it is evident that the same encompass a chequered history of litigations between the parties. A host of proceedings has been brought revolving around the lingering controversy over the restaurant contract of the Respondent. Several contentious issues are involved. A spate of orders have followed in different proceedings. The attending facts and circumstances demand a final and effective resolution of the controversy. I am, therefore, inclined to examine the contentions on merits. The contentions preliminary objection thus, cannot be upheld. 46. The nucleus of the controversy is whether the Respondent has a subsisting right after 31.5.2002 to carry on the business under the Petitioner Authority at the LGBI Airport, Guwahati. The main plank of the case of the Petitioners is that in any view of the matter, the Respondent cannot be claim such a right beyond 31.5.2002 and therefore, its possession of the space/room at the airport building presently in its occupation is that of a trespasser and in that view of the matter, the impugned orders are nothing, but an abuse of the process of the court. This contention of the Petitioners is founded on the observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in its order dated 18.3.2002 passed in W.A. No. 107/2002. This contention of the Petitioners is founded on the observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in its order dated 18.3.2002 passed in W.A. No. 107/2002. This observation is based on some admission on behalf of the Respondent about its right to continue with the business as a licensee under the Petitioner till 31.05.2002 in the meantime, on an application filed under Section 11(6) of the Act, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court by order dated 16.3.2002 had appointed the Director General of Civil Aviation, New Delhi or his nominee to be the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes between the parties. This, as the said order reveals is clearly with reference to Clause 27 of the agreement dated 1.10.81. It has been submitted at the bar that though belatedly, an arbitrator has been appointed and he has already entered upon the reference and that the proceeding involving the disputes between the parties are pending before him. It has been consistently claimed by the Respondent in all subsequent proceedings before the learned courts below that the dispute with regard to its right to continue as a licensee of the airport restaurant has also been referred to arbitration. There is no categorical denial from the side of the Petitioners in this regard. Their clear stand is that the Respondent, on its own admission has no right to continue as licensee under the Petitioner Authority beyond 31.5.2002 and therefore, it is not entitled to continue as such after that date. 47. The genesis of the relationship of the parties can be traced back to the agreement dated 1.10.81 whereunder the Respondent had taken on into the restaurant premises referred to therein for a period of 3 years from 1.10.81 to 30.9.83. The Respondent has been described therein as "Caterers" including its heirs, executors, administrators legal representatives and permitted assigns. The monthly licence fee had been fixed at Rs. 21,202.00. The agreement contains exhaustive terms and conditions subject to which the Respondent was to conduct its business. Clause 27 of the agreement is the arbitration clause. On a reading of the stipulations contained in the agreement, the transaction does not appear to be one of licence simpliciter. The monthly licence fee had been fixed at Rs. 21,202.00. The agreement contains exhaustive terms and conditions subject to which the Respondent was to conduct its business. Clause 27 of the agreement is the arbitration clause. On a reading of the stipulations contained in the agreement, the transaction does not appear to be one of licence simpliciter. The relationship between the parties was governed by the express terms and conditions contained in the agreement which comprehended some semblance of right to carry on the business subject to the stipulations specified therein. There is no dispute with regard to the existence of the said agreement. It is no longer res integra that the acid test to ascertain the true character of a transaction is the real intention of the parties to it. An analysis of the clauses of the agreement does not suggest that thereby the Respondent was simply granted the permission to run the business with no iota of right to continue with it. From the narration of the facts as above, it is clear that Hon'ble the Single Bench of this Court by judgment and order dated 18.1.2002 while setting aside the directions issued by the learned court below in Title Suit No. 42/1994 to the parties to settle their disputes through arbitration, granted liberty to the Respondent to file an application under Section 11(6) of the Act and further granted status quo till orders were passed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on the said application. Liberty was also granted to the aggrieved party thereafter to approach the appropriate forum for interim measure under Section 9 of the Act if the situation so permitted. After the appointment of the arbitrator by the Hon'ble Chief Justice on 16.3.2002, the Respondent filed an application under Section 9 of the Act registered as Misc.