ORDER R.C. Lahoti, J. - The tenant is in appeal by special leave feeling aggrieved by a decree of eviction passed under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter 'the Act' for short). 2. The suit premises are non-residential situated in Linghi Chetty Street, Madras (now Chennai). The landlord-tenant relationship between the parties is not disputed. The landlord and tenant, both are carrying on their respective business activities in the premises adjoining each other. The proceedings for eviction were initiated on twin grounds, firstly, that the landlord occupying only a part of non-residential building was in need of the remaining part of the building by way of additional accommodation for the purpose of the business, which he was already carrying on within the meaning of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act and, secondly, that the tenant had transferred his rights under the lease or sub-let a portion of the leased premises though the lease did not confer on him any right to do so within the meaning of Section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Act. The trial court decided against the landlord on both the grounds. In the appeal preferred by the landlord, the appellate authority reappreciated the evidence and arrived at a finding that sub-letting of a part of the tenancy premises was proved and, therefore, a case for eviction under Section 10(2)(ii)(a) was made out. So far as the ground of requirement is concerned, the appellate authority recorded a finding that the bonafide requirement of the landlord for additional premises was made out. However, within the meaning of the proviso appended to Section 10(3)(c), the appellate authority found that the tenant would be put to greater hardship if called upon to vacate the tenancy premises and his hardship outweighed the advantage to the landlord. Thus, only on the ground available under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, the appellate authority found the landlord entitled to a decree of eviction. 3. The tenant preferred revision petition to the High Court under Section 25 of the Act. The High Court reversed the finding of the appellate authority so far as the ground of sub-letting is concerned, and restored the finding of the trial court that such ground for eviction did not exist. 3. The tenant preferred revision petition to the High Court under Section 25 of the Act. The High Court reversed the finding of the appellate authority so far as the ground of sub-letting is concerned, and restored the finding of the trial court that such ground for eviction did not exist. On the ground of bonafide requirement, the High Court upheld the finding of the appellate authority that the requirement for additional space for the landlord was made out and to that extent the appellate authority's finding was upheld. Though in the opinion of the High Court, decree of eviction on the ground under Section 10(2)(ii)(a) was liable to be set aside still it could be supported and upheld on the ground under Section 10(3)(c). The landlord, non-petitioner in the High Court disputed the correctness of finding recorded by the appellate authority against him. On the issue of comparative hardship, the High Court formed an opinion that the conclusion drawn by the appellate authority from the proved facts was wholly unsustainable in law and to that extent reversing the conclusion arrived at by the appellate authority , the High Court has allowed decree for eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant has preferred this appeal by special leave. 4. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant tenant submitted that two substantial questions of law arise for decision in this appeal. Firstly, it was submitted that in a revision preferred by the tenant before the High Court against the decision of the appellate authority, the High Court was not justified in permitting the non-petitioner to get rid of an adverse finding recorded against him and in favour of the revision petitioner before it and sustain the decree for eviction on the ground under Section 10(3)(c) while forming an opinion in favour of the revision petitioner tenant under Section 10(2)(ii)(a). The learned Senior Counsel very fairly submitted that this plea is no longer available to be maintained by the appellant in view of the recent decision of this Court in Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman, (2002) 6 SCC 1 , wherein this Court has held that the decree of the appellate authority impugned in the High Court being in favour of the revision non-petitioner in the High Court, he had no right to file a revision, he being not an aggrieved party and, therefore, it was open for him to plead for maintaining the ultimate decree of eviction on another ground decided against him by the appellate authority while reversing the finding of the appellate authority on a ground decided against the revision petitioner. 5. The second submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that the issue as to comparative hardship being essentially a question of fact, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act could not have interfered therewith and, therefore, the decision of the High Court is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. Reliance was placed on Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC 259. We have carefully considered the submission so made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and examined the decisions of the appellate authority and the High Court in this background. It is settled that the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act is not so restricted and limited as one under Section 115 CPC, but at the same time it is not so wide and open as that of an appellate court so as to convert the revisional jurisdiction into an appeal against the findings of first appellate court or authority. However, in Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works itself this Court has held that if it could be shown that there was a taint of such unreasonableness as results in miscarriage