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Allahabad High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 2881 (ALL)

OM PRAKASH v. HARI SINGH YADAV

2003-12-10

S.P.MEHROTRA

body2003
S. P. MEHROTRA, J. ( 1 ) THE present Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, interalia, praying for quashing the judgment and order dated 19. 9. 2003 (Annexure-7 to the Writ petition) passed by the learned Special/additional District Judge, Saharanpur and the judgment and order dated 28. 4. 1998 (Annexure-6 to the Writ Petition) passed by the learned Judge, Small cause Court, Saharanpur. ( 2 ) THE dispute relates to a shop bearing Municipal No. 1/868/2 Shiv Mandir Chowk, Sharda nagar, Saharanpur, the details whereof are given in the plaint of the Suit referred to hereinafter. The said shop has hereinafter been referred to as "the disputed shop". ( 3 ) FROM a perusal of the averments made in the Writ Petition and the annexures thereto, it appears that the respondent filed a Suit for eviction, arrears of rent, damages etc. against the petitioner in respect of the disputed shop. It was, interalia, stated by the respondent in the said suit that the petitioner was the tenant of the disputed shop at a monthly rent of Rs. 25/-; and that the rent with effect from 1. 2. 1986 was due from the petitioner in respect of the disputed shop, which was not paid by the petitioner despite repeated demands and notice; and that a notice dated 20. 1. 1997 was sent by the respondent through his Counsel by registered post, which was received by the petitioner on 21. 1. 1997; and that by the said notice, the petitioner was called upon to pay, within one month of the receipt of the said notice, the entire arrears with effect from 1. 2. 1986 at the rate of Rs. 25/- per month as well as the cost of the notice, and further, the tenancy of the petitioner was determined on the expiry of the period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice; and that the petitioner did not comply with the terms of the said notice and instead, the petitioner gave an incorrect reply through his Counsel. ( 4 ) THE said Suit was registered as SCC Suit No. 21 of 1997. ( 5 ) COPY of the plaint of the said Suit has been filed as Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition. ( 4 ) THE said Suit was registered as SCC Suit No. 21 of 1997. ( 5 ) COPY of the plaint of the said Suit has been filed as Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition. ( 6 ) THE petitioner contested the said Suit, and filed written statement, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-4 to the Writ Petition. ( 7 ) IT was, interalia, stated in the said written statement that the rent of the disputed shop was Rs. 25/- per month; and that the petitioner did not commit any default in payment of rent; and that the petitioner demanded receipt from the respondent in respect of the rent, but the respondent avoided giving the receipt; and that as such, the petitioner sent the rent by money order to the respondent, but the respondent refused to accept the same; and that in the circumstances, the petitioner was compelled to deposit rent for the period February, 1986 to July, 1996 in Misc. Case No. 131 of 1996 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Saharanpur; and that thereafter, rent for the period with effect from 1. 8. 1996 to 31. 7. 1997 at the rate of Rs. 25/- was also deposited in the said Misc. Case. ( 8 ) IT further appears that the parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases in the said Suit. ( 9 ) BY the judgment and order dated 28. 4. 1998, the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, saharanpur decreed the said SCC Suit No. 21 of 1997 filed by the respondent. It was, interalia, held in the said judgment and order dated 28. 4. 1998 that the respondent gave notice dated 20. 1. 1997 to the petitioner, which, according to the respondent, was received by the petitioner on 21. 1. 1997; and that the petitioner gave his reply dated 3. 2. 1997 to the said notice wherein the petitioner accepted the receipt of the said notice dated 20. 1. 1997; and that thus, it was evident that the said notice dated 20. 1. 1997 was received by the petitioner on or before 3. 2. 1997; and that even according to the version of the petitioner, till 3. 2. 2. 1997 to the said notice wherein the petitioner accepted the receipt of the said notice dated 20. 1. 1997; and that thus, it was evident that the said notice dated 20. 1. 1997 was received by the petitioner on or before 3. 2. 1997; and that even according to the version of the petitioner, till 3. 2. 1997, rent for the period upto July, 1996 had been deposited under Section 30 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short "the Act"); and that it was fully evident that whether the said deposit under Section 30 of the Act be taken to be a valid deposit or not, but in the circumstances, at the time when the notice dated 20. 1. 1997 was given, rent for more than 4 months was due from the petitioner; and that the deposit in respect of the period subsequent to July, 1996 i. e. , for the period from August, 1996 to the July, 1997 was made on. 6. 3. 1997 in the said Misc. Case under Section 30 of the Act; and that thus, the said deposit under Section 30 of the Act made on 6. 3. 1997, was made after the expiry of one month from the receipt of the said notice dated 20. 1. 1997; and that no benefit could be given to the petitioner on the basis of the said deposit made on 6. 3. 1997 under Section 30 of the Act; and that Section 20 (4) of the Act required besides deposit of rent, deposit of cost of notice, interest, counsels fee etc. ; and that in any view of the matter, the said deposit under Section 30 of the act could not be treated to be deposit under Section 20 (4) of the Act. ( 10 ) THEREAFTER, the petitioner filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause courts Act, which was registered as SCC Revision No. 45 of 1998. ( 11 ) BY the judgment and order dated 19. 