U. S. TRIPATHI, J. The above appeals and criminal revision have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 22- 3- 1990 passed by Sessions Judge, Jaunpur in S. T. 106 of 1989 convicting appellant Brijesh Singh under Section 304 Part II I. P. C. and 324/34 I. P. C. and sentencing him to undergo RI for a period of three years and a fine of Rs. 1,500 under Section 304 Part II I. P. C. and to undergo R. I. for a period of six months and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under Section 324/34 I. P. C. and convicting appellant Dashrath Singh under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 I. P. C. and 324 I. P. C. RI and sentencing him to undergo R. I. for a period of two years and a fine of Rs. 1,500/- under Section 304 (2)/34 I. P. C. and R. I. for a period of six months and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under Section 324 I. P. C. The Government Appeal and Criminal Revision have been preferred against the acquittal of above appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 I. P. C. 2. The prosecution story briefly stated was that Nagraj Singh deceased (22) was son of Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1 ). A day before the occurrence of this case i. e. on 15-12-1988 Nagraj Singh deceased had gone to Jamalapur Bazar with his cycle. In the Bazar appellant Brijesh Singh and Dashrath Singh demanded cycle from the deceased , but he refused and on it the appellant threatened to kill him. In the evening Nagraj Singh deceased came to his house and told this fact to his father. Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1 ). 3. On 16-12-1988 Nagraj Singh deceased again came to Jamalapur Bazar on a cycle with mustered seeds to get it expelled at the oil machine of Buddhoo. Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) also came to the said oil machine. Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) and Daya Shankar also met Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Nagraj Singh deceased at the said oil machine of Buddhoo. Keeping the mustered seeds and their cycle Nagraj Singh deceased, his father Abhimanyu (PW 1) along with Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) and Daya Shankar were proceeding to the market to purchase vegetables. Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) and Daya Shankar also met Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Nagraj Singh deceased at the said oil machine of Buddhoo. Keeping the mustered seeds and their cycle Nagraj Singh deceased, his father Abhimanyu (PW 1) along with Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) and Daya Shankar were proceeding to the market to purchase vegetables. When the deceased reached on the road in Jamalapur Bazar in front of Ram Janki temple appellants Brijesh Singh and Dashrath Singh met him and they exhorted to kill him as he had not given them his cycle on the previous day. Saying it both the appellants whipped out knives and Brijesh Singh pierced knife on the abdomen of Nagraj Singh deceased. When Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) rushed to save the deceased, appellant Dashrath Singh inflicted knife below on him which hit on his right hand. Nagraj Singh deceased fell down Abhimanyu Singh and others rushed to his rescue and the appellants made their escape good. 4. Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and others brought Nagraj Singh and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) to Government Dispensary Madiahun in a jeep, where the doctor declared Nagraj Singh dead. Injuries of Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) were examined by Dr. Umesh Chand Rai (PW 4) at 4. 40 p. m. who found one incised wound 3. 5 cm x 0. 5 cm x muscle deep on posterior surface of right shoulder joint placed vertically 4 cm below lateral end of right clavicle with bleeding and clear cut margins. 5. Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) got prepared report Ext. Ka-1 from Udai Prakash and came to police station Madiahun where he lodged report at 5. 15 p. m. On the basis of written report Constable Shankar Singh (PW 7) prepared chick F. I. R. Ext. Ka-13 and made an endorsement of the same at GD report Ext. Ka-14. Since the case related to P. S. Rampur, the chick report and copy of the GD were sent to P. S. Rampur where it were received at 6. 15 p. m. and a case was registered against the appellants under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 I. P. C. 6. The investigation of the case was taken up by Sri Shyam Nath Singh (PW 6 ). 15 p. m. and a case was registered against the appellants under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 I. P. C. 6. The investigation of the case was taken up by Sri Shyam Nath Singh (PW 6 ). He came to Primary Health Centre Madiahun, where he interrogated Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) and directed Sub Inspector Ram Subhag Yadav to conduct inquest of the dead body of Nagraj Singh deceased who conducted inquest of the dead body, sealed it and sent for post mortem through constables Ayodhya Dubey (PW 3) and Ram Chandra. 7. The I. O. Shyam Nath Singh (PW 6) visited the place of occurrence on 17-12-1988, where he interrogated Daya Shankar, inspected place of occurrence and prepared site plan Ext. Ka-4. The injured handed over his blood stained shirt to the I. O. which he took into possession. 