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2003 DIGILAW 320 (KER)

Usman v. Sub-inspector Of Police

2003-05-03

R.BASANT

body2003
Judgment :- Does an accused apprehending arrest or arrested already have an unfettered option to approach this Court under Section 438 or 439, Cr. P.C. ? Cannot this Court in the interests of justice, expediency and convenience insist, (re)introduce and enforce compliance with the salutary and accepted rule of procedure that where two fora have concurrent powers the forum lower in the hierarchy must be approached before the doors of the superior one are knocked ? These interesting questions arise for determination in these Crl. MCs. The facts scenario is simple. Crl. M.C. 3265 of 2003 is an application for anticipatory bail under Section 438, Cr. P.C. The accused apprehends arrest in a crime registered under Sections 498-A and 306, I.P.C. Crl. M.C. 3391 of 2003 is a petition for regular bail under Section 439, Cr. P.C. where the accused has already been arrested on 4-4-2003 on the allegation that he has committed offences punishable under Section 55(a) of the Kerala Abkari Act. As this Court sitting as the vacation Court entertained doubts about the desirability of approving the course adopted in many cases that came up for consideration of the accused approaching this Court directly with applications under Sections 438 and 439 without and before approaching the Court of Sessions which has concurrent jurisdiction under these statutory provisions, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel were requested to advance arguments on this interesting legal question. Most of the counsel chose to adopt the very convenient course of getting their applications dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to move the Sessions Court. Considering the importance and the significance of the question raised, counsel who have appeared before me on 29-4-2003, 30-4-2003 and 2-5-2003 have all been permitted to advance detailed arguments if any on this question to assist the Court. I shall first of all extract the relevant portions of the statutory provisions. "438. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest. - (1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section, and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail. (2) .................. 439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail. (2) .................. 439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail. - (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct - (a) that any person the accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of S. 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section; (b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified : .............." The learned Public Prosecutor contends that though there can be no dispute about the jurisdictional competence of this Court in appropriate and exceptional cases to entertain an application for anticipatory bail/bail under Sections 438/439, Crl. P.C. at the first instance itself that cannot be the rule. The learned Public Prosecutor relies on the well established and salutary rule of procedure that where two flora are vested with concurrent authority, the superior one can be approached by a party only after the inferior one is approached, except in exceptional cases. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that this rule must be adhered to in the interests of convenience, expedition, inexpensive justice, avoidance of conflict of decisions and of saving the time of the superior Court for more sublime pursuits. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that it definitely reduces expenses, at least in a substantial number of cases. At least the presumption is that if the case is a fit one where discretion can be invoked in favour of the petitioner, the Court of Session would and should as well, invoke the discretion. In that case the litigant would be saved of the unnecessary trouble of approaching the Superior Court. There is only one seat for the High Court of Kerala and that is situated almost at the middle of the State. It would be very inconvenient, more expensive and cumbersome for the parties to approach the High Court. Relatively therefore, it will certainly advance the interests of parties and save unnecessary expenses if the local District Courts in each district can entertain applications under Sections 438/439. So far as the State is also concerned, there can be saving of a lot of expenditure as officers have to come from outlying districts to the seat of the High Court to instruct the Prosecutor. So far as the State is also concerned, there can be saving of a lot of expenditure as officers have to come from outlying districts to the seat of the High Court to instruct the Prosecutor. In the interests of proper disposal of cases also it is very essential that the Prosecutor gets proper assistance so that he can be of useful assistance to the Court. It would serve the cause of efficient and prompt investigation as the investigating officers will not have to proceed to the seat of the High Court and the case diary will not have to be carried there to instruct the Prosecutor. It helps also in adoption of uniform standards in respect of applications/bail applications in each district. It also saves the time of this Court as it will not be flooded with applications