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2003 DIGILAW 290 (BOM)

Evelyn Dias v. Omprakash Jaigopal Mahra & others

2003-03-10

S.H.KAPADIA

body2003
JUDGMENT - KAPADIA S.H., J.:-Petitioner is the Custodian appointed under the Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. Respondent No. 1 is the Private Limited Company. Respondent No. 1 is the landlord of Flat No. 2 in a building known as "Krishna Mahal" at Churchgate, Mumbai 400 020. Respondent No. 2 FFSI is a company, which has been notified on 2-7-1992 under Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. Respondent No. 2 is a tenant in respect of the said Flat No. 2. Reshma Estates Private Limited has instituted R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1990 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay for eviction against FFSL-the notified party under the Special Court Act, 1992, inter alia alleging non-user of premises and wrongful user of premises. In this matter, we are not concerned with the grounds of eviction. However, in the Court of Small Causes Court at Bombay a preliminary question of jurisdiction was raised by the Custodian on behalf of the notified party. FFSL, which is as follows : "Whether the Small Causes Court at Bombay has jurisdiction to entertain try and dispose of the suit in view of the FFSL, being notified under the Special Court Act, 1992." 2. This issue was decided in favour of Reshma Estates Private Limited plaintiff/landlord, inter alia, on the ground that the notified party had possessory title as a tenant in the suit premises which was not transferable and, therefore, attachment of the suit premises by the Special Court did not divest the Small Causes Court of its jurisdiction under section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. That, the above R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999 was a suit by the landlord against the tenant for possession of the suit premises and, therefore, the Small Causes Court at Bombay alone has the jurisdiction to try, entertain and dispose of the suit under section 28 of the Rent Act. Being aggrieved by the preliminary order, the Custodian came by way of Appellate Side Writ Petition No. 1380 of 2000 which has been assigned to this Court by the learned Chief Justice for disposal. ARGUMENTS : 3. Mr. Setalwad, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Custodian, submitted that in this case we are not concerned with the merits or the demerits of the claim made by the landlord. ARGUMENTS : 3. Mr. Setalwad, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Custodian, submitted that in this case we are not concerned with the merits or the demerits of the claim made by the landlord. That, in this case we are only concerned with the question whether the tenant was liable to be evicted on the grounds enumerated under section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947. That, in this case, we are only concerned with which Court should pronounce on the rights of the parties in the above R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999. That, according to the Custodian, statutory tenancy was the property of the notified party and that property became statutorily vested in the Custodian for distribution on 2-7-1992 when FFSL was notified under the Act, 1992 Mr. Setalvad contended that the Special Court Act, 1992 was enacted for a particular purpose and, if one keeps that purpose in mind then, this Court alone has the jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of the above R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999. He contended that section 13 of the Special Court Act, 1992 overrides section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. That, section 13 of the Special Court Act contains a non obstante clause which override section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947. That, the Special Court Act, 1992 is a latter enactment vis-a-vis Bombay Rent Act, 1947. That the Special Court Act, 1992 is a Special Act which applies to a specific type of property viz. the property of the notified party and to that extent, it is a special law vis-a-vis the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 which is a general law which covers eviction and statutory tenancies in all cases. In this connection, Mr. Setalwad relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank another)1, reported in A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1535. He also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Canara Bank v. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. others)2, reported in 84 Company Cases 70. He also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Harshad Shantilal Mehta v. Custodian others)3, reported in 1998(5) S.C.C. 1 , Mr. He also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Canara Bank v. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. others)2, reported in 84 Company Cases 70. He also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Harshad Shantilal Mehta v. Custodian others)3, reported in 1998(5) S.C.C. 1 , Mr. Setalwad contended that no prejudice will be caused to the landlord or the tenant by reason of the Special Court under this Act deciding R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999. He contended that the Court of Small Causes at Bombay will not get into the question of the attached assets being owned by the notified party. That, the Small Causes Court cannot go into the question of as to how those assets stood acquired whereas, this Court can certainly go into all questions of law and fact including the manner in which the assets stood acquired with or without aides of the public funds, Mr. Setalwad contended that the Act contemplates statutory attachment of all properties belonging to the notified party so that they can be distributed under the provision of section 11 at a later stage. That, the said properties do not vest in the Custodian. That the attached assets belonged to the notified party. That, they have been acquired from public funds and, since they have been acquired from the public funds at a later date, they were required to be distributed, divided, apportioned and applied to discharge the liabilities of the notified parties. That the Government, Banks, Financial Institutions and to other creditors. That, this purpose of the Act cannot be looked into