JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—Since these three appeals and one Cr.M.P. (M) arise out of the same judgment dated 18.9.2001 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala in Sessions, Trial No. 4 of 2000, therefore, are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Brief facts, relevant for the purpose of disposal of the aforesaid matters, are that the prosecutrix (PW-4), who belongs to a Scheduled Caste, is permanent resident of village Dagoh. Her parents had purchased some land in Village Rakkar. At the relevant time, her father was serving in Chandigarh and she was residing with her mother Kanta Devi (PW-9) in the home village and often used to go to village Rakkar with her mother for doing agricultural work. Before July 7, 1999 she had been residing in village Rakkar with her mother for about a month. On 7.7.1999 at about 11 a.m. the prosecutrix came to Rakkar Bazaar to take bus for her home village Dagoh. When she reached at the Bus Stand, Ashok Kumar (a procLalmed offender) and Arun Kumar (hereafter referred to as A-l) met her and asked her whether she would accompany them. On her refusal they threatened her to take her with them forcibly or to kill her. Said Ashok Kumar caught hold of the prosecutrix from the arm and A-l took her purse and thus they took her to the house of Ashok Kumar where they again threatened her that in the event of her making noise they would kill her. None else was present in the house. After bolting the doors A-l went to the upper storey and Ashok Kumar attempted to forcibly remove the Salwaar of the prosecutrix. When she stopped him and tried to cry he again threatened her that in the event of her making noise he would strangulate her. Thereafter Ashok Kumar removed her Salwaar and underwear and committed rape on her. He then called A-l to the room who also subjected the prosecutrix to rape. After that Ashok Kumar and A-l removed the prosecutrix to a Shehtoot Farm. There accused Narender (hereafter referred to as A-2) and accused Saurav (hereafter referred to as A-3) were bathing in a Khad. Expecting that A-2 and A-3 would save her from Ashok Kumar and A-l, the prosecutrix raised cries but on reaching the spot, A-2 and A-3 had a talk with Ashok Kumar and Arun. There accused Narender (hereafter referred to as A-2) and accused Saurav (hereafter referred to as A-3) were bathing in a Khad. Expecting that A-2 and A-3 would save her from Ashok Kumar and A-l, the prosecutrix raised cries but on reaching the spot, A-2 and A-3 had a talk with Ashok Kumar and Arun. The prosecutrix was then subjected to rape by all the four of them one after the other. After some time Ashok Kumar sent A-2 to the house of accused Ajay Kumar (hereafter referred to as A-5) with the instructions to make sleeping arrangements for the night and to bring liquor. After some time A-2 came back with liquor. Ashok Kumar, A-l, A-2 and A-3 thereafter again committed rape on the prosecutrix. At about 8.30 p.m. A-5 and accused Devinder Kumar Manu (hereafter referred to as A-4) who had brought a torch (flash light) with him came there and all of them took the prosecutrix to the house of A-5 in village Biara where they reached at about 9 p.m. Ashok Kumar and accused persons took liquor in the house and A-4 subjected the prosecutrix to rape followed by Ashok Kumar, A-l, A-2 and A-3. A-5, however, was not a participant in committing rape on the prosecutrix. At about 11 p.m. the aforesaid accused persons started making noise whereupon Prithivi Raj (PW-7), Kaushal Kumar (PW-8), Hem Raj and Virender Pal came to the spot. All the accused persons were present in the house and the prosecutrix narrated the occurrence to the persons who had so arrived in the house. A telephonic information was given to the police and police arrived on the spot at about 4.45 a.m. However, before the arrival of the police the accused persons managed to bolt away. The police recorded the statement of the prosecutrix Ext. PG/2 under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter referred to as the Code7) on the basis of which formal ELR. Ext. PY was recorded at Police Station, Palampur under Sections 376, 341, 342, 120-B and 34 I.P.C. and Section 3 of Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (hereafter referred to as the Act) and the investigation followed. 3. The prosecutrix was got medically examined in SDH Palampur. Dr. Sushma Sood (PW-1), who examined the prosecutrix, issued MLC Ext. PY was recorded at Police Station, Palampur under Sections 376, 341, 342, 120-B and 34 I.P.C. and Section 3 of Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (hereafter referred to as the Act) and the investigation followed. 3. The prosecutrix was got medically examined in SDH Palampur. Dr. Sushma Sood (PW-1), who examined the prosecutrix, issued MLC Ext. PB about such examination and opined that according to the injuries found on the person of the prosecutrix there was possibility that she might have been subjected to sexual intercourse. At the time of medical examination two vaginal swabs, two vaginal smears, pubic hairs, shirt and Salwaar of the prosecutrix were also taken in possession and sealed by the Doctor for the purpose of chemical examination. The facts discovered at the time of medical examination of the prosecutrix vide MLC Ext. PB are that the prosecutrix was limping and walking slowly, pubic hairs were stained with blood and mixed discharge, the hymen was torn, red and indurated, swollen and admitted one finger tightly. Blood stained discharge was also present. 4. During investigation accused persons other than Ashok Kumar, who absconded and is a procLalmed offender, were arrested. A-l to A-4 were got medically examined. A-l was so examined by Dr. S.K. Bhardwaj (PW-2) who prepared and issued MLC Ext. PD opining that there was nothing suggestive of that A-l is incapable of performing sexual intercourse. However, no injuries suggestive of any struggle were found on his person. A-4 was medically examined by Dr. Jaspal Singh (PW-3) who issued MLC Ext. PE opining that there was no evidence to suggest that A-4 was incapable of performing sexual act. No injuries were found on the person of A-4 also. A-3 was medically examined by Dr. Raman Puri (PW-17) who issued MLC Ext. PR opining that there was nothing to suggest that A-3 was not capable of performing sexual intercourse. A-2 was medically examined by Dr. H.K. Vashishat (PW-20) who issued MLC Ext. PT opining that A-2 was capable of performing sexual intercourse. No injury having been found on the person of A-2 at the time of medical examination has been mentioned in the MLC. At the time of medical examination of A-2, his undergarments were preserved by PW-20 and were handed over to the police. Saliva of the accused persons was also taken by the Investigating Officer vide Memo Ext. PAA. No injury having been found on the person of A-2 at the time of medical examination has been mentioned in the MLC. At the time of medical examination of A-2, his undergarments were preserved by PW-20 and were handed over to the police. Saliva of the accused persons was also taken by the Investigating Officer vide Memo Ext. PAA. From inside the house of Ashok Kumar an underwear lying under the pillow of the bed was also taken in possession vide Memo Ext. PH. Three bangles identified by the prosecutrix as her bangles thrown in the field by the accused were taken in possession by the police vide Memo Ext. PJ. From within the house were the prosecutrix was lastly taken by the accused persons blood stained earth and semen stains fallen on the floor, butts of Biri one Biri bundel, one pair of Chappal, one blanket and a handkerchief having semen stains and one liquor bottle were taken in possession vide Memo Ext. PL. On production by A-3 his wearing apparels, namely, one shirt and one pant which had been washed after the occurrence were taken in possession vide Memo Ext. PM. On production by A-l his pant, which he was allegedly wearing at the time of occurrence, was taken in possession vide Memo Ext. PN. Entries in the School records Ext. PP and birth record Ext. PQ and Ext. PU regarding date of birth of the prosecutrix were also taken in possession by the police. A-5 moved an application dated 31.7.1999 for bail, a photocopy whereof Ext. PS was also taken in possession. One shirt allegedly that of accused Ashok Kumar was taken in possession by the police on production by one Bhikam Ram vide Memo Ext. PZ. Rough site plans of the places of occurrence/recovery were prepared by the Investigating Officer and are Exts. PV, PW and PX. 5. The saliva of the accused persons and the butts of Biris taken in possession by the police, as aforesaid, were sent for chemical analysis and vide report Ext. PBB it was opined that saliva was detected in the butts of the Biris but it was not sufficient for further analysis. PV, PW and PX. 5. The saliva of the accused persons and the butts of Biris taken in possession by the police, as aforesaid, were sent for chemical analysis and vide report Ext. PBB it was opined that saliva was detected in the butts of the Biris but it was not sufficient for further analysis. Shirt of Ashok Kumar, the handkerchief, blanket, blood stained earth and semen stains, T-shirt and pant of A-4 and an underwear, vaginal swab, vaginal smear, pubic hairs, Salwaar shirt and underwear of the prosecutrix recovered and taken on possession by the police/Doctors, as aforesaid, were also got analysed in the State Forensic Science Labouratory. Report of the Assistant Director about the analysis of the aforesaid articles is Ext. PC according to which human blood was found on the earth, two underwears, vaginal swab and vaginal slides of the prosecutrix but it was insufficient for further analysis. However, no semen was found on these articles. In Salwaar and shirt of the prosecutrix human blood and human semen were found but the blood was insufficient for further tests. In pant and underwear of A-4 human blood was found which was insufficient for further examination but no semen was detected on these articles. Blood and semen were not found on the Baniyan of A-4. 6. On completion of investigation and being satisfied of the involvement of the accused persons in the commission of the offences alleged to have been committed by them, the concerned officer in charge of the Police Station submitted a chargesheet against the accused against whom the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala framed separate charges. The charge so framed against accused Arun Kumar was under Sections 341 and 342 read with Section 34 and 376(g) IRC and Section 3(xi) of the Act. Charges against each of the remaining accused were framed under Sections 342/ 34, 376(g) LRC. and Section 3(xi) of the Act. The accused pleaded not guilty to the said charges. To prove the charges against the said accused persons, prosecution examined 24 witnesses. 7. Accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein they denied the incriminating evidence of the prosecution and cLalmed to be innocent and that they have been falsely implicated in the case. A-5 further cLalmed that his house in village Biara remains closed and he resides with his sister in Village Patti at a distance of about 4/5 Kms. 7. Accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein they denied the incriminating evidence of the prosecution and cLalmed to be innocent and that they have been falsely implicated in the case. A-5 further cLalmed that his house in village Biara remains closed and he resides with his sister in Village Patti at a distance of about 4/5 Kms. from village Biara. His uncle Kushal Kumar approached him for making a bail application at the instance of the Investigating Agency as the police wanted to make him approver. Since he was not a party to the crime, therefore, he refused to become an approver and that on the day of occurrence he was not present in Village Biara. A-2 has further cLalmed that PW-Kushal Kumar and other witnesses have inimical relations with his family and there is litigation between Kushal Kumar and his family, therefore, he has been falsely implicated in the case at the behest of Kushal Kumar. A-3 has also cLalmed that he has been falsely implicated at the instance of PW Kushal Kumar and other witnesses as there is litigation between Kushal Kumar and his family and their relations are inimical. He has further stated that police officials compelled him to become approver. Even his father, who is also a police official, was also compelled in this regard but he refused to oblige, therefore, he has been falsely implicated in the case. A-2, A-3 and A-4 led defence evidence and examined Lok Ram Sharma DW-1 and Rajesh Kumar Gupta (DW-2) in their defence. DW-1 has been examined to show that the alleged offences could not be committed because of the topography of the concerned area. DW-2 has been examined to prove that from 1st to 9th of July, 1999 A-3 was present in the school. 8. On consideration and appreciation of the material on record, the learned Trial Judge held A-l guilty of the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342 and 376(g) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(xi) of the Act and held A-2, A-3 and A-4 guilty of the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 342 and 376(g) read with Section 34 I.P.C. and Section 3(xi) of the Act and accordingly convicted and sentenced them as aforesaid. A-5 was not found guilty of any offence, therefore, he was acquitted. 9. A-5 was not found guilty of any offence, therefore, he was acquitted. 9. Being aggrieved by the conviction and sentences, A-2 to A-4 have preferred Criminal Appeal No. 608 of 2001. 10. Being aggrieved by the acquittal of A-5, the State has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 232 of 2002. 11. Aggrieved by the inadequacy of quantum of sentences awarded to A-l to A-4, the State has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 331 of 2002 for enhancement of the sentences awarded to them. 12. At the time of admission a learned Single Judge while dealing with Criminal Appeal No. 608 of 2001 noticed that the appellants therein had been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years under Section 376(g) of the Indian Penal Code whereas minimum sentence of 10 years has been prescribed for such offence, therefore, notices were issued to the said accused to show cause why their sentence be not enhanced to the minimum prescribed in law in the event of their conviction being maintained On 27.11.2001 it was noticed that A-l who was also convicted and sentenced had not preferred any appeal, therefore, a show cause notice, as aforesaid, was issued to him also. The notice for enhancement of sentence has been registered as Cr.M.P. (M) No. 1384 of 2001. 13. We have heard the learned counsel for the accused persons and the learned Additional Advocate General for the State and have also gone through the records. 14. The first and foremost question which arises for determination in all these matters is whether A-l to A-5 or one or some of them committed rape on the prosecutrix? 15. The learned counsel for A-2 to A-4 who have filed appeal against their conviction and sentences and the learned counsel for A-l who got a right to cLalm acquittal because of the appeal and show cause notice for enhancement of the sentence, had assailed the impugned conviction on the following grounds :— 1. that the telephonic information given by Kushal Kumar (PW-8) was the FIR in this case and the alleged FIR Ext. PY recorded subsequently on the basis of statement Ext. PG is hit by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; 2. that there had been delay in recording the FIR (Ext. that the telephonic information given by Kushal Kumar (PW-8) was the FIR in this case and the alleged FIR Ext. PY recorded subsequently on the basis of statement Ext. PG is hit by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; 2. that there had been delay in recording the FIR (Ext. PY) and sending a copy thereof to the concerned Magistrate, affording time for consultations and deliberations which is fatal to the case of the prosecution; 3. that the accused were not earlier known to the prosecutrix and in the absence of test identification parade, their identity is not established; 4. that the statement of the prosecutrix is unreliable because it suffers from improbabilities, contradictions, want of corroboration and is contradicted by medical evidence; 5. that the prosecutrix is not proved below 16 years of age at the relevant time and no injuries on the person of the prosecutrix and the accused were noticed, therefore, even if sexual act with her was committed, it was on wilful submission by her; and 6. that there is no evidence to warrant conviction of the accused under Section 3 of the Act. 16. The learned counsel for A-5 while defending the acquittal of A-5, in addition to the above grounds, relied on the following ground : 6-A. that there is no evidence that A-5 had any knowledge of the other accused intending to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix and admittedly he had not indulged in such act, therefore, he has rightly been acquitted. Ground No. 1 17. It was contended for the accused that PW-8 has admitted that he had informed the police about the whole occurrence telephonically, therefore, the information given by him ought to have been treated FIR, in the case. But the police did not do so and proceeded to the spot and thereafter recorded the statement Ext. PG of the prosecutrix which is thus hit by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, shaking the very foundation of the prosecution case. 18. There is no dispute that telephonic information was given to the police by PW-8. In his statement PW-8 has stated that when he along with others reached on the spot, he found the girl not mentally fit and he telephonically informed the police. He has not given the details of the information conveyed by him telephonically in the examination-in-chief. 18. There is no dispute that telephonic information was given to the police by PW-8. In his statement PW-8 has stated that when he along with others reached on the spot, he found the girl not mentally fit and he telephonically informed the police. He has not given the details of the information conveyed by him telephonically in the examination-in-chief. However, in his cross-examination he has stated that he had given details of the accused as told by the girl (PW-4). However, PW-7, who was present on the scene, does not support the version that full account of occurrence was conveyed to the police telephonically. According to him, the police was informed that the girl was there and some boys misbehaved with her. The version of both these witnesses is as per their recollection of the events. The contemporaneous record of the telephonic information received by the police is daily diary report Ext. PO. According to PW-13, he had written the original daily diary report copy whereof is Ext. PO and that he had not added to or deleted from the telephonic message. It has not been suggested to him that the telephonic information received by him was about the whole occurrence or that he had deleberately avoided to record the information as was received by him. Even otherwise, there is no reason what-so-ever to believe that the information received by him was not recorded by him correctly and completely As per the contents of Ext. PO the information received by PW-13 was that a girl had been apprehended at the house of Jiwan Ram and action might be taken. On receipt of the information a police party headed by Sukh Lal (PW-15) proceeded to the spot. The information as recorded in the contemporaneous record. Ext. PO is evidently cryptic, vague and laconic. 19. In Prakash Chand v. State of H.P. (Cr.A. No. 643 of 2001, decided on 19.8.2003) a Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with a similar question as in hand, held as under:— 15. The expression FIR is not defined in the Statute. It is, however, the information first in point of time given to the police officer regarding commission of a cognizable offence which such police officer is duty bound to record by virtue of the provisions of Section 154 of the Code. The expression FIR is not defined in the Statute. It is, however, the information first in point of time given to the police officer regarding commission of a cognizable offence which such police officer is duty bound to record by virtue of the provisions of Section 154 of the Code. The purpose of FIR is to set the law in motion and such information can be given by any person. However, such information should not be vague or indefinite. It is not each and every vague, indefinite or cryptic information which may be treated as the First Information Report. 16. In the case in hand, the informant (PW-4) is not the eye witness of the occurrence. As per his evidence, he was informed of the occurrence at about 7 p.m. by Bhura Ram, who himself is not the eye witness of the occurrence. On receipt of the information from Bhura Ram, PW-4 proceeded to the spot, saw the dead body of the deceased lying on the back side of his house and telephonically sent information to police station, Barmana, Police Post, Namhol and Bilaspur. It is neither in his examination in chief nor suggested in his cross examination that before conveying the information to police, he enquired about the cause of death of the deceased or details of the occurrence from any eye witness of the occurrence or conveyed all the material particulars of the crime to the police. The evidence of the investigating officer (PW-12) in this regard is that a telephonic message was received from Ram Lal (PW-4) in the S.P. Office (Bilaspur) that Mast Ram had been murdered in village Lungri. Evidently, the message as conveyed to PW-12 is not from an eye witness. It is devoid of details, cryptic and laconic. Therefore, it could not be treated as FIR and PW-12 did not commit any illegality in recording the statement Ex. PA of PW-1 who is an eye witness of the occurrence and had given the details of the occurrence as witnessed by her. There is nothing on the record suggestive of any deliberation and consultations. 20. In Khimi Ram v. State of H.R, Cr.A. No. 627 of 2001, decided on 19.8.2003), this Court, while dealing with the subject under reference, held as under:— "9. There is nothing on the record suggestive of any deliberation and consultations. 