JUDGMENT Per Tapen Sen, J.-Heard Mr. M.M. Bannerjea, learned counsel for the Petitioners and Mr. R.S. Majumdar, learned counsel for the Respondents. 2. In this Writ Application the Petitioners pray for quashing the entire Certificate Proceedings initiated against the Petitioners (Central Coalfields Limited, a Government Company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act) for payment of Dead rent and Cess till 4.4.1991 being Certificate Case No. 22/95-96 (Annexure-2). The Petitioners further pray for a writ in the nature of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Respondents to forbear from giving effect to or acting in pursuance of the said proceedings. . 3. According to the Petitioners, they are not at all liable to pay either Dead rent or Cess because according to them, the area for which the aforementioned amounts are being sought to be realized were admittedly acquired under the provisions of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957. According to the Petitioners, the area having been 'Acquired'. the provisions of Section 9A of the Mines and Mineral Development Act, 1957 which is the enabling provision in respect of the liability to pay Dead rent, does not arise because the condition precedent for the application of said Section 9A, is that it is chargeable only from a 'Lessee' and not from an 'Acquirer'. 4. At the very outset however both, the learned counsel for the Petitioners as also the learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that the demand of Cess/ Levy of Cess. in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be made in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of "District Mining Officer and others vs. Tata Iron and Steel Company" reported in ' AIR 2001 (S.C.) 3134 '. 5. In that view of the matter, the learned counsel for the Petitioners states that the lands which are subject matter of the proceedings were admittedly acquired under the provisions of the Coal Bearing Area (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 by a Notification dated 29.7.1983. Consequently, the learned counsel states that as per the provisions of Section 18A of the said Act, the Petitioners are only liable to pay royalty and not Dead rent.
Consequently, the learned counsel states that as per the provisions of Section 18A of the said Act, the Petitioners are only liable to pay royalty and not Dead rent. Section 18A of the aforementioned Act reads as follows : "18-A. Payment to State Government in lieu of royalty.-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where any land or any rights in or over land belonging to a State Government (other than the rights under a mining lease granted, or deemed to have been granted by the State Government to any person) vest in the Central Government under Section 10 or in a Government company under Section 11, the Central Government or the company, as the case may be, may pay to the State Government such sum of money as would have been payable as royalty by a lessee had such land or 'rights been under a mining lease granted by the State Government." 6. The learned counsel for the Petitioners further submits that the enabling provision which makes Dead rent payable is to be found in Section 9A of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act. 1957 which reads as follows : "9A. Dead rent to be paid by the lessee.--{1) The holder of a mining lease, whether granted before or after the commencement of the Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 1972 shall notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of lease or in any other law for the time being in force pay to the State Government every year dead rent at such rate as may be specified for the time being, in the Third Schedule for all the areas included in instrument of lease: Provided that where the holder of such mining lease becomes liable under Section 9, to pay royalty for any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the leased area, he shall be liable to pay either such royalty or the dead rent in respect of such area whichever is greater." 7. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that upon a bare perusal of the aforementioned statute i.e. Section 9 A it is apparent that the holder of the Mining Lease only becomes liable to pay dead rent, but an Acquirer, by reason of Section 18A of the Coal Bearing Area (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 is liable to pay only royalty. 8.
8. The aforementioned submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner is rejected because of the provisions of Section 11 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 which reads as follows : Power of Central Government to direct vesting of land or rights in a Government company.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10, the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that a Government Company is willing to comply, or has complied with such terms and conditions as the Central Government may think fit to impose, direct by order in writing, that the land or the rights in or over the land, as the case may be, shall, instead of vesting in the Central Government under Section 10 or continuing to so vest, vest in the Government Company either on the date of publication of the declaration or on such other date as may be specified in the direction. (2) Where the right under any mining lease acquired under this Act, vest in a government company under Sub Section (1), the Government Company shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the lessee of the State Government as if a mining lease under the Mineral Concession Rules had been granted by the State Government to the Government Company, the period thereof being the entire period for which such a lease could have been granted by the State Government under those Rules and all rights and liabilities of the Central Government in relation to the lease or the land covered by it shall, on and from the date of such vesting be deemed to have become the rights and liabilities of the Government Company." 9. From a perusal of aforementioned provisions therefore, it is apparent that Section 11, Sub Section (2) thereof clearly, and in an unequivocal terms, lays down that where the rights under any Mining Lease acquired under this Act vests in a Government Company under Sub Section (1), the Government Company shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become a Lessee of the State Government as if a Mining Lease under the Mineral Concession Rules had been granted by the State Government to the Government Company, the period thereof being the entire period for which such a lease could have been granted by the State Government under those Rules.
This Sub Section further clarifies that all rights and liabilities of the Central Government in relation to the lease or the land covered by it shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the rights and liabilities of the Government Company. Paragraph 22 of the Writ Application is a pointer to the fact that prior to acquisition, private persons had been prospecting the area for Fire Clay on the basis of the Mining Leases. 11. On the aforementioned limited facts alone this Writ Application cannot succeed. 12. After the aforementioned Judgment had been directed in Court, the learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that if the Government Company is deemed to be a Lessee under the provisions of Section 11 (2) of the Coal Bearing Area (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 then in that event it has to be seen as a matter of fact as to whether the Petitioner is liable to pay either royalty or Dead rent because as per the proviso appended to Section 9A (1), liability of such payment is dependent on whichever amount is greater. 13. This Court does not wish to make any comments in this respect because what is greater in so far as the demands are concerned, can be ascertained only on factual investigation. Consequently and as suggested by the learned counsel for the Respondents, this Court merely observes that in the event the Petitioners file ari application for such determination, the same shall be considered on its own merit in accordance with law. The Writ Application is dismissed. No order as to costs.