J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) SINCE common questions of facts and law are involved, upon consensus, both these petitions are heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE petitioners-detenu, by way of these Special Civil Applications, have challenged the orders of detention passed by the detaining authority in exercise of powers under Section 3 (1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, (hereinafter referred to as "the PASA Act") with a view to prevent the petitioners from acting in any manner, prejudicial to public order. ( 3 ) THE detention orders are challenged on various grounds, however, the main ground is pertaining to delay in passing the orders of detention. ( 4 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 471 of 2003 is concerned, the last offence registered against the petitioner-detenu was on 10. 10. 2002, and on the same day, the petitioner was arrested and released on bail, whereas, the detention order came to be passed on 8. 12. 2002. Thus, there is a delay of almost two months in passing the order of detention from the date of last registered offence. ( 5 ) AS regards Special Civil Application No. 692 of 2003, the last offence was registered against the detenu on 27. 9. 2002, and the order of detention came to be passed on 13. 12. 2002. It therefore appears that there is a delay of about two and a half months in passing the impugned order of detention after the last offence was registered against the petitioner-detenu. ( 6 ) THE affidavits-in-reply, on behalf of the State of Gujarat, have been filed by one Mr. J. R. Rajput, Deputy Secertary to the Government of Gujarat, Home Department, (Special), Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar, in both these petitions, and obviously, the aspect of delay is not dealt with, much less explained. The unexplained delay in passing the detention order from the date of last offence registered, which is one of the main considerations and foundation of the questioned detention orders, obviously proves to be fatal to the detention orders impugned in these petitions. It may be mentioned that, ipso-facto, delay in passing the detention order would not always be fatal to the detention of a detenu, for, in certain cases, it can be due to unavoidable and reasonable grounds. It may be mentioned that, ipso-facto, delay in passing the detention order would not always be fatal to the detention of a detenu, for, in certain cases, it can be due to unavoidable and reasonable grounds. What is necessary to be placed on record or established in defence is satisfactory explanation for such delay, which is not so in the present cases, and, therefore, the detention orders challenged in these petitions will be vitiated on this ground alone. It is needless to mention that unexplained or unreasonable delay would not make the ground of detention proximate. This view is very much reinforced by the decisions of Apex Court in the case of Anand Prakash v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1990 SC 516 and in the case of Pradeep Nilkanth v. S. Ramamurthy, reported in 1993 (2) Suppli. SCC 61. ( 7 ) IN view of the above factual and legal position, the orders of detention dated 8. 12. 2002 and 13. 12. 2002 impugned in Special Civil Applications No. 471 of 2003 and 692 of 2003, respectively, are vitiated, and, therefore, they are quashed and set aside only on the ground of delay. The detenu in both these petitions shall be released from detention forthwith, if they are not required in any other case. The petitions shall stand allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. .