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2003 DIGILAW 327 (KAR)

RAJESH. D. DARBAR v. NARASINGRAO

2003-04-01

K.RAMANNA, S.R.NAYAK

body2003
S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) ALL these three appeals preferred under section 72 (4) of the Bombay Trust Act, 1950 (for short the Act) are directed against the common Judgment and Order dated 12th November, 2003 passed in Civil Miscellaneous Nos. 60/2000, 61/2000 and 62/2000 on the file of the Court of the II Additional District Judge, Bijapur. ( 2 ) THE dispute relates to the elections claimed to have been conducted by two rival groups in the Vidya Vardhak Sangh, Bijapur, which is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. It is also a registered body under the provisions of the Act. ( 3 ) THE events leading to the filing of the present appeals be noted first and they are as follows:- Vidya Vardhak Sangh (hereinafter shortly referred to as the Society) was registered under the Act on 13. 09. 1952 vide Inq. No. 421/1952. In the year 1993, there were 145 life members and they elected the members of the Managing Committee consisting of 15 members. Sri. B. V. Darbar was the elected President, whereas Sri N. K. Kulkarni was elected as the Secretary. The term of the Committee was 3 years and that term had to end on 31. 10. 1996. ( 4 ) THE Society has framed Bye-laws called Memorandum of Association, Rules and Regulations. As per the Bye-laws, the managing committee of the society shall consist of not less than 10 members and not more than 15 members and the members are to be elected at every third Annual General Body Meeting except the teacher representative and shall hold office for three years or until the holding of the next annual General Body Meeting after the completion of its three years term. The society has been running several educational institutions in Bijapur, namely, (1) V. B. Durbar Preuniversity College (2) D. N. Durbar Girls School, (3) V. V. Sangh (English and Kannada Primary School and (4) V. V. Sangh Degree College. ( 5 ) THE present dispute concerns the validity of election of the managing committee members at the special general body meeting held on 6th October 1996. The process of elections was commenced by issuance of a meeting notice dated 07. 09. 1996 to the members of the society which has been marked as Exhibit P1 before the Assistant Charity Commissioner (ACC ). The process of elections was commenced by issuance of a meeting notice dated 07. 09. 1996 to the members of the society which has been marked as Exhibit P1 before the Assistant Charity Commissioner (ACC ). The Meeting Notice reads as follows: meeting NOTICE in view of prevailing situation in sanghas management committee, a constitutional deed lock has been arisen in smooth functioning of management committee. Hence, considering the interest of sangha. I hereby call the Special General Body Meeting of the members of Vidya Vardhak Sangh, under the power vested in me, under Part-IIID (iii) of the Memorandum of Association Rules and Regulations of Vidya Vardhak Sangh, on Sunday, 6th October, 1996 at 3. 00 P. M. at V. B. Darbar premises to discuss and consider the following agenda, viz. 1. To dissolve the present management committee and to elect new management committee for the period 1996-97 to 1999- 2000. 2. Any other matter with the permission of the chair. You are requested to attend the meeting. Bijapur, Sd/-7. 9. 1996 B. V. Darbar president v. V. Singh, Bijapur ( 6 ) ON 6. 10. 1996, according to the Appellants herein, 77 persons were present; out of them, 71 members have signed the attendance register; 6 members including Sri. N. K. Kulkarni, the first respondent herein, had not signed the attendance register marked as Exhibit P. 14 before the ACC. During the course of the meeting, the members of the then managing committee tendered their resignations and thereafter according to Bye-laws, the office bearers were elected unanimously. After the election, the change was submitted by the elected members to the ACC as required under Section 22 of the Act. This change report was numbered as Enquiry. No. 859/1996. ( 7 ) HOWEVER, according to the respondents herein, 80 members were present in the meeting, which included 38 members claimed to have been admitted as members of the Society on 28. 08. 1996; 13 managing committee members resigned; the President Sri. B. V. Darbar and Joint Secretary Sri. Galagali did not resign; among 13 managing committee members who resigned, 7 belonged to respondents group and 6 belonged to appellants group. At that stage, a serious dispute arose between the two groups with regard to the necessity of conducting election by convening a special General Body Meeting on 06. 10. 1996. A life member posed a question to the President, Mr. At that stage, a serious dispute arose between the two groups with regard to the necessity of conducting election by convening a special General Body Meeting on 06. 10. 1996. A life member posed a question to the President, Mr. B. V. Darbar as to why there was dead lock in the administration of the Society and why the meeting was called. The President was enable to give any proper answer. That led to a commotion and the President Mr. B. V. Darbar seeing this commotion and galata, took some books and went away. