Judgment :- M.Karpagavinayagam, J. Venkatesan, the accused was convicted for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-. Challenging the same, this appeal has been filed. 2. The facts in brief, as projected by prosecution, are as follows:- (a) The deceased Kumari got married to one Govindasamy. The said Govindasamy left her and eloped with some other girl. Therefore, the deceased was living with her son-P.W.1 Suresh, along with her mother-in-law-P.W.4. (b) Accused Venkatesan is residing next to the house of the deceased and in course of time, they developed illicit intimacy. The accused used to get money from the deceased for his expenses. Sometimes, she also used to give jewels to him for pledging. (c)The fateful occurrence took place on 28-5-1998. At about 10 a.m., the accused went to the house of the deceased and asked her to pay Rs.5,000/-. The deceased refused to pay the amount, stating that she had no money. She also told him that the jewels already handed over to him for pledging were not redeemed. When the accused insisted for payment of money, she persisted saying that she had no money. The accused asked her to swear in the name of her son, by crossing her son-P.W.1. But the deceased refused to do so. The accused came near P.W.1 and tried to pull him. Then, the deceased asked P.W.1 Suresh to run away and escape from him. Accordingly, P.W.1 went out of the house and stood outside near the window. Then the accused took a kerosene tin and poured kerosene over the body of the deceased and set fire on her. Thereafter, the accused ran away. (d) Engulfed in fire, the deceased came out of the house, crying for help. P.W.5 Krishnan, who was residing nearby, heard the screaming of the deceased. The witnesses and neighbours, by using the gunny bags, doused the fire. (e) In the meantime, P.W.1, having witnessed the occurrence got shocked and rushed to P.W.2 Vatsala, the younger sister of the deceased and informed her about the same. (f) The neighbour, along with P.W.2, the younger sister of the deceased, P.W.3 Vasantha, the elder sister of the deceased and P.W.4 Vinayagam, the mother-in-law of the deceased, came to the scene and took the victim to Arni Hospital. (f) The neighbour, along with P.W.2, the younger sister of the deceased, P.W.3 Vasantha, the elder sister of the deceased and P.W.4 Vinayagam, the mother-in-law of the deceased, came to the scene and took the victim to Arni Hospital. (g) P.W.7 Doctor found 70% burn injuries on the body of the deceased and admitted her for treatment. Ex.P-7 is the copy of the accident register. While the deceased was admitted, she told the Doctor that the injuries sustained were due to burst of a stove in the house. P.W.7 Doctor sent Ex.D-1 intimation to Police on 28-5-1998. However, the Police did not choose to come immediately. On noticing her condition becoming worse, on 30-5-1998, P.W.7 Doctor sent Ex.P-8 requisition to P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate to come and record the dying declaration of the deceased at the hospital. (h) In the meantime, P.W.10 Sub-Inspector of Police, on 30-5-1998, noticing that Ex.D-1 was sent by the hospital on 28-5-1998 itself, went to hospital at about 10.30 a.m. and recorded the statement of the deceased in the presence of P.W.7 Doctor. Ex.P-14 is the statement of the victim. Ex.P-9 is the certificate given by P.W.7 Doctor to the effect that the deceased was conscious while giving the statement to P.W.10. A case was registered for the offence under Section 307 I.P.C. The copy of F.I.R. is Ex.P-15. Then, P.W.10 Sub-Inspector of Police handed over the investigation to P.W.11, another Sub-Inspector of Police. (i) On the same day, i.e. on 30-5-1998 at about 11.45 a.m., P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate came to the hospital and recorded the dying declaration of the deceased in the presence of witnesses. Ex.P-13 is the dying declaration and Ex.P-10 is the certificate issued by P.W.7 Doctor. (j) In the afternoon of 30-5-1998, the condition of the victim became critical. Therefore, the victim was sent to Vellore Hospital on the same day and on the same evening, she died at Vellore Hospital. P.W.11 Sub-Inspector of Police received Ex.P-16 death intimation. Therefore, he altered the offence from Section 307 I.P.C. to one under Section 302 I.P.C. Ex.P-17 is the express F.I.R. (k) P.W.12 Inspector of Police, on receipt of Ex.P-17, went to Vellore Hospital and conducted inquest on 31-5-1998 between 8 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. During the course of inquest, P.Ws.1,3 and 4 and another were examined. Ex.P-18 is the inquest report. Then the body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem. Ex.P-18 is the inquest report. Then the body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem. Thereafter, P.W.12 went to the scene of occurrence and prepared Ex.P-1 observation mahazar and Exs.P-19 and P-20 rough sketches in the presence of P.Ws.5 and 6. He recovered M.O.1 burnt saree and M.O.2 burnt match-sticks from the scene of occurrence. At about 12 noon, P.W.12 Inspector of Police arrested the accused and on his confession, he recovered M.O.3 white plastic can and M.O.4 match-box containing match-sticks from a bush near the house of the deceased. (l) On 31-5-1998 at about 12.30 p.m., P.W.8 Doctor conducted post-mortem and found 70% burn injuries all over the body of the deceased. He opined in Ex.P-12 post-mortem certificate that the deceased would appear to have died of shock due to extensive burns. (m) P.W.13, the successive Inspector of Police, took up further investigation and examined the witnesses and arranged for sending the material objects for chemical examination. After completion of investigation, he filed the charge sheet against the accused for the offences under Sections 302 and 506(ii) I.P.C. 3. During the course of trial, the prosecution has examined P.Ws.1 to 13, filed Exs.P-1 to P-22 and marked M.Os.1 to 4. 