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2003 DIGILAW 314 (ORI)

Nikhil Kumar Pattanaik v. State of Orissa

2003-04-23

A.S.NAIDU

body2003
JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. — This Criminal Misc. Case has been filed invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the order dated 27.2.2003 passed by the J.M.F.C., Sohella in G.R. Case No. 160 of 2002 taking cognizance of offences under Sections 341/448/294/506/34, IPC alleged against the petitioners. 2. The criminal action was set in motion on the basis of an FIR lodged by the informant-opposite party No.2, who is an employee of the Road Transport Organization and working as A.R.T.O at Luhurachati Check Gate under Sohela P.S. in the dis¬trict of Bargarh. It was alleged that the petitioners who were working as colleagues of the informant came to his house and started scolding him in filthy language. Most of them were drunk and were not in conscious state and they behaved in peculiar fashion. On the basis of the said FIR, the G.R. Case was initiat¬ed in which chargesheet has been submitted on 26.2.2003 for commission of offences as state above. 3. Mr. Dhal, learned counsel for the petitioners, force¬fully submitted that the entire incident occurred when the parties were not in conscious state and that the informant and the accused petitioners are all colleagues and friends. There was no mens rea nor any intention to harm the informant and the FIR had been lodged in haste. He further submitted that with the intervention of well-wishers and colleagues of the parties, the dissension among them has been patched up. 4. In course of hearing, the informant appeared through Mr. G.B. Jena and Mrs. Sujata Jena, Advocates who filed a Vaka¬latnama on 18.4.2003. A petition was also filed jointly by the petitioner and the informant-opposite party No.2 under Section 320(1), Cr.P.C. which is sworn to by both the parties inter alia stating that the dispute between the parties has been compromised and that pendency of the present criminal case would rather create a dent in their cordial relationship. A separate affidavit has also been filed by opposite party No.2 solemnly affirming that the FIR had been filed by him, but as the matter has been settled, he is no more interested to prosecute the case. Learned counsel for opposite party No.2 also reiterated the facts stated in the petition as well as the affidavit and prayed to quash the proceedings of the aforesaid G.R. Case. 5. Learned counsel for opposite party No.2 also reiterated the facts stated in the petition as well as the affidavit and prayed to quash the proceedings of the aforesaid G.R. Case. 5. Section 320, CrPC empowers the Court to compound certain offences more fully described therein. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 320 CrPC, the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code which can be compounded and the person by whom such offences can be compounded have been stipulated. Similarly, under Sub-section (2) of Section 320 CrPC the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code which can be compromised with permission of Court before which prosecution for the offences is pending are stipulated in a tabular form. Law is well settled that only the offences which have been specifically stipulated can be compound¬ed as provided either under Section 320 (1) or Section 320 (2), CrPC. 6. What is compounding is no more res integra. A compro¬mise effected between a complainant and the accused amounts to compounding the offence. It has the effect of acquittal of the accused. But then, under Section 320 CrPC, a Criminal Court has no power to grant permission to compound a non-compoundable of¬fences, i.e. an offence which does not come within either of the two tables specified under Section 320 (1) or Section 320 (2) CrPC. A Magistrate or a Sessions Judge who does not possess inherent power has no authority to accord permission to compound a non-compoundable offence. But then, can the High Court in exer¬cise of the power under Section 482 of the Code in a given case quash a criminal proceeding is the question posed. The scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC have been examined by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. But then, can the High Court in exer¬cise of the power under Section 482 of the Code in a given case quash a criminal proceeding is the question posed. The scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC have been examined by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, JT 1990 (4) SC 650, the Supreme Court has observed as follows : “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various rele¬vant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the princi¬ples of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following cate¬gories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficient¬ly channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulate (sic) and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.” In the case of Pepsi Food Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, JT 1997 (8) SC 705, also the guidelines where the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code could be or could not be exercised have been lucidly laid down. Exercise of such powers unambiguous¬ly would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers is to be kept in mind. In the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 (1) SCR 749 , the Supreme Court has also laid down the limits of the power of the High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint. In the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 (1) SCR 749 , the Supreme Court has also laid down the limits of the power of the High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint. It was inter alia held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in the Code can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court. In the case of State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, 1977 (3) SCR 113 , considering the scope of inherent powers under Section 482, CrPC, it was held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that ends of justice so require. While considering such proposition in a criminal case the High Court has to always consider the veiled object behind a lame prosecu¬tion, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, which would justify the High Court in quashing the proceedings in the interest of justice. It has to be always kept in mind that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be admiministered according to laws made by the legislature. In the case of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrajirao Angre, JT 1988 (1) SC 279, it has been held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecu¬tion to continue.It was observed that where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may, while taking into consid¬eration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings. In a recent decision, i.e. in the case of B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, JT 2003 (3) SC 277, considering all the earlier decisions, the Supreme Court arrived at a conclusion that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code. 7. In the present case, all the offences alleged against the petitioners, except the offence under Section 294, IPC, are covered by the tables prescribed under Section 320 of the Code and are compoundable. In the case of Sudarsan Sabat v. State of Orissa, (1988) 15 OCR 459, this Court relying upon the ratio of the decision in the case of Sudhakar Navak v. State, (1996) 11 OCR 77, held that though a Magistrate definitely cannot compound an offence which is not covered by the tables prescribed under Section 320 of the Code, the High Court in appropriate case can quash the proceeding in respect of a non-compoundable offence in the interest of justice. Here, as narrated above, all the parties are collegues and the offences alleged are also not so grave and are more in the nature of a prank at a colleague. The informant on the basis of whose FIR the G.R. Case was initiated also appeared before this Court and filed an affidavit specifically and unambiguously stating that the parties have ironed their disputes, if any, and he does not want to prosecute the case. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the parties are colleagues and are working in the same office. If they have arrived at a compro¬mise, it is a fit case where to secure the ends of justice the criminal proceeding should be quashed. Accordingly, I am of the view that it would not be in the interest of justice to allow the criminal case to continue any further. 8. In the result, the Criminal Misc. Case is allowed. The proceedings of G.R. Case No. 160 of 2002 on the file of the J.M.F.C., Sohela are quashed. Crl. Misc. Case allowed.