for bail/anticipatory bail when relief can be obtained from the Court of Session itself. If only fit cases, where the discretion has not been exercised correctly by the Court of Session, come before the High Court for its consideration, the time of the High Court can be saved. In that process quicker disposal of applications for bail can also be ensured. The High Court also would get the advantage of application of mind by the Court of Session to the same facts earlier. In these circumstances the learned Public Prosecutor submits that it will be more advantageous if this Court follows a self-imposed rule of restriction that ordinarily applications under Sections 438/439 will be entertained by this Court only if and after the Court of Session has considered the application earlier. My attention has been brought to many precedents showing that other High Courts have imposed such restrictions on themselves - reserving always the jurisdictional competence and the discretion to entertain an application for bail/anticipatory bail directly at the first instance if the peculiar facts of a given case warrant such a course. As against this the learned Counsel for the petitioners contend that it is not permissible to impose any such fetter on the right of a litigant to approach the superior Court. The language of Section 438, Cr. P.C. shows that the option to file an application before the Court of Sessions or the High Court is left to the discretion of the applicant and not the Court. The language of Section 438, Cr. P.C. shows that the option to file an application before the Court of Sessions or the High Court is left to the discretion of the applicant and not the Court. So far as Section 439 is concerned, though it does not refer to applications by the parties (and the powers can be exercised even in the absence of an application) both Courts have concurrent jurisdiction and by a process of interpretation or by imposing restrictions on itself the court cannot introduce any such fetters on the option conceded under Sections 438 and 439. It is then contended that Sections 438 and 439 are concurrent powers. The High Court does not exercise appellate, revisional or supervisory jurisdiction under Sections 438 and 439. The jurisdiction in both these cases, of the High Court, is special and original and in these circumstances no such fetter can be placed on the option of the party. Under Sections 438/439 the petitioners are entitled to have first consideration by the High Court uninfluenced by any earlier consideration by the Sessions Court. If such a Rule were followed the High Court will never have the option/ability to consider facts without being influenced by an earlier consideration by a subordinate Court, it is urged. It is then submitted that the rule that the lower forum having concurrent jurisdiction must be moved first is certainly not one of universal acceptance. Considering the language of Sections 438 and 439 such rule cannot be followed, it is urged. It is contended that it may perhaps be permissible for Courts which have been following such a self-imposed rule to continue with the practice. But this Court having not imposed any such restriction on itself earlier, should not and need not introduce any such rule of practice for the future. Some of the counsel contend that the question to be decided is one of signal significance. This is definitely not only an important or very important question but it is a crucial question of general public importance. Hence this Court sitting as a vacation Court may not decide the issue and may make a reference to the Division Bench under the relevant provisions of the Kerala High Court Act, it is submitted. The counsel further urged that if such a practice were introduced, the accused will have to suffer the evil consequences of the laws delays. Hence this Court sitting as a vacation Court may not decide the issue and may make a reference to the Division Bench under the relevant provisions of the Kerala High Court Act, it is submitted. The counsel further urged that if such a practice were introduced, the accused will have to suffer the evil consequences of the laws delays. It would hurt their interest. Some of the Sessions Courts take a minimum of 10 to 15 days before an application under Sections 438/439 is finally disposed of. There is inevitable delay in furnishing copies thereafter also. In these circumstances the introduction of such a self-imposed rule would jeopardise the interests of the accused persons in custody/facing the prospect of arrest. Finally it is contended that wherever the Legislature had wanted such restrictions to be imposed on the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, that has been made clear in the respective statutory provisions. Reliance is placed on Section 399(3), Cr. P.C. where it is said that if one Court having concurrent jurisdiction has exercised its jurisdiction, the other will not be entitled to invoke such powers. Reliance was also placed on the proviso to Section 407(2), Cr. P.C. to contend that wherever the legislature wanted the superior Court not to exercise such concurrent jurisdiction before the subordinate Court exercises such powers, it is made clear in the provision itself. In these circumstances by a process of interpretation such restrictive rule may not be introduced placing fetters on the powers of the Court, it