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2003 DIGILAW 322 (KAR)

KALYANAPPA SANGANABASAPPA BAGEWADI v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

2003-04-01

M.F.SALDANHA, M.S.RAJENDRA PRASAD

body2003
M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) WE have heard the learned Counsels representing the appellants, the counsels representing the contesting respondents and the learned government Advocate for respondents 1 and 2 on merits. ( 2 ) THIS litigation has already gone through an earlier remand and the entire dispute virtually narrows down to one important aspect which the learned Single Judge has taken cognisance of. The appellant though he is not the eldest member of the family and though he is also not designated as the kartha, was the sole applicant when the Form 7 was filed in respect of an area of 12 acres 3 guntas. Subsequently, the contesting respondents who are his brothers also filed Form 7 contending that they are also entitled to proportionate grant of occupancy rights. On 13-10-1981, the Tribunal recorded the finding that the brothers were entitled to joint occupancy rights, and that order was challenged upto the High uourt by the present appellant. We need to record here that it is the case of the appellant that the tenancy vests individually and personally in him, that he has been in occupation and cultivation for over 40 years and the further contention that is raised is that there is secondary evidence to indicate that at various points of time down the years various important functions were undertaken individually by him. The contention raised was that the Tribunal was in error in having granted occupancy rights and the High Court on an earlier occasion set aside the order of the Tribunal and ordered a de novo enquiry. On the second occasion, the Tribunal has passed a detailed speaking order and has on this occasion recorded a finding that the appellant who was the original applicant would be entitled to occupancy rights in respect of an area of 7 acres 3 guntas and that the balance 5 acres has been awarded to the respondents. It is against this order that the appellant has filed a writ petition which has been disposed off by the learned Single Judge through a short order. The learned Single Judge was in total agreement with the findings of the Tribunal and has virtually recorded the fact that since there was on record a partition deed of the year 1959 between the brothers that the apportionment of the rights was justified and that no interference is called for. The learned Single Judge was in total agreement with the findings of the Tribunal and has virtually recorded the fact that since there was on record a partition deed of the year 1959 between the brothers that the apportionment of the rights was justified and that no interference is called for. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed. ( 3 ) THE principal submission canvassed by the appellants' learned advocates is that the Tribunal has totally misconstrued the High Court order insofar as what the Tribunal has done is to have done a synthesis of the record, that the Tribunal has ultimately placed very strong reliance on the existence of the partition deed and has brushed aside all the remaining material and has upheld the theory of apportionment. Mr. Patil's submission is that when the High Court ordered a de novo inquiry it presupposes the fact that the High Court was not satisfied with the manner in which the earlier inquiry was held or with the conclusions that were arrived at. To that extent, the learned Counsel is right because the High Court had not only on the earlier occasion remanded the case for reconsideration but had also directed a de novo inquiry, which meant that the Tribunal was required to apply its mind to the entire proceeding afresh. There is a slight difference of opinion between what has been submitted at the Bar by the appellant's learned Counsel and us with regard to the situation that would hold good in the light of such an order. Mr. Patil's submission is that when a de novo inquiry is directed, it really means that the Tribunal is required to start virtually from square one, that the Tribunal is required to build up an entirely new record and that the Tribunal is required to decide the case according to facts and the law on the basis of the material that has emerged on the second occasion. One of the reasons why this submission is advanced is because he has vehemently argued before us that pursuant to the High court orders that a de novo enquiry was held and fresh statements were recorded which position is undisputed and he is seriously aggrieved by fact that the Tribunal seems to have totally disregarded all this material. One of the reasons why this submission is advanced is because he has vehemently argued before us that pursuant to the High court orders that a de novo enquiry was held and fresh statements were recorded which position is undisputed and he is seriously aggrieved by fact that the Tribunal seems to have totally disregarded all this material. What we need to point out here is that when the High Court orders a de novo inquiry, undoubtedly the Tribunal is required to start afresh but having regard to the length of time that these proceedings take what one needs to guard against is, a situation whereby all that has happened earlier cannot be ignored. It is very true, as pointed out by Mr. Patil, that the material that subsequently emerges i. e. , documents/statements or for that matter even new evidence will certainly have to be taken into consideration but this does not mean to say that the earlier record is totally obliterated. There may be situations in which in the process of appreciation of evidence some material will have to be culled out, some will have to be disallowed and some will have to be relied upon but what we need to emphasise is that the Tribunal in these circumstances, will always have to follow the procedure of adopting a total approach. We have perused the Tribunal's order and we do find that the Tribunal must have specifically referred to certain particulars of the record. Mr. Patil's submission is that on the second occasion when the respondent's statement was recorded that in cross-examination there is an admission by him to the effect that he does not know what happened pursuant to the partition deed. Learned Counsel submits that this fully supports the submission canvassed at all stages on behalf of the appellant that this partition deed was never given effect to, that no physical partition by