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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 312 (HP)

SUSHMA DEVI v. STATE OF H. P.

2003-10-21

M.R.VERMA

body2003
JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—By this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter referred to as the Code), read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioners have sought quashing of proceedings, pursuant to F.I.R. No. 487, dated 9.9.1999, under Sections 323, 109, 498-Aand 506 I.P.C., registered at Police Station, Una, in case No. 178-1/1999, pending in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate (II), Una. 2. The material and admitted facts for the purpose of disposal of his petition are that petitioner No. 1 lodged the aforesaid F.I.R. and on investigation, the officer incharge, Police Station, Una, submitted a charge sheet against petitioner Nos. 2 to 4, under Sections 498-A, 323, 109 and 506 I.P.C. On the basis of the charge-sheet, the trial Court summoned petitioners 2 to 4. On 12.6.2003, an application under Section 320 of the Code was presented by petitioner No. 1 before the trial court for composition of the case on the grounds that she is legally wedded wife of petitioner Des Raj and petitioners Raj Rani and Raj Kumar, being brother and brothers wife of the accused, are closely related to each other and that petitioner No. 1 had been living with petitioner No. 2 happily eversince her marriage but in September, 1999, some misunderstanding took place between them which led to the lodging of the F.I.R., though in fact there was no demand for dowry not was there any alleged beating at the time of the lodging of the F.I.R. Petitioner No. 1 is residing with the other petitioners and to save the relations and harmony in the family, she be permitted to compound the case. The learned trial Magistrate dismissed the application on the ground that an offence punishable under Section 498-A is not compoundable and could not be permitted to be compounded. It is against this background that the present petition has been filed by the petitioners for quashing the aforesaid F.I.R./case and the proceedings therein. 3. The respondent State filed reply, wherein the aforesaid facts have not been disputed but it has been claimed that the trial court had no power to grant permission to compound the offence and the F.I.R. disclosed the commission of the offences and during investigation, the allegations therein were found correct. Therefore, it will not be in the interest of justice to quash the proceedings. 4. Therefore, it will not be in the interest of justice to quash the proceedings. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State and have also gone through the records. 5. Be it stated at the very outset that the very purpose of the law, particularly the penal laws, is to ensure peace and harmony in the society and to deter people from causing harm to the person and property of others. One of the basic requirements to maintain peace and harmony is that the relations in the family, the smallest social unit, are cordial and affectionate. In case of any discord or dispute within the families, the Court must lean in favour of bringing about the cordial and harmonious relations and peace to the family, rather than to perpetuate them on technicalities. 6. In the case in hand, there is no dispute that the aforesaid F.I.R. culminating into the institution of the aforesaid case, has been instituted by petitioner No. 1 and the accused therein are petitioners 2 to 4, one of whom is the husband, another is the brother-in-law and third is the Jethani of petitioner No. 1. It is evident from the contents of application under Section 320 of the Code filed by petitioner No. 1 that she is no more interested in prosecuting petitioners 2 to 4 with whom she is now living in a cordial atmosphere and does not want any deterioration in the cordial relations between them. 7. It is true that an offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is not compoundable and within the framework of the Code, Court has no power and authority to grant permission to compound an offence which is not compoundable. However, quashing of the proceedings, as prayed for in the present petition, is not granting permission to compound an offence which is not compoundable. The powers to quash proceedings under Section 482 of the Code stands entirely on a different footing and the provisions of Section 320 of the Code, in no way, affect such powers. 8. Section 482 of the code preserves the inherent powers of the High Court which gives the widest jurisdiction to such court to undo such injustice which cannot be undone under any other provision of the code. 8. Section 482 of the code preserves the inherent powers of the High Court which gives the widest jurisdiction to such court to undo such injustice which cannot be undone under any other provision of the code. However, these powers can be exercised within the framework of the Section i.e. to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice and exercise of such power with a view to achieve the aforesaid objectives is independent of the powers of the Courts under Section 320 of the Code. 9. In B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another, AIR 2003 Supreme Court 1386, the Honble Supreme Court, while dealing with a controversy as in hand, held as under: "8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limayes case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or F.I.R. or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extra-ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of F.I.R. becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. 12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. This is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian.Penal Code. 15. There is every likelihood that non exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. This is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian.Penal Code. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or F.I.R. or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code." 10. In view of the above, it is clear that powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are not, in any manner controlled by Section 320 of the Code. 11. As already stated hereinabove petitioner No. 1, in her application under Section 320 I.P.C., has clearly and unambiguously made it clear that at the time of lodging of the F.I.R., neither she was beaten up by petitioners 2 to 4 nor there was any demand for dowry, therefore, the accusations she has made against petitioners 2 to 4 in the F.I.R., stand controverted by her. It is immaterial and also not possible to say at this stage whether the allegations made by petitioner No. 1 in the F.I.R. are true or the averments made by her in the application are true? But the position at present is that in view of the stand now taken by petitioner No. 1, the continuation of the case against petitioners 2 to 4 will be an exercise in futility and in the event of holding a trial, the material witnesses in the case to be examined on oath, in all probability, make such statements which may suit the petitioners in the present situation and such statements, in view of the contents of the F.I.R., may not be true. Thus, the continuation of the proceedings may impel witnesses to make false statements on oath to achieve objective as reflected in the application under Section 320 of the Code. The most important requirement of justice delivery system is that the witnesses speak and are encouraged to speak the truth, therefore, the courts have to ensure that sanctity of oath is preserved to ensure to do substantial justice. The most important requirement of justice delivery system is that the witnesses speak and are encouraged to speak the truth, therefore, the courts have to ensure that sanctity of oath is preserved to ensure to do substantial justice. Therefore, to keep the system of administration of justice unpolluted, a situation where the witness, for certain compelling reason, are likely to make false statement on oath, has to be dealt with in a manner most suited to meet the ends of justice. Therefore, in a situation as exists in the case in hand, it is in the larger interest of fair play and social justice that criminal proceedings against petitioners 2 to 4 are quashed. 12. In Haji Nihal Ahmad and others v. State of U.P. and another, 1998 Cri. L.J. 2082, Allahabad High Court held as under: "........The trial against the applicants would be an exercise in futility for one simple reason that the opposite party No. 2 who lodged the F.I.R. and other witnesses of prosecution are bound to stage a volte face. There is no chance of convicting the applicants in the case. The dispute, by and large, is likely to effect the matrimonial life of Smt. Naushad Parveen who happens to be daughter of applicant No. 1 and sister of applicant Nos. 2 to 4. In case the trial is permitted to go on, without any corresponding advantage, it would have adverse repercussions on the married life of Smt. Naushad Parveen and Haji Giyas Mohd. The end product of law is justice. Since the parties have themselves patched up their differences by settling the dispute outside the court, they should not be unnecessarily driven to face the fruitless trial. Compounding of the case is one thing while reconciliation between the parties is another. In 1976 Cri. L.J. 217 (Kant), SM. Jayaram v. State of Karnataka, it was held, thus:— ".........to call the compromise as compounding is a distinction with quite a lot of difference. The two cannot be equated. After the parties had compromised among themselves, the police had no business at a later stage to butt into the Court and file a charge sheet and them further represent that the charge sheet being one for theft under Section 379, I.P.C., can be compounded only with the permission of the Court. The two cannot be equated. After the parties had compromised among themselves, the police had no business at a later stage to butt into the Court and file a charge sheet and them further represent that the charge sheet being one for theft under Section 379, I.P.C., can be compounded only with the permission of the Court. The compromise being a fait accompli there was no question of compounding." In another case reported in 1983(3) Crimes 694 (Delhi), N.P. Singh v. State, in the similar circumstances, as are appearing in the present case, the proceedings in a criminal case under Sections 498-A and 405,1.P.C. were quashed on a application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. with the observation that inherent power can be invoked to do justice notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. In the background of above facts and circumstances, I am of the view that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution against the applicants and, therefore, it is necessary to quash the proceedings in the criminal case." 13. In Gurcharan Singh v. The State and another, 1998 Cri. L.J. 3780, Delhi High Court held as under: "27. After a careful scrutiny and analysis of the various judgments mentioned above, the legal position seems to be quite clear that a High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can quash the proceedings, where there is an abuse of process of the Court or the ends of justice so requires. 28. There seems to be conflict of opinion, as far as inherent powers of the High Court in the matter of exercise of its jurisdiction for compounding a non compoundable offence is concerned. This High Court has consistently taken the view that Court has inherent powers to compound a non compoundable offence. 29. In the instant case, the only prayer is for quashing the proceedings, therefore, the question of compounding of non compoundable offences need not be determined in this case. 30. In view of the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case and law declared by the apex court and other Courts for securing the ends of justice, I deem it appropriate in the interest of justice to quash the F.I.R. No. 599/97 under Sections 307/34, I.P.C., Police Station Vasant Kunj, New Delhi and proceedings arising therefrom." 14. 30. In view of the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case and law declared by the apex court and other Courts for securing the ends of justice, I deem it appropriate in the interest of justice to quash the F.I.R. No. 599/97 under Sections 307/34, I.P.C., Police Station Vasant Kunj, New Delhi and proceedings arising therefrom." 14. In view of the above factual aspects, conclusions and the legal position, the present petition deserves to be allowed. 15. As a result, this petition is allowed and proceedings in Criminal Case No. 178-1/1999, titled State v. Des Raj and others, under Sections 498-A, 323, 506/109 I.P.C, pursuant to F.I.R. No. 487, dated 9.9.1999, registered at Police Station, Una, and pending in the Court of the leaned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (II), Una, are quashed. Appeal allowed.