9. 2003, the learned Special/additional District Judge, saharanpur dismissed the said SCC Revision No. 45 of 1998, and confirmed the said judgment and decree dated 28. 4. 1998 passed by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Saharanpur. ( 12 ) THEREAFTER, the petitioner filed the present Writ Petition seeking the reliefs mentioned above. 9. 2003, the learned Special/additional District Judge, saharanpur dismissed the said SCC Revision No. 45 of 1998, and confirmed the said judgment and decree dated 28. 4. 1998 passed by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Saharanpur. ( 12 ) THEREAFTER, the petitioner filed the present Writ Petition seeking the reliefs mentioned above. ( 13 ) I have heard Shri Rakesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri S. S. Nigam, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent, and perused the record. ( 14 ) IT is submitted by Shri Rakesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner that in view of the fact that petitioner deposited the rent for the period February, 1986 to July, 1996 in Misc. Case no. 131 of 1996 under Section 30 of the Act, and further deposited the rent for the period 1. 8. 1996 to 31. 7. 1997 in the said Misc. Case No. 6. 3. 1997, the finding recorded by the Courts below, that the petitioner defaulted in payment of rent, was illegal. ( 15 ) IT is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that in case the said deposit under Section 30 of the Act were taken into consideration in deciding the question of entitlement of the petitioner for the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act, there was only a little deficiency, if any, and in the circumstances, the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the act. ( 16 ) SHRI Rakesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following decisions: 1. Mam Chand Pal v. Smt. Shanti Agarwal, 2002 (1) ARC 370 : 2002 (1) CLR 669 (S. C. ). 2. Krishna Manohar Dhawan v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur and Ors. , 1983 (1) ARC 823. 3. Mahendra Nath Tandon v. VIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and Ors. , 1997 (1)ARC 139. 4. Gokaran Singh v. Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi, 2000 (1) ARC 653 (F. B. ). ( 17 ) IN reply, Shri S. S. Nigam, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent submits that the courts below, on a consideration of the material on record, have recorded findings of fact on various factors including the question of default by the petitioner in payment of rent. ( 17 ) IN reply, Shri S. S. Nigam, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent submits that the courts below, on a consideration of the material on record, have recorded findings of fact on various factors including the question of default by the petitioner in payment of rent. No interference, the submission proceeds, is, therefore, called for with the said findings of fact by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 18 ) IT is further submitted by Shri Nigam that the composite notice of demand and determination of tenancy dated 20. 1. 1997 sent to the petitioner was served on the petitioner on 21. 1. 1997. The petitioner gave reply to the said notice on 3. 2. 1997. Deposit of rent for the period 1. 8. 1996 to 31. 7. 1997 under Section 30 of the Act was made on 6. 3. 1997. ( 19 ) IT is submitted by Shri Nigam that the said deposit under Section 30 of the Act could not have been made by the petitioner once the notice dated 20. 1. 1997 was given to the petitioner by the respondent wherein demand for rent was made from the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner was required to tender rent within one month of the receipt of the said notice dated 20. 1. 1997, and it is only if the respondent had refused to accept such tender that the petitioner could deposit rent under Section 30 of the Act. Reliance in this regard is placed by Shri Nigam on the decision of the Full Bench in Gokaran Singh case (supra ). ( 20 ) IN the alternative, Shri Nigam submits that even if the said deposit under Section 30 of the act could be taken into consideration, the said deposit was made on 6. 3. 1997 i. e. , after a period of one month from the receipt of the notice on 21. 1. 1997. It is submitted that even if the period of one month were to be counted from 3. 2. 1997 i. e. , the date on which the petitioner gave reply to the said notice, the period of one month would expire prior to 6. 3. 1. 1997. It is submitted that even if the period of one month were to be counted from 3. 2. 1997 i. e. , the date on which the petitioner gave reply to the said notice, the period of one month would expire prior to 6. 3. 1997, and in the circumstances, in any view of the matter, the said deposit under Section 30 of the Act could not save the petitioner from being a defaulter in payment of rent within the meaning of Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act. ( 21 ) IT is further submitted by Shri Nigam that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act, inasmuch, as even if the deposit under Section 30 of the Act were to be taken into consideration, the said deposit was far below than the deposit required to be made as per the requirements of Section 20 (4) of the Act. ( 22 ) I have consideration the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. ( 23 ) TAKING up the question of default by the petitioner in payment of rent, it is evident from the facts narrated above as also from the perusal of the record that the rent for the period from 1. 2. 1986 to 31. 7. 