by the Small Causes Court whereas, on the other hand, this Court only can look into the dispute from the point of view of the Special Court Act, 1992 but it can also apply the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Mr. Setalwad contended that if at the end of the day in a given matter, the Court finds that the landlord has made out its case for eviction then this Court can certainly evict the tenant subject to the landlord proving the grounds of eviction. Mr. Setalwad contended that if at the end of the day in a given matter, the Court finds that the landlord has made out its case for eviction then this Court can certainly evict the tenant subject to the landlord proving the grounds of eviction. He contended that similarly, in cases where the notified party seeks a declaration of tenancy, this Court can certainly give a declaration under section 28 of the Rent Act after examining all the facts and circumstances of the case against the landlord. He, therefore, contended that no prejudice will be caused to the tenant or the landlord by the Special Court under this Act deciding the above R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999. Mr. Setalwad next contended that under section 9-A of the Act, 1992, the Special Court is empowered to exercise all jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before commencement of this Act by any Civil Courts. He contended that the words "Civil Courts" include the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. He contended that the object of section 9-A was to constitute one Court for all disputes relating to attached assets and if one keeps that object in mind then the words "Civil Courts" in section 9-A would include Small Causes Court. However, it will not include Criminal Courts in that section. He contended that for the purposes of Civil Procedure Code, the words Small Causes Court may be different from "Civil Court". However, for the purposes of the Special Court Act, 1992 the word "Civil Court" include Small Causes Court. The contended that all money suit in respect of notified parties have to come before this Court. He, therefore, contended that the words "Civil Court" in section 9-A(1) will include Small Causes Court also. Mr. Setalwad further points out that section 3 of the Special Court Act, 1992 specifically provides for statutory attachments. That, on such attachment all assets belonging to the notified party stand attached. He contended that at the stage of distribution, the Court may come to the conclusion that statutory tenancy was not saleable but, that does not mean, till that stage is reached, the notified party is free to dispose of the statutory tenancy. In this connection Mr. That, on such attachment all assets belonging to the notified party stand attached. He contended that at the stage of distribution, the Court may come to the conclusion that statutory tenancy was not saleable but, that does not mean, till that stage is reached, the notified party is free to dispose of the statutory tenancy. In this connection Mr. Setalwad submitted that even section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act is subject to the contract to the contrary and therefore in appropriate cases a landlord can permit a tenant to sub-let or transfer the property and, therefore, the reliance placed by the Small Causes Court on section 15 of the Rent Act to say that the tenancy was not transferable was an erroneous view. Mr. Setalwad contended that there is no doubt that the Bombay Rent Act is a special enactment in the matter of eviction of a tenant. He, however, contended that the Special Act, 1992 carves out and deals with only one kind of property viz. assets belonging to the notified party. Be it the landlord or tenant and qua such type of property, the Special Court Act, 1992 alone shall apply and qua such type of property, the Special Court Act, 1992 shall override section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. 4. Mr. De Vitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Reshma Estates Private Limited landlord/plaintiff, however, contended that in October, 1991, tenancy was created in favour of FFSL. That rent was paid by FFSL up to March, 1998. However in the meantime, on 2-7-1992. FFSL became a notified party. That, the above R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999 was filed on 12-7-1999 on two ground viz. non user of flat and illegal conversion of user of the flat from residential to commercial without permission of the landlord Mr. De Vitre contended that section 9-A(1) of the Special Court Act, 1992 specifically refers to the Civil Courts. In this connection he invited my attention to section 3 and section 8 as well as Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Code and he contended that if one goes through the above sections of Civil Procedure Code, it is clear that Civil Court is different from Small Causes Court. In this connection he invited my attention to section 3 and section 8 as well as Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Code and he contended that if one goes through the above sections of Civil Procedure Code, it is clear that Civil Court is different from Small Causes Court. He contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Canara Bank v. Nuclear Power Corporation India Ltd. others (supra) has no application to the facts of this case because, in that matter, the Supreme Court was only concerned with deciding the question whether Company Law Board was a Court. He contended that in that judgment, the Supreme Court has laid down that the Company Law Board, was a Court. That however, was not the issues before this Court. He contended that the Legislature has deliberately used the words "Civil Court" in section 9-A of the Special Court Act, 1992 because, the Act was enacted primarily to deal with matters or claims arising out of transactions in securities entered into after 1-4-1991 and on or before 6-6-1992 in which a person who is notified under section 3(2) is involved Mr. De Vitre, therefore, contended that the Civil Court in section 9-A(1) cannot cover the Small Causes Court. Mr. De Vitre relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd v. Church of South India Trust Association, Madras)4, reported in A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1439. 