4. When the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with reference to incriminating materials, he stated that he obtained a loan of Rs.10,000/- from the deceased and since the said amount was not paid in time, the deceased Kumari quarreled with him and as the amount was not paid, P.W.1 Suresh, P.W.2 younger sister and P.W.3 elder sister instigated the deceased to give false dying declaration, implicating the accused in this case. On the side of defence, Ex.D-1 was marked. 5. Having regard to the materials available on record, the trial Court found the accused guilty for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C., though found him not guilty in respect of the charge under Section 506(ii) I.P.C. and sentenced him thereunder. Hence, this appeal. 6. Mr.Rajagopalan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/accused would take us through the entire evidence and make a strenuous submission that the case of the prosecution would suffer from various infirmities found available on record. 7. Hence, this appeal. 6. Mr.Rajagopalan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/accused would take us through the entire evidence and make a strenuous submission that the case of the prosecution would suffer from various infirmities found available on record. 7. The contentions of learned counsel appearing for the appellant/accused, assailing the judgment impugned, in short, are as follows:- (a) Though P.W.1 has been cited as an eye-witness, his evidence cannot be believed for the reason that he, being a child witness, had given the details which are quite contradictory to the evidence of P.Ws.2,3 and 4. P.W.1, after having seen the occurrence, rushed to the house of P.W.2, the younger sister of the deceased and told her about the incident. P.W.2 did not depose that she was informed about the incident in which the accused was infuriated by P.W.1. Furthermore, Exs.P-13 and P-14, the dying declarations given by the deceased, would not show as to what is the time of the occurrence when P.W.1 was questioned. Furthermore, P.W.1 did not tell about the incident to any other person. Therefore, P.W.1's evidence cannot be believed. (b) The main material placed by the prosecution to prove this case is Exs.P-13 and P-14. Ex.P-14 is the statement given by the deceased to P.W.10 Sub-Inspector. Ex.P-13 is the dying declaration recorded by P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate from the deceased. The contents of dying declaration are completely contradictory to Ex.P-7 accident register issued by P.W.7 Doctor. Ex.P-7 and Ex.D-1, the earliest statements by the deceased to Doctor, would show that the deceased sustained injuries due to burst of the stove. Only after two days, the present version has been put forward by the deceased in the form of Ex.P-14 statement and in the form of dying declaration which is Ex.P-13. Therefore, no reliance can be placed on the belated statements-Exs.P-13 and P-14 which are inconsistent with Ex.P-7 accident register. (c) There is no explanation on the part of the Police as to why no action was taken by the Police till 30-5-1998, even though it has been admitted by P.W.10 Sub-Inspector of Police that Ex.D-1 sent by Doctor has been received by him at about 7.30 p.m. on 28-5-1998. (c) There is no explanation on the part of the Police as to why no action was taken by the Police till 30-5-1998, even though it has been admitted by P.W.10 Sub-Inspector of Police that Ex.D-1 sent by Doctor has been received by him at about 7.30 p.m. on 28-5-1998. (d) Furthermore, the evidence relating to recovery of kerosene can and the match-sticks, cannot be accepted, in view of the fact that P.W.1 admitted in the cross-examination that the kerosene tin which was used at the time of commission of offence, was still in the house. Furthermore, the mahazar witnesses, who have spoken about the recovery of kerosene can and match-sticks, have turned hostile. (e) The evidence available on record would indicate that the relative witnesses, namely P.Ws.2,3 and 4 were there in the hospital throughout and therefore, only on the basis of their tutoring, the deceased was made to give false dying declaration implicating the accused. As such, the belated dying declarations cannot be believed. (f) To substantiate the above pleas, learned counsel would cite a decision of this Court reported in 1994 (2) L.W. (CRL) 133-Short notes (ARUMUGHAM, IN RE) and a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2002 (4) Crimes 27 (SC) (T.K.REDDY VS. STATE OF A.P.) 8. In reply to the above submissions, learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that the materials available on record, are sufficient to find the accused guilty for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C., especially when the evidence of child witness is corroborated by other materials, including the dying declarations given by the deceased to P.W.10 Sub-Inspector of Police and P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate. He would cite a decision of the Supreme Court reported in STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VS. BHARAT FAKIRA DHIWAR (2002 (1) Crimes 164 (SC)) in order to substantiate his contention with reference to the importance of the evidence of child witness. 9. We have given our careful consideration to the rival contentions urged by learned counsel on either side and also gone through the records 10. BHARAT FAKIRA DHIWAR (2002 (1) Crimes 164 (SC)) in order to substantiate his contention with reference to the importance of the evidence of child witness. 9. We have given our careful consideration to the rival contentions urged by learned counsel on either side and also gone through the records 10. The following are the three sets of evidence available in this case:- (i) The evidence of P.W.1, the eye-witness; (ii) Ex.P-14 statement of the deceased made to P.W.10 Sub-Inspector of Police and Ex.P-13 dying declaration made by the deceased to P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate and (iii) The accused was arrested on 31-5-1998 and on his confession, the kerosene can and match-sticks which were concealed in a bush near the house of the deceased, were recovered under Ex.P-22 seizure mahazar in the presence of P.Ws.5 and 6 by P.W.12 Inspector of Police. 11. According to prosecution, the deceased had an illicit intimacy with the accused for about six years. She was living in their house along with her own parents, since her husband Govindasamy eloped with some other girl seven years back. P.W.1 is aged about ten years and was studying IV Standard at the time of occurrence. It is noticed from the records that the accused often used to go to the house of the deceased and receive money and jewels. The accused himself has admitted in his Section 313 Cr.P.C. questioning that he obtained a loan of Rs.10,000/- from the deceased and he was not able to pay back the same in time. 12. It has been specifically stated by P.W.1 that on the date of occurrence at about 10 a.m., the accused came and demanded Rs.5,000/-. When the deceased stated that she had no money, the accused asked the deceased to swear in the name of her son--P.W.1 by crossing him and then say that she had no money. The deceased refused to do so. The accused came near P.W.1 who was present inside the house, a boy aged about 9 years and manhandled him. Noticing that the accused may do some harm to her son, the deceased asked her son P.W.1 to run away from the house. Accordingly, P.W.1 came out of the house and stood on the pial and saw the further happenings through window. 13. Noticing that the accused may do some harm to her son, the deceased asked her son P.W.1 to run away from the house. Accordingly, P.W.1 came out of the house and stood on the pial and saw the further happenings through window. 13. When the deceased also was trying to escape from the house, the accused closed the door and then took the kerosene tin which was kept in the kitchen and poured kerosene over the body of the deceased. Then, he took the match-box and threw the lighted match-sticks and set fire to the body of the deceased. Thereupon, the accused ran out of the house. Engulfed in fire, the deceased came out of the house and ran towards the house of neighbours. P.W.5 Krishnan, one of the neighbours, came and helped to douse the fire with the help of gunny bags. Thereafter, the victim-deceased was taken to Government Hospital, Arni. 14. According to P.W.1, immediately after seeing the ghastly incident, he rushed to P.W.2, the younger sister of the deceased and informed the same to her. On hearing about the incident, P.W.3 and P.W.4 also came to the scene immediately. 15. The evidence of P.W.1 was attacked on the ground that his evidence cannot be true, because his version that he told about the incident to P.W.2, has not been supported by P.W.2. It is true that P.Ws.2,3 and 4 never said that they were informed by P.W.1 that the accused only poured kerosene over her and set fire on her. But, this may not be a ground to reject the evidence of P.W.1, especially when the evidence of P.W.1 has been corroborated by Exs.P-13 and P-14, the dying declaration given by the deceased to P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate and the Police Officer respectively. 