8. Autopsy on the dead body of Nag Raj Singh deceased was conducted on 17-12-1988 by Dr. R. S. Shukla (PW 5), who found following ante mortem injury on his person : 9. Punctured wound 1. 5 cm x 1 cm x cavity deep on the abdomen 7 cm below umbilicus at 7 Oclock position. Margins were clear cut. 10. Internal examination showed that peritoneum was cut under the injury, liquid blood and blood clots about 1-1/2 liter was present in peritoneal cavity. There was 3 cm x 1. 5 cm cut on the all mesenteric border of intestine, three feet proximal to one cm down. There was mesenteric cut longitudinal 2 cm x 1 cm, one feet proximal to intestinal injury of large intestine. The cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage due to injury noted above. 11. The I. O. completed remaining investigation and submitted charge sheet against the appellant. 12. The cognizance of the case was taken by the Magistrate who committed the case to the Court of Sessions. 13. The appellant Brijesh Singh was charged with the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 324 read with Section 34 I. P. C. and appellant Dashrath Singh was charged with the offences punishable under Sections 302/34 and 324 I. P. C. The appellants pleaded not guilty. Appellant Dashrath contended that he was residing at the residence of his Mausa Paras Nath Singh of village Damodara and was studying. Appellant Dashrath contended that he was residing at the residence of his Mausa Paras Nath Singh of village Damodara and was studying. Udai Prakash and Shyam Lal were inimical to his Mausa and on their instigation he was falsely implicated. Appellant Brijesh Singh contended that Bisrajan Singh of his village with inimical with his father and Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) was relative of Bisarjan Singh. He was falsely implicated on the instigation of Bisarjan Singh. 14. The prosecution in support of its case examined Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) witnesses of fact, besides constable Ayodhya Prasad Dubey (PW 3), Dr. Umesh Chandra Rai (PW 4), Dr. R. S. Shukla (PW 5), Shyam Nath Singh I. O. (PW 6) and Constable Shankar Singh (PW 7) formal witnesses. The appellant did not adduce any evidence. 15. The learned Sessions Judge on considering evidence of the prosecution held that both the appellants in furtherance of their common intention assaulted Nagraj Singh deceased with knife, which resulted into his death and voluntarily caused hurt to Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) with knife. He further held that injury to Nagraj Singh deceased was caused with the knowledge that it may cause his death, therefore, the offence against the appellants fell under Section 304 Part II I. P. C. With these findings he convicted the appellants under Section 304 Part (II) read with Sections 34 I. P. C. and 324 read with Section 34 I. P. C. and sentenced them as mentioned above. 16. Aggrieved with their above conviction and sentence the appellants preferred Criminal Appeal No. 674 of 1990 and State of U. P. filed appeal against the acquittal of appellants under Section 302/34 I. P. C. The complainant has also preferred revision against the acquittal of appellants under Section 302/34 I. P. C. 17. Both the appeals and revision arise out of the same judgment and order and therefore, are taken up together for decision by a common judgment with the consent of the parties learned counsel. 18. We have heard Sri H. N. Singh for the appellant Dashrath Singh, Sri Kamal Krishna for the appellant Brijesh Singh, learned AGA for State of U. P. and Sri M. D. Misra for the complainant and have perused the evidence on record. 19. 18. We have heard Sri H. N. Singh for the appellant Dashrath Singh, Sri Kamal Krishna for the appellant Brijesh Singh, learned AGA for State of U. P. and Sri M. D. Misra for the complainant and have perused the evidence on record. 19. The death and cause of death of Nagraj Singh deceased as well as knife injury on the person of Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) are not disputed. The evidence of Dr. R. S. Shukla (PW 5) and Dr. Umesh Chandra Rai (PW 4) referred to above disclosed that the deceased and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) sustained injuries narrated above. It is also clear from the evidence of Dr. R. S. Shukla (PW 5) that there was punctured wound on the abdomen of the deceased which resulted into cutting of large intestine, small intestine and peritoneal cavity and was the cause of his death. As such it is established that Nagraj Singh deceased died due to punctured wound (knife injury) on abdomen and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) also sustained knife injury in the same transaction. 20. According to prosecution the occurrence took place on 16-12- 1988 at about 3. 30 p. m. Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Suresh (PW 2) stated that the occurrence took place on the said date time and place. They further stated that just after the occurrence Nagraj Singh deceased and Suresh Tiwari were brought to Madiahun Hospital. Suresh Tiwari was medically examined at Primary Health Centre Madiahun at 4. 40 p. m. His injury was bleeding and fresh. Report of the occurrence was lodged at P. S. Madiahun at 5. 15 p. m. as stated by Constable Shankar Singh (PW 7 ). The evidence of Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1), Suresh Tiwari (PW 2), Dr. Umesh Chandra Rai (PW 4) and Constable Shankar Singh (PW 7) on the above facts are not challenged. As such it has been established that occurrence took place on 16-12- 1988 at about 3. 