20. In Khimi Ram v. State of H.R, Cr.A. No. 627 of 2001, decided on 19.8.2003), this Court, while dealing with the subject under reference, held as under:— "9. The expression First Information Report has neither been defined nor referred to as such in the Criminal Procedure Code (hereafter referred to as the Code). However, for all intents and purposes the expression First Information Report7 means the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence given to a police officer and reduced into writing by him or under his direction under Section 154 of the Code. Thus, it is one of the essential ingredients of the information so given to be treated as the First Information Report is that it must disclose commission of a cognizable offence. Thus, a message disclosing commission of a cognizable offence sent by telephone to the police officer and recorded by him in writing will be First Information Report. However, if such a message is cryptic and on the face of it does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence it cannot be treated as First Information Report within the meaning of Section 154 of the Code. 10. In the case in hand, the information given by PW-8 and recorded in the form of a report in the Daily Dairy (Ext. PW-13/D) is that his niece Leela Devi resident of Village Bharain had expired on the preceding night and the circumstances leading to her death may be enquired. Evidently, this report does not contain any allegation which could be treated as commission of a cognizable offence. It is a simple message about the death of the deceased with the request to enquire into the circumstances under which the deceased died. It is statement of PW-12 Ext. PW-12/A which i discloses that the deceased had been throttled to death by the accused and thus is the information regarding commission of a cognizable offence and has rightly been treated as F.I.R. Therefore, contention to the contrary, as raised for the accused, is not sustainable." 21. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee Dhana v. State of West Bengal JT 1994(1) SC 33, the Honble Apex Court, while dealing with the question in hand, held as under:— "9. We are unable to agree with the opinion of the High Court. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee Dhana v. State of West Bengal JT 1994(1) SC 33, the Honble Apex Court, while dealing with the question in hand, held as under:— "9. We are unable to agree with the opinion of the High Court. The cryptic telephonic message received at the Police Station from Nagardas PW 4 had only made police agency to rush to the place of occurrence and record the statement of Yashmoti PW 3 and thereafter commence the investigation as was admitted by the investigating officer in his testimony which testimony was not challenged during the cross-examination of the investigating officer. The High Court failed to notice that the vague and indefinite information given on the telephone which made the investigating agency only to rush to the scene of occurrence could not be treated as a First Information Report under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. The unchallenged statement of the investigating officer that he commenced the investigation only after recording the statement of PW 3 Yashmoti unmistakably shows that it was that statement which alone could be treated as the First Information Report. The High Court fell in error in observing that the statement of PW 3 Yashmoti was recorded after the investigation had already commenced". There is no material on the record for the above opinion of the High Court. The cryptic telephonic message given to the police by Nagardas PW 4 was only with the object of informing the police so that it could reach the spot. The investigation in the case only started after the statement of PW 3 Yashmoti was recorded. Though initially Mr. Ganguli did try to support the finding of the High Court but in the face of the evidence on the record and more particularly in the absence of any challenge to the testimony of the investigating officer, in fairness to Mr. Ganguli, we must record that he rightly did not pursue that argument any further. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with the opinion of the High Court and hold that the statement of Yashmoti PW 3, recorded by the investigating officer PW 28, was rightly treated as FIR in this case by the prosecution and the trial Court." 22. In Thaman Kumar v. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh, (2003) 6 SCC 380, the Honble Apex Court held as under:— "19.......It is true that Ext. In Thaman Kumar v. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh, (2003) 6 SCC 380, the Honble Apex Court held as under:— "19.......It is true that Ext. PL which is copy of the entry made at 1.05 a.m. in DDR No. 52 of Police Post Sector 36, the names of the assailants were not mentioned and only the fact that three persons were assaulting a person was recorded. PW 4 has stated that he gave telephonic message about the incident at Police Post Sector 36 and made a request for sending some police force. The entry in DDR was made by Surender Kumar, SI that after receiving the aforesaid information he is proceeding to the spot along with some other police constables. This was not a first information report of the incident but merely an entry made regarding the departure of the police personnel to the place of occurrence and, therefore, the non-mention of the names of the assailants in this entry cannot have any bearing....." 23. In view of the above settled position in law, the vague, cryptic and laconic information received vide Ext. PO could not be treated as an FIR in the case. 24. To support the contention for the accused, reliance was placed on State of Andhra Pradesh v. Punati Ramulu and others, 1993 Cri.L.J. 3684. In this case the police officer deliberately did not record the FIR despite receipt of information regarding commission of a cognizable offence and proceeded to the spot and during investigation obtained a complaint after due deliberation, consultation and discussion and on the basis of such complaint, recorded the FIR. Against this background, the Honble Apex Court held that the complaint could not be treated as FIR and could be a statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the ratio in Punati Ramulus case (supra) based on the facts stated hereinabove, is not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and Ext. PO in no way can be held to be the FIR. 25. As per the contents of Ext. PO, the information as contained therein was received at Police Post at 2.00 a.m. on 8.7.1999 and PW-15 along with a few other police officials proceeded to the spot where he reached at about 4.45 a.m. and recorded the statement of the prosecutrix Ext. 25. As per the contents of Ext. PO, the information as contained therein was received at Police Post at 2.00 a.m. on 8.7.1999 and PW-15 along with a few other police officials proceeded to the spot where he reached at about 4.45 a.m. and recorded the statement of the prosecutrix Ext. PG which contains the version of the prosecutrix about the occurrence as a whole and discloses commission of cognizable offences. Formal FIR Ext. PY was then recorded on the basis of Ext. PG. There is nothing illegal in treating Ext. PG (formal FIR Ext. PY) as FIR of the case. The contention to the contrary is, therefore, not sustainable. Ground No. 2 26. It was contended for the accused that there has been delay in reporting the incident and in sending a copy of FIR to the Magistrate, therefore, FIR is outcome of consultations and deliberations and the delay so caused is fatal to the case of the prosecution. 27. As already noticed above, soon after the receipt of telephonic information Ext. PO at 2.00 a.m., PW-15 proceeded to the spot, reached there at about 4.45 a.m. and recorded Ext. PG. He had completed writing of Ext. PG at 5.30 a.m. on 8.7.1999 and formal FIR Ext. PY was recorded at 6.30 a.m. at the Police Station as is evident from the contents of Exts. PG and PY. Thus, there had been no delay in recording Ext. PG and PY, therefore, it is not a case of delayed FIR. 28. Copy of the FIR. Ext. PY appears to have been received by the Magistrate at 6.15 p.m. on 8.7.1999. Thus, some delay on this count appears to have occurred but this delay by itself is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. 29. In view of the above, the contention raised, for the accused is unsustainable. Ground No. 3 30. It was contended by the learned counsel for the accused that the accused were earlier not known to the prosecutrix and no test identification parade was held which is by itself fatal to the prosecution case. To substantiate his contention, the learned counsel relied on Kanan and others v. State of Kerala, (1979) 3 SCC 319, Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700, Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, (1995) Supp. To substantiate his contention, the learned counsel relied on Kanan and others v. State of Kerala, (1979) 3 SCC 319, Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700, Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, (1995) Supp. (1) SCC 80, Shaikh Umar Ahmed Shaikh and another v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 5 SCC 103, and Ronny alias Ronald James Alzvaris and others v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 3 SCC 625. 31. Per contra, the learned Additional Advocate General, repelling the contention of the learned counsel for the accused, contended that the accused were not utter strangers to the prosecutrix who was kept confined by the accused, and had seen the accused for sufficient time, therefore, test identification parade was not necessary and the accused had been rightly and correctly identified by the prosecutrix. 32. It may be pointed out here that in the case of Kanan (supra), the accused who was not previously known, was seen by the identifying witness only once in the Court, therefore, in the absence of test identification parade the evidence regarding identification was not excepted. Similarly, in Mohanlal Gangaram Gehanis case (supra) the witness who identified the accused for the first time in Court, did not know him before, therefore, in the absence of test identification parade evidence was held valueless and unreliable. Thus, the rejection of the testimony of the identifying witnesses was based on the well settled legal proposition that when the accused is not previously known to the witness concerned, the identification of the accused by the witness soon after the arrest of the accused is of great importance because it lends assurance that the investigation is proceeding on the right lines in addition to furnishing corroboration to the evidence by the witness later in Court at the trial. It is from this point of view that it is of great importance for the prosecution, accused and finally the administration of justice that such identification is held soon after the arrest of the accused. However, this principle will apply only to a case where the accused is not earlier known to the witness and not to a case where the accused was earlier known to the witness. Secondly, identification of the accused by the witness in the Court is substantive evidence. However, this principle will apply only to a case where the accused is not earlier known to the witness and not to a case where the accused was earlier known to the witness. Secondly, identification of the accused by the witness in the Court is substantive evidence. Test identification parade is a matter of precaution and safeguard to be taken to lend corroboration to identification of accused by the witness in the Court in a case where the accused was an utter stranger to the witness before the commission of the offence by him. This principle of law has been reiterated in the cases of Suresh Chandra Bahri, Sheikh Umar Ahmed Shaikh and Ronny (supra). 