R. M. DOSHIT, J. ( 1 ) DRAFT amendment is allowed. The amendment shall be carried out forthwith. ( 2 ) THE petitioner before this Court claims to be the Organization of self-employed workers (hereinafter referred to as the Organization ). At the time of the hearing of the petition on 1st May, 2003, Mr. Pahwa had submitted the above referred amendment. Alongwith the amendment is the list of persons who, according to the petitioner, are the members of the Organization. It is the claim that the members of the Organization are small business people who run their business from small stalls placed on the public roads of the city of Bhavnagar. A long time dispute as to the right of the said members to carry on business on the public roads is pending before this Court. Earlier, the Organization had filed Special Civil Application No. 4838/1982 for the benefit of its members and some individuals also preferred Special Civil Application No. 5485/1982. The said petitions were amicably settled. Under the said settlement, the respondent - Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) (then Bhavnagar Municipality) agreed to move all such members to particular places indicated in the settlement and to allow them to occupy such place and to carry on their business. Pursuant to the said settlement, on 13th January, 1983, the petitions were disposed of as withdrawn. It appears that the said settlement was not acted upon and the members of the Organization have continued to have their business at the respective places. However, the Corporation appears to have taken up the task of removing encroachment from the roads to clear the roads for smooth flow of traffic and to provide for footpaths for pedestrians. Feeling aggrieved, the Organization has filed Special Civil Application No. 10818/2001 and some individuals also have filed Special Civil Application No. 5657/2001. Those two petitions are admitted to final hearing. Pending those petitions, this Court (Coram: Jayant Patel, J.) under order dated 27th September, 2002, directed that "the authority shall give opportunity of hearing before taking decision of evicting or removing the petitioners from the land in question. However, this order would not mean that the petitioners have any statutory right over the land in question to continue with the occupation. " Pursuant to the above order, the Organization was given opportunity of hearing. However, this order would not mean that the petitioners have any statutory right over the land in question to continue with the occupation. " Pursuant to the above order, the Organization was given opportunity of hearing. Under order dated 16th January, 2003, the Commissioner decided that it was not possible to accede to the request of the Organization. The city roads were required to be widened earnestly and footpaths were required to be cleared of encroachment. Feeling aggrieved, the Organization has preferred the present petition. ( 3 ) AT the outset, Mr. Pahwa has submitted that the Organization is not particular about continuance of its members at their present place. However, according to Mr. Pahwa, the said members have a fundamental right to carry on business on the roads and pavements. It is, therefore, the duty of the Corporation to provide alternative place to such members where they can establish and carry on their business. Mr. Pahwa has also submitted that earlier the matter was settled as recorded hereinabove. The Corporation is bound to respect the said settlement and act accordingly. According to Mr. Pahwa, the Corporation is under obligation to offer space for business to the members of the Organization as was agreed in the year 1982 under the aforesaid settlement. ( 4 ) MR. PAHWA has relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the matter of SAUDAN SINGH V/s. N. D. M. C. AND ORS. [jt 1992 (2) S. C. 190]. The Honble Court referred to the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in the matter of SODAN SINGH AND ORS. V/s. NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND ORS. [ (1989) 4 S. C. C. 155]. In the said judgment, the Constitution Bench held that ". . . the right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution on street pavements, if properly regulated, cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for pedestrians and cannot be put to any other use. " It was further held that ". . . All public streets and roads in the country vest in the State. " It was further held that ". . . All public streets and roads in the country vest in the State. The State holds them as trustee on behalf of the public, and the members of the public are entitled as beneficiaries to use them for trading as a matter of right subject of course to similar rights possessed by every other citizen including pedestrians. " The Constitution Bench, however, clarified that "there cannot be a fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a particular place on the pavement where he can squat and engage in trading business. Nor can the hawkers assert a fundamental right to occupy permanently specific