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to the respondents, after the President went away, Sri P. B. Kulkarni presided over the Meeting and elections were conducted and M/s. (1) N. K. Kulkarni (2) G. K. Galagali (3) R. B. Patil (4) N. P. Jagirdar (5) Satish Bagalkotkar (6) Krishna Kulkarni (7) Bapugouda Patil (8) V. M. Bhede (9) Dr. Dhanakshara (10) R. B. Muthalik Desai (11) K. R. Arjunagi (12) V. B. Kulkarni (13) P. B. Kulkarni and (14) R. P. Chikkalki were elected as members of the Managing Committee. The respondents Group submitted a change report with regard to the election of 14 members of the Managing Committee on 02. 12. 1996 to the ACC and that report was numbered as Enquiry No. 1005/96. ( 9 ) THE above claim of two respondents group is denied by the appellants. According to the appellants, in the General Body meeting dated 06. 10. 1996, Sri Rajesh D Darbar, the first appellant was elected as the President of the Society and one Sri Raju Naik was elected as the Secretary. Sri Raju Naik resigned to the office thereafter. Consequent upon the resignation of Sri Raju Naik, Sri Prakash Udupikar was co-opted as the Secretary-cum-Treasurer; one Sri Pankaj Darbar was co-opted as the managing Committee member. In that behalf also a change report was submitted to the ACC which was numbered as Enquiry No. 144/1997. ( 10 ) ALL the three cases, Viz. , Enquiry Nos. 859/96, 1005/96 and 144/97 were clubbed together by the ACC on 11. 02. 1997. Two applications were filed, one by appellants group and another by the respondents group, for permission to operate Bank accounts of the Society. Of these two applications, ACC on 29. 05. ( 10 ) ALL the three cases, Viz. , Enquiry Nos. 859/96, 1005/96 and 144/97 were clubbed together by the ACC on 11. 02. 1997. Two applications were filed, one by appellants group and another by the respondents group, for permission to operate Bank accounts of the Society. Of these two applications, ACC on 29. 05. 1997 passed an order appointing Sri S. S. Udupi to operate Bank accounts of the Society during the pendency of the proceeding before the ACC. Against the said interim order of the ACC dated 29. 05. 1997, the respondents group filed W. P. No. 14102 of 1997 and the same was dismissed by this Court on 05. 06. 1997. Against the order of the learned Single Judge, Writ Appeal No. 3578 of 1997 was preferred and that Writ Appeal was disposed of by the Division Bench reserving liberty to the respondents group to prefer revision to the Charity Commissioner. The operative portion of the order of the Division Bench reads: writ Petition No. 14102/97 is accordingly dismissed with the liberty as prayed for. It is, however, ordered that the observations made by the learned Single Judge would not affect the rights of any of the parties. As the writ petition has been dismissed as withdrawn, the appeal has become infructuous and it is accordingly dismissed. ( 11 ) AT the time of hearing, it was brought to our notice that the respondents group preferred revision petition Nos. 19 and 29 of 1997 before the Charity Commissioner and the same were dismissed by the Charity Commissioner and that order was allowed to become final. ( 12 ) IN the course of enquiry before the ACC, three witnesses were examined as P. W.-1 to 3 on behalf of the appellants and 69 documents were marked as Ex. P1 to P69. On behalf of the respondents, as many as 71 witnesses were examined as D. W.-1 to D. W.-71 and 37 documents were marked as Ex. D1 to D37. The ACC disposed of the proceedings by his order dated 28. 08. 1999, rejecting the report of the respondents and accepting the change reports of the appellants. ( 13 ) THE respondents being aggrieved by the order of the ACC dated 28. 08. 1999, preferred three appeals under Section 70 (1) of the Act, being appeal Nos. 11, 12 and 13 of 1999 before the Charity Commissioner. 08. 1999, rejecting the report of the respondents and accepting the change reports of the appellants. ( 13 ) THE respondents being aggrieved by the order of the ACC dated 28. 08. 1999, preferred three appeals under Section 70 (1) of the Act, being appeal Nos. 11, 12 and 13 of 1999 before the Charity Commissioner. The Charity Commissioner after hearing on merits allowed the appeals of the respondents and rejected enquiry report No. 859/96 and enquiry report No. 144/97, and accepted enquiry report No. 1005/96. The appellants herein feeling aggrieved by the order of the Charity Commissioner preferred three applications in M. A. Nos. 60 of 2000, 61 of 2000 and 62 of 2000 before the II Additional District Court, Bijapur. In the above Miscellaneous Applications, the Appellants herein filed an Interim Application seeking for the stay of the order of the Charity Commissioner. . The learned II Additional District Judge, overlooking the Caveat filed by the respondents herein, passed an order on 14. 11. 2002 granting stay. Against the said Interim Order, the respondents filed C. R. P. No. 525 of 2001 in this Court and this Court on 29. 03. 2001 allowed the C. R. P and set aside the order of the learned II Additional District Judge dated 14. 11. 2000 and directed him to rehear the Interlocutory Application filed by the Appellants group. It is stated that the above Interlocutory Application was not pressed by the Appellants. Ultimately, the learned II Additional District Judge dismissed M. A. Nos. 60, 61 and 62 of 2000 by Common Order dated 12. 