(J) case No. 58/2002 in the court of the learned District Judge, Jorhat praying for an order of status quo as regards its business at LGBI Airport, Guwahati and to restrain the Petitioner Authority from taking steps pursuant to the NIT dated 15.3.2000 till disposal of the disputes by the arbitrator. Having regard to the fact that an arbitrator has been appointed under Section 11(6) of the Act and that the subsisting disputes between the parties had been referred to him for arbitration. Having regard to the fact that an arbitrator has been appointed under Section 11(6) of the Act and that the subsisting disputes between the parties had been referred to him for arbitration. In view of the consistent claim of the Respondent that its right to continue as a licensee under the Petitioner Authority is one of the items of the disputes referred to the arbitrator, it is not possible to conclude that the Respondent had conceded that its right to carry on the restaurant contract under the Petitioner Authority had ceased on 31.5.2002. As can be noticed from the stand of the Respondent in Misc. (J) case No. 58/ 2002. Title Suit No. 2/2002 and Title Suit No. 18/2002 it is its case that when the dispute with regard to its right to carry on the business at the Airport restaurant is pending adjudication before the arbitrator, status quo with regard to its business activities should be maintained pending final disposal of the arbitration proceedings,. A bare perusal of the order dated 18.3.2002 of the Division Bench in W.A. No. 107/2002 reveals that there had been no adjudication as such of the said issue pertaining to the right of the Respondent to carry on the restaurant contract under the Petitioner Authority. The observation that it can enjoy its said right upto 31.5.2002 seems to be based on some admission made on behalf of the Respondent in that regard. This was evidently based on the stand of the Respondent in Misc.(Arb.) case No. 95/2000. 48. The contention of the Respondent in Misc.(Arb.) case No. 95/2000 inter alia has been that a settlement had been arrived at between the parties on 24/25.11.94 pursuant to which, it paid additional licence fee as a consideration for the extension of the contract from 1.6.98 to 31.5.2002. After filing of the TS No. 42/1994, there were negotiations between the parties and it was agreed that the Respondent would continue with the restaurant business subject to the condition that the monthly licence fee would be raised by 20% after every 3 years. The Respondent claimed that it thereafter paid the enhanced licence fee and other accidental charges in terms of the said negotiations and the Petitioner Authority duly accepted the same. The Respondent claimed that it thereafter paid the enhanced licence fee and other accidental charges in terms of the said negotiations and the Petitioner Authority duly accepted the same. In the said background the Respondent also asserted that the Petitioners authority assured that there would be a fresh agreement for extending the prevailing arrangement at least upto 31.5.2002. 49. The stand of the Respondent in TS No. 2/2002 inter alia was that it had shifted its restaurant to a space at the newly constructed portion of the terminal building of the airport on the request of the Petitioner Authority on the assurance that as soon as the renovation and construction work of the new terminal building would be completed it would be accommodated there and the entire earmarked space of the Airport restaurant as set out in the master plan would be handed over to it. It, therefore, claimed that on the basis of the negotiations already held and on the above assurances it was entitled to an extension of the contract beyond 31.5.2002. 50. In Title Suit No. 13/2002, the Respondent challenged the decision of the Petitioner Authority rejecting its tender pursuant to the NIT dated 15.3.2000 and also assailed the action of the Petitioner Authority in proceeding with the tender process without appointing an arbitrator in terms of the order dated 16.3.2002 passed under Section 11(6) of the Act. It prayed for a declaration therein that it was a sitting and operating licensee in respect of the Airport restaurant under the Petitioner Authority and that it should be allowed to run/operate the said restaurant till completion/finalization of the arbitration proceeding. The order dated 7.5.2002 passed by the learned court below in the said suit with regard to the business of the Respondent has remained un-assailed. The common plea of the Respondent as can be deciphered from the pleadings of the Title Suit No. 2/2002 and Title suit No. 18/ 2002 is that in view of the prevailing facts and circumstances as well as the earlier settlement/negotiations between the parties, the Respondent is entitled to continue as a licensee under the Petitioner Authority till completion of the proceeding before the arbitrator appointed under Section 11(6) of the Act. There is no denial of the fact that liberty was granted to