JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J. (Oral) :- When this case was taken up today, learned Counsel for the petitioner stated that for the purpose of disposal of this revision petition, presence of respondents No. 2 to 4 is not required, as according to him relief claimed in this revision, is confined against respondent No. 1 Mohammad Ismail. 2. A suit for partition was filed by the petitioner-plaintiff. This suit after contest was decreed. However, appeal by respondent No. 1 was allowed and case was remanded. After remand, suit was dismissed. 3. Against this decree of dismissal of suit, petitioner filed appeal before the District Judge below. When this appeal was pending, it appears that the petitioner-plaintiff and respondent No. 1-defendant made statements before the Court. 4. - Record of the appeal reveals that on the basis -of the statements made by both of them, a sum of Rs. 75,000/- was admittedly received in the court on 25th March, 2003. Appellate Court below ought to have proceeded further to have dealt with the matter on the basis of the admissions made by the parties in their respective statements on oath recorded by him. Instead of proceeding further in the matter in accordance with law, he adjourned the mater to 2nd April, 2003. 5. In the aforesaid background this matter was partly heard on 8.9.2003 when following order was passed :- "Admittedly facts of this case are that Civil Appeal No. 44-CA/13 of 2002, Shabir Hussain v. Mohammad Ismail and others, was pending before the District Judge, Sirmour, at Nahan. During its pendency, statements of the parties i.e. present petitioner and respondent No. 1 (to whom only notice of this petition has been confined to), were recorded. It was further not disputed at the time of hearing of this petition, that respondent No. 1 Mohammad Ismail received Rs. 75,000/- in the Court. In consideration of the receipt of this sum, he relinquished his share in the property that was the subject matter of appeal. Not only this but he further agreed that he will be responsible for the preparation of relinquishment deed in favour of petitioner and in case he (petitioner) does not get the needful done, then he (respondent No. 1, Mohammad Ismail) will be entitled to get it done through the judicial process. Similarly, as per statement of the petitioner, he will get the relinquishment deed prepared within one month. Similarly, as per statement of the petitioner, he will get the relinquishment deed prepared within one month. He prayed that appeal may be decided in terms of this statement. In this behalf it may also be observed here that when statement of Mohammad Ismail was recorded, he also stated that he has no objection to the decision of the appeal in terms of the statements. Strangely enough, the District Judge, instead of dealing with the matter on 25th March, 2003 passed the following order :- "Arguments heard. For orders on 2nd April, 2003. Statement of parties are also recorded." When the case came up for orders on 2nd April, 2003, an application was filed by Mohammad Ismail. For ready reference, its contents are extracted here in below :- "1. That the case titled above was fixed before this learned Court on 25.3.2003 for arguments. 2. That the compromise was affected between the parties to the said case in this Honble Court on 25.3.2003 on paying Rs. 75,000/- to the respondent Mohammad Ismail by the appellant, but when the respondent reached home and told about the said decision to his family members then his family members told that the said compromise has been wrongly affected by the respondent with the appellant and as such the same is not arrived at and in their interest the same is required . to be .set aside. As the family is big and they are in need of residential house. 3. That the disputed property is situated before/in front of the house of the respondent Mohammad Ismail. Therefore, it is humbty prayed that the compromise decree passed on 25.3.2003 may kindly be set aside in the interest of justice and the appeal may be decided on merits." This application was contested and resisted on behalf of the petitioner. Learned Appellate Court below by means, of impugned order has allowed the said application, hence this revision petition. In the aforesaid background, learned Senior Counsel challenged the impugned order being not only illegal, as well as contrary to law, but also submitted that it is perverse. According to him compromise as per statements of parties if could be challenged, was only on settled principles of law governing/challenging a statement/agreement/decree, within the meaning of Sections 13 to 19-A of the Contract Act. None of these situations were set up in the application (supra) per Mr. Kanwar. According to him compromise as per statements of parties if could be challenged, was only on settled principles of law governing/challenging a statement/agreement/decree, within the meaning of Sections 13 to 19-A of the Contract Act. None of these situations were set up in the application (supra) per Mr. Kanwar. On the other hand, Mr. Kaushik, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the impugned order calls for no interference. As according to him it suffers from no jurisdictional error within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. In addition to this, Mr. Kaushik further submitted that before recording the statements, referred to hereinabove, it was incumbent in law, as also it was the bounden duty of the appellate Court below to have first entertained a written compromise duly signed by the parties before it. Then only it could proceed further in the matter. Per him, statements referred to hereinabove cannot be termed as a written compromise under Order XXIII of C.P.C. It was only thereafter that the appellate Court could ascertain its legality or otherwise. After having argued the matter for some time, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 stated that some time may be allowed to him to examine the matter further. Prayer allowed. List this case on 17th October, 2003 for further hearing." 6. In this case arguments were heard on 17th October, 2003 and judgment was reserved. In the facts and circumstances, as detailed hereinabove and also taking note of the order passed by this court when the matter was partly heard, I have heard learned Counsel for the parties further. 