L. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. has been filed for quashing the proceeding in G. R. Case No. 393 of 2001 pending in the Court of learned S. D. J. M. , Jeypore. ( 2 ) FROM the record it appears that the aforesaid G. R. case has been registered for commission of offence under Sections 489 (B)/489 (C)/34 of the Penal Code against the petitioner and some other accused persons. The case was registered on the basis of an F. I. R. lodged by one Santanu Kumar Sahoo on 12-7-2001 before the O. I. C. , Town Police Station, Jeypore. Allegations made in the F. I. R. is that on 12-7-2001 at about 1. 30 p. m. when the informant arrived at his petrol pump one Tankadhar Bisoi who works there showed him a five hundred note and requested him whether the same is genuine or fake note. On being questioned Tankadhar Bisoi informed that he got the note from two boys standing at a distance. Thinking the note to be genuine the informant asked the boys as to where from they got the note and the boys disclosed the name of one Milan and ran away towards Christian Petta. Thereafter, Milan and other two boys who disclosed the name of Milan were caught-hold and on being asked the boys stated that they were given the note by one Yusuf Jahan (Babloo) who is an accused in the case. The boys also stated that the said accused Yusuf Jahan had requested them to change the note in the petrol pump. On the basis of such allegations made in the F. I. R. investigation was taken up and charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons including the present petitioner for commission of offences as stated above. It also appears from the order-sheet that accused persons namely Yusuf John alias Bablu and Seru alias Lalaram alias Gulab Singh had been taken to custody and another accused Johnright Naik alias Basu was on bail. Rest of the accused persons have not been apprehended including the petitioner. It also appears from the order-sheet that accused persons namely Yusuf John alias Bablu and Seru alias Lalaram alias Gulab Singh had been taken to custody and another accused Johnright Naik alias Basu was on bail. Rest of the accused persons have not been apprehended including the petitioner. Learned S. D. J. M. , Jeypore by order dated 18-12-2001 issued N. B. W. against the petitioner and other absconding accused persons subsequently by order dated 22-12-2001 split up the case and committed the same to the Court of Session so far as other accused persons who were either in custody or on bail are concerned. ( 3 ) SHRI Sarangi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner prayed for quashing the proceeding so far as the present petitioner is concerned solely on the ground that except the statement of co-accused there is absolutely no other material on record to implicate the petitioner in commission of offence. According to Sri Sarangi, there being no legal evidence available against the petitioner till today the Investigating Officer neither could have submitted charge-sheet nor the learned Magistrate could have taken cognizance of offence and issued N. B. W. Learned Addl. Standing Counsel, on the other hand, submitted that in a case of such nature reliance has to be placed on the statement of co-accused as statement of independent witnesses are rarely available. He also submitted that the petitioner should face trial and if no legal evidence is available against him, he may be acquitted in the trial Court and this Court should not interfere at this stage in exercise of powers under Section 482, Cr. P. C. and quash the proceeding. ( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to refer to a decision of the Apex Court with regard to powers of this Court that can be exercised under Section 482, Cr. P. C. Inherent power of High Court was available in the old Code of Criminal Procedure in Section 561-A. In the case of R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 , while considering inherent powers of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Cr. P. C. Inherent power of High Court was available in the old Code of Criminal Procedure in Section 561-A. In the case of R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 , while considering inherent powers of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Cr. P. C. , 1898 the Apex Court observed as follows (Para 6):"the inherent power of High Court under Section 561-A, Criminal P. C. cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to cure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. Some of the categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised are: (i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. (iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. "the aforesaid Apex Court decision has been followed by this Court in the case of Satrughana Dalabehera v. State of Orissa, reported in (1983) 56 Cut LT 405. While considering an application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. this Court also followed the Apex Court decision in the case of Satyanarayan Nayak v. State of Orissa, reported in (1988) 1 OCR 545. From the aforesaid three decisions, it is clear that where the allegations made against accused persons do not constitute an offence alleged, or there is evidence which is not legally acceptable or evidence collected clearly or manifestly fail to prove the offence alleged, the Court would interfere in exercise of powers under Sec. 482, Cr. P. C. Undisputedly, the only evidence available against the petitioner is the statement of co-accused. In order to appreciate what is the value of the statement of co-accused, and whether such material could be taken into consideration for taking cognizance reference may be made to a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, reported in AIR 1949 PC 257. In order to appreciate what is the value of the statement of co-accused, and whether such material could be taken into consideration for taking cognizance reference may be made to a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, reported in AIR 1949 PC 257. The Privy Council in the aforesaid case observed as follows :"whilst it is not illegal to act upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, it is a rule of prudence so universally followed as to amount almost to a rule of law that it is unsafe to act upon the evidence of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material respects so as to implicate the accused; and further the evidence of one accomplice cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of another accomplice. Courts should be slow to depart from the rule of prudence, based on long experience, which requires some independent evidence implicating the particular accused. The danger of acting upon accomplice evidence is not merely that the accomplice is on his own admission a man of bad character who took part in the offence and afterwards to save himself betrayed his former associates, and who has placed himself in a position in which he can hardly fail to have a strong bias in favour of the prosecutions; the real danger is that he is telling a story which is its general outline is true, and it is easy for him to work into the story matter which is untrue. The real safeguard against the risk of condemning the innocent with the guilty lies in insisting upon independent evidence which in some measure implicates each accused. " ( 5 ) ON bare perusal of the observations of the Privy Council quoted above, clearly indicate that acting upon uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is not illegal but as rule of prudence unless it corroborate in material respects. After conclusion of trial if it is found material available against a particular accused is the statement of an accomplice only, the Court should be slow to depart from the rule of prudence which is based on long experience and should require corroboration from independent sources. But at the stage of taking cognizance what the Court is required to look into is existence of prima facie case. But at the stage of taking cognizance what the Court is required to look into is existence of prima facie case. Court is not required to see whether on the basis of materials available before it at the time of taking cognizance a conviction will lie or not. I am, therefore, of the view that where an accomplice implicates himself as well as another accused same can be taken into consideration as prima facie material so far as other accused is concerned. As submitted by the learned Addl. Counsel in this case, accomplice is not only admitted his involvement in commission of offence but also has implicated the present petitioner which formed the basis of submission of charge-sheet. Since the learned Magistrate took this material into consideration while taking cognizance I do not think any illegality has been committed by him at this stage. ( 6 ) IN view of the observations made above, I do not find any merit in this application and the same stands dismissed. Application dismissed.