33. It may be clarified that expression earlier known with reference to the context has to be given widest possible meaning. A witness may not know the place of residence, parentage and name of the accused and may not have ever talked to him but had repeatedly seen him on different occasions enabling to preserve his facial/bodily features so as to identify him in future despite lapse of time, the accused will be previously known to the witness for the purpose of his physical identity. 34. In Malkhansingh and others v. State of M.P. (2003) 5 SCC 746, while dealing with the consequences of failure to hold a test identification parade, the Honble Apex Court held as under:— "16. It is well settled that the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in court and the test identification parade provides corroboration to the identification of the witness in court, if required. However, what weight must be attached to the evidence of identification in court, which is not preceded by a test identification parade, is a matter for the courts of fact to examine, in the instant case the courts below have concurrently found the evidence of the prosecutrix to be reliable and, therefore, there was no need for the corroboration of her evidence in court as she was found to be implicitly reliable. We find no error in the reasoning of the courts below. From the facts of the case it is quite apparent that the prosecutrix did not even know the appellants and did not make any effort to falsely implicate them by naming them at any stage. The crime was perpetrated in broad daylight. We find no error in the reasoning of the courts below. From the facts of the case it is quite apparent that the prosecutrix did not even know the appellants and did not make any effort to falsely implicate them by naming them at any stage. The crime was perpetrated in broad daylight. The prosecutrix had sufficient opportunity to observe the features of the appellants who raped her one after the other. Before the rape was committed, she was threatened and intimidated by the appellants. After, the rape was committed, she was again threatened and intimidated by them. All this must have taken time. This is not a case where the identifying witness had only a fleeting glimpse of the appellants on a dark night. She also had a reason to remember their faces as they had committed a heinous offence and put her to shame. She had, therefore, abundant opportunity to notice their features. In fact on account of her traumatic and tragic experience, the faces of the appellants must have got imprinted in her memory, and there was no chance of her making a mistake about their identity. The occurrence took place on 4.3.1992 and she deposed in court on 27.8.1992. The prosecutrix appears to be a witness on whom implicit reliance can be placed and there is no reason why she should falsely identify the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime if they had not actually committed the offence. In these circumstances if the courts below have concurrently held that the identification of the appellants by the prosecutrix in court does not require further corroboration, we find no reason to interfere with the finding recorded by the courts below after an appreciation of the evidence on record. 35. In Harish Kumar and others v. State of H.P., 2001(1) Shim. L.C. 281, this Court held as under:— "30. PW-2, the informant has stated about the arrival of accused Ram Kedar and Laxmi Nand in the hotel at Tapri where the complainant party was staying and regarding inquiries made by them about the complainant party having any permit (pass) to enter Kinnaur. When the witness informed them in the negative, the said accused told them that police would arrest and put them behind the bars for having entered Kinnaur without permit. When the witness informed them in the negative, the said accused told them that police would arrest and put them behind the bars for having entered Kinnaur without permit. PW-2 has further stated that these two accused assured them that they would get the requisite pass from SDM. Bhawanagar. So has been stated by PW-1 and PW-3. This discussion was of serious nature so far as the complainant and his companions (PW-1 and PW-3) were concerned. Therefore, they must be attentive during discussion and thus had ample time and opportunity to see Ram Kedar and Laxmi Nand so as to preserve their facial features to identify them at a later stage. 31. In view of the above, the contention of the learned counsel for these accused that they were not known to the witnesses earlier and their test identification parade was not held, therefore, their identification by the prosecutrix (PW-1), informant (PW-2) and PW-3 for the first time in the Court is unreliable, is not sustainable. 36. In Kamaljeet Singh v. State of H.P. (Cr.A. No. 345 of 2002, decided on 21.5.2003), this Court held as under: 15. In the case in hand, as already stated PW-1 to PW-4 had enough time to preserve the facial features of the accused and his companion to enable them to identify the accused at a later stage. Moreover, the witnesses have identified the wearing apparel i.e. Jacket of the accused having distinct marks and recovered from the accused vide memo Ex. PB. The accused was found travelling in the car in which the dacoits had arrived at the bank and bolted away therefrom and was apprehended with currency notes immediately after the occurrence. Therefore, neither test identification parade of the accused which is not substantive evidence, was necessary not this is a case of mistaken identity. Hence the contention raised for the accused is not sustainable. 37. In Baldev Singh and another v. State of H.P. (Cr.A. No. 78 of 2003), decided on 21.8.2003), this Court held as under:— "23. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition that where the accused is not previously known to the witness, ordinarily test identification parade must be held to ensure proper identity of the accused. 37. In Baldev Singh and another v. State of H.P. (Cr.A. No. 78 of 2003), decided on 21.8.2003), this Court held as under:— "23. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition that where the accused is not previously known to the witness, ordinarily test identification parade must be held to ensure proper identity of the accused. However, it is so required only in such cases where the witnesses have a fleeting view of the accused and had not seen him for such time during which he can preserve his facial features. In case the witness had seen the accused committing the offence when there is sufficient light and the witness has seen the accused for sufficient time to preserve his facial features to identify him at a later stage the failure to hold test identification parade will be rendered inconsequential. It is more so when the identification by the witness is duly supported by other independent and reliable corroborative evidence." 38. It is in view of the above position in law that the rival contentions of the parties have to be examined and determined. 39. A perusal of the statement Ext. PG on the basis of which FIR Ext. PY was recorded, reveals that the prosecutrix had named specifically and correctly the absconder, A-l to A-3 an A-5 and had given nick-names of A-2, A-3 and A-4. In case of A-4 the name given in the FIR is Des Raj instead of Devinder Kumar whereas Des Raj is the name of father of A-4 which may be a slip of tongue or in writing as his nick-name has rightly been given in the FIR. While framing the charge and examining A-4 under Section 313 of the Code, his name has been mentioned as Devinder alias Mannu and it was not disputed at any point of time. Thus, there is nothing in the FIR from which it may be inferred that the accused were total strangers to PW-4. At the time of her statement in the Court PW-4 has specifically and correctly identified the accused persons. In her cross-examination for A-5, she has stated that she had not met A-5 prior to the occurrence and learnt his name when the villagers came to his house where she was confined and called his name. At the time of her statement in the Court PW-4 has specifically and correctly identified the accused persons. In her cross-examination for A-5, she has stated that she had not met A-5 prior to the occurrence and learnt his name when the villagers came to his house where she was confined and called his name. In her cross-examination for other accused there is no positive suggestion that they were not seen by the prosecutrix earlier. On the contrary, the prosecutrix has stated that she had seen the accused persons in the Khokha of Ashok (the absconder) when she used to alight from the bus though she did not know their names and parentage nor had ever talked to them. She has denied the suggestion that she did not name the accused persons and has specifically stated that she had named the accused before the police as she had come to know about their names from the talks in between them. Thus, the accused were not total strangers to the prosecutrix and she has given satisfactory explanation as to how she had named them in the FIR. Undisputably, the prosecutrix had been coming to the purchased land and going back to the original place of her residence, therefore, her version regarding her having seen the accused earlier appears to be natural and confidence inspiring. The accused persons had been within the view of the prosecutrix for hours together and four of them committed rape on her. In these circumstances, the prosecutrix had ample time and opportunity to preserve the facial features of the previously seen accused persons as to identify them even after lapse of some time. 40. The statement of the prosecutrix about the identity of the accused persons is further corroborated by other evidence. It is case of the prosecution that on hearing the noise coming from the house of A-5, the villagers including PW-7 and PW-8 came there and they found the prosecutrix and the accused and Ashok Kumar in the house. PW-7 and PW-8 have corroborated this version regarding presence of the prosecutrix, A-l to A-4 and Ashok Kumar in the house of A-5. It is nobodys case that the accused were not earlier known to PW-7 and PW-8. PW-7 and PW-8 have corroborated this version regarding presence of the prosecutrix, A-l to A-4 and Ashok Kumar in the house of A-5. It is nobodys case that the accused were not earlier known to PW-7 and PW-8. Thus, the evidence of the prosecutrix regarding correct identification of the accused persons is corroborated by two witnesses who are residents of the place where the prosecutrix was lastly taken by the accused. 