7. Learned Senior Counsel made a very short and precise submission. According to him learned appellate Court below has shown complete ignorance of law, substantive as well as procedural, when he did not proceed further on 25th March, 2003 itself. As according to him once the matter had been sorted out/adjusted and statement made by respondent No. 1 relinquishing his share of 26 sq, meters in the suit land in favour of the petitioner and having also pocketed Rs. 75,000/- he was precluded from saying anything to the contrary to over-come the same. According to him, trial Court was bound to have passed a decree on the basis of such admissions/statements of the parties. 8. All these pleas have been controverted by Mr. Kaushik, learned Counsel for the contesting respondent No. 1-defendant. 75,000/- he was precluded from saying anything to the contrary to over-come the same. According to him, trial Court was bound to have passed a decree on the basis of such admissions/statements of the parties. 8. All these pleas have been controverted by Mr. Kaushik, learned Counsel for the contesting respondent No. 1-defendant. According to him, the impugned order suffers from no jurisdictional error calling for interference in this revision petition. He further stated that there was no written compromise as envisaged under Order XXIII C.P.C. filed by the parties. Alternatively, and without conceding, he urged that even if statements are accepted to be compromise, those having not been acted upon by the appellate Court below when it did not accept those while passing the impugned order, as such this revision petition has no substance. 9. After having given my thoughtful consideration to the facts of this case, and having also examined the record of the courts below, as well as legal position applicable to it, I find that submissions urged on behalf of respondent No. 1-defendant need to be rejected. Detailed reasons in this behalf are as under: 10. No doubt after amendment of Order XXII C.P.C. vide Central Act No. 104 of 1976 which came into force w.e.f. 1st February, 1977, compromise is required to be in writing signed by the parties. But then further question that needs to be examined is whether in the absence of a written compromise any lawful agreement based on the statements of the parties in the nature of offer and its acceptance, as in the present case, has always to be set aside as a principle of universal application ? 11. Answer to this proposition in my consideration view would be no. It appears that something transpired between the parties pursuant to which both the parties made statements on 25.3.2003 before the court, as referred to hereinabove. Making of statements was not disputed at the time of hearing of this revision. Thereafter statements stood acted upon when respondent No. 1 Mohammad Ismail further admittedly received sum of Rs. 75,000/-. After receipt of this amount, there was nothing that was required to be done further by the petitioner and/or for that matter by respondent No. 1. 12. Making of statements was not disputed at the time of hearing of this revision. Thereafter statements stood acted upon when respondent No. 1 Mohammad Ismail further admittedly received sum of Rs. 75,000/-. After receipt of this amount, there was nothing that was required to be done further by the petitioner and/or for that matter by respondent No. 1. 12. It is most unfortunate that the learned Appellate Judge, below for reasons best known to him did not proceed further to dispose of the matter on 25th March, 2003 itself on the basis of the statements/admissions. 13. Effect of there being no written statement, under Order XXIII C.P.C., when the matter was compromised on the basis of the statements of counsel, which resulted in disposal of the matter finally came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and others, AIR 1991 SC 2234. The relevant extract from this judgment are as under:- The words in writing and signed by the parties, inserted in Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976 necessarily mean and include duly authorised representative and counsel. Thus a compromise in writing and signed by counsel representing the parties, but not signed by the parties in person, is valid and binding on the parties and is executable even if the compromise relates to matters concerning the parties, but extending beyond the subject matter of the suit. A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting, from a decision of the Court at the end of long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment. Counsels role in entering into a compromise has been traditionally understood to be confined to matters within the scope of the suit. However, a compromise decree may incorporate not only matters falling within the subject matter of the suit, but also other matters which are collateral to it. The position before the amendment in 1976 was that, in respect of the home, the decree was executable, but in respect of the latter, it was not executable, though admissible as judicial evidence of its contents. After the CPC amendment of 1976, a consent decree is executable in terms thereof even if it comprehends matters falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but concerning the parties. After the CPC amendment of 1976, a consent decree is executable in terms thereof even if it comprehends matters falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but concerning the parties. There is no indication in preparatory work such as the 54th Report of the Law Commission dated 6.2.1973 or in the Statements of Objects and Reasons or in the words employed by the legislature that the concept of agents and pleaders of Order III, C.P.C., was in any manner altered. There is no warrant for any such presumption. There is no reason to assume that the legislature intended to curtail the implied authority of counsel, engaged in the thick of proceedings in Court, to compromise or agree on matters relating to the parties, even if such matters exceed the subject-matter of the suit. The relationship of counsel and his party or the recognized agent and his principal is a matter of contract; and with the freedom of contract generally, the legislature does not interfere except when warranted by public policy, and the