1996 was deposited by the petitioner in Misc. Case No. 131 of 1996 under section 30 of the Act on 22. 8. 1996. The said composite notice of demand and determination of tenancy was given by the respondent to the petitioner on 20. 1. 1997. Thus, on the date when the said notice was given by the respondent to the petitioner (i. e. , on 20. 1. 1997), rent with effect from August, 1996 was due from the petitioner even if the said deposit under Section 30 of the act were to be taken into account. Therefore, rent for more than four months was due from the petitioner to the respondent on the date of the said notice even if the deposit under Section 30 of the Act made by the petitioner on 22. 8. 1996 were to be taken into account. ( 24 ) SECTION 20 of the Act provides as follows: "20. Bar of Suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds (1 ). 8. 1996 were to be taken into account. ( 24 ) SECTION 20 of the Act provides as follows: "20. Bar of Suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds (1 ). Save as provided in Sub-section (2), ( * * *) no Suit shall be instituted for eviction of a tenant from building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in other manner: provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a Suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a Suit, appeal, revision or execution proceedings, which is either recorded in Court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant. (2) A Suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds: (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand: provided that in relation to a tenant who is a member of the armed forces of the Union and in whose favour the prescribed authority under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (Act No. IV of 1925), has issued a certificate that he is serving under special conditions within the meaning of Section 3 of that Act or where he has died by enemy action while so serving, then in relation to his heirs, the words "four months" in this clause shall be deemed to have been substituted by the words "one year"; (b) that the tenant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the building; (c) that the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction or structural alteration in the building as is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it; (d) that the tenant (has without the consent in writing of the landlord used it for a purpose other than the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the building or otherwise done by act which is inconsistent with such use), or has been convicted under any law for the time being in force of an offence or using the building or allowing it to be used for illegal or immoral purposes; (e) that the tenant has sub-let, in contravention of the provisions of Section 25, or, as the case may be, of the old Act the whole or any part of the building; (f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord, and the latter has not waived his right of re-entry, or condoned the conduct of the tenant; (g) that the tenant was allowed to occupy the building as part of his contract of employment under the landlord, and his employment has ceased. (* * *) (4) In any Suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the Suit the tenant unconditionally pays or (tenders to the landlord or deposits in court) the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlords costs of the Suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground: provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notification or two area. (Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section- (a) the expression "first hearing" means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant; (b) the expression "cost of the Suit", includes one half of the amount of Counsels fee taxable for a contested Suit.) (5) Nothing in this section shall affect the power of the Court to pass a decree on the basis of an agreement, compromise or satisfaction recorded under Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the First schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (6) Any amount deposited by the tenant under Sub-section (4) or under Rule 5 of Order XV of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall be paid to the landlord forthwith on his application without prejudice to the parties pleadings and subject to the ultimate decision in the Suit.)" ( 25 ) CLAUSE (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, thus, provides that a Suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted in case the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand. ( 26 ) AS noted above, on 20. 1. 1997 when the said composite notice of demand and determination of tenancy was given to the petitioner by the respondent, rent for more than four months was due from the petitioner to the respondent even if the deposit made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act on 22. 8. 1996 were to be taken into consideration. The petitioner in order to avoid default within the meaning of Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act was, thus, required to pay the arrears of rent within one month from the date of service upon him of the said notice of demand and determination of tenancy. ( 27 ) ACCORDING to the respondent, the said notice was served on the petitioner on 21. 1. 1997. The said version of the respondent appears to have been accepted by the Courts below. Therefore, the petitioner was required to pay or tender to the respondent the arrears of rent, mentioned in the said notice of demand and determination of tenancy, within one month from 21. 1. 1997. No such payment or tender of the arrears of rent within one month from 21. 1. 1997 has been shown by the petitioner. ( 28 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner however, submits that the rent for the period from 1. 