is urged. It is submitted that under the Criminal Procedure Code or the Kerala High court Act or under the relevant Rules framed there is no provision by which it can be insisted that the Sessions Court must be moved before the High Court is moved for grant of bail/anticipatory bail. In these circumstances there can be no question of introduction of a self-imposed rule restricting the powers of the High Court, it is argued. My attention has been drawn to various precedents on the point also. I shall advert to them later. At the very outset I must note that the powers vested in the High Court and the Court of Session under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. are concurrent. The powers are equal and identical. There is of course the difference that the command of the High Court would run over a larger geographical area. At the very outset I must note that the powers vested in the High Court and the Court of Session under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. are concurrent. The powers are equal and identical. There is of course the difference that the command of the High Court would run over a larger geographical area. So far as the nature of the relief is concerned both Courts have exactly identical equal and concurrent powers. This is a very serious distinction when we consider the other analogous provisions as also precedents. Any relief which the High Court can grant under Sections 438/439 can also be granted by the Court of Session. This is explicit from the language of the statutory provisions. It is evident from precedents also. I do also agree that the powers of the High Court are not appellate, revisional or supervisory under Sections 438 and 439. It is a special original jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under Sections 438 and 439. It is by now trite and the decisions reported in Gopinath v. State of Kerala, 1986 Ker LT 107 : (1986 Cri LJ 1742) and Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 : 2001 Cri LJ 2566 : (AIR 2001 SC 2023) make it very clear that notwithstanding the fact that the powers are concurrent the High Court can exercise such powers even after the Sessions Court exercises such powers earlier. There can also be no doubt about the jurisdictional competence of the High Court to entertain an application under Sections 438/439 at the first instance. The question is only whether a self-imposed rule of restriction can be introduced in the procedure. In an appropriate case, notwithstanding any such self-imposed restriction the High Court will be at liberty to entertain the application at the first instance. Under Sections 438 and 439 a very wide discretion is conferred on the superior Courts. The legislature has chosen to confer such discretion without any limitations. As to how the discretion must be exercised and what restrictions must be imposed is certainly left to the courts concerned. It is trite that in appropriate cases the High Court would be justified in not entertaining an application under Sections 438/439 itself and can direct the Court of Sessions to consider such application or refer the parties to the Sessions Court. It is trite that in appropriate cases the High Court would be justified in not entertaining an application under Sections 438/439 itself and can direct the Court of Sessions to consider such application or refer the parties to the Sessions Court. All that I intend to note is that such a self-imposed restriction on sound judicial discretion is certainly not outside the amplitude of the discretion conferred under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. I find merit in the submission of the learned Public Prosecutor that in actual practice the imposition of such a restriction while exercising the discretion would advance the interests of justice convincingly. Experience shows that considerable amount of time in this Court is wasted for the Public Prosecutor to get instructions and to enable him to peruse the case diary. The officers of the State have to undertake unnecessary and avoidable trips to the seat of the High Court to bring the case diary and to instruct the Public Prosecutor. Often this Court finds that proper assistance is not available from the Public Prosecutor on account of want of instructions and their inability to have access to and peruse the case diary. The travelling up and down of the case diary does interfere with proper and prompt investigation also. Unnecessary delay, inconvenience and expenses are caused to the parties also when relief which could have been obtained from the Court of Session is unnecessarily sought from this Court. The argument that the party has an unfettered option to choose the forum does not appeal to me. The legislature when it conferred concurrent jurisdiction must be presumed to have been aware of the salutary Rule of procedure that ordinarily the superior Court's time and resources will be and can be called in aid only after the Court of lower jurisdiction is moved. From the language of Sections 438 and 439 according to me it would be imprudent to jump to the conclusion that an unfettered option was conferred on the applicant in an application under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. I do not find much merit in the contention that if the Sessions Court once applies its mind, the High Court will not be able to apply its mind