41. In view of the evidence hereinabove discussed, test identification parade of the accused persons was not at all called for. Therefore, the contention that the case must fail for want of test identification parade, is not sustainable. Ground No. 4 42. It was contended by the learned counsel for the accused that the statement of the prosecutrix is unreliable for the following reasons:— (i) that it suffers from improbabilities and is self contradictory; and (ii) that it is not corroborated but is contradicted by those witnesses who are inimical towards the accused as also by medical evidence. 43. Before we take up the contention raised for the accused for consideration, it may be pointed out that by now the law about appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, the value of the statement of the prosecutrix and effect of contradictions and want of corroboration of the statement of the prosecutrix is well settled. Since a prosecutrix is not an accomplice but a victim of crime and no self-respecting woman or a unmarried girl is expected to make a self defiling statement, therefore, conviction can be based on a confidence inspiring statement of the prosecutrix. In case there is any difficulty in believing the statement of the prosecutrix, the court may look for assurance short of corroboration from other evidence. Minor and immaterial contradictions in the evidence has to be ignored and due margin has to be given to individual perception, understanding and descriptive ways. Only such contradictions have to be taken note of which go to the root of the case. 44. In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753, the Honble Supreme Court held as under:— "5.....Overmuch importance cannot be attached to minor discrepancies. The reasons are obvious:— (1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. The reasons are obvious:— (1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. (2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. (3) The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one persons mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. (4) By and large people canhot accurately recall a conversation.and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to except a witness to be a human tape recorder. (5) In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person. (6) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. (7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the Court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination made by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub-conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him perhaps it is a sort of a psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the moment. 6. Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses, therefore cannot be annexed with undue importance. 6. Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses, therefore cannot be annexed with undue importance. More so when the all important probabilities-factor echoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses. 7. It is now time to tackle the pivotal issue as regards the need for insisting on corroboration to the testimony of the prosecutrix in sex-offences. This Court, in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, (1952) 3 SCR 377 at p. 386: (AIR 1952 SC 54 at p. 57), has declared that corroboration is not the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. The utterance of the Court in Rameshwar may be replayed, across the time-gap of three decades which have whistled past, in the inimitable voice of Vivian Bose, J. who spoke for the Court— The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the Judge...........The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the Judge or the Jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand." 45. In Appabhai and another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 696, the Honble Supreme Court held as follows:— "13.......The Court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The Court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The Court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such witness, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the root of the matter so as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the Court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy, Jaganmohan Reddy, J. speaking for this court in Sohrab v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1972 Cr.L.J. 1302 at 1305: AIR 1972 SC 2020 at p. 2024, observed: "This Court has held that falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses when asked about details venture to give some answer, not necessarily true or relevant for fear that their evidence may not be accepted in respect of the main incident which they have witnessed but that is not to say that their evidence as to the salient features of the case after cautious scrutiny cannot be considered." 46. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and others, 1996 Cri. L.J. 1728, the Honble Apex Court held as follows:— "7.....The Courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a Court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the Courts should not overlook. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the Courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The Court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost at par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another persons lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another persons lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of .rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, 1990 (1) SCC 550: AIR 1990 SC 658, Ahmadi, J. (as the Lord Chief Justice then was) speaking for the Bench summarised the position in the following words: "A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction of her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence." 47. In Visveswaran v. State, 2003 Cri. LJ. 2548, the Honble Apex Court held as under:— "12. Before we notice the circumstances proving the case against the appellant and establishing his identity beyond reasonable doubt, it has to be borne in mind that approach required to be adopted by Courts in such cases has to be different. The cases are required to be dealt with utmost sensitivity. Courts have to show greater responsibility when trying an accused on charge of rape. In such cases, the broader probabilities are required to be examined and the Courts are not to get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies which are not of substantial character. The evidence is required to be appreciated having regard to the background of the entire case and not in isolation. The ground realities are to be kept in. view. It is also required to be kept in view that every defective investigation need not necessarily result in the acquittal. In defective investigation, the only requirement is of extra caution by Courts while evaluating evidence. It would not be just to acquit the accused solely as a result of defective investigation. Any deficiency or irregularity in investigation need not necessarily lead to rejection of the case of prosecution when it is otherwise proved." 48. In Dabe Ram v. State of H.P., Latest HLJ 2003 (HP) 440, this Court held as under:— "18. It would not be just to acquit the accused solely as a result of defective investigation. Any deficiency or irregularity in investigation need not necessarily lead to rejection of the case of prosecution when it is otherwise proved." 48. In Dabe Ram v. State of H.P., Latest HLJ 2003 (HP) 440, this Court held as under:— "18. It may be pointed out that by now it is well settled that in cases involving sexual offences, the inferential considerations having no direct and material bearing on the evidence of the prosecutrix and discrepancies in her statement unless fatal to the case, should not be treated as grounds for discrediting confidence inspiring version of the prosecutrix. While appreciating the testimony of a victim of sexual molestation, it has to be borne in mind that no self respecting woman would come forward just to make a humiliating statement against their honour as in a rape case. It is more so, in the case of an unmarried girl. Therefore, there should be no difficulty to act on the statement of the prosecutrix who is not an accomplice but victim of the crime and conviction can be based on her confidence inspiring statement. In case the Court is hesitant to place full reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix, it may take into account the other evidence which may lend assurance to her statement." 49. It is in view of the above settled position in law that the grounds of assailing the credibility of the prosecutrix has to be examined. 50. It was contended by the learned counsel for the accused that the bus-stand at Rakkar, the path to the house of Ashok Kumar and then to the orchard and to the house of A-5 are within populated area, therefore, no force could be used to take the prosecutrix from one place to another and in the event of her forcible removal, she could have raised hue and cry which she never did. Therefore, her version that she was forcibly removed by the accused, is improbable. The prosecutrix has stated that from the bus-stand she was dragged to the house of Ashok Kumar. In case she was so dragged, it is improbable that she would not have sustained drag-injuries whereas none was found on her person at the time of her medical examination. Therefore, her version that she was forcibly removed by the accused, is improbable. The prosecutrix has stated that from the bus-stand she was dragged to the house of Ashok Kumar. In case she was so dragged, it is improbable that she would not have sustained drag-injuries whereas none was found on her person at the time of her medical examination. It was further contended that as per the statement of the prosecutrix, she was subjected to sexual intercourse repeatedly by five persons and in all not less than 22 times within about 12 hours. However, the physical examination of the prosecutrix by the medical expert, the medical opinion on such examination and the report of the chemical examiner render this version improbable. 