legislative intent is expressly made manifest. There is no such declaration of policy or indication of intent in amended Order 23, Rule 3. The legislature has not evinced any intention to change the well recognized and universally acclaimed common law tradition of an ever alert, independent and active Bar with freedom to manoeuvre with force and drive for quick action in a battle of wits typical of the adversarial system of oral hearing which is in sharp contrast to the inquisitorial traditions of the civil law of France and other European and Latin American countries where written submissions have the pride of place and oral arguments are considered relatively insignificant. So long as the system of judicial administration in India continues unaltered, and so long as Parliament has not evinced an intention to change its basic character, there is no reason to assume that Parliament has, though not expressly, but implied reduced counsels role or capacity to represent his client as effectively as in the past. On a matter of such vital importance, it is most unlikely that Parliament would have resorted to implied legislative alteration of counsels capacity or status or effectiveness. On a matter of such vital importance, it is most unlikely that Parliament would have resorted to implied legislative alteration of counsels capacity or status or effectiveness. Considering the traditionally recognized role of counsel in the common law system, and the evil sought to be remedied by Parliament by the C.P:C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing the compromise decree to comprehend even matters falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but relating to the parties, the legislature cannot, in the absence of express words to such effect, be presumed to have disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by counsel in their cause or by their duly authorised agents. Any such presumption would be inconsistent with the legislative object of attaining quick reduction of arrears in Court by elimination of uncertainties and enlargement of the scope of compromise. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or compromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of non-resident persons. It has always been universally understood that a party can always act by his duly authorised representative. If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of this principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorization by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client. Not to recognize such capacity is not only to cause much inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also to delay the progress of proceedings in Court. If the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated." 14. At the risk of repetition it may be noted that so far statements of the parties are concerned, they met all the requirements of an offer and its acceptance, thus a complete agreement between the parties came into being. This could be enforced in law. From the contents of the application filed before the Court below, as extracted hereinabove, it is clear that no ground whatsoever in law was set up as a plea on which an agreement could be legally avoided. 15. This could be enforced in law. From the contents of the application filed before the Court below, as extracted hereinabove, it is clear that no ground whatsoever in law was set up as a plea on which an agreement could be legally avoided. 15. Even at the time of hearing of this case it was not the case of respondent No. 1 that the statement made by him was the result of fraud, misrepresentation etc. etc. 16. Regarding requirement of an agreement being in writing between the parties as an essential condition for passing a compromise decree, came up before the Supreme Court wherein on the basis of the consensus by both the parties for disposal of the appeal during the course of second appeal, when it had come up for final hearing, and was examined in Jinshwardas (dead) Through L.Rs. and others v. Smt. Jagrani and another, JT- 2003 Supp.(2) SC 158. Following the decision of Byramji Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and others (supra), the Supreme Court after taking note of this decision, as well as its earlier decision in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, AIR 1987(4) S.C. 665, held as under :- "6. The learned Counsel for the appellants strongly placed reliance upon the decision of this Court reported in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, to contend that in the absence of compliance with the provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 3, CPC, the judgment of the High Court could not be sustained. The learned Counsel for the respondent reiterated the stand taken in the corner, noticed supra. 7. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side. Though, in Gurpreet Singhs case (supra) this Court explained the object and purport of Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC, by laying emphasis on the words, "in writing and signed by parties", to be necessitated in order to prevent false and frivolous pleas that a suit had been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise with a view to protract or delay the proceedings in the suit itself. It was also observed therein that as per Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC, when a claim in the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, such compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a complete agreement between them and that to constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. The fact that the parties entered into a compromise during the hearing of the suit or appeal was considered not to be sufficient, to do away with the requirement of the said rule and that courts were expected to insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing. In Burma Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and others, this Court while adverting to the very Amendment in 1976 to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC, noticed also the effect necessarily to be given to Rule 1 of Order 3 CPC, as well and on an extensive review of the case law on the subject of the right of the counsel engaged to act on behalf of the client observed as follows :- "37. We may, however, hasten to add that it will be prudent for counsel not to act on implied authority except when warranted by the exigency of circumstances demanding immediate adjustment of suit by agreement or compromise and the signature of the party cannot be obtained without undue delay. In these days of easier and quicker communication, such contingency may seldom arise. A wise and careful counsel will no doubt arm himself in advance with the necessary authority expressed in writing to meet all such contingencies in order that neither his authority nor integrity is ever doubted. This essential precaution will safeguard the personal reputation of counsel as well as uphold the prestige and dignity of the legal profession. 