8. 1996 to 31. 7. 1997 was deposited by the petitioner in the said Misc. Case No. 131 of 1996 under Section 30 of the Act on 6. 3. 1. 1997 has been shown by the petitioner. ( 28 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner however, submits that the rent for the period from 1. 8. 1996 to 31. 7. 1997 was deposited by the petitioner in the said Misc. Case No. 131 of 1996 under Section 30 of the Act on 6. 3. 1997, and in view of the said deposit, the petitioner would not be defaulter in payment of rent. I have considered the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and I find myself unable to accept the same. ( 29 ) IN Gokaran Singh case (supra), the following questions (paragraph 1 of the said ARC) came up for consideration before the Full Bench of this Court: 1. Whether a notice of demand can be held to be invalid or malafide on the ground that the rent had been demanded at a higher rate than the correct rate, and if so whether the tenant can be absolved from the duty of complying with such a notice? 2. In a case where the landlord had earlier been refusing to accept rent at the correct rate and had been claiming rent at higher rate and the tenant had as a consequence of landlords earlier refusal in the past, deposited the rent in Court under Section 30 and thereafter, landlord serves a formal notice of demand again at a higher rate, whether the tenant without tendering rent at the correct rate to the landlord has a right straight away to deposit the same under Section 30 (1)? 3. On which party, does the burden of proof lie in regard to the existence of arrears of rent? ( 30 ) THE Full Bench answered the said questions as follows (Paragraph 37 of the said ARC): "37. In view of the aforesaid discussions, three questions referred to the Full Bench, are answered as under: "1. A notice of demand, by which rent is demanded at higher rate than the correct rate, cannot be said to be invalid or malafide. On receipt of such notice of demand, the tenant is not absolved from his duty to comply with the said notice. He can, however, tender arrears of rent at the admitted rate to the landlord. 2. A notice of demand, by which rent is demanded at higher rate than the correct rate, cannot be said to be invalid or malafide. On receipt of such notice of demand, the tenant is not absolved from his duty to comply with the said notice. He can, however, tender arrears of rent at the admitted rate to the landlord. 2. If the landlord has been refusing to accept the rent at correct rate and has been claiming rent at higher rate, the tenant as a consequence of landlords earlier refusal in past, deposited the rent in the Court under Section 30 and if thereafter landlord serves formal notice of demand again at the higher rate and expresses his willingness to accept the rent, the tenant after receipt of notice is under an obligation to tender the rent at least at the rate admitted to him to the landlord and has got no right to straight away deposit the same under Section 30 (1) of the Act. 3. Initial burden of proof with regard to the existence of arrears of rent lies upon the landlord. Once said burden is discharged, the tenant will have to prove the payment of rent. Where the landlord and tenant both produce evidence with regard to the existence of arrears and payment of rent, the question of burden to proof looses is importance. " ( 31 ) IN view of the said decision of the Full Bench, it is evident that when the said composite notice of demand and determination of tenancy dated 20. 1. 1997 was served on the petitioner, the petitioner ought to have tendered the rent to the respondent, and in case such tender were refused by the respondent, the petitioner could then make deposit under Section 30 of the Act. ( 32 ) IN the present case, as is evident from the facts narrated above, no tender was made by the petitioner to the respondent after receipt of the said composite notice of demand and determination of tenancy. Hence, in view of the above decision of the Full Bench, the deposit could not be made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act. The deposit made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act on 6. 3. 1997 was, thus, not a valid deposit, and the same could not enure for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, in view of the above decision of the Full Bench, the deposit could not be made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act. The deposit made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act on 6. 3. 1997 was, thus, not a valid deposit, and the same could not enure for the benefit of the petitioner. ( 33 ) THERE is one more aspect of the matter. Even if the said deposit under Section 30 of the Act made on 6. 3. 1997 for the period from 1. 8. 1996 to 31. 7. 1997 were to be taken into consideration, still the said deposit could not save the petitioner from being a defaulter in payment of rent within the meaning of Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act. This is because, the said deposit was made on 6. 3. 1997, i. e. , after the expiry of period of one month from 21. 1. 1997 i. e. , the date of service of the said composite notice of demand and determination of tenancy. Even if the period of one month were to be counted from 3. 2. 1997 i. e. , the date on which the petitioner gave reply to the said notice dated 20. 1. 1997, the said deposit made on 6. 3. 1997 would be beyond the period of one month. ( 34 ) THEREFORE, in any view of the matter, the said deposit under Section 30 of the Act made on 6. 3. 