JUDGMENT R. K. PATRA, J. — In obedience to the order of the Supreme Court, the Income Tax (Appellate) Tribunal has under Section 256 (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 referred the follow¬ing three questions to this Court for opinion : (1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in holding that the assessee is not entitled to the exemption under Section 11 of the Act ? (2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in rejecting the method of com¬puting the income followed by the assessee? (3) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in declining to grant exemption to the assessee-trust on a completely new ground made out suo motu without affording an opportunity to the assessee to have its say on the said new ground ? 2. The facts of all the consolidated references in brief are as follows : The Prajatantra Prachar Samity, Cuttack (hereinafter re¬ferred to as ‘the assessee’), a registered society, is a public charitable trust registered as such with the Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa under Section 12-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The objective of the assessee-society are to promote literature, science, fine arts and infuse useful knowledge. It is engaged in publication of books, periodicals, journals and newspapers. For the assessment year 1985-86, it filed return of income on 30.9.1985 declaring loss of Rs. 15,76, 888/- before the Income Tax Officer, Ward-A, Circle-II, Cuttack. Notice being issued under Section 142 (1) of the Act, the assessee appeared with books of accounts and submit¬ted that from 1.4.1984 it changed its method of accounting from mercantile to hybrid system of accounting. The assessing Officer on examination of the books of accounts found that during the previous year the assessee had effected total sale of Rs.1,21,98,772/- on account of the advertisement, circulation of papers, printing etc. out of which it received Rs. 91,07,679/- and the balance of Rs.30,91,093/- remains unreceived or receiva¬ble on the close of the accounting year, i.e. 31.3.1986. That means, under the so-called hybrid system of accounting its final account had incorporated only Rs.91,07,679/- on the credit side of the income and expenditure account as against the total turn-over of Rs.1,21,98, 772/-. out of which it received Rs. 91,07,679/- and the balance of Rs.30,91,093/- remains unreceived or receiva¬ble on the close of the accounting year, i.e. 31.3.1986. That means, under the so-called hybrid system of accounting its final account had incorporated only Rs.91,07,679/- on the credit side of the income and expenditure account as against the total turn-over of Rs.1,21,98, 772/-. In other words, the sundry debtors to the extent of Rs.30,91,093/- had been excluded from the gross turnover. The Assessing Officer did not accept the new method of accounting followed by the assessee and by order dated 28.1.1998 determined the taxable income on accrual basis under Section 143 (3) of the Act. Against the said order of assessment, the asses¬see filed I.T. Appeal No 11/ORS/ORA/88-89 before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Orissa, Cuttack who by order dated 28.11.1988 dismissed the appeal. Being dissatisfied with the order of dismissal, it filed appeal before the Income Tax (Appel¬late) Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack which by order dated 19.1.1990 dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, the assessee made an application under Section 254 (2) of the Act for rectification of the order dated 19.1.1990 and the Tribunal by its order dated 13.12.1990 held that “both legal principles and judicial wisdom demand that the entire order should be recalled and the appeal should be heard afresh”. It accordingly recalled its earlier order dated 19.1.1990. The Tribunal thereafter re-heard the matter and allowed the appeal by order dated 10.5.1991. Contend¬ing that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction while deciding the application under Section 254 (2) of the Act, the Revenue filed writ petition bearing O.J.C. No.2953 of 1991 in this Court challenging the order dated 13.12.1990. By judgment dated 2.12.1991 (1992) 196 ITR 564), this Court allowed the writ peti¬tion by setting aside the Tribunal’s order dated 13.12.1990 as well as its substantive order dated 10.5.1991. The assessee filed special leave petition before the Supreme Court challenging the aforesaid decision of this Court dated 2.12.1991. The Supreme Court by its order dated 24.4.1996 in Civil Appeal No.153 of 1993 dis¬posed of the matter with the following observations and direc¬tions : “ With a view to have a satisfactory decision on all the questions arising herein, we have proposed the following course to which the counsel for both the parties have agreed. The Supreme Court by its order dated 24.4.1996 in Civil Appeal No.153 of 1993 dis¬posed of the matter with the following observations and direc¬tions : “ With a view to have a satisfactory decision on all the questions arising herein, we have proposed the following course to which the counsel