4-A. Mr. De Vitre next contended that statutory tenancy was neither saleable nor transferable. He contended that under section 9-A(1) of the Special Court Act, all claims to the property standing attached under section 3 can be gone into by the Special Court. However, he submitted that section 9-A(1) should be read with section 11 deals with discharge of liabilities. Mr. De Vitre contended that the object of Special Court Act, 1992 was attachment of the properties of the notified party for the purposes of distribution and discharge of liabilities of the notified party to the Government, Banks and Financial Institutions and to other unsecured creditors. He, however, contended that statutory tenancy in the lands of the notified party, was neither saleable nor transferable and, therefore, it cannot be realised and used for discharge of liabilities of the notified party to the Government, banks, financial institutions and other unsecured creditors. He, however, contended that statutory tenancy in the lands of the notified party, was neither saleable nor transferable and, therefore, it cannot be realised and used for discharge of liabilities of the notified party to the Government, banks, financial institutions and other unsecured creditors. He, therefore, contended that section 13 of the Special Court Act cannot override section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. In this connection, Mr. De Vitre relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of (Zarina Umer Chamdewala v. Sati Lalchand Verumal Lalwani)5, reported in 1969(71) Bom.L.R. 809. Mr. DeVitre further contended that the object of the Special Court Act was to attach the properties belonging to the notified party with a sole purpose of distribution and since statutory tenancy was non distributable, it was not attachable under the Special Court Act. He, therefore, contended that if statutory tenancy was non saleable at the time of distribution under section 11 of the Special Court Act then, statutory tenancy cannot form part of the attached assets under the Special Court Act, 1992. In this connection, he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ravindra Ishwardas Sethna and another v. Official Liquidator, High Court, Bombay and another)6, reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1061. Mr. DeVitre contended that the above R.A.E. suit filed before the Small Causes Court for eviction under the Bombay Rent Act cannot be tried by the Special Court under the Act, 1992 because, the Special Court can only resolve disputes involving attachable assets. That, the object of the Special Court Act was distribution of assets and to discharge the liability of the notified party to the Government, Banks, Financial Institutions and other unsecured creditors and, since tenancy was non transferable, it cannot come under section 11 of the Special Court Act, 1992 particularly, when statutory tenancy was not capable for distribution. Mr. DeVitre contended that eviction can only be the subject-matter of the Rent Act. That, both the acts have a non obstante clause. However, he contended that when it comes to tenancies and eviction, then the Bombay Rent Act is a special law whereas Special Court Act is a general law. Mr. DeVitre therefore, contended that in this case the Special Court has no jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of the matter under the Special Court Act, 1992. FINDINGS : 5. However, he contended that when it comes to tenancies and eviction, then the Bombay Rent Act is a special law whereas Special Court Act is a general law. Mr. DeVitre therefore, contended that in this case the Special Court has no jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of the matter under the Special Court Act, 1992. FINDINGS : 5. At the outset, it may be mentioned that in this case, we are concerned with institution of R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay for eviction of a notified party, who is a tenant in respect of Flat No. 2, Krishna Mahal, Churchgate, Bombay. This eviction is sought under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947. In this case, we are not concerned with the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. The Special Court Act was enacted to provide for establishment of the Special Court for the trial of offences relating to transactions in securities and for matters connected therewith. Under the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it has been stated that in the course of investigations by RBI, large scale irregularities and malpractices were noticed in transactions in both the Government and other securities, indulged in by some brokers in collusion with the employees of various banks and Financial Institutions with a view to divert funds from banks and financial institutions to the individual accounts of certain brokers. It may not be out of place to mention that the notified parties in large number of cases have acquired properties on ownership and on tenancy basis from funds belonging to Public and Financial Institutions. Section 3(3) of the Special Court Act, 1992 begins with a non obstante clause. It states that notwithstanding anything contained in Code and any other law for the time being in force, on and from the date of notification under sub-section (2), any properly, moveable or immovable belonging to any notified persons shall stand attached with the issue of the notification and such property shall be dealt with by the custodian in such manner as the Special Court may direct. Therefore, section 3 provides for statutory attachment. It also empowers the custodian to deal with such property as per the directions of the Special Court. Hence, section 3 clearly provides for statutory attachments. Therefore, section 3 provides for statutory attachment. It also empowers the custodian to deal with such property as per the directions of the Special Court. Hence, section 3 clearly provides for statutory attachments. Section 6 of the Special Court Act provides for cognizance of cases instituted before the Special Court or transferred to the Special Court. Section 9 deals with procedures and powers of Special Court. Section 9-A deals with jurisdiction, power, authority and procedure of Special Court in civil matters. Section 9-A(1) states that on and from the commencement of the Special Court Act, the Special Court shall exercise all such jurisdiction, power and authority as