51. The prosecutrix has stated that she was standing by the roadside at Rakkar waiting for a bus when accused Ashok Kumar (absconder) and A-l came there and asked her to accompany them. On her refusal, they snatched her purse, kept it in the Khokha and on her raising alarm, they told her that nobody can do anything to them and none would listen to her and then forcibly took her to the house of Ashok Kumar. On this aspect of her statement, she has not been cross-examined by A-l. In her cross-examination for A-2 to A-4, she has stated that there are shops at the place where she was standing but the shops were closed and the house of Ashok Kumar is a lonely house and the school was also closed on the relevant day. DW-1 has been examined about the topography of the place and has stated that there are many shops and houses in Rakkar. However, when his cross-examination is read with site plan Ext. PW, it becomes clear that the place from where PW-4 was taken to the house of Ashok Kumar is not densely populated area. It is admitted by DW-1 that there is a Tiala at Rakkar Chawk and about 100 meters from there is a Shiv Mandir and opposite to it is the path to the house of Ashok Kumar and there is no shop /house by the side of this path. The prosecutrix was taken from Tiala to the house of Ashok Kumar which passage as per Ext. PW and statement of DW-1 does not have any shop/house on its sides. The prosecutrix was taken from Tiala to the house of Ashok Kumar which passage as per Ext. PW and statement of DW-1 does not have any shop/house on its sides. S.R. Rana (PW-22) who has prepared the site plan Ext. PW showing the area between Tiala and house of Ashok Kumar, has stated that Ext. PW and marginal notes therein are correct and nothing has been suggested in his cross-examination about anything wrong or incorrect in Ext. PW. Thus, from Ext. PW it appears that a person can be removed from Tiala to Ashok Kumars house without being noticed unless a person is present between these two places. It is nobodys case that at the relevant time any person was present in this part of the place. Thus the contention that forcible removal in a populated area like Rakkar was not possible without attracting shopkeepers/residents etc. is not an improbability. 52. The prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief has stated that A-l and Ashok Kumar forcibly took her to the house of Ashok Kumar after having snatched away her purse. In the cross-examination she has stated that she was dragged to the house of Ashok Kumar. No drag-marks were noticed on the person of the prosecutrix at the time of her medical examination. When her examination-in-chief and cross-examination are read together, it appears that force was used to remove her to the house of Ashok Kumar what she has described as dragging. This way of expressing the manner of removal of the prosecutrix by the accused does not render her statement unreliable or improbable about her removal by use of force. 53. As per the version of the prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief, she was raped by Ashok Kumar and A-l in the house of Ashok Kumar shortly after 12.00 noon. Then she was removed to the Shahtoot Garden where she was raped by Ashok Kumar A-l, A-2 and A-4 one after the other. At about 8.30 p.m. she was removed to the house of A-5 where Ashok Kumar and A-l to A-4 committed rape on her. Thus, as per her version in the examination-in-chief, she was subjected to rape 10 times during a period of about 12 hours. At about 8.30 p.m. she was removed to the house of A-5 where Ashok Kumar and A-l to A-4 committed rape on her. Thus, as per her version in the examination-in-chief, she was subjected to rape 10 times during a period of about 12 hours. There is nothing improbable in this version of the prosecutrix because in a case of forcible sexual intercourse it depends on the desire of the rapist(s) as to how many times he is to satisfy his lust within the available period. 54. The learned counsel for the accused persons had submitted on the basis of the statement of the prosecutrix in her cross-examination that according to her, she was raped not less than 22 times which is improbable. The prosecutrix in her cross-examination has stated that "I was raped thrice time each by each of the four accused persons named above in the orchard" and in the house of Ajay "I had been raped once or twice by the accused persons named above." It may be pointed out that this statement was made by the prosecutrix when she had been under the stress and strain of long and searching cross-examination for the accused. Thus, this variation in her version in examination-in-chief and cross-examination has to be ignored as insignificant more so when her version is corroborated on material particulars by other independent evidence. 55. As per evidence of the prosecutrix, she was subjected to rape by Ashok Kumar and A-l to A-4. There is nothing on the record nor urged to show that the prosecutrix had any reason what-so-ever to falsely implicate the accused persons by making such allegations which are derogatory to her own honour. Her version that she was raped, is fully corroborated by medical evidence. PW-1 who medically examined the prosecutrix, has stated that at the time of medical examination the gate of the prosecutrix was abnormal and she was limping and walking slowly. Her hymen was "torn-red and indurated, swollen......Blood stained discharge was present and local examination was very painful." On the basis of these findings, PW-1 has opined that there is possibility that the prosecutrix had been subjected to sexual intercourse. 56. It may also be pointed out that as per the report Ext. PC, human blood and semen was detected on shirt Ext. P-l and Salwar Ext. 56. It may also be pointed out that as per the report Ext. PC, human blood and semen was detected on shirt Ext. P-l and Salwar Ext. P-2 which the prosecutrix was wearing at the time of occurrence and which were taken in possession by PW-1 at the time of her medical examination. Thus, the medical evidence not only supports the version of the prosecutrix regarding commission of rape on her but also the version that she was repeatedly raped to the extent that even at the time of medical examination her gate was abnormal and she was limping and walking slowly which is indicative of her having been repeatedly raped. 57. To support the contention that medical evidence contradicts the evidence of the prosecutrix, it was submitted for the accused that according to the opinion of PW-1, had the prosecutrix been raped twenty times within four or five hours, the tears in the hymen would have been much more than were noticed and there would have been many more corresponding injuries. As already concluded herein-in-above, the prosecutrix was subjected to rape about 10 times within about 12 hours, therefore, the said opinion is not exactly relevant to the fact of this case. Moreover, the main opinion being in support of the rape having been committed, the accused cannot derive any benefit from the opinion relied on by them. 58. The evidence of PW-7 and PW-8 also lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix. PW-7 has stated that on 7.7.1999 the date of occurrence, when he was sleeping at about 11.30 p.m. he heard noise coming from the house of A-5 and he heard a girl crying "Mummy", "Papa" and from his house he saw two boys taking a naked girl for urination. He informed his neighbour Shashi Pal who advised to call other villagers also to the spot. Accordingly PW-8 uncle of A-5 and one Virendrer Pal, father of A-3, were informed and then they went to the house of A-5 and got the door of the room opened and Ashok Kumar, A-l to A-4 and the prosecutrix who was then wearing only a shirt, were found in the room. Finally, the accused present in the room, made good their escape through the back door of the house. This statement of PW-7 is corroborated by PW-8. Finally, the accused present in the room, made good their escape through the back door of the house. This statement of PW-7 is corroborated by PW-8. We have gone through the statements of these PWs and do not find any such contradiction in their statements which may render their version unreliable about finding Ashok Kumar, A-l to A-4 and the prosecutrix in the house of A-6 in such circumstances as stated by them and briefly set out here-in-above. The evidence of PW-7 and PW-8 lead to the only conclusion that the prosecutrix was taken to the house of A-5 for being sexually abused and was sexually assaulted and she was kept under watch to prevent her from making good her escape. That is why even for urination she was removed while naked and accompanied by two of the accused persons. 59. The contention for the accused that these witnesses are inimical towards the accused and have falsely implicated the accused in the case, is unsustainable. Though it is admitted by PW-7 that he had civil litigation with Ram Kumar, father of A-2 and A-3 is the son of Virender Kumar, brother of Ram Kumar, however, pendency of civil litigation between PW-7 and Ram Kumar does not afford a sound ground to disbelieve the natural and cogent statement of PW-7 primarily for the reason that he has named five persons as the persons present in the house along with the prosecutrix and with three of them he is not shown to be inimical. Secondly, his statement is corroborated by PW-8 who is not shown biased against any of the accused for any reason what-so-ever. Thus, the evidence of PW-7 and PW-8 further corroborates the evidence of the prosecutrix. 60. Overall perusal of the evidence on record does not bring to force any such major contradiction(s) in the statements of the PWs which may go to the rorot of the prosecution case or render the evidence of the PWs unreliable or doubtful. Therefore, the contention for the accused that the improbabilities, contradictions, want of corroboration and is contradicted by medical evidence, is not sustainable. Therefore, the contention for the accused that the improbabilities, contradictions, want of corroboration and is contradicted by medical evidence, is not sustainable. On the contrary, in view of the statement of the prosecutrix read with medical evidence and the statements of PW-7 and PW-8, it is fully proved that she was removed by Ashok Kumar and A-l to the house of former where they committed rape on her and then she was removed to Shehtoot Garden where she was raped by Ashok Kumar, A-l, A-2 and A-4 and was then removed to and confined in the house of A-5 where she was raped by Ashok Kumar and A-l to A-4. Ground No. 5 61. It was contended for the accused persons that there is no evidence to prove that the prosecutrix at the relevant time was below 16 years of age. Therefore, keeping in view her alleged conduct of accompanying the accused without resistence, there being no injuries on the person of the prosecutrix and the accused persons, the only permissible conclusion is that she was a consenting party to the act of sex with the accused persons. 62. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that in view of the school and Panchayat records read with the statements of Ram Prakash (PW-16) and Bhikham Ram (PW-21), it is fully proved that the prosecutrix was born on 18.12.1985, therefore, at the time of commission of rape on her, she was below 16 years of age and in any case it is proved that the accused objected the prosecutrix to repeated forcible sexual intercourse against her will and without her consent, therefore, they are guilty of commission of gang rape. 63. The prosecution, in addition to the mother of the prosecutrix (PW-9), examined PW-16 and PW-21 to prove that the date of birth of the prosecutrix as per the school and Panchayat records was 18.12.1985. It is so mentioned in the copy of school admission form Ext. PP, copy of age certificate Ext. PQ and copy of birth entry Ext. PU. PW-16 has stated that Ext. PP is correct as per the school record of admission. He has further issued Ext. PQ and according to him, this is correct according to the school records. However, he could not vouch safe the correctness of the original of Ext. PP, copy of age certificate Ext. PQ and copy of birth entry Ext. PU. PW-16 has stated that Ext. PP is correct as per the school record of admission. He has further issued Ext. PQ and according to him, this is correct according to the school records. However, he could not vouch safe the correctness of the original of Ext. PQ nor he is aware as to from where and by whom it was issued. Thus, the correctness of the contents of PQ including the date of birth of the prosecutrix is not proved. The entries in Ext. PP are admittedly made on the basis of PQ. It is admitted by PW-16 that name Savita Devi has been substituted in the admission register for Savita Kumari by scoring off "Kumari". Why it was done is not explained. Thus, neither the entries regarding age in Ext. PP and PQ are proved to be correct nor these are proved to be relating to the prosecutrix. 