1997 could not save the petitioner from being a defaulter in payment of rent within the meaning of Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act. ( 35 ) COMING now to the submission made by Shri Rakesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, regarding entitlement of benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act, it is pertinent to quote the following portion of the judgment and order dated 19. 9. 2003 passed by the learned special/additional District Judge, Saharanpur (Revisional Court): "with regard to Section 20 (4) no plea to this effect has been taken in the W. S. Otherwise also the tenant defendant has not complied with any condition envisaged under Section 20 (4) for getting its benefit. He has neither deposited the costs of the Suit nor interest nor Counsel fee etc. He has neither deposited the costs of the Suit nor interest nor Counsel fee etc. Even assuming the sake of arguments that deposit made under Section 30 in Misc. Case No. 131 of 1996 is presumed to be deposits under Section 20 (4) of the Act the defendant has deposited rs. 300/- on 6. 3. 1997, 12 months rent from 1. 8. 1996 to 31. 7. 1997 meaning thereby advance rent of four months, Rs. 100/- was deposited. Even if this R. 100/- is considered otherwise there is deficiency of the amount to large extent. It may be mentioned here that the Court fee stamps of rs. 237. 50 has been affixed, the Counsel fee of Rs. 56/- has not at all been included in addition to interest at the rate of 9% p/a. Therefore, the defendant is not entitled to get the benefit under section 20 (4) of the Act and the learned J. S. C. C. has rightly refused the benefit and has rightly come to the conclusion with regard to default. " ( 36 ) A perusal of the above passage of the judgment and order, of the Revisional Court shows that even if the deposit under Section 30 of the Act were to be taken into account, still there was deficiency of the amount to a large extent as per the requirements of Section 20 (4) of the Act. Therefore, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there was only a short deficiency, cannot be accepted. ( 37 ) IN Mam Chand Pal case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 11 of the said CLR): "7. In regard to the date of first hearing as indicated earlier, while ordering for publication of the notice, date of hearing was fixed as 3. 7. 1989. It was wrongly published as 26. 4. 1989, nothing however would turn upon this, but on 26. 4. 1989, the Presiding Officer was not available and 11. 5. 1989 was fixed as the next date. In cases where the Court itself is not available it could not be treated as date of first hearing. This contention of the tenant-appellant finds support from a division Bench of Allahabad High Court reported in 1982 (1) ARC Page 665-Jagannath and anr. v. Ram Chandra Srivastava and Anr. . 5. 1989 was fixed as the next date. In cases where the Court itself is not available it could not be treated as date of first hearing. This contention of the tenant-appellant finds support from a division Bench of Allahabad High Court reported in 1982 (1) ARC Page 665-Jagannath and anr. v. Ram Chandra Srivastava and Anr. . The Court was considering the expression "first hearing" as occurring in Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. It was held that the "first hearing" will be the date mentioned in the summons for the purpose except when the Presiding Officer is absent or otherwise is not available to take up the case on that. Two other dates of deposits made by the tenant shall also be important. The amount of lawyers fee was deposited on 11. 5. 1989 and 1. 5. 1989 the tenant had deposited the rent for the months of March, April and May, 1989. Copy of the relevant tenders has been filed alongwith counter affidavit of the respondent. The appellate Court also mentioned about the deposit of the rent for the months of March, April and may, 1989 in its judgment while dealing with the matter relating to the point raised about striking off the defence of the tenant-defendant under Order XV, Rule 5, CPC. The High Court however observed that if the next date of hearing is to be taken as 3. 7. 1989, in that even there would be no deposit of rent for the months of March, April, May and June, 1989. It is difficult to sustain above observations made by the High Court as there is material on the record to indicate that rent for the months of March, April and May, 1989 was deposited by the tenant-appellant in court on 1. 5. 1989 and the amount on account of fee of the lawyers was deposited on 11. 5. 1989 which was the next date fixed after 26. 4. 1989. That is to say by 11. 5. 1989 of the amounts of arrears due up to May, 1989 stood deposited. The amount deposited even before the date of first hearing amounts to sufficient compliance of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. Such observations have also been made in the decisions of this Court as referred to earlier namely; ved Prakash Wadhwa and Sudarshan Devi (supra ). The amount deposited even before the date of first hearing amounts to sufficient compliance of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. Such observations have also been made in the decisions of this Court as referred to earlier namely; ved Prakash Wadhwa and Sudarshan Devi (supra ). It is thus clear that all the dues of arrears of rent as well as other amounts liable to be deposited under Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the act had been duly deposited by 11. 5. 1989. There has been thus sufficient compliance of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. The High Court and the Courts below erred in treating 26. 4. 1989 as the date of first hearing. " 8. According to the appellant alternatively the matter can be viewed from another angle as well. As per the respondent, there has been a shortfall of the amount payable on account of Counsels fee, which was deposited only after 26. 4. 