were exercisable immediately before such commencement of the Act by any Civil Court in relation to any matter or claim relating to any property standing attached under section 3(3) and also in relation to any matter or claim arising out of transactions in securities entered into after 1-4-1991 and on before 6-6-1992 in which a person is notified under section 3(2) stands involved. Under sub-section (4) of section 9-A, it is, inter alia, laid down that while dealing with cases relating to any matter or claim, under section 9-A(1) the Special Court shall not be bound by Civil Procedure Code but shall be guided by use of natural justice. Section 11 deals with discharge of liabilities. If starts with a non obstante clause. Section 11(2) states inter alia that the following liabilities of the notified parties shall be discharged or paid in full in the following order : (a) all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the notified parties; (b) all amount due from the notified persons to any bank or financial institutions or mutual funds and lastly (c) any other liability that may be specified by the Special Court. In the case of (Bank of India Finance Ltd. v. Custodian)7, reported in 1997(10) S.C.C. 488 , it has been observed that section 13 of the Special Court Act gives overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force. In the case of (Bank of India Finance Ltd. v. Custodian)7, reported in 1997(10) S.C.C. 488 , it has been observed that section 13 of the Special Court Act gives overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force. It has been laid down that section 13 has been given an overriding effect because the intention of framing Special Court Act was to protect the interest of banks and financial institutions from irregularities and malpractices which had been committed by some brokers in collusion with the employees of banks and financial institutions. That, the important features of the Act was attachment of the properties with a view to prevent its diversion. That, the Special Court was required to pass orders directing disposal of the properties under attachment. That, section 11(2) provided for the priority in which the liabilities of the notified parties were to be discharged from out of the attached properties. That, since the Act was passed because of diversion of funds from banks and financial institutions to the brokers, section 11(2)(b) clearly stipulates that after discharge of the liabilities to the Government for taxes the amounts shall be paid to the banks which indicated the funds were diverted from the banks by reason of malpractices in security transactions. The Supreme Court further laid down that the losses caused to the banks and financial institutions were to be made good from out of the assets of the notified persons. In this judgment, the Supreme Court has also discussed the three main functions of the custodian. Firstly, that he has the authority notify the person under section 3(2) of the Act. Secondly, he has the authority to cancel the contract under section 4 of the Act. Lastly, the custodian is required to deal with the properties in the manner directed by the Special Court. In other words, the custodian is required to assist the attachment of the notified persons' property and to manage the same thereafter. It is important to note that even the priority for discharge of liability of the notified parties is not strictly as per the normal rule contemplated by the Civil Procedure Code. In other words, the custodian is required to assist the attachment of the notified persons' property and to manage the same thereafter. It is important to note that even the priority for discharge of liability of the notified parties is not strictly as per the normal rule contemplated by the Civil Procedure Code. It has been further held by the Supreme Court in BOI Finance (supra) that the properties of the notified parties whether attached or not, do not vest in the custodian. That, there is vesting in the Official Assignee under section 28(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act and section 17 of the Presidential Insolvency Act but there is no such vesting in the custodian. That, the custodian is merely required to assist in the attachment of the notified persons' property and to manage the same thereafter. In the circumstances, one has to read section 9-A of the Special Court Act in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in BOI Finance (supra). Section 9-A(1) contemplates of the Act, the Special Court shall exercise all such jurisdiction, power and authority as were exercisable immediately before such commencement by any Civil Court in relation to any matter or claim relating to any property standing attached under section 3. If one reads section 9-A in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in BOI Finance (supra), it is clear that the custodian is required only to assist in the attachment of the notified persons properties and to manage the same thereafter. The position of the custodian is the same as that of the notified person himself. There is no vesting of the property in the custodian. However, section 9-A provides that if any matter or claim relates to any property attached under section 3 of the Act then such claim shall be adjudicated upon by the Special Court. In other words, such claims shall be adjudicated upon by only one particular Court so that all questions as to how such property came to be acquired by the notified party, the funds from which such property came to be acquired, whether such property has direct nexus with the diversion of funds from banks, etc. In other words, such claims shall be adjudicated upon by only one particular Court so that all questions as to how such property came to be acquired by the notified party, the funds from which such property came to be acquired, whether such property has direct nexus with the diversion of funds from banks, etc. can be gone into and if such questions are answered in the affirmative i.e. against the notified party then at the time of distribution, the Court can certainly discharge the liability of the notified party by distributing the realised amounts in the manner indicated by section 11(2) of the Act. Therefore, if one reads section 9-A in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in BOI Finance (supra) then the words "Civil