Judgment M. M. Kumar, J. 1. The petitioner-management Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation for brevity the HSIDC) has challenged the ex-parte award of the Labour Court, Chandigarh dated 3.4.1998 and the subsequent order of the Labour Court dated 10.4.2001 dismissing the application of the HSIDC for setting aside the ex-parte award. 2. Facts in brief are that workman-respondent No.3 was working as a Tracer on fixed remuneration @ Rs.646/- p. m. , which was D. C. rate fixed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. On 10.9.1988, his services were dispensed with as no longer required. The Labour Court passed as award directing reinstatement of the workman-respondent No.3 with continuity of service but held that the workman was not entitled to payment of any backwages till 3.2.1990 as the demand notice was issued by his after one and half year of his termination. He was however, held entitled to wages @ 70% for the subsequent period. On 9.3.1992, workman-respondent No.3 was reinstated in service and backwages were paid by HSIDC as per the award of the Labour Court. The workman-respondent No.3 filed an application under Sec.33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity the Act) before the Labour Court claiming that he was entitled to regular pay scale of Rs.1200-2040 but the same was dismissed on 2.2.1995 as not maintainable because the claim of the workman was neither adjudicated or recognised by the management in any ward or settlement. Thereafter the workman-respondent No.3 sent a demand notice (Annexure P-2), claiming regularisation, pay scale of Rs.12002040, attendant benefits and interest @ 18% on the different of emoluments. 3. It is significant to note that on 30.12.1996, HSIDC on its own and in pursuance of the government instructions dated 27.5.1993 offered the workman-respondent No.3 appointment to the post of Tracer in the pay scale of Rs.1200-2040 on regular basis but on probation of one year. Accordingly accepting the terms recorded in the appointment letter (Annexure P-3), workman-respondent No.3 joined on 31.12.1996 (Annexure P-4 ). In pursuance of settlement between HSIDC and the workman-respondent No.3, the demand notice sent by workman-respondent No.3 was withdrawn on 8.1.1997 vide Annexure P-6, which is a copy of the registered letter sent by the workman respondent No.3 to the Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer, U. T. Chandigarh, and it reads as under: "the above case was fixed for consideration in the month of September/october, 1996. The Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation has issued letter on 30.12.1996. Photocopy of which is enclosed herewith. In this letter they have given me the regular cadre in the pay scale of Rs.1200-2040 with immediate effect. I have been placed on probation for one year. I have given my joining report in view of regularisation letter dated 30.12.1996. I am therefore, withdrawing my demand notice which is pending before your goodself, the necessary intimation may be sent to the Government. " 4. The HSIDC did not expect reference of any dispute to the Labour Court in respect of which settlement had been arrived at with workman-respondent No.3. However, the same dispute was referred to the Labour Court. U. T. Chandigarh under Sec.10 (1) (c) of the Act and after adjudication it was decided on 3.4.1998 in favour of workman-respondent No.3 on 3.4.1998. The Labour Court in its ex-parte award (Annexure P-7) held that he was entitled to pay scale of Rs.1200-2040 with effect from 31.3.1993. The application of the HSIDC seeking setting-aside of the ex-parte award on various grounds has been dismissed by the Labour Court vide order dated 10.4.2001 (Annexure P-8 ). Feeling aggrieved, HSIDC has approached this Court with the prayers that the ex-parte award dated 3.4.1998 Annexure P-7 and the order dated 10.4.2001 refusing to set-aside the ex-parte award be quashed. 5. In his written statement, workman-respondent No.3 has taken the stand that the appropriate government was apparently satisfied that dispute existed or was apprehended regarding non grant of scale of pay with effect from 31.3.1993. Therefore, it has been claimed that the reference was rightly made by the appropriate government to the Labour Court and no exception can be taken to the award dated 3.4.1998 (Annexure P-7) and the order dated 10.4.2001 (Annexure P8 ). It has further been claimed that ex-parte award was passed by the Labour Court on 3.4.1998 and the same was not challenged. However, after about one and half year on 19.11.1999, an application for setting-aside ex-parte award was filed before the Labour Court, which has been dismissed on 10.4.2001. Therefore, it is claimed that the instant petition is liable to be dismissed on account of delay and laches. It has also been claimed that in the application filed on 19.11.1999, it is conceded that HSIDC was duly served but Sh. Therefore, it is claimed that the instant petition is liable to be dismissed on account of delay and laches. It has also been claimed that in the application filed on 19.11.1999, it is conceded that HSIDC was duly served but Sh. G. S. Sawhney, its Manager (Legal), who was incharge of the case did not process the case. 6. We have heard Mr. A. K. Pathania, learned counsel for HSIDC, who has argued that after workman-respondent No.3 had sent an application on 8.1.1997 (Annexure P-6) to the Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer, no dispute would survive for reference under Sec.10 (1) (c) of the Act because the workman in writing has withdrawn his demand notice after feeling satisfied with the order of regularisation on the post of Tracer in the pay scale of Rs.1200-2040 with effect from 1.1.1997. According to the learned counsel, the reference made on 28.1.1997 by the U. T. Chandigarh is without jurisdiction and any determination by Labour Court on the basis thereof is liable to be setaside. Therefore, he has prayed for quashing of the ex-parte award dated 3.4.1998 (Annexure P-7) and the order of the Labour Court refusing to set-aside the ex-parte award dated 10.4.2001. 