38. A wise and careful counsel will no doubt arm himself in advance with the necessary authority expressed in writing to meet all such contingencies in order that neither his authority nor integrity is ever doubted. This essential precaution will safeguard the personal reputation of counsel as well as uphold the prestige and dignity of the legal profession. 38. Considering the traditionally recognized role of counsel in the common law system, and the evil sought to be remedied by Parliament by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing the compromise decree to comprehend even matters falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but relating to the parties, the legislature cannot, in the absence of express words to such effect, be presumed to have disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by counsel in their cause or by their duly authorised agents. Any such presumption would be inconsistent with the legislative object of attaining quick reduction of arrears in Court by elimination of uncertainties and enlargement of the scope of compromise. 39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or compromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of non-resident persons. It has always been universally understood that a party can always act by his duly authorised representative. If a power of attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorization by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client. Not to recognize such capacity is not only to cause much inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also to delay the progress of proceedings in Court. If the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated." 40. Not to recognize such capacity is not only to cause much inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also to delay the progress of proceedings in Court. If the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated." 40. Accordingly, we are of the view that the words in writing and signed by the parties, inserted by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, must necessarily mean, to borrow the language of Order III Rule 1 C.P.C. "any appearance, application or act in or to any court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such court, may except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader, appearing, applying or acting as the case may be on his behalf: Provided that any such appearance shall, if the court so directs, be made by the party in person." (Emphasis supplied) 17. In Regular Second Appeal No. 19 of 1998 Shyam Singh v. Dhanbir Singh and others, identical situation came up for consideration before this Court. It was held as under:- The main argument of Shri Kuldip Singh learned Counsel for Shyam Singh is that in the absence of written instrument of compromise as envisaged under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C., the compromise decree and judgment dated 23.12.1987 is not legal and valid. According to him, the statements of all the three brothers, namely, Gaje Singh, Shyam Singh and Prem Singh recorded in the trial court do not constitute a written compromise. Except this legal ground, it is not the case of Shyam Singh either that no compromise was arrived at between the parties or arrived at by fraud or mis-representation and also that it was not given effect to and mutation No. 509 was not attested in his presence. Sh. Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for Shyam Singh has referred to judgments of Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, AIR 1988 S.C. 400; Burmna Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and others, AIR 1991 S.C. 2234 : 1992(1) SCC 31, and also the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Chand Kaurv. Raj Kaur and others, 1996(3) 114 P.L.R.523. Raj Kaur and others, 1996(3) 114 P.L.R.523. On the other hand, Ms. Jyotsna Dua, learned Counsel appearing for legal representatives of Gaje Singh and Prem Singh has supported the impugned decree and judgment and has urged that if the statements of the parties contain all the terms and conditions of the compromise arrived at amongst the parties, these can be considered as a document of compromise and no written instrument of compromise is necessary. After giving its best consideration, this Court does not find any merit in the submissions made by Shri Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for Shyam Singh. No doubt in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel (supra), learned Judges of the Supreme Court while interpreting the words in writing and signed by the parties have held that when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in a writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them so that it can be embodied in a decree. Learned Judges have further clarified : "When the parties enter into a compromise during the hearing of a suit or appeal, there is no reason why the requirement that the compromise should be reduced in writing in the form of an instrument signed by the parties should be dispensed with. The Court must, therefore, insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing." (Emphasis supplied) In Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and others (supra), learned Judges of the Supreme Court have further given a liberal meaning to the words "in writing and signed by the parties" inserted in Order 23 Rule 3 by C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976 by holding that signed by the parties, necessarily mean and include duly authorised representative and counsel. Thus a compromise in