Courts" in section 9-A(1) would include and cover Small Causes Court also. I am, therefore, of the view that the Special Court under the Act, 1992 alone is empowered to try and dispose of the above R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999. Further, by reason of this Court trying the above R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999, no prejudice is caused to the landlord or tenant. One of the main arguments advanced on behalf of the landlord is whether the statutory tenancy is a property which is neither transferable nor saleable and therefore, it was not capable of attachment. That, since the statutory tenancy was neither transferable nor saleable, it was not capable of being sold and, consequently, it was not capable of being distributable as per section 11(2) of the Act. I do not find any merit in this argument. As laid down by the above judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bank of India Finance Ltd. (supra), the Special Court Act was passed because of diversion of funds from banks and financial institutions to the brokers. It is for this reason that section 11(2)(b) of the Act stipulates that after discharge of the liabilities to the Government towards taxes, the amounts shall be paid to banks and financial institutions, which indicates recognition by the legislature that funds were diverted from banks and financial institutions by reason of malpractice in security transactions. It is for this reason that section 11(2)(b) of the Act stipulates that after discharge of the liabilities to the Government towards taxes, the amounts shall be paid to banks and financial institutions, which indicates recognition by the legislature that funds were diverted from banks and financial institutions by reason of malpractice in security transactions. It is for this reason that section 11(2)(b) has been enacted because it proceeds on the basis that losses caused to banks and financial institutions were to be made good from out of the assets of the notified persons. It is for this reason that the custodian is empowered to deal with attached assets in the manner directed by the Special Court. Large number of immovable properties have been acquired by notified persons during the statutory period from funds diverted from banks and financial institutions. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that because statutory tenancy was not transferable nor saleable, it was not capable of being distributed under section 11(2) of the Act. Moreover, section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 is also subject to the contract to the contrary. In appropriate cases, even surrender of statutory tenancies do fetch monetary value from the landlords, which amount can be utilised by the custodian to discharge the liabilities of the notified party qua the Government, banks and financial institutions etc. As stated above, the questions such as the funds used for acquiring statutory tenancies, the diversion of such funds from banks and financial institutions to the notified persons, the nexus between the funds and acquisition of statutory tenancies etc. cannot be gone into by the Court of Small Causes. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the suit instituted by Reshma Estates Private Ltd. in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay being R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999 can be tried exclusively by the Special Court under the Special Court Act, 1992. The judgments cited on behalf of the landlord are under Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1986 as also under section 457 of the Companies Act. They are the judgments which deal with vesting of properties to the Official Assignee and the liquidator. None of these judgments apply to the facts of the present case. The judgments cited on behalf of the landlord are under Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1986 as also under section 457 of the Companies Act. They are the judgments which deal with vesting of properties to the Official Assignee and the liquidator. None of these judgments apply to the facts of the present case. As held by the Supreme Court in the above judgment of BOI Finance (supra), the attached assets under the Special Court Act do not vest in the custodian as in the case of insolvency as also in the case of liquidation of companies. Therefore, it is not necessary for this Court to discuss the judgments cited on behalf of the landlord. 6. In this matter, the preliminary objection regarding the Special Court trying the Suits filed for eviction in Small Causes Court was raised in two proceedings viz. Special Court Suit No. 3 of 1997 and Writ Petition No. 1380 of 2000 (arising from pending suit in Small Causes Court being R.A. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999). In this judgment this Court has considered the facts in R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999 because both the proceeding raise common question of law. In the circumstances, the following order is passed : ORDER (A) It is hereby declared that the provisions of section 13 of the Special Court Trial of Offences Relating To Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 shall override section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. (B) Consequently, R.A.E. R. Suit No. 2869 of 1987 pending in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay filed by Mr. Evelyn Dias v. Omprakash Mehta and others, as also R.A.E. Suit No. 676/1245 of 1999 filed by Reshma Estate Pvt. Ltd. v. FFSL others, pending the Court of Small Causes shall be tried by the Special Court. I am, therefore, directing the OSD attached to the Special Court to call for the R P in both the above suits from the Court of Small Causes if such R P has not been received so far. I am, therefore, directing the OSD attached to the Special Court to call for the R P in both the above suits from the Court of Small Causes if such R P has not been received so far. (C) Accordingly, the preliminary issue raised by the Custodian on behalf of FFSL in Writ Petition No. 1380 of 2000 is answered in the affirmative i.e. to say that the Special Court alone is empowered to try and dispose off the above two Suits pending in the Court of Small Causes and which are hereby ordered to be transferred to the Special Court. W.P. is disposed of. Order accordingly. -----