independently. That proposition does not appeal to me as correct or reasonable. P.C. I do not find much merit in the contention that if the Sessions Court once applies its mind, the High Court will not be able to apply its mind independently. That proposition does not appeal to me as correct or reasonable. In the hierarchy of Courts it must be presumed that the superior Courts do have the judicial competence and ability to exercise their discretion appropriately whether the subordinate Court has earlier considered the question or not. It will be apposite to note that powers under Sections 438 and 439 are vested only in superior Courts like the Court of Session and the High Court which are presumed to be manned by experienced and competent personnel. The fact that a subordinate Court has already applied its mind does not appeal to me as a sufficient reason to assume that the superior Court will not be able to apply its mind independently and properly. That it has the result of application of mind by another authority having concurrent jurisdiction is to be reckoned only as an advantage and not certainly as a fetter or disadvantage. Reference to Sections 399(3) and 407(2) does not also lead me to any contra conclusion. Section 399(3) is a peculiar provision which after conferring concurrent powers takes away the powers of the authority if the other authority having concurrent powers has already exercised its powers. That restriction cannot and does not apply to applications u/Ss. 458/459, Cr. P.C.. That cannot lead to the conclusion that in all cases where there is conferment of concurrent powers on two flora no self-imposed restrictions can apply. Similarly the powers under Sections 406 and 407 cannot certainly be reckoned as concurrent. Separate conferment is made of the power of transfer on the Court of Session and the High Court under these provisions. The proviso to S. 407(2) cannot in these circumstances help the Court to conclude that no self-imposed restriction can be made in the matter by the Court in the absence of an identical salutary stipulation in Ss. 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. The argument that such a self-imposed restriction cannot be placed and that would run against the intent of the legislature cannot also obviously succeed as the salutary rule has been tested by the times and has been accepted and followed by Courts in the absence of exceptional reasons. 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. The argument that such a self-imposed restriction cannot be placed and that would run against the intent of the legislature cannot also obviously succeed as the salutary rule has been tested by the times and has been accepted and followed by Courts in the absence of exceptional reasons. The legislature when it conferred concurrent powers on the Court of Session and the High Court must be presumed to have known and assumed that the provision will be understood and interpreted consistent with the well accepted rules of interpretation and that the salutary rule of procedure referred above shall also be followed while construing the statutory provision. Coming to the delay I am appalled to hear the submission that some Sessions Court take as many as 10 to 15 days on an average to dispose of applications under Sections 438/439, Cr. P.C. The system must hang its head down in shame if that submission were factually correct. Liberty of an individual is given paramount importance under the system of laws in which we function. If Courts of Session do not imbibe the sublime respect for liberty which the system mandates, it would be a very unfortunate state of affairs. If such a practice exists it must certainly be discontinued forthwith. Every application for bail, whichever be the Court, must ideally be disposed of on the same date as its filing. But sometimes to comply with the requirement of giving notice and getting instructions, it may be necessary to deviate from that ideal rule. But even then there can be no justification for a bail application remaining without disposal beyond a period of three working days. That must be the outer limit whatever be the hierarchy of the Court. Similarly it is submitted that it takes a long period of time to get copy applications complied with. I am shocked to hear submissions on this sad state of affairs also, Order in every bail application must be given to the party/counsel by the Court on the date on which such orders are pronounced. It must be the duty of the system to ensure this. It would be unreasonable to deny the party the advantage of a copy on the date of the order. Lip service to the cause of liberty will not suffice. A person is entitled to know immediately why his application for bail is dismissed. It must be the duty of the system to ensure this. It would be unreasonable to deny the party the advantage of a copy on the date of the order. Lip service to the cause of liberty will not suffice. A person is entitled to know immediately why his application for bail is dismissed. He is entitled thereafter to seek his relief before Superior Courts. Fetters cannot be placed on such rights by the unreasonable delay in furnishing copies. The law has already accepted this obligation to furnish copies on the date of pronouncement of the order. Order XX, Rule 6-B, C.P.C. and Section 363(1), Cr. RC. recognise and accept this requirement. If