of justice then even concurrent findings of facts are liable to be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. A perusal of the decision of the High Court shows that on the question of comparative hardship, the High Court has not interfered with any of the findings of facts arrived at by the appellate authority . A perusal of the decision of the High Court shows that on the question of comparative hardship, the High Court has not interfered with any of the findings of facts arrived at by the appellate authority . All that the High Court has said is that from the proven facts, the inference which has been drawn by the appellate authority is wholly unsustainable in law and has, therefore, obviously occasioned miscarriage of justice. How the issue as to comparative hardship is to be approached has been dealt with by this Court while dealing with pari materia provisions contained in similar rent control legislations in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 273 and recently in Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada, (2003) 2 SCC 320 . 6. The conclusion of the appellate authority that the tenant would suffer comparatively more hardship is based on two findings of fact: one, that the business of the tenant is more flourishing than that of the landlord and, two, that the administrative office of the tenant was situated on the upper floor of the same tenancy premises and in the event of the tenant being called upon to shift his business to another premises, he shall have to move at a distance from the administrative office, which would cause serious inconvenience to him. Suffice it to observe that the conclusion drawn by the appellate authority on the issue as to comparative hardship from the proved facts is vitiated by two infirmities: the appellate authority has taken irrelevant factors into consideration and ignored the relevant factors from consideration. In Bega Begum case3 this Court has held that merely because the tenant will have to be ousted from the tenancy premises on account of a decree for eviction being passed is irrelevant to be considered as a hardship because asking by the tenant for availability of premises similarly situated in all respects the same as the tenancy premises would be asking for almost an impossible and if that factor be taken into consideration as a relevant factor, then a decree for eviction would not be liable to be passed in any case at all. It has also been held that the landlord cannot be prevented from augmenting his income by expanding his own business merely for the sake of securing enjoyment by the tenant of the tenancy premises for any length of time. It has also been held that the landlord cannot be prevented from augmenting his income by expanding his own business merely for the sake of securing enjoyment by the tenant of the tenancy premises for any length of time. In Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada case4 this Court has held that the onus is on the tenant of proving relevant factors, which would enable a finding as to comparative hardship being arrived at in his favour and he should discharge the onus. One of the relevant factors which the tenant is expected to point out is that he cannot shift to other premises because other premises for carrying on his business activity in the city would just be not available. In the present case, the finding of fact arrived at by the appellate authority is that to accommodate his business which has already expanded, the landlord has taken two godowns on rent and the rent which the landlord is paying for these two godowns is much more than the rent which the tenant is paying in respect of the tenancy premises. Apart from this, the landlord for want of requisite space in his business premises is being compelled to stack his business stock on the road edges in front of his shop and he is being repeatedly harassed by the local authority and other officials on account of such avoidable misuse of the road by the landlord. Simply because the tenant has a flourishing business, the same cannot be set up as a defence, in the name of comparative hardship, against the bonafide requirement of the landlord whose business has already outgrown and whose necessity is imminent. Thus, a relevant factor was ignored by the appellate authority . The fact that the business premises of the tenant shall have to be shifted at some distance from the administrative office situated on the first floor is not a factor of any relevance as the activities, which are carried on from the administrative office can very well be carried on therefrom while the business dealings can very well be carried on from such premises as the tenant shall have to avail himself in the event of his being evicted from the tenancy premises. A little inconvenience to the tenant cannot be called a hardship. 7. A little inconvenience to the tenant cannot be called a hardship. 7. For the foregoing reasons and in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think that the High Court has committed any such error much less a jurisdictional error in recording a finding on the question of comparative hardship, in departure from the one arrived at by the appellate authority, as may be liable to be interfered with in exercise of this Court's jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. 8. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that no interference with the decision of the High Court is called for. The appeal is held devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly. However, to save the appellant from facing immediate eviction, it is directed that the decree for eviction shall not be available for execution for a period of six months from today subject to the appellant clearing all the arrears of rent and furnishing the usual undertaking within a period of four weeks from today and undertaking to deliver peaceful and vacant possession to the landlord over the tenancy premises at the end of the six months and in between continuing to pay the arrears of rent falling due month by month. Appeal dismissed.