for both the parties have agreed. The course suggested is that while the assessee shall ask for a reference against the order dated 19.1.1990 the substantive order of the Tribunal dismissing the appellant’s appeal, the Revenue shall ask for reference against the order of rectification dated 13.12.1990 and the substantive order of the Tribunal dated 10.5.1991. If such applications are filed within sixty days from today, the Tribunal shall refer the questions arising therein for considera¬tion of the High Court. The above course is adopted in the par¬ticular facts of this case and with a view to over come the several technical objections put forward by both parties. We make it clear that we intend no reflection upon the merits of the case of either party. All the questions which arise from the orders of the Tribunal aforesaid shall be open in such reference which may be heard together.” 3. The litigation was going on a straight track. After the assessee’s appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal, it as an ordi¬nary course could have moved under Section 256 of the Act for reference to this Court. Instead, it opted for a short cut and applied for rectification of the order under Section 254 (2) of the Act which has resulted in these proceedings. Therefore, the first question that arises for consideration is whether in exer¬cise of power purported to be under Section 254 (2) of the Act, the Tribunal is competent to reverse its earlier decision and make the order dated 10.5.1991 in favour of the assessee. Sub-section (2) of Section 254 lays down that the Appellate Tribunal may at any time within four weeks from the date of the order with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record amend any order passed by it under Sub-section (1), Perusal of the aforesaid provision would clearly show that the Tribunal has been statutorily conferred the power for rectifying any of its mis¬takes apparent from the record and amend any order passed by it under Sub-section (1). The expression “mistake apparent from the record” occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 254 of the Act also finds mention in Section 154 of the Act, the meaning of which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in T.S. Balaram, IT Officer v. Volkart Brothers, Bombay, (1971) 82 ITR (SC) 50 : AIR 1971 SC 2204 . It has been explained as follows : “... A mistake apparent on the record must be an obvious and patent mistake and not something which can be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may conceivably be two opinions. As seen earlier, the High Court of Bombay opined that the original assessments were in accordance with law though in our opinion the High Court was not justified in going into that question. In Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Ehavanappa Tirumale, (1960) 1 S.C.R. 890 : (AIR 1960 S.C.137) this Court while spelling out the scope of the power of a High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution ruled that an error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opin¬ions cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. A decision on a debatable point of law is not a mistake apparent from the record - see Sidharamappa v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, (1952) 21 ITR 333 - (AIR 1952 Bombay 287). The power of the officers mentioned in S.154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to correct “any mistake apparent from the record” is undoubtedly not more than that of the High Court to entertain a writ petition on the basis of an “error apparent on the face of the record”. In this case it is not necessary for us to spell out the distinction between the expressions “error apparent on the face of the record” and "mistake apparent from the record”. The Calcutta High Court (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. as he then was) in Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. v. Income-Tax Officer J-Ward, Company Dist. In this case it is not necessary for us to spell out the distinction between the expressions “error apparent on the face of the record” and "mistake apparent from the record”. The Calcutta High Court (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. as he then was) in Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. v. Income-Tax Officer J-Ward, Company Dist. II, (1979) 118 ITR 946 after considering number of decisions held as follows : “ The position, therefore, is that in order to attract the jurisdiction under section 154 of the Act the mistake proposed to be rectified must be patent or apparent or obvious and on which there could not conceivably be two points of view. A mistake which has to be established by way of a process of reasoning or of investigation either on facts or by examination of the ques¬tion of law on which there might conceivably be two views was not a mistake which came within the provisions of S.154 of the Act. But whether the mistake sought or proposed to be rectified is a mistake which comes within the purview of the Section must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” The