11. 2002 and upheld the orders of the Charity Commissioner. After the dismissal of the applications, the Appellants herein filed stay applications on 14. 11. 2002 before the learned II Additional District Judge and the same were rejected. In the meanwhile, according to the Appellants, on 23. 01. 2000, another General Body Meeting was held and office bearers of the Managing Committee of the society were elected and they filed a change report and the same is registered as Enquiry No. 193 of 2000 before the ACC and the ACC by his Order dated 29. 06. 2000 accepted the change report. According to the respondents, the above change report in Enquiry No. 193 of 2000 was accepted by ACC without notice to them. 06. 2000 accepted the change report. According to the respondents, the above change report in Enquiry No. 193 of 2000 was accepted by ACC without notice to them. It is stated that the respondents have preferred Revision No. 2 of 2000 before the Charity Commissioner against the order of the ACC dated 23. 01. 2000 and the same is pending. ( 14 ) IN the meanwhile, the Appellants being aggrieved by the common order passed by the learned II Additional District Judge dated 12. 11. 2002 in M. A. Nos. 60, 61 and 62 of 2000, have preferred these three Miscellaneous First Appeals Under Section 72 (4) of the Act. ( 15 ) WE have heard Sri. T. N. Raghupathy, learned Counsel for the Appellants and M/s. G. S. Visweshwara and Sri. S. S. Ramdas, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. ( 16 ) SRI. T. N. Raghupathy, at the outset, contended that since term of the earlier Managing Committee elected on 06. 10. 1996 had already come to an end when the appeals filed by the respondents were pending before the Charity Commissioner, the learned District Judge ought to have dismissed miscellaneous applications filed by the respondents herein as infructuous. Sri. T. N. Raghupathy also contended that, since the term of managing committee had come to an end even before the appeals were disposed of by the Charity Commissioner, the question of the respondents group taking over the management of the society did not arise and, therefore, the learned District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in directing that the respondents group being legally elected body, can administer the properties of the society. Sri T. N. Raghupathy in support of his contention that the questions raised in the appeals before the Charity Commissioner have become academic, placed reliance on an unreported judgment of this Court dated 21. 04. 1994 in M. F. A. No. 522/1994 and the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of JAGAT-NARAYANSINGH SWARUPSINGH CHITHERS AND OTHERS V. SWARUP-SING EDUCATION SOCIETY AND ANOTHER (1980 Maharastra Law Journal 372 ). Sri. 04. 1994 in M. F. A. No. 522/1994 and the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of JAGAT-NARAYANSINGH SWARUPSINGH CHITHERS AND OTHERS V. SWARUP-SING EDUCATION SOCIETY AND ANOTHER (1980 Maharastra Law Journal 372 ). Sri. T. N. Raghupathy, secondly, contended that the Charity Commissioner is not right in holding that the ACC exceeded his jurisdiction U/s. 22 of the Act in deciding on the legality of admission of 38 persons who claim to have been admitted by the respondents group and who participated in the special General Body Meeting held on 06. 10. 1996. Sri. T. N. Raghupathy, assailing the findings recorded by the Charity Commissioner and affirmed by the learned District Judge, would maintain that the findings are perverse, whereas the finding recorded by the ACC that admission of 38 persons as members of the society is irregular and illegal is supported by the evidence on record. ( 17 ) SRI. G. S. Vishveshwara, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents group, would maintain that the finding recorded by the ACC was based on an erroneous assumption that 38 persons were admitted as members of the Society on. 06. 10. 1996. Learned Senior Counsel would point out that, in fact, 38 persons were admitted as life members of the society vide resolution of the managing committee dated 28. 08. 1996. Sri. G. S. Visveshwara also contended that special General Body Meeting convened on 06. 10. 1996 cannot be equated to a General Body Meeting of the Society under the bye-laws and therefore, the action taken by the Appellants group or respondents group in electing office bearers of the Committee of the Management of the Society was totally irregular, null and void and it does not exist in the eye of law. Sri. G. S. Visveshwara would contend that the bone of contention of the Appellants is that 38 life members were not legally admitted to the society and if this contention is found to be untenable they have no case to succeed in these appeals. Meeting the contention of Sri. T. N. Raghupathy that the issue brought before the Court has become academic, Sri. G. S. Visveshwara would maintain that even assuming that the Appellants group conducted another General Body Meeting on 23. 01. 2000 and subsequently on 25. 10. Meeting the contention of Sri. T. N. Raghupathy that the issue brought before the Court has become academic, Sri. G. S. Visveshwara would maintain that even assuming that the Appellants group conducted another General Body Meeting on 23. 01. 2000 and subsequently on 25. 10. 