30 p. m. 21. The place of occurrence alleged by prosecution was at Jamalapur market in front of Ram Janki Mandir. The ocular witnesses Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) stated that occurrence took place in front of Ram Janki Mandir, besides Jaunpur Mirzapur Road at Jamalapur market. 30 p. m. 21. The place of occurrence alleged by prosecution was at Jamalapur market in front of Ram Janki Mandir. The ocular witnesses Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) stated that occurrence took place in front of Ram Janki Mandir, besides Jaunpur Mirzapur Road at Jamalapur market. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that no blood was found on the spot and, therefore, the place of occurrence alleged by the prosecution has not been established. The occurrence had taken place in the market and it was market day. The injury of Nagraj Singh deceased shows that it was on the abdomen and there was internal bleeding. The occurrence had taken place in the winter season and the deceased and injured were wearing clothes. It is also clear from the evidence on record that the deceased was wearing baniyan, bush shirt, and two sweaters. In these circumstances the blood which could have come out of the injury would have been soaked in the above clothes and as such there was no question of falling blood on the spot. Moreover, if some drops of blood would have fallen on the spot, it would have been diminished by the foot steps of the persons present in the market. The I. O. visited the spot on the next day and there was no possibility of blood stains on the spot. The prosecution was not going to gain by changing the place of occurrence and as such absence of blood on the spot has been fully explained. The appellants have also not suggested any counter place of occurrence. Thus, the prosecution has established the place of occurrence. 22. The motive alleged by the prosecution was that a day before the occurrence of the case Nagraj Singh deceased had come to Jamalapur market with his cycle. The appellants met him at the market and demanded his cycle from him. He refused to give cycle to them, which was not relished by the appellant and they threatened him to kill. This fact was disclosed by Nagraj Singh deceased to his father Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) when he returned to his house in the evening. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there is no direct evidence of above motive and the motive alleged appears very weak as the appellants could have not murdered the deceased on such a flimsy grounds. This fact was disclosed by Nagraj Singh deceased to his father Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) when he returned to his house in the evening. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there is no direct evidence of above motive and the motive alleged appears very weak as the appellants could have not murdered the deceased on such a flimsy grounds. The threats extended by the appellants to the deceased was told by him to his father and after death of deceased the above communication is admissible under Section 32 of Indian Evidence Act. A Three Judges Bench of Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 SCC (Crl.) 487, considered the scope of Section 32 (1) of Evidence Act. After referring to a number of decisions of different High Courts on the point, the majority opinion laid down five propositions. Among them the first is that the legislature has thought it necessary to widen sphere of Section 32 for avoiding injustice. Among the remaining propositions the Second is relevant for our purpose and hence it is extracted below : " (2) The test of proximity can not be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut and dried formula of universal application and so as to be confined in strait jacket. Distance of time which would depend or vary with circumstances of each case. . . . . . . Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death". 23. Following the above decisions the Apex Court further held in the case of Rattan Singh v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, 1997 SCC (Cr) 525, as below : "the collocation of the words in Section 32 (1) `circumstances of transactions which resulted in his death is apparently of wider amplitude than saying `circumstance which caused his death. There need not necessarily be a direct nexus between `circumstance and death. It is enough if the words spoken by the deceased have reference to any circumstance which has connection with any of the transactions which ended up in the death of the deceased. Such statement would also fall within the purview of Section 32 (I) of the Evidence Act. There need not necessarily be a direct nexus between `circumstance and death. It is enough if the words spoken by the deceased have reference to any circumstance which has connection with any of the transactions which ended up in the death of the deceased. Such statement would also fall within the purview of Section 32 (I) of the Evidence Act. In other words, it is not necessary that such circumstance should be proximate for an even distant circumstances can also become admissible under sub-section, provided it has nexus with the transactions which resulted in the death. " 24. The statement which the deceased made to his father a day before the occurrence that on his refusal to give cycle to him the appellants had threatened to kill him has nexus and proximate with the death of the deceased and, therefore, is admissible under Section 32 (I) of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, the above evidence of Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) can not be discarded simply on the ground that it was hear say one and in fact it is admissible in evidence is dying declaration of the deceased because it relates to the circumstances and the transactions which resulted in his death. 