16. On going through the entire evidence of P.W.1, a child witness, it is noticed that relevant questions have been put by the Court to verify as to whether he is able to understand the same. It is seen from his answers that he is able to understand the facts and give correct answers to the questions put by the Court. Both in the chief and cross-examination, P.W.1 gave clear details as to how the occurrence had taken place. Even in the lengthy cross-examination, he withstood and emphatically said that he was deposing in the Court only the truth which he actually saw. Both in the chief and cross-examination, P.W.1 gave clear details as to how the occurrence had taken place. Even in the lengthy cross-examination, he withstood and emphatically said that he was deposing in the Court only the truth which he actually saw. Though P.W.2 did not say that P.W.1 told her that the accused only poured kerosene, P.W.2 would state in her evidence that P.W.1 came running to her and told her that the deceased was in flames. 17. Under those circumstances, we cannot reject the evidence of P.W.1, especially when the same has not been challenged in the cross-examination by putting a suggestion that the accused never came to the house of the deceased on that day. On the other hand, it is noticed from the cross-examination that a suggestion was put to P.W.1 that the deceased was cooking in her kitchen room even before the accused came to the house of the deceased. The said suggestion has been admitted by P.W.1. By this, the presence of the accused also has been admitted. Under those circumstances, there is no reason to reject the evidence of P.W.1, especially when we find that his evidence is trustworthy and natural. 18. In this context, it would be relevant to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2002 (1) Crimes 164 (SC) (supra). It has been held in that decision that the evidence of a child witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that the witness is of teen age. The fact of a child witness would require the Court to scrutinise the evidence with care and caution. If the evidence is shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and there is no infirmity in the evidence, then a conviction can be based upon such testimony alone. The corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not rule, but a measure of caution and prudence. Some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. As a matter of fact, the discrepancies in the deposition of a child witness, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of the child witnesses. 19. Of course, it is true that while appreciating the evidence of a child witness, the Court should see as to whether the witness is being tutored. As a matter of fact, the discrepancies in the deposition of a child witness, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of the child witnesses. 19. Of course, it is true that while appreciating the evidence of a child witness, the Court should see as to whether the witness is being tutored. When the apex Court would hold that even in the absence of corroboration, if the evidence of child witness is inspiring the confidence in the mind of the Court, then that alone can be the basis for conviction. But, in this case, we have not only the evidence of P.W.1, but also the other evidence, namely the dying declaration made by the deceased. 20. Ex.P-14 is the statement given by the deceased on 30-5-1998 at about 10.30 a.m. to P.W.10 Sub-Inspector of Police. Ex.P-13 dying declaration was given by the deceased to P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate at about 12 noon on the same day. Both the documents have been attested by P.W.7 Doctor in Exs.P-9 and P-10, certifying that the deceased was in conscious state while she was making those statements. P.W.7 Doctor, P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate and P.W.10 Sub-Inspector, would clearly give the details given in these documents. These documents have been fervently attacked by the counsel for the appellant on the reason that the contents of the same cannot be relied upon, in view of the fact that the same are contradictory to the earliest version by the deceased made to P.W.7 Doctor. 21. It is true that P.W.10 received Ex.D-1 even on 28-5-1998 itself at about 7.30 p.m. There is no dispute in the fact that the deceased was admitted in the hospital by P.W.7 at about 10 a.m. on 28-5-1998. At the time of admission, the deceased herself stated to P.W.7 Doctor that the burn injuries sustained by her were due to the burst of stove. This has been clearly mentioned in Ex.P-7. As a matter of fact, it cannot be debated that Ex.P-7 is the earliest document in this case. After preparation of Ex.P-7 (copy of the accident register), P.W.7 Doctor sent Ex.D-1 to the Police, intimating about the admission of the deceased who involved in the accident. Thus, it is clear that it was never the case of the prosecution at the initial stage that the accused poured kerosene and set fire to the deceased. 22. After preparation of Ex.P-7 (copy of the accident register), P.W.7 Doctor sent Ex.D-1 to the Police, intimating about the admission of the deceased who involved in the accident. Thus, it is clear that it was never the case of the prosecution at the initial stage that the accused poured kerosene and set fire to the deceased. 22. In the light of the above fact situation, this Court has to find out as to which document would contain the correct particulars. 