1989. In this connection, it may be observed that under sub-section (4) of Section 20 arrears of rent, damages for use and occupation, interest, costs of litigation is required to be deposited. There is no requirement of depositing any other amount or electricity charges. Admittedly, the petitioner had deposited a sum of Rs. 358/- also as electricity charges. The amount on account of fee of the lawyer was a sum of Rs. 375/ -. The amount of electricity charges could well be adjusted or treated to be as against lawyers fee. A minor deficiency of Rs. 17/- only against the total amount deposited near about six thousand or around that would be inconsequential and insignificant to defeat the purpose of enacting the relevant provisions as contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. It would only be a hyper technical view of the matter which would in no way serve the ends of justice even where virtually and substantially requirement of the legal provision is stands satisfied. 10. After the Suit was filed the tenant was too willing and ready to clear all the dues so much so that he did it before the first date of hearing and made subsequent deposits as well to make it up to date. We feel that the whole purpose of enacting Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act is to do substantial justice between the parties. We feel that the whole purpose of enacting Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act is to do substantial justice between the parties. It covers those cases along where the ground for eviction is default in payment of rent still the legislature intended to provide an opportunity to a tenant for payment of rent. On availing of such an opportunity, equities between the parties are levelled as the landlord gets the amounts of arrears of rent and damages alongwith legal expenses and interest on the defaulted amount and the tenant is saved of liability of being thrown out of the premises. While considering the import of such provisions, it may have to be seen that the requirement of law is substantially and virtually stands satisfied. A highly technical view of the matter will have no place in construing compliance of such a provision. We may however hasten to add that is not intended to lay down that non-compliance of any of the requirements of the provision in question is permissible. All the dues and amounts liable to be paid have undoubtedly to be paid or deposited on the date of first hearing but within that framework virtual and substantial compliance may suffice without sticking to mere technicalities of law. "11. In view of the discussion held above, we find that the appellant had duly complied with the requirement of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act and -is entitled for the benefit of protection against eviction as provided thereunder," ( 38 ) IT will be noticed that in Mam Chand Pal case (supra), there was a minor deficiency of Rs. 17/- only against the total amount near about Rs. 6000/- or around. In the circumstances, the said minor deficiency was held to be inconsequential and insignificant for the purposes of giving benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. ( 39 ) THE decision in Mam Chand Pal case (supra), in my opinion, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. As noted above, in the present case, even if the deposit made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act were to be taken into consideration, still there was deficiency of the amount to a large extent as per the requirements of Sub-section (4) of section 20 of the Act. As noted above, in the present case, even if the deposit made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act were to be taken into consideration, still there was deficiency of the amount to a large extent as per the requirements of Sub-section (4) of section 20 of the Act. ( 40 ) IN Krishna Manohar Dhawan case (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it was held by this Court as follows (at Page 825 of the said ARC): ". . . . . . . . . . . . The very use of word, relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction, for arrears of rent used in the sub-section indicates that it is beneficent provision in furtherance of objective of the Act to save tenant from eviction. It has, therefore, to be construed liberally in his favour. A tenant should be denied benefit of this provision for technical omissions or unintended failures. Provision for payment of interest, cost of Suit and arrears, having been held by this Court to include even time barred arrears, are by itself compulsive provisions to keep a tenant on guard. Payment of interest at nine percent if not penal is certainly harsh. Therefore, it should be construed strictly. And a tenant should not be thrown out even though he bonafide complies with law. . . . . . . . . in doing so there is same mistake in calculation or some misapprehension by use of such words as in this case. Action of tenant which may debar him from claiming benefit of this provision should be decided on anvil of bonafide. Therefore, even if there was some deficiency in payment of interest there is hardly any doubt that opposite party was not only keep but was taking all steps to save him from liability of eviction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 41 ) THE decision in Krishna Manohar Dhawan case (supra), in my opinion, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Krishna Manohar Dhawan case (supra), there was a short deficiency in the payment of interest, and in the circumstances, it was held that the benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act could not be denied to the tenant. In Krishna Manohar Dhawan case (supra), there was a short deficiency in the payment of interest, and in the circumstances, it was held that the benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act could not be denied to the tenant. In the present case, no deposit has been made by the petitioner under Section 20 (4) of the Act. The deposit has been made by the petitioner only under Section 30 of the Act. Even if the said deposit under Section 30 of the Act were to be taken into consideration, still there was deficiency of the amount to a large extent as per the requirements of Section 20 (4) of the Act. ( 42 ) IN Mahendra Nath Tandon case (supra), this Court held as follows (Paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 20 of the said ARC): "15. So far as the question of benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act is concerned, petitioner pleaded that after the money order sent by him was refused by the contesting respondents, an amount of Rs. 1809 was deposited under Section 30 of the Act and, thereafter, on receipt of summons issued by the trial Court, an amount of Rs. 3000 was deposited on 30. 10. 1993. According to the findings recorded by the Court below, the date of first hearing in the case was 8. 12. 1993. Thus, petitioner has deposited the requisite amount according to his calculation, even much before the date of first hearing. The Court below has refused to give the benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act to the petitioner on the ground that the said amount was found short of Rs. 899. 13, and that the deposit made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act has been held to be a invalid. Thus, the question is as to whether the amountdeposited by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act was liable to be adjusted in the amount required to be deposited under Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. Thus, the question is as to whether the amountdeposited by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act was liable to be adjusted in the amount required to be deposited under Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of section 20 of the Act provides as under: "20 (4) In any Suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the Suit the tenant unconditionally pays or (tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court) the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent annum and the landlords costs of the Suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground: provided that nothing in this sub-section, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. " 16. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is apparent that the amount deposited under Section 30 of the Act by a tenant, is liable to be adjusted in the amount required to be deposited under the said provision. 17. It is well settled in law that the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and eviction) Act, 1972, is a beneficial legislation for the tenant. It should be construed liberally and in favour of the tenant as for as possible. As provided in the aforesaid provision, the amount deposited under Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act, is liable to be deducted from the amount required to be deposited under the said provision. Therefore, even assuming as held by the Courts below that the amount of rent was deposited by the petitioner without the same was being tendered to the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and without there being no refusal by the said respondents to receive the same. Therefore, even assuming as held by the Courts below that the amount of rent was deposited by the petitioner without the same was being tendered to the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and without there being no refusal by the said respondents to receive the same. Petitioner offered to pay the said amount to the said respondents unconditionally, therefore, there was no justification for the Courts below not to deduct the said amount in the amount required to be deposited under Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. "20. In the present case, admittedly, petitioner has deposited an amount of Rs. 1809 under Section 30 of the Act and thereafter, deposited an amount of Rs. 3000 on receipt of the summons issued from the trial Court with a view to save his tenancy. Petitioner never objected to the withdrawal of the said amount by respondents Nos. 3 and 4. If the amount deposited under Section 30 of the act is adjusted in the amount required to be deposited under Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the act, admittedly, the amount will be much more than the amount required to be deposited by him. Therefore, in my opinion, there was no justification for the Courts below to refuse the petitioner to give benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. The intention of the legislature is, as it is evident from reading of Section 20 of the Act, that if a tenant was sought to be evicted on account of default, he is to be given two opportunities to save his tenancy; one by offering the amount outstanding against him to the landlord on receipt of the notice of demand and other opportunity on receipt of the summons from the Court, where the Suit is instituted. Petitioner, as stated above, deposited much more amount than was required to be deposited under law before the date of first hearing in the case and sought relief from the liability of eviction, therefore, he cannot be denied the right to save his tenancy, merely on technical ground raised by the Courts below. " ( 43 ) THE aforesaid decision in Mahendra Nath Tandon case (supra), in my view, does not help the petitioner. " ( 43 ) THE aforesaid decision in Mahendra Nath Tandon case (supra), in my view, does not help the petitioner. As noted above, even if the deposit under Section 30 of the Act were to be taken into account for the