7. Mr. Deepak Arora, learned counsel for workman-respondent No.3 has submitted that dispute existed with regard to payment of wages with effect from 31.3.1993 till 31.12.1996 in the pay scale of Rs.1200-2040 or in any case the same was appreciated by the Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer, U. T. Chandigarh within the meaning of Sec.10 (1) (c) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, there is no legal infirmity in the reference made by the Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer, U. T. Chandigarh. 8. We have thoughtfully considered the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and are of the view that this petition deserves to succeed. The definition of expression Industrial Dispute under Sec.2 (k) of the Act makes it evident that any difference or dispute connected with the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or with the condition of labour would be an industrial dispute within the meaning of that section. However, in cases where the difference or dispute between the parties have been amicably settled resulting in filing of application for withdrawal of the demand notice, it would be trite to say that no dispute would exist. Therefore, no reference as such would require to be made. However, in cases where the difference or dispute between the parties have been amicably settled resulting in filing of application for withdrawal of the demand notice, it would be trite to say that no dispute would exist. Therefore, no reference as such would require to be made. 9. The question as to whether the appropriate government is entitled to cancel the reference already made has been answered in negative by the Supreme Court in catena of judgments. By interpreting Sec.10 (1) of the Act, it has been observed by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar V/s. D. N. Gangul AIR 1958 S. C.1018 that the appropriate government having once made a reference would not be competent to cancel or supersede the same as no express power has been conferred. However, there is nothing in the Act prohibiting the Labour Court from interpreting the term of settlement in his award and pass the award accordingly because once a settlement has been entered into between the management and the workman, then its validity on the touchstone of arbitrariness and discrimination cannot be tested. These views have been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of I. T. C. Limited Workers Welfare Association V/s. I. T. C. Limited (2002) 3 SCC 411. In that case during the course of conciliation proceedings, a settlement was entered into between the management and the workers and after the settlement has been arrived at dispute was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal and the Tribunal answered the reference in favour of the management and against the workers union. The award of the Tribunal was upheld by the High Court and then by the Supreme Court. The views of the Supreme Court on the question relevant in the present case could be gleaned from the following observations of their Lordships:- "what remains to be considered is whether it is fair and just, viewed from a broader angle and taking a holistic view of the matter. The present case is one where Article 14 cannot be applied as the respondent is not state or other authority. It is true that certain considerations germane to Article 14 may also be germane while deciding the issue whether the settlement is just and fair. The present case is one where Article 14 cannot be applied as the respondent is not state or other authority. It is true that certain considerations germane to Article 14 may also be germane while deciding the issue whether the settlement is just and fair. But, it does not follow that the doctrine of classification and the principles associated with it should be projected wholesale into the process of consideration of justness and fairness of the settlement. There may be some overlapping and there may be some facets which apply in common to determine the crucial issue whether the settlement on the whole is just and fair, but that is not to say that the settlement is liable to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14, more os when it has no application in the instant case. Keeping this distinction in mind and considering the grounds of attack on the particular clause of settlement, it is not possible to hold that it is vulnerable to challenge on any well-recognised grounds. The facts on record do not establish that the settlement which was reached was palpably unjust or unfair from the point of view of the entire body of workmen. The preponderance of circumstances and the material on record do not displace the presumption attached to the settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation. " 10. If the facts of the present case are examined in the light of principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in ITC Workers Welfare Unions case (supra) or judgements of the Supreme Court referred above, it becomes evident that the award dated 3.4.1998 passed by the Labour Court cannot be sustained in the eyes of law nor the order dated 10.4.2001 could be considered to be valid. To our mind, the course open to the Labour Court in such circumstances was to conclude that the dispute between the HSIDC and the workman-respondent No.3 has been amicably settled and, therefore, nothing survives for adjudication. This course could have been adopted by the Labour Court when an application for setting-aside the ex-parte award was made and these facts that the workman has accepted the pay scale of Rs.1200-2040 with effect from 1.1.1997 and that the demand notice issued by his was withdrawn. This course could have been adopted by the Labour Court when an application for setting-aside the ex-parte award was made and these facts that the workman has accepted the pay scale of Rs.1200-2040 with effect from 1.1.1997 and that the demand notice issued by his was withdrawn. The Labour Court committed a legal mistake by proceeding with the adjudication of the reference and going beyond the settlement arrived at between HSIDC and the workman-respondent No.3. Therefore, the order of the Labour Court dated 10.4.2001 and the order dated 3.4.1998 are liable to be set-aside. 11. For the reasons recorded above, we allow this petition. The exparte Award dated 10.4.2001 and the order dated 3.4.1998 refusing to set aside the award are set aside.