25. It is true that the motive alleged by the prosecution was very weak, but how and in what manner the appellants took the refusal of the deceased to give cycle to them cannot be ascertained as the prosecution cannot lead any evidence on the point how the mind of appellants acted in such circumstances. Moreover, in this case the prosecution has relied on ocular evidence of Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2 ). It is settled that in cases of direct evidence the motive recedes to its background and the case has to be decided on the strength of ocular testimony. If the ocular testimony is reliable the weakness or absence of motive has no effect. 26. On the factum and manner of occurrence and complicity of appellant the prosecution relied on ocular testimony of Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2 ). Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) stated that on the date of occurrence at 3. 00 p. m. his son Nagraj Singh deceased had gone to Jamalapur market for expelling mustered seeds at the oil machine of Buddhoo Pasi. Thereafter he also went to oil machine of Buddhoo Pasi. Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) stated that on the date of occurrence at 3. 00 p. m. his son Nagraj Singh deceased had gone to Jamalapur market for expelling mustered seeds at the oil machine of Buddhoo Pasi. Thereafter he also went to oil machine of Buddhoo Pasi. Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) and Daya Shankar also came there. Keeping their cycle, he alongwith deceased, Suresh Tiwari and Daya Shankar was going to purchase vegetables. When he and above persons reached in front of Ram Janki Mandir in the market the appellants seeing the deceased challenged him and said that he had not given his cycle to them and he should be killed. Saying it both the appellants whipped out knives. Appellant Brijesh inflicted knife below on the abdomen of the deceased and when Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) rushed to save him he was assaulted by appellant Dashrath. 27. Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) stated that on the date of occurrence he had gone to Jamalapur Bazar at the oil machine of Buddhoo Pasi. Nagraj Singh and his father met him there. Daya Shankar was also there. When they came in front of Ram Janki Mandir appellant Brijesh and Dasarath rushed towards Nagraj Singh deceased saying that he had not given his cycle to them and they would kill him. Brijesh inflicted knife blow on the abdomen of Nagraj Singh. When he rushed to save him, Dasartha assaulted him with knife on his right shoulder. He along with Nagraj Singh was taken to Madiahun Hospital in a jeep, where he was medically examined. 28. Learned counsel for the appellant challenged the presence of Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) on the spot on the ground that he had no occasion to go to market as his son Nagraj Singh deceased has already gone there with mustered seeds. It was also argued that Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) stated that he had gone to market for purchasing vegetables and in case Nagraj Singh deceased had already gone to market, he could also bring vegetables. The witness clarified in his cross examination that though his son had gone to market he also went to purchase vegetables and also to pass time. We find no improbabilities in the conduct of Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) in going to market. The witness clarified in his cross examination that though his son had gone to market he also went to purchase vegetables and also to pass time. We find no improbabilities in the conduct of Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) in going to market. Jamalapur market is at a distance of only one kilo meter from the house of the witness and if he thought to come to market there was no improbability in it as the villagers often visit the nearby market to purchase their daily use articles or to meet the persons or to pass time. After occurrence Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) had taken the deceased and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) to Madiahun Hospital in a jeep and this fact is proved by the evidence of Dr. Umesh Chandra (PW 4) that Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) was brought to the dispensary by him (Abhimanyu Singh) at 4. 40 p. m. Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) had also lodged the report of the occurrence at 5. 15 p. m. at P. S. Madiahun. His presence at the police station at said time is also corroborated by evidence of constable Shankar Singh (PW 7) and GD report, Ext. Ka-14. The above documentary evidence thus proved the presence of Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) on the spot. 29. Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) is injured witness. His injuries were examined at 4. 