purposes of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act, still there was deficiency of the amount to a large extent as per the requirements of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act, Therefore, even if the deposit made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act were to be taken into consideration, still the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. ( 44 ) BEFORE parting with the case, it is pertinent to refer to the decision in Gopal Yadav v. Special judge (Anti Corruption/additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi and Ors. , 2002 (1)ARC 197, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent. ( 45 ) IN Gopal Yadav case (supra), this Court Maid down as follows (paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the said ARC): "14. The legislature has used the expression ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Landlords costs of the Suit. . . . . . . " and that it avoided to use expression "which would have been finally found payable" or "which should have been finally found to be payable on the reliefs granted by the Court. " 15. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the aforesaid provision is beneficial piece of legislation to confer benefit upon the tenant and it should be interpreted accordingly. 16. In my consideration opinion aforesaid aimed to confer provision is not solely benefit upon tenant only but to confer benefit upon both landlord and tenant. Secondly this Court cannot do violence with a given statutory provision while interpreting it and particularly when there is no for ambiguity in the language requiring interpretation. 17. Perusal of the impugned judgment and order, with reference to the charts annexed with the writ Petition as Annexures 6 and 7 to the Writ Petition, clearly shows that considerable amount of Court Fee as well as half lawyers on taxable side and clerkage have not been deposited by the tenant-petitioner. "18. 17. Perusal of the impugned judgment and order, with reference to the charts annexed with the writ Petition as Annexures 6 and 7 to the Writ Petition, clearly shows that considerable amount of Court Fee as well as half lawyers on taxable side and clerkage have not been deposited by the tenant-petitioner. "18. It is abundantly clear that tenant has not deposited the required amount towards "landlords" costs of Suit contemplated under Section 20 (4) of the Act and, therefore, he cannot claim benefit to Section 20 (4) of the Act and protect, himself from eviction from the accommodation in question. " ( 46 ) IT is submitted by Shri Nigam, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent, that in view of the said decision in Gopal Yadav case (supra), the petitioner was required to deposit Court Fee, half lawyers fee on taxable side and clerkage etc. . No such deposit having been made by the petitioner, the submission proceeds, the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. ( 47 ) HAVING considered the submission made by Shri Nigam, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent, I am of the opinion that the said submission is correct. In the present case, the petitioner has not deposited various amounts in respect of Court fee, Counsels fee and clerkage etc. as per the requirements of Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. Even if the deposit made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act were to be taken into consideration, still there should be deficiency of the amount to a large extent, as held by the Revisional Court in its judgment and order dated 19. 9. 2003. ( 48 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the Writ Petition lacks merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. ( 49 ) SHRI Rakesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner then submits that reasonable time be granted to the petitioner for vacating the disputed shop. ( 50 ) I have heard Shri Rakesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri S. S. Nigam, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent on the said question also. . ( 49 ) SHRI Rakesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner then submits that reasonable time be granted to the petitioner for vacating the disputed shop. ( 50 ) I have heard Shri Rakesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri S. S. Nigam, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent on the said question also. . ( 51 ) HAVING considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it is directed the petitioner will not be evicted from the disputed shop till 30. 6. 2004 provided the petitioner gives an undertaking on his personal affidavit within six weeks from today incorporating the following conditions: 1. The petitioner will vacate the disputed shop on or before June 30, 2004 will handover its peaceful vacant possession to the respondent. 2. The petitioner will deposit the entire decretal amount with rent/damages upto December, 2003 at the decreed rate within six weeks from today. The amount, if any, already deposited by the petitioner in the suit/revision may be adjusted. 3. The petitioner will continue to pay to the respondent rent/damages at the decreed rate with effect from January, 2004 till the date of vacating the disputed shop by 7th of each succeeding month. 4. The amount so deposited by the petitioner may be withdrawn by the respondent without furnishing any security. ( 52 ) IN case the aforesaid undertaking is not given by the petitioner within the period mentioned above, or any of the aforementioned conditions incorporated in the undertaking is violated, this order granting time to the petitioner for vacating the disputed shop will stand automatically vacated, and it will become open to the respondent to execute the decree forthwith.