metes and bounds has taken place, that in effect therefore, that the partition deed ought not to have been looked at by the Tribunal. ( 4 ) AS far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, there is something else that we need to record, viz. , the fact that it has emerged that the respondents viz. , other brothers had instituted certain civil proceedings against the appellant for an injunctive relief. ( 4 ) AS far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, there is something else that we need to record, viz. , the fact that it has emerged that the respondents viz. , other brothers had instituted certain civil proceedings against the appellant for an injunctive relief. The entire cause of action proceeded on the footing that on the basis of the partition deed, shares have been carved out and that consequently, the appellant should be restrained from interfering with the possession of the other brothers. Mr. Patil has read to us and shown to us the findings recorded by the civil Court wherein the Civil Court has upheld the view that when the commissioner was appointed there was absolutely no evidence which emerged in support of the contention raised before the Civil Court that the respondent's shares had been carved out and that they were in possession thereof. Conversely, what he submits is that this supports the view that the document had never been given effect to and that it was the appellant who continued in occupation, cultivation and possession of the whole of the area of 12 acres 3 guntas, ( 5 ) WE have very carefully considered the implications of these submissions. What has happened before the Civil Court has come on record and it is certainly relevant but what we need to take note of is that at no stage of the proceedings has there been any finding to the effect that the document namely, the Partition Deed of 1959 was neither a family partition or for that matter that it is a document which will have to be totally disregarded. The contention raised was that this partition deed had not been given effect to. The legal implication of this submission would be that despite the document having been executed between the brothers that it had not been translated into practical reality insofar as the lands had not been physically sub-divided. In our considered view, this would not make any difference to the issue that this Court is required to agitate upon. We indicate the reasons for this. In our considered view, this would not make any difference to the issue that this Court is required to agitate upon. We indicate the reasons for this. ( 6 ) EVEN assuming everything that is pointed out on behalf of the appellant or the appellant's legal heirs is upheld, it would at the most indicate that it was the appellant who was effectively cultivating and managing the lands and it would also indicate, as the record amplifies, that it was his name that appeared in the revenue records. Had the records stopped there, there would have been absolutely no difficulty in upholding the argument, that his rights would have been confined to the appellant alone. ( 7 ) THE record of this case however indicates that the partition deed of 1959 is very much on record and that the appellant cannot and has not disputed its existence. One of the submissions canvassed on behalf of the appellant is that this document had not been referred to at any of the earlier stages of the litigation and Mr. Patil very strongly submitted that this document has been used as the main plank of defence only after the remand and it was therefore his submission that on the ground that it has been produced at a very belated stage the Tribunal ought to have totally disregarded it. Had the existence of the document or for that matter the validity of the document been questioned or had the contention been raised that this document has been fabricated at a later stage in order to support a false defence being taken up, then this Court will certainly have added credibility to the late production. In our considered view, that document has come on record after the remand in the course of the inquiry, the existence of the document has not been denied and once that position comes up the Tribunal was duty-bound to have taken cognisance of the document and given effect to it. That is precisely what the Tribunal has done in this case. That is precisely what the Tribunal has done in this case. We have been conscious of the fact that in numerous similar other situations it is customary for the tribunal to adopt a very technical approach, to go very strongly by the revenue records and if they stand either in the name of the head of the family or in the name of the family members who contest the litigation to the effect that the occupancy rights are granted but that they stand in the name of that person which then gives rise to civil litigation, that the parties are then driven to a civil forum for purposes of apportionment. It is for this reason that the High Court has pointed out from time to time that the correct procedure for the parties to follow is to place the material before the Tribunal to indicate and justify apportionment, then the tribunal must undertake the task of apportionment in order to obviate any further dispute or any unnecessary litigation. ( 8 ) WE have carefully perused the Tribunal's order and we do find that the Tribunal has given very valid and cogent reasons for the manner in which the apportionment has been done and we see no ground on which we can find fault with this reasoning. The learned Single Judge who was thereafter required to review the order has undoubtedly been in total agreement with the finding of the Tribunal which is why relying on the partition deed the challenge has been negatived. ( 9 ) SINCE the appeal has been preferred against that order and since the proceedings are hotly contested it was necessary for us once again to do a total review of the legal position. This would necessarily involve the mixed question of fact and law which is why we have heard the parties at considerable length, we have reviewed the record and in our considered view, once the existence of the partition deed is accepted the Tribunal was perfectly and fully justified in having acted upon it. Even with regard to the manner in which the apportionment has been done meets with our total approval. The order of the Tribunal and the order of the learned Single Judge confirming that order do not require interference. ( 10 ) THE appeal accordingly fails and stands dismissed. No order as to costs. --- *** --- .