that be so I can find no reason why the principle should not be followed in the matter of furnishing copies of orders in bail/anticipatory bail applications also. It is submitted that separate applications are insisted for copies. This is totally unnecessary. It is common knowledge that any person who makes an application before Court would be interested in getting copy of the order passed on such application. The Court-fee collected must definitely and certainly include or deemed to include the requisite expenses for furnishing copy also. If necessary court-fees may have to be increased. But certainly it is puerile to insist on a separate application for a copy of the order from a party. At any rate here it must certainly be insisted that copies of orders in bail and anticipatory bail applications must be furnished free of cost to the party - simultaneously with the pronouncement of the orders. It is submitted that at the Sessions Court the Prosecutors do not have as much and efficient assistance as is available to the Law Officers of the High Court. In the Magistrate's Court also, such assistance is not available. In these circumstances it is submitted that unnecessary and avoidable delay would unfortunately occur if the claimants have to approach the Sessions Court for the relief under Sections 438 and 439. Cr. P.C. This again should not occur and should hot in any way contribute to the delay in disposal of applications under Sections 438 and 439. It is the responsibility of the system to make sure that such delay is avoided. Cr. P.C. This again should not occur and should hot in any way contribute to the delay in disposal of applications under Sections 438 and 439. It is the responsibility of the system to make sure that such delay is avoided. Appropriate safeguards can be insisted to avoid such delay in the disposal of bail/anticipatory bail applications and the furnishing of copies and in these circumstances the delay aspect cannot stand against the acceptance of such a salutary self-imposed procedural rule of restriction. It is submitted that there is no practice available in the High Court of Kerala. All the relevant precedents were considering only the advisability of continuing with an existing practice. A new practice may not be introduced by this Court by accepting such a rule, it is urged. It is true that such a rigid rule has not been insisted by this Court. But that again cannot persuade me to hold that it is not necessary to adhere to such a salutary procedural rule of self-imposed restriction if the same is found to be proper, legal and advantageous. That no rules under the Cr. P.C., the High Court Act and Rules impose such a restriction is not at all relevant. If such a rule of restriction can be imposed it is in exercise of the wide discretion available to the Court under Sections 438 and 439. When the High Court has powers to entertain applications under Sections 438 and 439 and exercise their discretion, the power or the jurisdiction to impose such a salutary rule is inherent in such powers itself. It is not necessary to trace such power outside such discretion or under the relevant rules. I do not find merit in the submission that the question must be referred to a Division Bench for its decision. The decision reported in Babu Premarajan v. Supdt. of Police, (2000) 3 Ker LT 177 : (AIR 2000 Ker 417) does not at all mandate that a single Judge who has powers under the relevant provisions of the Kerala High Court Act must refer the matter to a Division Bench for decision even if the question raised be one which is important, very important or one of public importance. I do not find any reason therefore to adjourn the matter for hearing by a Division Bench. I do not find any reason therefore to adjourn the matter for hearing by a Division Bench. Certainly if necessary the matter will have to be considered by a Division Bench/Larger Bench later. I now come back to the precedents cited at the bar. Two rulings of the Full Bench of this Court have first been cited. The earlier one reported in S. Narayan v. Kannamma Bhargavi, 1968 Ker LT 495 (FB) : 1969 Cri LJ 611 : (AIR 1969 Ker 126) does not at all support the contention that such self-imposed restriction cannot be made. In fact the said decision stems from the fact that the revisional powers available under the former Criminal Procedure Code to the Court of Session and the High Court in the matter of revision are not really concurrent - joint and equal in authority. The operative portion of the said decision clearly shows that in respect of matters where concurrent jurisdiction is available such a rule can be imposed. I extract below the relevant operative portion. ........ "We are of the view that it would be improper to compel a party having a strong case in his favour under S. 439 of the Code, to approach first the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate. He should not be compelled to do so except in cases where the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate is capable of passing effective orders, as in a case of discharge or dismissal of complaint. In all other revisional matters the aggrieved party may approach this Court direct, if so inclined. ......." The next Full Bench ruling reported in K. Sivan Pillai v. Rajamohan, 1978 Ker LT 223 : 1978 Cri LJ 743 : (AIR 1978 Ker 131) (FB) was rendered taking into account Section 399(3), Cr. P.C. which mandates that though both Courts are vested with concurrent jurisdiction one cannot exercise such jurisdiction if the other has already exercised such jurisdiction. The Court had in the said decision certainly accepted the rule of salutary practice requiring the party to resort to the lower forum before moving the higher one, so long as the two flora are available for resort. In the instant case, it is by now trite, that the petitioner/accused will be at liberty to move the High Court even after he has unsuccessfully sought relief from the Court of Session. In the instant case, it is by now trite, that the petitioner/accused will be at liberty to move the High Court even after he has unsuccessfully sought relief from the Court of Session. The reason which prompted the Full Bench to hold that such a rule of restriction need not be imposed in the matter of revisions after the 1973 amendment, is therefore not available in this case. In the decision reported in M. Zacharia v. Sate of Kerala, 1974 Ker LT 42 : (1974 Cri LJ 1198), a Division Bench of this Court has certainly accepted the principle that in respect of bail applications 'frog leaping' cannot be permitted and the party is obliged to move the Magistrate/Sessions Court before coming to the High Court. Of course the fact scenario was slightly different as the petitioner in that case had chosen to surrender before the High Court even before appearing before the Magistrate/Court of Session. But that distinction in facts is not very crucial while considering the dictum laid down. It is very clearly held in the said decision that a petitioner/claimant cannot be allowed "to frog leap the Magistrate and Sessions Judge and make a direct approach to the High Court for bail". The decision in 1974 Ker LT 42 still holds the field and this Court is bound by the same. Reference has been made to decisions rendered by other Courts. Though the counsel were specifically requested to research, no other binding precedent of the Supreme Court or this Court (other than 1974 Ker LT 42) having a direct bearing on the question has been traced. There is conflict of views among other High Courts. The Rajasthan High Court in Hajialisher v. State of Rajasthan, 1976 Cri LJ 1658, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Rajpal Singh v. State of Haryana, 1978 Cri LJ 609, the Bombay High Court in Jagannath v. State of Maharashtra, 1981 Cri LJ 1808, Karnataka High Court in 1985 Cri LJ 214 : Iyya v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 Kant LJ 8 have held that such a rule of self-imposed restriction is perfectly justified while exercising the discretion under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. The contra view has been taken by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Onkar Nath v. State, 1976 Cri LJ 1142. I have gone through the said decision in detail. P.C. The contra view has been taken by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Onkar Nath v. State, 1976 Cri LJ 1142. I have gone through the said decision in detail. All that the Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad disapproved was a rigid imposition of the rule. A reading of the entire decision clearly shows that their Lordships did approve of the salutary rule of procedure obliging the Sessions Court having concurrent jurisdiction considering the exercise of discretion first before the High Court is called upon to exercise such jurisdiction. My attention has also been drawn to a detailed judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Y. Chandrasekhara Rao v. Y. V. Kamala Kumari, 1993 Cri LJ 3508 as also the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court (Full Bench) reported in Mohanlal V. Prem Chand, AIR 1980 Him Pra 36. These also according to me do not at all lay down that such a self-imposed restriction should not be placed in the matter of exercise of discretion u/Ss. 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. The Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering the practice of the registry refusing to send up petitions to the Bench. That of course is improper. No one can perhaps dispute the fact that the High Court retains its jurisdiction to entertain an application under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. That discretion cannot certainly be surrendered to the Registry. It has to be exercised by the Court. 1993 Cri LJ 3508 (Andh Pra) and AIR 1980 Him Pra 36 can only be understood to mean that the Judges are obliged to consider request for grant of anticipatory bail even when the High Court is moved without and before moving the Court of Session. That is far from saying that ordinarily and unless exceptional reasons exist the High Court would exercise such discretion if and only after the Sessions Court having concurrent jurisdiction is moved earlier. At any rate I prefer to accept the former view. After an anxious consideration of all the relevant precedents and statutory provisions I am of opinion that the following conclusions emerge: - i. There is absolutely no want of jurisdictional competence for the High Court to consider and exercise powers in an application for bail/anticipatory bail under Section 438/439, Cr. P.C. at the first instance. After an anxious consideration of all the relevant precedents and statutory provisions I am of opinion that the following