writing and signed by counsel representing the parties, but not signed by the parties in person, is valid and binding on the parties and is executable even if the compromise Relates to matters concerning the parties, but extending beyond the subject-matter of the suit. Thus a compromise in writing and signed by counsel representing the parties, but not signed by the parties in person, is valid and binding on the parties and is executable even if the compromise Relates to matters concerning the parties, but extending beyond the subject-matter of the suit. No doubt, under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. the requirement that compromise should be reduced in writing suggests that there will be an instrument/document of compromise duly signed by the parties or their counsel, but if the statements of the parties recorded in the court consist of complete terms and conditions of the compromise arrived at amongst the parties, these are nothing less than instrument/document of compromise. On the other hand, if the statements of the parties only pertain to the effect that they have compromised the matter and the terms and conditions of compromise are not contained therein, these cannot be termed as instrument/document of compromise as envisaged under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. Therefore, it will depend upon the statements of the parties recorded in the Court on the basis of which compromise decree and judgment is passed. So far the present case is concerned, the statements of the parties consist of all the terms and conditions of the compromise which were incorporated in the decree and judgment. Not only this, the compromise decree was also acted upon and shares were allotted to the parties in terms thereof and accordingly, mutation No. 509 was also attested in the presence of all of them. In this view of the matter, the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the decree and judgment dated 23.12.1987 were legal and valid as they were passed on the basis of statements of the parties recorded in the Court consisting of complete terms and conditions of the compromise. The judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in Kishore Lai v. Devinder Nath and another, Civil Revision No. 222 of 1995, decided on 24.4.1996, is on the facts of that case, in which the statements of the parties did not contain complete terms and conditions of the compromise arrived at between them. The judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in Kishore Lai v. Devinder Nath and another, Civil Revision No. 222 of 1995, decided on 24.4.1996, is on the facts of that case, in which the statements of the parties did not contain complete terms and conditions of the compromise arrived at between them. Similarly, in the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Chand Kaur v. Raj Kaur and others (supra) the compromise was effected between some of the parties to the suit and was found prejudicial to the interest of others, who had not joined the compromise. Therefore, in view of the above findings, this Court need not go into the other questions decided by the Courts below that the suit of Shyam Singh was time barred as well as not maintainable. In the result, there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed. No costs. 18. Faced with his situation, Mr. Kaushik learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 made another submission that none of these decisions are applicable to the facts of this case. As according to him in cases before the Supreme Court, referred to hereinabove, as well as the third one decided by this Court, there was subsistence decrees and it was in those circumstances that the said cases have been decided. Whereas in the present case admittedly no final decree, muchless a decree in accordance with law had been passed. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, this plea is being noted simply to be rejected. 19. The core question while considering whether on the basis of statements recorded by the appellate Court below, it can be said that there is a subsisting and legal agreement between the parties so as to term it as such is there or not. Another test to be applied in such a situation is whether it can be enforced like any other agreement or not. In my view keeping in view the facts of this case answer would be in the affirmative. Again at the risk of repetition, it may be noted that it is not the case of respondent No. 1 that he was either misled or otherwise any ground is there so as to enable him to resile from his voluntary statement before the appellate Court below. Again at the risk of repetition, it may be noted that it is not the case of respondent No. 1 that he was either misled or otherwise any ground is there so as to enable him to resile from his voluntary statement before the appellate Court below. Passing of the final order/decree was an act to be performed by the Court as a direct fall out of such statements. Impugned order, nowhere shows that any such ground has been made out within the meaning of Order XXIII C.P.C. so as to authorise, muchless enable it to have held that the statements were either not voluntary or were the result of any other ground on which the respondents could have avoided the same. 20. No other point is urged, 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this revision petition is allowed and what follows from this is that the order dated 8.4.2003 allowing the application for setting aside the compromise order dated 26.3.2003 shall stand dismissed. As a further consequence of the above discussion, this case is remanded back to the learned District Judge below with a direction to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law on the basis of the statements recorded by him on 25.3.2003 by passing appropriate decree. Since record of the courts below is here, parties through their learned Counsel are directed to appear before the appellate Court on 29.11.2003. No fresh date will be given by the appellate Court even if it is not holding the court on the date fixed by this .Court. In such a situation not only on 29.11.2003, but on the adjourned date to which the case is posted for proper orders, the parties will appear in the Court below. Registry will ensure that record is transmitted before the date fixed. -