40 p. m. and it was bleeding and fresh in duration. The injury on the person of the witness proves his presence. Moreover, he had also explained that on the date of occurrence he had gone to Jamalapur market and Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Nagraj Singh deceased met him at the oil machine of Buddhoo Pasi and in their company he was proceeding to market for purchasing vegetables. He further stated that he tried to save the deceased and in this attempt sustained injury. Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) had sustained injury in the same transaction in which Nagraj Singh deceased sustained injury. Therefore, his presence on the spot can not be doubted. 30. An attempt was made from the side of the appellant that Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) falsely deposed against the appellant Brijesh Singh as one Bisarjan Singh of the village of appellant was his relative and he was deposing falsely on the instigation of Bisarjan Singh. Therefore, his presence on the spot can not be doubted. 30. An attempt was made from the side of the appellant that Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) falsely deposed against the appellant Brijesh Singh as one Bisarjan Singh of the village of appellant was his relative and he was deposing falsely on the instigation of Bisarjan Singh. The witness has repelled the above suggestion and there is no evidence to prove relationship of the witness with Bisarjan Singh. Assuming that Bisarjan Singh was inimical with Brijesh Singh it was not expected from Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) being real father of the deceased, to leave out real assailants and falsely implicate innocent person. Thus, no grounds for false implication of appellants have been shown. 31. It was further suggested to Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) that Udai Prakash scribe of the report was inimical with Paras Nath Singh, Mausa of appellant Dasarath Singh and therefore he falsely implicated him on the instigation of Udai Prakash. As mentioned above, Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) the father of the deceased was not expected to spare out real assailants and falsely implicate innocent persons simply on the instigation of Udai Prakash with whom he had no close intimacy and, therefore, there was no ground for Abhimanyu Singh to depose falsely. Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) has no animosity, ill will or grudge with appellants. He was also resident of another village and there is nothing on record to show that he had any ground to falsely implicate the appellants. 32. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) admitted in his cross examination that the report was prepared in his presence at Madiahun Hospital at 7. 00 p. m. while the report was lodged at 5. 15 p. m. But on account of above discrepancy the evidence of Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) cannot be discarded. Moreover, Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) had stated that the police came to the hospital at 7. 00 p. m. The case related to P. S. Rampur, Sri Shyam Nath I. O. (PW 6) stated that papers of the case were received at P. S. Rampur through constable driver of P. S. Madiahun at 6. 15 p. m. and thereafter he went to Primary Health Centre, Madiahun, where he interrogated Suresh Tiwari (PW 2 ). 00 p. m. The case related to P. S. Rampur, Sri Shyam Nath I. O. (PW 6) stated that papers of the case were received at P. S. Rampur through constable driver of P. S. Madiahun at 6. 15 p. m. and thereafter he went to Primary Health Centre, Madiahun, where he interrogated Suresh Tiwari (PW 2 ). Therefore, the police of P. S. Rampur reached the Primary Health Centre Madiahoo at 7. 00 p m. after registration of the case. The possibility that Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) gave the above statement of preparation of report at 7. 00 p. m. under some confusion can not be easily ruled out and the documentary evidence as well as evidence of Shankar Singh (PW 7) that the written report Ext. Ka- 1 was handed over at P. S. Madiahun by Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) at 5. 15 p. m. and the evidence of Shyam Nath Singh (PW 8) that the chick report and copy of G. D. from P. S. Madiahun were received at P. S. Rampur at 6. 15 p. m. make it clear that the report of the occurrence was lodged at 5. 15 p. m. and not after 7. 00 p. m. Therefore, no importance can be attached to the above confused statement of Suresh Tiwari (PW 2 ). 33. In this way we find that the evidence of ocular witnesses Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) whose presence on the spot has been established and is corroborated by medical evidence F. I. R. and G. D. report as well as evidence of I. O. is worthy of credence. 34. From the above ocular evidence it is established that the appellants participated in the commission of murder of Nagraj Singh deceased and assault by knife on Suresh Tiwari (PW 2 ). 35. The learned Sessions Judge has held that the act of appellants in causing death of Nagraj Singh deceased fell under Section 304 Part (II) I. P. C. as there was no intention on their part to commit his murder. 