23. As admitted by prosecution, though Ex.D-1 was received by P.W.10 Sub-Inspector of Police on 28-5-1998 itself, P.W.10 came to hospital only at 10.30 a.m. on 30-5-1998 and recorded Ex.P-14. In Ex.P-14, there are clear details given by the deceased with regard to the manner of occurrence in which the victim was set fire to. As indicated above, the presence of P.W.1 is also mentioned during the time of occurrence. Ex.D-1 was recorded at about 10.30 a.m. P.W.7 Doctor sent Ex.P-8 requisition to P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate, requesting the Magistrate to come to hospital and record the dying declaration. Accordingly, P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate came to hospital on 30-5-1998 at about 12 noon and recorded Ex.P-13 dying declaration. On both the occasions, P.W.7 Doctor was present. In fact, P.W.7 Doctor certified in both Exs.P-13 and P-14 that the deceased was fit enough to give statements to the Doctor and Sub-Inspector of Police concerned. Under those circumstances, the evidence of P.W.7, the Doctor assumes much importance. 24. On going through Ex.P-8 requisition, it is noticed that the condition of the deceased became critical and therefore, P.W.7 Doctor enquired the deceased as to what really happened. Only on that enquiry, the deceased, for the first time, i.e. on 30-5-1998, came forward by giving the details of the occurrence by mentioning to P.W.7 Doctor that her paramour Venkatesan poured kerosene and set fire to her. Only on receipt of the said information from the deceased, P.W.7 Doctor though it fit to send Ex.P-8 requisition for recording dying declaration to P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate. Accordingly, on 30-5-1998, P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate came to hospital at about 12 noon and recorded Ex.P-13 dying declaration. 25. Only on receipt of the said information from the deceased, P.W.7 Doctor though it fit to send Ex.P-8 requisition for recording dying declaration to P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate. Accordingly, on 30-5-1998, P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate came to hospital at about 12 noon and recorded Ex.P-13 dying declaration. 25. On going through the evidence of P.Ws.7,9 and 10 in respect of Ex.P-14 and P.Ws.7 and 9 in respect of Ex.P-13, we are unable to see any infirmity in their evidence, especially when both Ex.P-13 dying declaration and Ex.P-14 statement would give clear and consistent materials relating to the occurrence. If we are to believe the witnesses, namely P.Ws.7,9 and 10 who speak about Exs.P-8,13 and 14, naturally, we have to reject the earliest version of the deceased as referred to in Ex.P-7 (copy of the accident register). 26. On going through the materials available on record, we could notice that in the beginning, the deceased was not inclined to tell about the incident to any other person. This is so explicit from the evidence of P.W.2. P.W.2, on hearing the news from P.W.1, rushed to the house of the deceased. At that time, the Panchayat President--Chinnapaiyan came and arranged a car for taking the victim to the hospital. At that time, he asked the deceased to tell the truth as to what had happened. When she was reluctant to tell, he said that unless she tells the truth, he would not send her to the hospital. Even then, the deceased was weaping and did not tell anything. Then, P.W.2 and others requested Chinnapaiyan, the Panchayat President to take her in the car without wasting any time, so that she could be saved and on that request, the victim was taken to the hospital. The relevant portion of the evidence of P.W.2 is as follows:- 27. Furthermore, the evidence of P.Ws.2 to 4 would indicate that the deceased had never told them about the incident. They also admitted that they were not able to get the particulars from the deceased with regard to the involvement of the accused in the incident. 28. So, the above facts would show that the deceased was not inclined to utter the truth initially with reference to the involvement of the accused in the incident. On the other hand, she told to P.W.7 Doctor at the time of admission that she sustained injuries due to stove burst. 28. So, the above facts would show that the deceased was not inclined to utter the truth initially with reference to the involvement of the accused in the incident. On the other hand, she told to P.W.7 Doctor at the time of admission that she sustained injuries due to stove burst. This cannot be true, because as per the evidence of P.W.12 Inspector and Ex.P-1 observation mahazar and Ex.P-19 and Ex.P-20 rough sketches, no stove was available at the scene of occurrence. P.W.1 also would state in the cross-examination that the kerosene was not being used for cooking. Therefore, the question of sustaining injuries due to stove burst would not arise. 