Calcutta High Court in Niranjan & Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, (1980) 122 ITR 519 (525) has held as fol¬lows : “..... The jurisdiction of the Tribunal on an application under S.254 (2) is to make an amendment of an order passed by it under sub-S. (1) in order to rectify any mistake apparent from the record if such mistake is brought to its notice...... On the other hand, the Tribunal has gone into the merits of the appeal again and found that this order is sound even on the basis of the materials sought to be relied upon. This, in my opinion, the Tribunal could not do. The Tribunal has got no power to review an earlier order or rehear a matter afresh. Its only duty on such rectification application is to ascertain whether there was any mistake apparent from the record or not...” This Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Jagabandhu Roul, (1984) 145 ITR 153 after taking notice of an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Dhadi Sahu, (1976) 105 ITR 56 and decisions of Bombay, Madras, Madhya Pradesh and Calcutta High Courts held that “the Tribunal does not have power of review. What has been given under Section 254 (2) of the Act is one of rectification of mistakes. There can be no two opinion that the power of review has to be statutorily conferred”. The rectification application was allowed by the Tribunal (consisting of Shri T.V.K. Natarajachandran, Accountant Member and Shri K.R. Dixit, Judicial Member) by order dated 13.12.1990 with a direction to hear the appeal afresh. The appeal was heard by the Tribunal (consisting of Shri S.L. Banerjee, Judicial Member and Shri N. Pachusu, Accountant Member) which by order dated 10.5.1991 allowed the appeal in favour of the assessee. In the above order dated 13.12.1990 the Tribunal held that the asses¬see’s grievance was with regard to rejection of its method of accounting for the purpose of computation of its income and the grant of exemption under Section 11 of the Act. But while consid¬ering the appeal on merit, the Tribunal in its order dated 19.1.1990 applied the provisions of Section 11 (4A) of the Act and denied relief to the assessee without confronting to it with the possibility that the said provision would be invoked for which it had no opportunity to object to its application. This, according to the Tribunal, is a clear and apparent error in the order, because it was no body’s case that the said Section 11 (4A) would be applicable to the assessee’s case. In the substantive order of the Tribunal dated 10.5.1991, besides the above mistake (applicability or non-applicability of Section 11 (4A), the Tribunal has given an additional ground of apparent mistake. That ‘mistake’, according to the Tribunal is — the assessee for the first year of assessment, i.e., for the disputed year 1985-86 having adopted hybrid system of accounting, question of changing the method of accounting to adopt dubious way of avoiding tax does not arise. Keeping in view the decisions referred to above and the finding recorded by the Tribunal in its order dated 13.12.1990 and 10.5.1991, we have no hesitation to hold that the order of the Tribunal dated 19.1.1990 dismissing the assessee’s appeal suf¬fered from the mistake apparent from the record and, therefore, the application made under Section 354 (2) of the Act for recti¬fication of the order dated 19.1.1990 was rightly accepted by the Tribunal by its order dated 13.12.1990. 4. 4. As mentioned above, the Tribunal thereafter set down the case for hearing afresh and passed a substantive order on 10.5.1991. The Supreme Court has asked us also to consider the validity and propriety of the said order dated 10.5.1991. Sub-section (2) of Section 254 of the Act states that the Tribunal while rectifying mistake apparent from the record may amend any order passed by it under Sub-section (1). We have already noted that in exercise of that power the Tribunal can only make changes in the original order consequent on the recti¬fication and it cannot go further and deal with the entire appeal afresh. Perusal of the aforesaid substantive order dated 10.5.1991 would clearly show that in the garb of rectification/amendment, the Tribunal has substituted a fresh order which, in our opinion, in excess of its jurisdiction. Therefore, having regard to the nature of the issue that was before the Tribunal and in view of what has been stated above, we think it proper to set aside that order dated 10.5.1991 and direct the Tribunal to consider the case on all the points aris¬ing out of the Commissioner’s order dated 28.11.1988. While considering the matter, the Tribunal will also keep in view the provision of Section 11 (4A) of the Act which came to be inserted by the Finance Act, 1983 with affect from 1.4.1984. In the result, we answer the question No. (3) in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The references are returned unanswered in respect of question Nos. (1) and (2) in view of our direction to the Tribunal as mentioned above. L. MOHAPATRA, J. I agree. One question answered, two questions unanswered.