the Respondent to file appropriate application under Section 11(6) of the Act for appointment of an arbitrator and status quo with regard to its business was granted till final orders were to be passed on such an application Liberty was also granted to it to approach the appropriate forum, if aggrieved for interim measures of protection under Section 9 of the Act. Admittedly, the arbitrator has been appointed and the disputes are pending for resolution before him. The Respondent categorically claims that its right to continue as licensee under the Petitioner Authority is one of the items of disputes before the arbitrator. It has claimed a right to continue as a licensee on the basis of settlement/negotiations between the parties. The plea about continuance of its right to carry on business as advanced in TS No. 2/2002 and TS No. 18/2002 has its roots in Misc. (Arb) 95/2000. The Respondent has projected subsequent developments in its pleadings in the above suits to content that its right to continue with the restaurant contract subsists beyond 31.5.2002. Its claim remains to be examined by the arbitrator. The pleadings in Misc.(Arb) 95/2000 do not conclusively indicate that the Respondent had conceded unequivocally that its right as a licensee was only upto 31.5.2002. The observations made by the Division Bench in W.A. No. 107/2002 does not indicate any adjudication of the right of the Respondent as a licensee under the Petitioner Authority. Considering the entire gamut of facts, I cannot persuade myself to upheld the contention of Mr. Choudhury that for all intents and purposes the right of the Respondent as a licensee had been decisively adjudicated in the said appeal to have culminated on 31.5.2002 and not beyond it. 51. While passing the order dated 26.3.2002, the learned court below took note of the order dated 18.1.2002 and 16.3.2002 passed by this Court. It also took note of the contentions that inspite of the order of this Court appointing the arbitrator to decide the disputes between the parties, the Petitioner Authority was proceeding with the NIT dated 15.3.2000 and threatening to dispossess it from its premises at the Airport restaurant. It also took note of the contentions that inspite of the order of this Court appointing the arbitrator to decide the disputes between the parties, the Petitioner Authority was proceeding with the NIT dated 15.3.2000 and threatening to dispossess it from its premises at the Airport restaurant. It is not clear as to whether the Respondent had produced before the learned court below, the order dated 18.3.2002 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in WA No. 107/2002 observing that it had the right to carry on its business upto 31.5.2002. Presumably, not. This is significant in view of the fact that by the said judgment and order the Division Bench of this Court had also rejected to attack on the stipulations contained in the NIT dated 15.3.2000 and had permitted the Petitioner Authority to complete the process pertaining thereto, but to give effect to the decision taken in connection therewith only with effect from 1.6.2002. To that extent, the conduct of the Respondent cannot be approved. The order dated 26.3.2002 though cryptic in the sense, that it does not deal with the fundamental principles relevant for the purpose of granting an interim order in the nature of injunction, in view of the fact that sufficient time has elapsed thereafter and that, the disputes between the parties are admittedly pending before the arbitrator, I do not feel inclined to interfere with the same in exercise of the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 52. The order dated 5.4.2003 was passed on the allegation of wilful violation of the order dated 26.3.2002 directing maintenance of status quo as regards the business of the Respondent at the LGBI airport restaurant. It cannot be gainsaid that on the date on which the letter dated 7.3.2003 was issued, the order of status quo dated 26.3.2002 was in force. The order dated 5.4.2003 was passed on the allegation of wilful violation of the order dated 26.3.2002 directing maintenance of status quo as regards the business of the Respondent at the LGBI airport restaurant. It cannot be gainsaid that on the date on which the letter dated 7.3.2003 was issued, the order of status quo dated 26.3.2002 was in force. As the letter dated 7.3.2003 reveals, the stand on behalf of the Petitioner authorities is that the same was issued being under the impression that in view of the order dated 24.1.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Jorhat vacating the status quo order dated 28.2.2002 passed in Misc.