conclusions emerge: - i. There is absolutely no want of jurisdictional competence for the High Court to consider and exercise powers in an application for bail/anticipatory bail under Section 438/439, Cr. P.C. at the first instance. It can exercise such jurisdiction even if the Sessions Court were not called upon earlier to exercise such jurisdiction. ii. Following the salutary procedural self-imposed rule of restriction, a High Court shall not ordinarily (and except under exceptional circumstances) exercise its powers under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. without and before the Sessions Court having concurrent jurisdiction is moved for identical relief. iii. Needless to say the High Court must be very careful and circumspect in identifying such exceptional cases. Myriad are the facts scenarios and the real life situations possible. The High Court should not refuse to invoke its powers/discretion under Sections 438 and 439 merely because the Court of Session has not been moved if circumstances warrant the exercise of such powers in the interests of justice and in the interests of the sacrosanct right to liberty of the individual. Without intending to be exhaustive I may mention that the need to settle a question of law of general public importance, the need to protect the interests of an accused apprehending arrest in more than one Sessions Division within a State, the incompetence of the Sessions Court to afford adequate and effective relief in a given case for whatever reason, shall certainly bring the case within the class of exceptional cases where this salutary rule will not apply. Other exceptional circumstances if any which may be there, do not occur to me now. Having thus attempted to ascertain the law I shall consider the facts of these cases specifically. I do not find any special or sufficient reasons in the facts and circumstances revealed in Cri. M.C. 3265 and 3391 of 2003 which can bring the cases within the category of exceptional cases where the salutary Rule should not apply in the interest of justice. When requested pointedly to bring to my notice exceptional reasons if any the counsel do not strain to contend that such exceptional reasons exist. It is in these circumstances not necessary to advert to the facts in greater detail in this common order. When requested pointedly to bring to my notice exceptional reasons if any the counsel do not strain to contend that such exceptional reasons exist. It is in these circumstances not necessary to advert to the facts in greater detail in this common order. I place on record my appreciation for the assistance rendered to this Court by various counsel including the counsel appearing for the petitioners in these petitions and the learned Public Prosecutor to resolve the controversy. In the result these petitions are dismissed and the following directions are issued :- i. Applications under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. P.C. shall hereafter be numbered by the Registry of this Court only when it is accompanied by the copy of the order of the Sessions Court (or memo/petition as indicated in clause (ii) below). ii. If, it is not accompanied by copy of the order, such applications must be accompanied by a petition/memo explaining why copy is not produced or why the Sessions Court had not been moved earlier. The application shall be numbered by the Registry only after the Court in its discretion by order passed in such memo/petition directs such reception/numbering. iii. Every application for bail/anticipatory bail must be disposed of by the respective subordinate Courts in the State on the date of receipt of the application itself ideally if moved with sufficient prior notice to the Prosecutor. At any rate all Courts including the Sessions Courts shall scrupulously ensure that bail applications are disposed of within the outer limit of three working days of their filing without fail. iv. The Director General of Police shall ensure that a competent Police Officer is posted in every District to assist the District Public Prosecutor to liaison between the police and the Prosecutor and to ensure that relevant records and instructions are given to the Prosecutor promptly. Similarly every police station shall also depute a competent official to assist the Public Prosecutor in charge at the Court having local jurisdiction. v. Copies of orders in every bail application (whether regular or anticipatory) shall be furnished to the accused/counsel free of cost and acknowledgment obtained from the respective counsel/accused (one copy in each application irrespective of the number of petitioners) immediately after pronouncement of orders on the same day as mandated in the case of judgments in Section 363(1). Cr. v. Copies of orders in every bail application (whether regular or anticipatory) shall be furnished to the accused/counsel free of cost and acknowledgment obtained from the respective counsel/accused (one copy in each application irrespective of the number of petitioners) immediately after pronouncement of orders on the same day as mandated in the case of judgments in Section 363(1). Cr. P.C. It shall be the duty of the Presiding Officer of the Court to ensure this. The Registry shall ensure that the directions above are complied with and communicated to all the criminal Courts and the officers concerned. Order accordingly.