64. PW-21 has stated that as per the birth and death register of Gram Panchayat Dagoh, the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 18.12.1985 and extract of the register is Ext. PU which is correct. The witness has no personal knowledge about the date of birth of the prosecutrix. The record on the basis of which he has made his statement was not in his custody nor the entries therein were made by him. In Ext. PU including its original, the place of residence of the girl born or names of her parents had not been given. The register admittedly has two leafs numbered as 11 and one of such leafs is filled in only on one side. The entries at Serial Nos. 20 to 27 one of which, that is entry No. 24, is stated to be of the prosecutrix admittedly have not been made in chronological order. Thus, these entries are highly unreliable. 65. PW-9 has stated that her daughter, the prosecutrix was 14 or 15 years of age at the time of making the statement by her in the Court on 27.4.2000. She is admittedly not aware of the date, month or year of birth of anyone of her four children including the prosecutrix. Therefore, his statement about the age of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon. 66. It may also be pointed out here that as per the contents of MLC Ext. She is admittedly not aware of the date, month or year of birth of anyone of her four children including the prosecutrix. Therefore, his statement about the age of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon. 66. It may also be pointed out here that as per the contents of MLC Ext. PB, PW-1 referred the prosecutrix to the radiologist Dharamshala/Baijnath to ascertain her age. As per the prosecutrix, she was taken to Dharamshala to ascertain her age but nothing happened there, however, her tests and X-Ray were taken in Palampur hospital. The outcome of X-Ray and opinion thereon had not been produced by the prosecution and with-holding it leads to the legitimate inference that opinion about skeleton age of the prosecutrix was not favourable on the prosecution. 67. In view of the above, it can be safely concluded that age of the prosecutrix at the relevant time is not proved to be below 16 years. However, even if the prosecutrix was 16 or more years of age at the relevant time, the commission of sexual intercourse with her will be rape if such sexual intercourse was without her consent and against her will. It is constant case of the prosecutrix that she was repeatedly and forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse by Ashok Kumar and A-l to A-4. It has not been suggested to her in her cross-examination that the accused or anyone of them had sexual intercourse with her with her consent. 68. It is true that at the time of medical examination of the prosecutrix and the accused persons no injuries were found on their persons. However, this alone cannot be conclusive reason to hold that the sexual act was committed with the consent of the prosecutrix. 69. This Court in Harish Kumar and others v. State of H.P, 2001 (1) Shim. L.C. 281 and Pritam Singh v. State of H.P. Cr.A. No. 224 of 1999, decided on 28.9.1999 has held that absence of injuries on the person of prosecutrix is not a positive indication of her being a consenting and willing partner to the act of sex. 70. In Sunil Kumar v. State of H.P., 2001(2) S.L.J. 1511, a Division Bench of this Court held as under:— "28. There is no dispute that no injuries were found on the person of the accused when he was medically examined after the occurrence. 70. In Sunil Kumar v. State of H.P., 2001(2) S.L.J. 1511, a Division Bench of this Court held as under:— "28. There is no dispute that no injuries were found on the person of the accused when he was medically examined after the occurrence. However, non-existence of injuries on his male organ or absence of injury on any other part of his person is not sufficient to rule out the commission of rape by him. The ratio of Bhim Begs case supra was considered by the Honble Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 and it was held as under: "7. Dr. Ghatate, learned senior counsel for the respondent, submitted, by reference to RahimBeg v. State of U.P. that the absence of injuries on the penis of the respondent should be treated as sufficient to negative the prosecution case. We are afraid we cannot agree. Inference have to be drawn in every case from the given set of facts and circumstances. There is no inflexible axiom of law which lays down that the absence of injuries on the male organ of the accused would always be fatal to the prosecution case and would discredit the evidence of the prosecutrix, otherwise found to be reliable. The presence of injuries on the male organ may lend support to the prosecution case, but their absence is not always fatal. Rahim Beg case was based on its peculiar facts and the observations made therein were on a totally different context and cannot advance the case of the respondent. The observations in Rahim Beg case cannot be mechanically pressed into aid in every case regardless of the specific circumstances of the crime and absence of the fact situation as existing in that case. Every case has to be approached with realistic diversity based on peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. Doctor Sharma who had examined the respondent had found him to be capable of sexual intercourse and according to his opinion the absence of injury on his male organ was not suggestive of the fact that he had not indulged in sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, then of tender years of age. His evidence was not at all challenged on this aspect by the defence." 71. In Uttam alias Bhadrya and another v. The State of Maharashtra, 1991 Cri. L.J.1644, it was held as under:— "8. His evidence was not at all challenged on this aspect by the defence." 71. In Uttam alias Bhadrya and another v. The State of Maharashtra, 1991 Cri. L.J.1644, it was held as under:— "8. The prosecution has examined Dr. Smt. Sankar (P.W. 7) who examined the prosecutrix Purna on 6.11.1984 at about 10 p.m. Dr. Smt. Sankar gave a report dated 6.11.1984 (Exhibit 27). she did not find any injury on her person or on her private parts. She, however, opined that it was not possible for her to give a definite opinion whether the prosecutrix was raped or not. The report shows that the hymen of the prosecutrix was intact. In her evidence, Dr. Smt. Sankar stated that in rare cases the hymen may remain intact in spite of sexual intercourse. She has further stated that if the girl is acccustomed to sexual intercourse, there would not be internal injury to the vagina. In the cross-examination, she has stated that the age of the girl was about 14 to 15 years. 10. Mr. Gulhane, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants, argued that the fact that hymen was found intact belies the prosecution story. According to him, it is almost impossible that when two young men commit sexual intercourse with a young girl, her hymen can remain intact. But as we have seen above from the opinion of both the Doctors that it is not necessary that sexual intercourse may necessarily result in the rupture of a hymen, it is not possible to accept the argument of Mr. Gulhane. Mr. Gulhane relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1972 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 827: 1972 Cri.LJ. 1260) (Rahim Beg v. State of U.P.). He has invited our attention to para 26 of the judgment. In the above cited case, the girl was about 10 to 12 years old. There was also no dispute that she was virgin. In this background, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the absence of injuries on the male organs of the accused would thus point out to their innocence. In the present case, the girl is not that young and it is also not known whether she was really virgin or not at the time of the incident. In this background, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the absence of injuries on the male organs of the accused would thus point out to their innocence. In the present case, the girl is not that young and it is also not known whether she was really virgin or not at the time of the incident. On the contrary, suggestions were made to her by the accused that she had sexual relations with them as well as with some other persons. Dr. Smt. Sankar, in her report (Exhibit 27),has stated that the girl was young and well-built. Having regard to all these facts, we do not think that mere absence of the injury, either on the person or private parts of the girl or the appellants, as an indication of innocence of the appellants. The trial Court has exhaustively dealt with all these aspects and has come to the correct conclusion, and in our view, has rightly recorded a finding that the appellants, who are two in number, are guilty of the offence of gang rape." 72. In view of the above settled position in law and the statement of the prosecutrix and medical evidence on record, the want of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix and the accused is not suggestive of her being a consenting and willing partner to the repeated sexual intercourse with her. 73. In a case of sexual intercourse alleged to be with consent of the woman, the consent must be voluntary and not an act of helplessness. In this regard in Rajinder alias Raju v. State of H.P. Cr.A. No. 484 of 2002, decided on 1.11.2002, this Court held as follows:— "8. Before I consider the aforesaid circumstances to arrive at any conclusion, it may be pointed out that it is well settled that consent is an act of reason coupled with deliberation after the mind has weighed the good and evil on each side in a balanced manner and denotes an active will to permit the doing of the act complained of. A mere act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, quiescence, non-resistance or passive giving in, when volitional faculty is either clouded by fear or vitiated by duress, cannot be deemed to be "consent". A mere act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, quiescence, non-resistance or passive giving in, when volitional faculty is either clouded by fear or vitiated by duress, cannot be deemed to be "consent". To be a valid defence the consent on the part of the woman to an act of sex requires voluntary participation and she can be said to consent only when she freely agrees to submit herself, while in free and inconstrained possession of her physical and moral power to act in a manner she desired." 