(J) case No. 36/2002 and the order dated 26.2.2002 passed by this Court in MFA No. 26/2003 refusing the extension of the order of status quo granted on 14.3.2003, it was open for them to ask the Respondent to vacate the business premises in its occupation. On a perusal of the order dated 24.1.2003 it appears that the order of status quo granted on 28.2.2002 related to the balance portion of the earmarked premises of the airport restaurant of the model Airport terminal building at Guwahati and not to the portion already in occupation of the Respondent. The order dated 14.1.2003 and 26.2.2003 as have been passed in MFA No. 26/2003 filed by the Respondent against the order dated 24.1.2003, therefore also relates to the balance portion of the premises. It can thus be reasonably concluded that it could not have been construed, following the orders dated 24.1.2003 and 26.2.2003, that it was permissible to ask the Respondent to vacate the space in its occupation in face of the order of status quo dated 26.3.2002. In that view of the matter, the learned Court below cannot be said to be in error in entertaining Misc.(J) case No. 45/2002. However, considering the fact that the letter had been issued on 7.3.2003 and that the application under Order 39 Rule 2A Code of Civil Procedure discloses that the direction contained in the said letter had taken effect already, the learned court below ought not to have issued the ex parte direction to the Petitioner Authority to restore status quo ante of the business of the Respondent as on 26.3.2002 and to restore the validity of the entry passes to its workers with immediate effect. A reading of the order dated 10.4.2003 indicates that the learned Counsel for the Petitioner was without any instruction regarding implementation of the order dated 5.4.2003, and the learned court below by taking note of the allegation that the same had not been implemented, directed the Superintendent of Police, Guwahati (City) to take necessary steps for implementation of the said order dated 5.4.2003. 53. It is submitted at the bar that the Respondent has already been restored the possession of the space in its occupation earlier and is conducting its business therefrom. However, the balance portion of the earmarked space of the restaurant in the airport terminal building has also been handed over the successful bidder pursuant to the NIT dated 15.3.2000 in the meantime and it is also carrying on its business there. In the above premises, I do not consider it to be a case of such an exceptional nature calling for interference with the orders dated 5.4.2003 and 10.4.2003 in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is no-doubt, true that the Respondent ought to have been cautiously restrained in its approach in initiating the proceedings one after the other and the learned courts below ought to have been more careful and circumspect in passing the orders impugned herein. But in the attending facts and circumstances of the case, I cannot persuade myself to hold that the learned courts below in doing so have acted beyond the bounds of their authority so much so that interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for. From the contextual facts involved in the Miscellaneous proceedings impugned as well as in Title Suit No. 2/2002 and Title Suit No. 18/2002, it cannot be said that those do not disclose any cause of action therefore. But, it has to be observed, that considering the common plea of the Respondent in all these proceedings that in view of the appointment of arbitrator and reference of disputes to him, it had a right to continue with the restaurant contract, it ought to have approached the arbitrator with his prayer for the interim reliefs instead of indulging in a litigation spree. 54. On the date on which the order dated 26.3.2002 had been passed, the order appointing the arbitrator for deciding the disputes between the parties had already come into existence. 54. On the date on which the order dated 26.3.2002 had been passed, the order appointing the arbitrator for deciding the disputes between the parties had already come into existence. The learned court below had taken note of the said order before passing the order dated 26.3.2002. I, therefore, do not consider that the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Sundaram Finance Limited (supra) helps the case of the Petitioners. The Respondent has consistently taken the plea that in view of settlements and negotiations between the parties, terms of the contract had been extended upto 31.5.2002 and that in view of the subsequent conduct of the Petitioner Authority, it is entitled to continue with its business thereafter. It is its plea that the dispute with regard to its right to carry on business as a licensee under the Petitioner authority is pending decision before the arbitrator. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Damodar Valley Corporation (supra) is also distinguishable as the Respondent has claims that the contract is continuing on the basis of fresh settlement and negotiations between the parties and the dispute pertaining thereto is pending before the arbitrator. The Apex Court in the said decision has analyzed in what conditions an arbitration clause in a contract survives or cease to exit vis-a-vis the contract. It was not ruled therein that performance under a contract, a dispute regarding continuance thereof pending in terms of the arbitration clause thereof, cannot be contemplated enforced under any circumstances. In view of the materials on record as noticed hereinabove in details, the decisions rendered in M/s East India Commercial Company Ltd. Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vid(s) State of Bihar v. Rani Sanabati Kumari (supra) also do not advance the case of the Petitioner. 55. As alluded above, the agreement dated 1.10.1981 between the parties whereunder the Respondent was inducted in the premises in question does not reflect the intention of the parties to construe the transaction comprehended therein as a licence simpliciter. The terms and conditions incorporated in the agreement recognize some element of right in favour of the Respondent to carry on its business in the premises referred to therein. The terms and conditions incorporated in the agreement recognize some element of right in favour of the Respondent to carry on its business in the premises referred to therein. In view of the categorical and consistent plea that the Respondent is entitled to carry on its business based on negotiations and settlements between the parties and that the disputes with regard thereto is pending before the arbitrator, a fact not specifically denied by the Petitioner Authority, I cannot subscribe to the view that in the present state of affairs, pending final decision in arbitral proceeding it can be held at this stage that the possession of the premises in occupation of the Respondent is that of a trespasser. Such a conclusion would amount to prejudging the disputes of arbitration. In that view of the matter, the decision of the Delhi High Court in Chandulal (supra) is also of no assistance to the Petitioner. 56. One aspect of the matter, however cannot be over looked. The parties have been involved in protracted litigations over the controversy for almost a decade. A number of proceedings have been initiated where several orders have been passed at different points of time. Admittedly, the disputes which form the substratum of the controversy are pending resolution before the arbitrator. But, the Respondent time and again has been approaching the courts below with fresh grievances relatable thereto and those have been entertained and orders passed providing new dimensions to the controversy every time. In my considered opinion, an early and final adjudication of the disputes between the parties is likely to provide the much needed quietus to the lingering controversy. For that, in my view, the unabated proliferation of proceedings before the court below on the matters relating to the controversy needs to be restrained as otherwise the parties would remain engaged therein and the proceedings before the arbitrator would remain unattended rendering it redundant. As the common plea of the Respondent in all the proceedings before the learned courts below is that it is entitled to continue with its business till the disputes with regard to its said right is finally resolved by the arbitrator, I am of the view that all further proceedings pending in the courts below should remain stayed and a time frame be fixed for the arbitrator to complete the proceedings before him and pass an award therein. As the Respondent and the successful bider are presently in occupation of their respective portions, I feel that status quo in respect thereof be maintained during the pendency of the arbitral proceeding. 57. This Court of action, I am inclined to direct, keeping an eye on the tortuous path of the events relating to the litigations between the parties. Whereas on one hand, quashing of the proceedings and the orders passed therein as prayed for by the Petitioners would amount to prejudging the issues pending before the arbitrator, thus paying the way for further litigations, continuance of the pending proceedings before the learned courts below parallely would have the potential of rendering the arbitration proceeding meaningless and redundant. The ultimate aim of the justice dispensing system is to achieve a finality in dispute resolution and that too as expeditiously and effectively as possible. The measure, sought to be adopted by this Court is thus, to facilitate a comprehensive and one time settlement of the disputes between the litigating parties. To this extent, the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has to be invoked. 58. In the light of the above discussion and on a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances, I therefore, dispose of this Revision petition with a direction that all further proceedings in Misc.(Arb.) case No. 95/ 2000, Misc(J) case No. 58/2002, Misc(J) case No. 45/2003, Title Suit No. 2/2002 and Title Suit No. 18/2002 shall remain stayed till disposal of the proceeding before the arbitrator appointed by this Court. The arbitrator would decide the disputes pending before him positively within a period of 3(three) months herefrom and pass his award in connection therewith. The order of status quo dated 26.3.2002, 7.5.2002 and 5.4.2003 shall continue for a period of three(3) months from today. Prayer for any interim relief pertaining to the arbitration disputes would be made before the arbitrator alone and the outcome of the above pending proceedings before the Courts below would abide by the final orders that would be passed under the Act following resolution of the disputes by the arbitrator. No costs. Petition disposed of.