places on the pavement. " Considering the above observations made by the Constitution Bench, the Honble Supreme Court set to consider the scheme for settlement of squatters prepared by the respondents Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the New Delhi Municipal Committee. The Honble Court observed that ". . . having regard to the fact that we are dealing with the question of livelihood and survival of a large number of families, we do not think we would not be justified if we adopt a compassionate approach so as to ensure that genuine squatters/hawkers are not denied their daily bread at the alter of technicalities while at the same time ensuring that those who are out to exploit and abuse the process of law do not succeed. " ( 5 ) NEXT, Mr. Pahwa relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the matter of GAINDA RAM AND ORS. V/s. M. C. D. TOWN HALL AND ORS. [jt 1993 (3) S. C. 396] arising from the directions issued in the above referred judgment of Saudan Singh v/s. N. D. M. C. and Ors. [jt 1992 (2) S. C. 190]. ( 6 ) MR. PAHWA also relied upon the judgment in the matter of SALKIA BUSINESSMENs ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS V/s. HOWRAH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND OTHERS [ (2001)6 S. C. C. 688]. Mr. Pahwa particularly relied upon paragraphs 3,4,8 and 9 thereof. In the said matter, the Honble Supreme Court was called upon to consider the efficacy of an order passed by the Court in terms of memorandum of compromise or an agreement filed in proceedings on the basis of which the Court proceedings came to be finally disposed of. Mr. Pahwa particularly relied upon paragraphs 3,4,8 and 9 thereof. In the said matter, the Honble Supreme Court was called upon to consider the efficacy of an order passed by the Court in terms of memorandum of compromise or an agreement filed in proceedings on the basis of which the Court proceedings came to be finally disposed of. It appears that the traders and businessmen carrying on business on the Grand Trunk Road (North) in and around Salkia Chowrasta within the limits of Hawrah Municipal Corporation, apprehending displacement and demolition of the places of their business for the construction of a flyover, initiated proceedings in the Calcutta High Court. In the said proceedings, an application for settlement of disputes had been taken out and the writ petition was sought to be disposed of in terms of the said settlement. The respondents Authorities, however, instead of abiding by the terms of the order, offered alternative accommodation on ownership basis. Feeling aggrieved, the writ petitioners moved the High Court and sought direction to allot alternative accommodation in terms of the earlier order of the Court. In the appeal arising from the said claim, the Honble Supreme Court observed that ". . . The High Court failed to do justice to its own orders. If courts are not to honour and implement their own orders, and encourage party litigants - be they public authorities, to invent methods of their own to short-circuit and give a go-by to the obligations and liabilities incurred by them under orders of the court the rule of law will certainly become a casualty in the process - a costly consequence to be zealously averted by all and at any rate by the highest courts in the States in the country. It does not, in our view, require any extraordinary exercise to hold that the memorandum and terms of the compromise in this case became part of the orders of the High Court itself when the earlier writ petition was finally disposed of on 13-2-1991 in the terms noticed supra, notwithstanding that there was no verbatim reproduction of the same in the order. " ( 7 ) AT last, Mr. Pahwa has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of ANUPAM REKADI CABIN ASSOCIATION V/s. JAMNAGAR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [1995 (1) G. L. H. 586]. Mr. " ( 7 ) AT last, Mr. Pahwa has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of ANUPAM REKADI CABIN ASSOCIATION V/s. JAMNAGAR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [1995 (1) G. L. H. 586]. Mr. Pahwa has submitted that in the said matter the respondent Jamnagar Municipal Corporation worked out a scheme for rehabilitation of the members of the petitioner Association. A similar scheme can be worked out in the present case also. In the said judgment, this Court has considered all the previous judgments of the Honble Supreme Court including the above referred judgments. Having considered all these judgments, the Honble Judges, speaking through His Lordship Mr. Justice R. K. Abichandani, observed that ". . . It is clear from the record that the petitioner - Association and its members who were carrying on trade in the disputed places were removed from such places in view of heavy traffic and the obstruction and nuisance which was being caused to the pedestrians and the traffic. These cabins/larri-gallas/rekdis were occupying vital public roads where there was heavy vehicular traffic and this resulted in traffic hazards and accidents. The Corporation