74. In Bijoy Kumar Mohapatra and others v. The State, 1982 Cri. L.J. 2162, while dealing with the meaning of the expression "consent", Orissa High Court held as under : "10. In a case of rape, consent, if any, given by the victim must be voluntary. A mere act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, quiescence, non-resistance or passive giving in, when volitional faculty is either crowded by fear or vitiated by duress, cannot be deemed to be "consent". Consent on the part of a woman, as a defence to an allegation of rape, requires voluntary participation after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. The question of consent or compulsion is to be judged on a careful consideration and scrutiny of the evidence of the victim and from other corroborative evidence, if available and the attendant circumstances preceding, accompanying or following the acts of sexual intercourse." 75. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Mango Ram, (2000) 7 SCC 224, the Honble Supreme Court while dealing with the subject held as under: "13.....Submission of the body under the fear of terror cannot be construed as a consented sexual act. Consent for the purpose of Section 375 requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances." 76. In the case in hand the prosecutrix was not a permanent resident of the locality in which she was repeatedly raped at different places. None was known to her there. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances." 76. In the case in hand the prosecutrix was not a permanent resident of the locality in which she was repeatedly raped at different places. None was known to her there. As stated by her when she was detained in the Shehtoot garden by Ashok Kumar and A-l, she noticed A-2 and A-4 taking bath in the Khad. She requested them "Bhaiji I be saved". But instead of saving her, they joined hands with A-l and Ashok Kumar and raped the prosecutrix. While being confined in the house of A-5 where the accused were creating noise the prosecutrix was crying "Mummy", "Papa" as stated by PW-7. In these circumstances, the prosecutrix cannot be said to be a consenting and willing party to the acts of sex by Ashok Kumar and A-1 to A-4. Thus, the contention raised for the accused does not hold good. Ground No. 6 77. To sustain a charge under Section 3 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, it has to be proved that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste and the offenders to a non-scheduled caste. The prosecutrix has stated that "We are Harijan" by caste and the "accused are Brahmin, Katoch and Girth". But for this, there is no other evidence to prove the respective castes of the prosecutrix and the accused persons. It is evident from the above referred statement of the prosecutrix that she has claimed to be a "Harijan" which is no caste. Similarly, Katoch is no caste. Even the prosecutrix has not specified as to which one of the accused belongs to which caste. PW-9, mother of the prosecutrix has also not stated anything about the caste of the victim and the accused. There is not even an iota of evidence to suggest that the accused know that the prosecutrix belongs to any scheduled caste. Thus, the head of charge against the accused persons under Section 3 (xi) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not proved. Therefore, the conviction of A-l to A-4 under this head of charge is unsustainable being based on no evidence. Ground No. 6-A. 78. Thus, the head of charge against the accused persons under Section 3 (xi) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not proved. Therefore, the conviction of A-l to A-4 under this head of charge is unsustainable being based on no evidence. Ground No. 6-A. 78. A-5 is not shown to have accompanied the other accused while removing the prosecutrix from one place to another and finally to his house. It is not even in the statement of the prosecutrix that A-5 either committed rape on her or shared the common intention with the rapists to commit rape on her. On the contrary she has denied committing of rape on her by A-5. When the villagers came to the house of A-5, he was not present there with other accused persons. There is no evidence on the record to infer that A-5 shared the intention of other accused persons to commit rape on the prosecutrix. Therefore, his acquittal by the trial Court does not warrant interference. 79. In view of the above discussion and conclusions, the conviction of A-l to A-4 under Section 3(xi) of the Act is unsustainable but their conviction under the other heads of charge including one under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code does not call for interference. Therefore, the question of inadequacy of the sentence imposed upon them as raised by the State in Criminal Appeal No. 331 of 2001 and taken note of by this Court vide Cr.M.P.(M) No. 1304 of 2001 requires determination. 80. The relevant part of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code providing sentence for gang rape reads as under :— "376. Punishment for rape.—(1) xxx xxx (2) Whoever,— (a) to (f) xxx xxx (g) commits gang rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine; Provided that the court may for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term not less than ten years.” 81. It is clear on a bare perusal of the above provisions that for the offence of gang rape, the legislative mandate is to impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 10 years but may extend to life and also fine. However, the Court may for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than 10 years. 82. The learned trial Judge imposed lesser sentence of imprisonment upon the accused on the grounds that they are in the age group of 19 to 24 years and are first offenders. In this country a person of 18 years is considered a mature man having a right to vote and thereby participate in the governance of the country. Such a person is expected to behave like a good citizen and if he indulges in the commission of the offences of grave nature involving moral turpitude and acts in a cruel manner while committing the offence, his age factor will not be an adequate and special reason to bypass the legislative mandate regarding punishment. Same logic will apply to a person claiming that he is first offender. The punishment must be commensurate with the gravity of the offence and the sentencing Court cannot overlook the will of the people reflected in the legislative mandate providing minimum sentence in cases of rape on insufficient and inadequate reasons. 83. In State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa, 2000 SCC (Cri) 755, while dealing with the question whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment awarded by the trial court in a rape case to four years rigorous imprisonment, held as under:— "18. The High Court, however, differed with the reasoning of the trial court in the matter of sentence and, as already noticed, the reasons given by the High Court are wholly unsatisfactory and even irrelevant. We are at a loss to understand how the High Court considered that the discretion had not been properly exercised by the trial court". There is no warrant for such an observation. We are at a loss to understand how the High Court considered that the discretion had not been properly exercised by the trial court". There is no warrant for such an observation. The High Court justified the reduction of sentence on the ground that the accused respondent was unsophisticated and illiterate citizen belonging to a weaker section of the society"; that he was a "chronic addict to drinking and had committed rape on the girl while in a state of "intoxication" and that his family comprising of "an old mother, wife and children" were dependent upon him. These factors, in our opinion, did not justify recourse to the proviso to Section 376(2) I.P.C. to impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum. These reasons are neither special nor adequate. The measure of punishment in a case of rape cannot depend upon the social status of the victim or the accused. It must depend upon the conduct of the accused, the state and age of the sexually assaulted female and the gravity of the criminal act. Crimes of violence upon women need to be severely dealt with. The socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of the accused or the victim are irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to be achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence. The sentencing courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by the society in cases of the heinous crime of rape on innocent helpless girls of tender years, as in this case, and respond by imposition of proper sentence. Public abhorrence of the crime needs reflection through imposition of appropriate sentence by the court. There are no extenuating or mitigating circumstances available on the record which may justify imposition of any sentence less than the prescribed minimum on the respondent. To show mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would be a travesty of justice and the plea for leniency is wholly misplaced. There are no extenuating or mitigating circumstances available on the record which may justify imposition of any sentence less than the prescribed minimum on the respondent. To show mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would be a travesty of justice and the plea for leniency is wholly misplaced. The High Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was not justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the trial court and our answer to the question posed in the earlier part of the judgment is an emphatic—No." 84. In view of the above legal position, the brutality with which the prosecution was dealt with and the inadequacy of the reasons assigned by the trial Court to impose lesser punishment than prescribed by law, the sentence imposed on the convicts under Section 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code, is inadequate and disproportionate to the gravity of the crime committed by them and deserves to be enhanced to the minimum prescribed by law. 85. As a result, Criminal Appeal No. 608 of 2001 preferred by A-2 to A-4 against their conviction and sentence is partly allowed to the extent that their conviction and sentence awarded to them under Section 3 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are set aside and they are acquitted of the head of charge under the said Section. As a consequence, similar conviction of and sentence awarded to A-l is also set aside and he is also acquitted of the head if charge under Section 3 of the Act. Rest of the appeal No. 608 of 2001 is dismissed. 86. Criminal Appeal No. 232 of 2002 preferred by the State against acquittal of A-5 is dismissed. 87. Criminal Appeal No. 331 of 2002 preferred by the State for enhancement of sentence imposed on A-l to A-4 is allowed to the extent that sentence of imprisonment imposed on these accused by the trial Court is enhanced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years while the sentence of fine as imposed is maintained. 88. Cr.M.P. (M) No. 1384 of 2001 stands disposed of in terms of the orders passed in Criminal Appeal No. 331 of 2002. 89. The bail bonds furnished by A-5 are discharged. Appeal partly allowed.