C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) RESPONDENT filed the suit seeking eviction of the appellants from the demised premises, which is a building, arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation from the date of expiry of the period of lease. The trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, not only ordered eviction of the appellants from the demised premises, but also passed a decree for Rs. 18,600/- towards arrears of rent and fixed the damages for use and occupation payable by the appellants to respondent at Rs. 7,500/- per month from 1-4-1998 onwards till the date of delivery of possession with interest at 12% p. a. On appeal by the appellants, the first appellate Court confirmed the decree of the trial Court. Hence this second appeal. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT, who filed a caveat, appeared through a senior counsel. ( 3 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned senior counsel for the respondent. ( 4 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that since the dispute between the parties was referred to arbitration as per Ex. A-8 and since the arbitrators passed Ex. B-4 Award, the suit ought to be dismissed in view of the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short "the Act") because Ex. B-4 need not be made a rule of the Court as was necessary under the provisions of the repealed Arbitration Act, 1940. It is his contention that the substantial question of law that arises for consideration in the appeal would be whether a party to an arbitration can, by ignoring the Award passed by the arbitrators, approach the Civil Court and seek a relief contrary to the Award. His contention also is that both Courts below fixed the quantum of damages arbitrarily without any basis. The contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent is that no Award, in fact, was passed by the arbitrators and that Ex. B-4 was brought into existence by the appellants by forging the signature of the respondent to drag on the proceedings and so both the Courts below ignored it, and contended that inasmuch as there is concurrent finding of fact by both the Courts against the appellants, the second appeal is not maintainable. ( 5 ) AS per Ex. B-4 was brought into existence by the appellants by forging the signature of the respondent to drag on the proceedings and so both the Courts below ignored it, and contended that inasmuch as there is concurrent finding of fact by both the Courts against the appellants, the second appeal is not maintainable. ( 5 ) AS per Ex. B-4, Award said to have been passed by the arbitrators, the lease in favour of the appellants is to be extended by a period of six years from the date of Award. Ex. B-4, admittedly, is an unstamped and unregistered document. Without going into the question as to whether the signature of the respondent in Ex. B-4 is genuine or forged, and assuming, for the purpose of deciding this appeal, that it does contain the signature of the respondent, the contention raised that suit ignoring Ex. B-4 is not maintainable is being considered by me. ( 6 ) EX. B. 4 cannot be ignored as not a duly stamped document because it was admitted in evidence, without objection, in view of Section 36 of Stamp Act. It is true that for an Award to become enforceable, it need not be made a rule of the Court as was necessary under the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940, and can straight away be enforced, as per Section 36 of the Act, in the same manner as a decree of the civil Court. Therefore, the question is Ex. B4 Award is enforceable. Since as per Ex. B4 the lease in respect of the demised premises is for a period of six years from the date of Award, the question is if Ex. B4 should be construed as a decision extending the lease by six years or is a mere direction to the parties to enter into a fresh lease for six years. There can be no dispute for the proposition that a lease for six years can only be made would come into existence only through a registered document. That an Award creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing, whether in present or in future, a right, title or interest in immovable property worth more than hundred rupees requires registration and if it is not so registered it cannot be acted upon, is a well settled proposition of law. That an Award creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing, whether in present or in future, a right, title or interest in immovable property worth more than hundred rupees requires registration and if it is not so registered it cannot be acted upon, is a well settled proposition of law. A Full Bench of this Court in Venkataratnam v. Chalamayya (1966) 2 Andh WR 361, considering the effect of an unregistered Award passed under the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940 and the question as to whether the Award which is sought to be made the rule of the Court requires registration, held that inasmuch as the rights and liabilities of the parties are created by the Award, but not by the decree of the Court passed in accordance with Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, an unregistered Award relating to immovable property, which requires registration under the provisions of the Registration Act, cannot be made a rule of the Court. The said decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court in M. Chalamayya v. M. Venkata-ratnam, AIR 1972 SC 1121 , where it is clearly held :"it should be noted that the Section (i. e. Section 17 of Registration Act) does not say that the document cannot be received in evidence at all. All that it says is that the document cannot be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. If under the Evidence Act the document is receivable in evidence for a collateral purpose, Section 49 is no bar. " ( 7 ) I may also usefully refer to Ratan Lal v. Purshottam, AIR 1974 SC 1066 , where also it is held that an Award creating rights in immovable property worth more than Rs. 100/- is to be compulsorily registered and if it is not so registered would be inadmissible in evidence for pronouncing judgment in accordance with it. In view the legal position, Ex. B. 4 creating a lease for six years in immovable property, being unregistered, cannot be relied on or used for granting any relief to the appellants. ( 8 ) IF Ex. B. 4 is to be construed as an Award directing the parties to execute a document creating a lease for six years from the date of Award, in view of the ratio in T. P. Sidhwa v. S. B. and Sons Pvt. Ltd. , AIR 1974 SC 1912 , it (Ex. ( 8 ) IF Ex. B. 4 is to be construed as an Award directing the parties to execute a document creating a lease for six years from the date of Award, in view of the ratio in T. P. Sidhwa v. S. B. and Sons Pvt. Ltd. , AIR 1974 SC 1912 , it (Ex. B. 4) does not require registration. But that fact, by itself, is of no help to the appellants, because till a fresh lease deed, extending lease for six years from the date of Award, is executed and registered, appellants would not attain the status of lessees in respect of the suit property for six years from the date of Award. So, appellants ought to have taken steps to obtain a lease deed for six years in respect of the demised premises, as per the Award. Admittedly appellants did not take steps to get a fresh lease for six years from the respondent. So, they cannot be said to have any right in the demised premises by virtue of Ex. B. 4. ( 9 ) THUS, in either way, i. e. , if Ex. B. 4 is construed as a decision creating a fresh lease for six, years or is a direction to the parties to enter into a fresh lease, appellants cannot be said to have acquired any right by or through Ex. B. 4 to resist the claim of respondent-landlord for recovery of possession of the demises premises, because a document which requires registration, if not registered, would be ineffective in view of Section 49 of Registration Act, and since no steps in pursuance of Ex. B. 4 to obtain a lease deed for six years are taken. In view of the above, I find no force in the contention of the learned counsel for appellants that the suit is not maintainable in view of Ex. B. 4 and that a substantial question of law arises for decision in this appeal. ( 10 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the quantum of damages arrived at by both the courts is on the higher side, inasmuch as the rent prevailing in the locality is far less than the amount fixed by the trial Court, even if true, cannot be interfered with in this second appeal because it would be a concurrent finding of fact by both courts. ( 11 ) FOR the above reasons, I find no grounds to admit this second appeal and hence the same is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. The appellants are given one month time from today for vacating the suit property i. e. , the demised premises. Second appeal dismissed.