36. The State has filed appeal and the complainant has also filed revision against the acquittal of appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 I. P. C. Therefore, the acquittal of appellants under Section 302/34 IPC is under challenge before us. 36. The State has filed appeal and the complainant has also filed revision against the acquittal of appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 I. P. C. Therefore, the acquittal of appellants under Section 302/34 IPC is under challenge before us. The principle to be followed by the Appellate Court while considering the appeal against the order of acquittal is to interfere only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable" it is compelling reason for interference. (Vide Shivaji Saheb Rao Bobade v. State of Maharastra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 . The Apex Court in Dhanna v. State of M. P. , (1996) 10 SCC 79 : 1996 (1) JIC 1084 (SC), reiterated the perspective to be adopted in such a situation after referring some of the earlier decisions rendered by the Apex Court on that aspect. Following observation of the above decision is material : "though the Code does not make any distinction between an appeal from acquittal and an appeal from conviction, so far as the powers of the appellate Court are concerned, certain unwritten rules of adjudication have consistently been followed by Judges while dealing with the appeals against acquittal. No doubt, the High Court has full power to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent conclusion, where the appeal is against conviction or acquittal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court has to bear in mind first, that there is a general presumption in favour of the innocence of the person accused in criminal cases and that presumption is only strengthened by the acquittal. The second is, every accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt regarding his guilt and when the trial Court acquitted him he would retain that benefit in the appellate Court also. Thus, the appellate Court in appeals against acquittals has to proceed more cautiously and only if there is absolute assurance of the guilt of the accused, upon the evidence on record, that the order of acquittal is liable to be interfered with or disturbed". 37. Keeping in mind the above standard of caution we would make the scrutiny of the findings of the trial Court regarding acquittal of appellants under Sections 302 and 302/34 I. P. C. 38. 37. Keeping in mind the above standard of caution we would make the scrutiny of the findings of the trial Court regarding acquittal of appellants under Sections 302 and 302/34 I. P. C. 38. It is relevant to mention at this stage that the trial Court has relied on the evidence of ocular witnesses and participation of the appellants in the offence. The ground for acquittal of appellants under Sections 302 and 302/34 I. P. C. was that the appellants had no intention to commit murder of the deceased or to cause such injury as would have likely cause death in the ordinary course of nature and that the altercation which took place a day before the occurrence was not sufficient to commit murder of the deceased. However, it was observed by the trial Court that the injury on the abdomen of the deceased was caused with a force and with the knowledge that it would likely to cause the death of the deceased. 39. On appraisal of the evidence, we find that the trial Court has totally ignored the evidence of Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) that a day before the occurrence, on refusal of the deceased to give his cycle to the appellants, they had threatened to kill him, as well as the evidence Abhimanyu Singh (PW 1) and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) that on the date of occurrence observing the deceased both the appellants exhorted that the deceased should be killed and both the appellants whipped out knives. The injury on the abdomen of the deceased was caused by knife with such a force that it had resulted in cutting of peritoneum, small and large intestines. The threats given on the previous day as well on the date of occurrence and the force with which the injury was caused, in our opinion clearly indicated the intention of the appellants. Section 299 I. P. C. which defines culpable homicide reads as under: "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. Section 299 I. P. C. which defines culpable homicide reads as under: "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. " Explanation 2 to Section 299 has material bearing on the point which says as under : "where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented. " Section 300 I. P. C. carves out two segments one is culpable homicide amounting to murder and the second segment consists of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Four clauses enumerated in the section are enveloped in the first segment. What is set apart for the second segment is compendiously described as "except in the cases hereinafter excepted" from out of the first segment. The second clause which is relevant for the purpose of this case is quoted below : 2ndly- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused. " 40. Learned counsel for the appellant did not make an effort to bring the case within any of the four exceptions enumerated in Section 300 I. P. C. Therefore, only question to be answered is whether the appellant did an act with intention of causing such bodily injury as he knew to be likely to cause death of deceased. Evaluating the evidence of the ocular witnesses in the light of earlier threats as well as the threats extended at the time of causing injury and causing injury on the vital part of the deceased with such a force, in our opinion can not evacuate the act out of the contours of the secondly clause of Section 300 I. P. C. 41. In the case of Basanta v. State of Maharashtra, A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 361, there was some verbal altercation as a result of which the deceased had caught the hand of the accused, whereupon the accused assaulted the deceased with a knife with very great force according to medical evidence. In the above circumstances it was held that in view of the medical evidence and the injuries received by the deceased the case squarely falls within the four corners of Section 302 I. P. C. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the case falls under Section 304 Part II I. P. C. was repelled, because there was nothing to show that the altercation was of such a serious nature which could cause sudden provocation and secondly, the nature of injury, namely, stab on the chest which resulted in fracture of sixth rib and injured heart and the lung and which according to the doctor was given with great force showed that it was most cruel and, therefore, the case squarely falls under Section 302 I. P. C. 42. Thus, we find that the nature of injury and previous altercation as well exhortation prior to causing of injury on the deceased clearly indicated that the injury on the deceased was caused with intention to kill him. Therefore, the case falls within four corners of Section 302 I. P. C. 43. Learned counsel for the appellant Dasarath Singh further contended that the fatal injury to the deceased was caused by appellant Brijesh Singh and role assigned to appellant Dasarath Singh was that he caused injury to Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) which was simple in nature and, therefore, appellant Dasarath Singh had not shared the common intention of the main assailant and is not liable under Section 302/34 I. P. C. 44. As held by Apex Court in the case of Suresh and another v. State of U. P. 2001 (2) JIC 169 (SC) : JT 2001 (3) SC 336, to attract Section 34 I. P. C. two postulates are indispensable : (1) The criminal act (consisting of series of acts) should have been done not by one person, but more than one person. (2) Doing of every such individual act cumulatively resulting in the commission of criminal offence should have been in furtherance of the common intention of all such persons. 45. (2) Doing of every such individual act cumulatively resulting in the commission of criminal offence should have been in furtherance of the common intention of all such persons. 45. In the case of Nandu Rastogi alias Nandji Rastogi and another v. State of Bihar, 2002 A. I. R. SCW 4022, before the Apex Court, the appellants along with three others came armed with country made pistols. They came together and while two of them stood guard and prevented the prosecution witnesses from intervening, three of them took the deceased inside and one of them shot him dead. Thereafter they fled away together. In view of above facts the Apex Court held as below : "to attract Section 34 I. P. C. it is not necessary that each one of the accused must assault the deceased. It is enough that if it is shown that they shared a common intention to commit the offence and in furtherance thereof each one played his assigned role by doing separate acts, similar or diverse. The fact of this case or eloquent and the role played by Bal Mukund Rastogi of preventing the prosecution witnesses from going to the rescue of the deceased was the role played by him with a view to achieve the ultimate objective of killing Shankar Rastogi. We therefore, entertain no doubt that all the five persons who came to the shop of the informant had a common intention to commit the murder of Shankar Rastogi and they acted pursuant to a pre-arranged plan. The facts clearly are consistent only with the hypothesis of their acting in furtherance of a common intention. They have, therefore, rightly been convicted with the aid of Section 34 I. P. C". 46. In this case it is established from evidence on record that on previous day both the appellants together demanded cycle from the deceased and on refusal they threatened the deceased to kill him. On the date of occurrence observing the deceased they again threatened to kill him and both of them were having knives which they whipped out. When appellant Brijesh Singh inflicted knife injury on the deceased and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) came to his rescue appellant Dasarath Singh prevented him by causing knife injury and both the appellants on the challenge given by the witnesses, ran away together. When appellant Brijesh Singh inflicted knife injury on the deceased and Suresh Tiwari (PW 2) came to his rescue appellant Dasarath Singh prevented him by causing knife injury and both the appellants on the challenge given by the witnesses, ran away together. The above evidence clearly established that both the appellants had a common intention and appellant Dasarath also shared the common intention of both in killing the deceased. Therefore, appellant Dasharath Singh is also liable for the murder of the deceased with the aid of Section 34 I. P. C. 47. Lastly it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant Dasharath that at the time of occurrence appellant Dasharath Singh was above 16 years old and, therefore, he could not get benefit of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 but on the enforcement of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 a person who is below 18 years of age has been treated as juvenile and, therefore, he is entitled to the benefit of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, because he was below 18 years on the date of the offence. 