has found it expedient in the interest of public to remove these rekdis/larri-gallas/cabins from the disputed places. ( 8 ) THE footpaths and roads are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public and they ought not to be converted to a private use. These traders cannot claim a permanent right to continue at a particular public place for their business. The Municipal Corporation is under an obligation by virtue of the provisions of Section 63 (19) of the said Act to remove obstructions and projections in or upon the streets and other public places. We are, therefore, satisfied that the Corporation has undertaken the drive of removing the petitioners from the disputed places for valid reasons and in exercise of its statutory obligation to remove obstructions from public places and streets. " ( 9 ) THE Court further held that ". . . The hawkers cannot assert any legal right to occupy permanently any particular place on the streets or pavements or other public property. . . . . the public streets are meant for the use of general public and are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private business. . . The hawkers cannot assert any legal right to occupy permanently any particular place on the streets or pavements or other public property. . . . . the public streets are meant for the use of general public and are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right claimed by them, they could hold the society to ransom by squatting on the busy thoroughfares thereby paralysing all civic life. . . . . It is thus, clear that the petitioners cannot claim any right to continue at a particular public place for carrying on their business. In the instant case, the Corporation and the Police have, considering the traffic hazards and obstructions at various congested points, undertaken to remove the obstructions in the interest of general public. " ( 10 ) UPSHOT of all these judgments is that the squatters/hawkers have no right either fundamental or statutory to carry on their business on public roads/streets/pavements. The public roads/streets/ pavements are public property to be utilised by the people in general. ( 11 ) AS to the settlement recorded in the year 1982, I must say that the said settlement has not been acted upon for these last 20 years and more. The members of the petitioner Organization also seem to be satisfied to continue their business on the existing places without being disturbed. None of them sought implementation/enforcement of the said settlement. I am of the view that the members of the petitioner Organization and other squatters and hawkers having enjoyed their continuance in the existing places for more than 20 years, cannot now seek enforcement of the said settlement. ( 12 ) AS to the impugned order dated 16th January, 2003 made by the Commissioner, I am of the view that the request of the petitioner Organization has been rejected on cogent and valid grounds. It is noted that there is no scope for widening of the roads or footpaths; there has been two-fold increase in the population of the city and ten-fold increase in the vehicles. High-rise buildings have come up. Such places have been sold by the concerned allottees for a huge sum. Such places are now being occupied by people other than the original allottees. The places which were earmarked for shifting the hawkers in the 1982 settlement have now become congested areas. High-rise buildings have come up. Such places have been sold by the concerned allottees for a huge sum. Such places are now being occupied by people other than the original allottees. The places which were earmarked for shifting the hawkers in the 1982 settlement have now become congested areas. The removal of encroachment is necessitated for smooth flow of traffic and for the use of footpaths by the pedestrians. ( 13 ) IN above view of the matter, I see no merit in the claim made by the petitioner Organization. Further, I am unable to be oblivious to quite a few lives, mainly of young school going children, lost every day in the cities of the State for want of safe pedestrian paths. If such pedestrian paths can be provided for people to walk safely on, all these budding, promising lives can be saved. The unhygienic conditions and pollution generated on account of the filth and the garbage left by these squatters/hawkers also cannot be overlooked. ( 14 ) MOREOVER, in the present case, as disclosed in the counter affidavit, the Corporation has offered as many as 150 regularly constructed shops at upset price as a matter of precedence. The members of the Organization can avail of the said opportunity. ( 15 ) IN above view of the matter, all these petitions are dismissed. Notice issued in Special Civil Application No. 549/2003 is discharged. Ad-interim relief is vacated. ( 16 ) RULE nisi issued in Special Civil Applications Nos. 5657/2001 and 10818/2001 is discharged. Interim relief in each of these petitions stands vacated. The parties shall bear their own costs. ( 17 ) THE Registry shall maintain copy of this order in each of these petitions. .