29. On the other hand, it is clearly seen that the deceased was not inclined to utter the real truth for some reasons. According to Ex.P-13 dying declaration, the accused developed illicit intimacy with the deceased for about six years. The deceased herself mentioned in Ex.P-13 dying declaration that the first husband left her house seven years back and eloped with some other girl and married someone and that she was living alone with her only son P.W.1. Admittedly, the deceased was alive for about two days. P.W.7 Doctor, at the time of admission, did not find that the deceased was in a serious condition. In other words, it can be stated that the deceased never expected that she would die due to burn injuries. Reluctance to tell the truth either to P.W.7 Doctor or to P.W.12 Inspector of Police, may be for the reason that if the truth comes out, the fact that she had illicit intimacy with the accused, would be exposed to the public. That must be the reason as to why P.Ws.2 to 4 were also not informed by the deceased at the initial stage even though they were with the deceased in the hospital throughout. But, as the condition of the deceased on 30-5-1998 that she became so serious, the deceased thought it fit to tell the details of the incident to the Doctor since she felt that she was in the verge of death and before her death, she must tell the truth. That was how P.W.7 Doctor sent Ex.P-8 mentioning this fact and requesting P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate to rush to the hospital and record the dying declaration. Accordingly, Ex.P-13 was promptly recorded by P.W.9. 30. That was how P.W.7 Doctor sent Ex.P-8 mentioning this fact and requesting P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate to rush to the hospital and record the dying declaration. Accordingly, Ex.P-13 was promptly recorded by P.W.9. 30. It was strenuously contended by learned counsel for the appellant that only on the tutoring by P.Ws.2,3 and 4, the deceased was made to give dying declaration to implicate the accused. This contention, in our view, has no basis. As a matter of fact, a perusal of the evidence of P.Ws.2,3 and 4 would never indicate that they had any grudge against the accused. When P.W.1 stated that he informed P.W.2 about involvement of the accused in the fire incident, P.W.2 did not choose to support P.W.1's evidence. This shows that none of the relative witnesses was interested in implicating the accused. If they had actually grudge against the accused, even at the time of admission in the hospital on 28-5-1998, P.W.2 Vatsala who took the deceased to the hospital, would have informed to Doctor that the accused only poured kerosene over the body of the deceased. That is not the case here. Hence, it cannot be contended that the relative witnesses tutored the deceased to implicate the accused. 31. In the decision cited by learned counsel for the appellant/accused in 2002 (4) Crimes 27 (SC) (supra), the dying declaration was rejected. This decision would not apply to the present facts of the case, because in that case, one of the witnesses admitted that the accused was not present at the time of occurrence in the house and the accused came to the house only after the deceased was taken to the hospital. 32. In this case, it is the specific evidence of P.W.1 that the accused came to the house and quarreled with the deceased and ultimately, poured kerosene over her body and set fire to her. The presence of the accused in the scene was also admitted through the suggestion made to P.W.1 by the defence. As indicated above, the evidence of P.W.1 has been sufficiently corroborated by Ex.P-13 and Ex.P-14, the dying declarations, which have been, in our view, validly proved through the witnesses, namely P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate and P.W.10 Sub-Inspector of Police. 33. The presence of the accused in the scene was also admitted through the suggestion made to P.W.1 by the defence. As indicated above, the evidence of P.W.1 has been sufficiently corroborated by Ex.P-13 and Ex.P-14, the dying declarations, which have been, in our view, validly proved through the witnesses, namely P.W.9 Metropolitan Magistrate and P.W.10 Sub-Inspector of Police. 33. One more important aspect is this: It was P.W.7 Doctor who sent Ex.P-8 requisition to the Magistrate, stating that he was told by the deceased that she was set fire to by her paramour Venkatesan, and so, the dying declaration is to be recorded urgently. Thus, the deceased has given one more dying declaration to P.W.7 Doctor as is evident from Ex.P-8. 34. Though there is an attack with reference to the evidence relating to the recovery of material objects on the basis of P.W.1's admission about the kerosene can, we are not prepared to give much importance to the said portion of the evidence of P.W.1, as there is no reason to reject the evidence of P.W.12 Inspector of Police, who stated that he arrested the accused on 31-5-1998 and on his confession, the kerosene can and match-sticks were recovered from the bush near the house of the deceased. Hence, we find that there are sufficient materials to connect the accused with the crime in question and as such, we are to hold that the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt. 35. Under those circumstances, we find no merit in the appeal and consequently, the same is liable to be dismissed. The appeal is dismissed, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant/accused.