48. Undisputedly on the date of offence i. e. 16-12-1988, Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter called Act of 1986) was in force. Under the Act of 1986 juvenile means a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. The age certificate of appellant Dasharath Singh ( copy of transfer certificate ) filed before this Court shows that his date of birth was 12- 4-1971. Meaning thereby on the date of offence he was above 16 years of age ( 17 years, 8 months and 4 days old) and was not juvenile for the purpose of Act of 1986. Probably for this reason no such plea was raised before the trial Court and this point was not considered. The question before us is whether the appellant Dasharath Singh is entitled to benefit of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, hereinafter called Act of 2000. There is no provision in the Act of 2000 to make it applicable retrospectively. Contrary to it Repeal and Saving Section 69 of the Act of 2000 reads as under: "69. Repeal and savings.- (1) The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 ( 53 of 1986) is hereby repealed. There is no provision in the Act of 2000 to make it applicable retrospectively. Contrary to it Repeal and Saving Section 69 of the Act of 2000 reads as under: "69. Repeal and savings.- (1) The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 ( 53 of 1986) is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said Act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. " Section 20 of the Act of 2000 which deals with the special provisions in respect of pending cases reads as under : "20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this act that a juvenile has committed the offence. " 49. The above section is applicable to proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court on the date the Act of 2000 comes into force. This section as it is clear from its wordings, applies to cases on which old Act (Act of 1986) was applicable. As mentioned above, in the instant case the old Act (Act of 1986) was not applicable. There fore, the provisions of Section 20 of Act of 2000 will not apply to the present case. 50. Assuming that appellant Dasharath Singh is entitled to benefit of any of the provisions of Act of 2000 the provisions of Section 64 of Act of 2000 alone may be said applicable in his case, which reads as under : 51. But the powers of Section 64 are to be exercised by the State Government or the local authority for which the appellant may redress his remedy before the appropriate authority. But the powers of Section 64 are to be exercised by the State Government or the local authority for which the appellant may redress his remedy before the appropriate authority. The above section does not confer any power on the Court to grant any sort of benefit of the Act of 2000 to the appellant. "64. Juvenile in conflict with law undergoing sentence at commencement of this Act.-In any area in which this Act is brought into force, the State Government or the local authority may direct that a juvenile in conflict with law who is undergoing any sentence of imprisonment at the commencement of this Act, shall, in lieu of undergoing such sentence, be sent to a special home or be kept in fit institution in such manner as the State Government or the local authority thinks fit for the remainder of the period of the sentence, and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the juvenile as if he had been ordered by the Board to be sent to such special home or institution or, as the case may be, ordered to be kept under protective care under sub-section (2) of Section 16 of this Act". 52. In view of our above discussions and observations, we find that the appeal preferred by the appellants is liable to be dismissed and the Government Appeal and Revision are liable to be allowed. 53. Accordingly Criminal Appeal No. 674 of 1990 is dismissed and the conviction and sentence of appellants under Sections 324/34 and 324 I. P. C. awarded by the trial Court are confirmed. Government Appeal No. 1271 of 1990 is allowed and in addition to his conviction under Section 324/34 I. P. C. awarded by the Trial Court appellant Brijesh Singh is convicted under Section 302 I. P. C. and is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Appellant Dasharath Singh in addition to his conviction under Section 324 I. P. C. is further convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 I. P. C. and is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Both the substantive sentences shall run concurrently. 54. Both the appellants are on bail. They shall surrender before the C. J. M. Jaunpur to serve out the sentences awarded and confirmed by this Court. 55. Both the substantive sentences shall run concurrently. 54. Both the appellants are on bail. They shall surrender before the C. J. M. Jaunpur to serve out the sentences awarded and confirmed by this Court. 55. C. J. M. Jaunpur is directed to procure the arrest of appellants Brijesh Singh and Dasharath Singh by adopting all processes available under law and send them to jail to serve out the sentences. Criminal Revision No. 692 of 1990 is disposed of accordingly. Revision disposed of. .