2002 and elected office bearers of the Managing Committee of the society, those elections were subject to the final result of these appeals and, therefore, it cannot be said that issue raised by the respondents group before the Charity Commissioner became academic. In support of his submission, Sri. G. S. Visveshwara placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of BEG RAJ SINGH Vs. STATE OF U. P. AND OTHERS ( (2003) 1 SCC 726 ). Sri. G. S. Visveshwara further contended that the findings recorded by the Charity Commissioner are well founded and justified and therefore, no exception can be taken to the order of the Charity Commissioner. ( 18 ) SRI. S. S. Ramdas, learned Senior Counsel while supplementing the arguments of Sri. G. S. Visveshwara contended that, if according to the Appellants, admission of 38 members as life members, was irregular and in violation of the bye-laws, the Appellants ought to have appealed to the General Body as provided under the bye-laws and having failed to do so, the appellants could not be permitted to raise the question of legality of admission of those members as life members join the present proceedings. Both Sri. G. S. Visveshwara and Sri. S. S. Ramdas conclude their submissions by suggesting that in the event of the Court finding any flaw, factual or legal in the order of the Charity Commissioner and or in order of the learned District Judge, the Court may give a quietus to the dispute between the warring parties by directing fresh election to elect the office bearers of the Managing Committee of the society. The learned Counsel would point out that such a power is available to this Court Under Section 72 (4) of the Act. In that regard, learned Counsel would cite the judgement of the Supreme Court in S. L. P (Civil) No. 8112 of 84 and 8602 of 94 in the case of Bijapur Liberal Dist. Education Association Vs. B. B. Patil and others dated 15. 05. 1994. ( 19 ) SRI. In that regard, learned Counsel would cite the judgement of the Supreme Court in S. L. P (Civil) No. 8112 of 84 and 8602 of 94 in the case of Bijapur Liberal Dist. Education Association Vs. B. B. Patil and others dated 15. 05. 1994. ( 19 ) SRI. T. N. RAGHUPATHY, by way of reply, would point out that the new case pleaded by the respondents group that on 28. 08. 1996 itself 38 persons were inducted as life members to the society, was not their case before the ACC; that plea was taken for the first time in the appeals before the Charity Commissioner by filing an application to produce additional evidence, but the respondent did not press that application and the Charity Commissioner did not pass any orders on that application and, therefore, the materials produced before the Charity Commissioner while filing application for additional evidence, could not be taken into consideration for decision making in these appeals. In that regard Sri. T. N. Raghupathy, placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of ASSOCIATED HOTELS OF INDIA LTD VS S. B. SARDAR RANJIT SINGH (AIR 1908 SC 933 ). Further, Sri. T. N. Raghupathy would point out that loss of memory pleaded by the applicant for non-production of additional evidence before the Assistant Charity Commissioner could hardly be a good and sufficient ground to permit production of additional evidence before the Charity Commissioner. ( 20 ) SINCE T. N. Raghupathy has contended that the issue raised before the Charity Commissioner has become academic having regard to the subsequent elections to the committee of management and only on that count, the Charity Commissioner ought to have dismissed the appeals of the Respondents herein as infructuous, it becomes necessary for us to deal with that contention in the first instance, because, if the above contention of the learned counsel is upheld, these appeals are entitled to be allowed and the judgment and the orders of the Charity Commissioner and that of the learned District Judge are liable to be set aside. ( 21 ) THE contentions of Sri T. N. Raghupathy, in that regard, briefly stated is that the subject matter of dispute between the parties relates to the election held by two rival groups to the committee of management on 06. 10. ( 21 ) THE contentions of Sri T. N. Raghupathy, in that regard, briefly stated is that the subject matter of dispute between the parties relates to the election held by two rival groups to the committee of management on 06. 10. 1996 and since the term of the committee had expired long back and since fresh election was conducted to the Committee of Management on 23. 01. 2000, and subsequently on 25. 10. 2002, the issue relating to the validity of the election held to the Committee of Management on 06. 10,1996 would not survive for decision and if the Court were to decide the validity of that. issue, it would tantamount to the Court deciding an academic issue. Sri Raghupathy in support of the above contention placed reliance on unreported judgement of a Division Bench of this Court dated 21st April, 1994 in MFA No. 522 of 1994. We have perused the said judgment. Full facts of that case are not available in the judgment. However, in paragraph 4 of the judgment the Division Bench, after referring to the following observations of the learned District Judge The term of the body elected in the year 1991 expired by April 1993 and it is contended that new body is elected. But, however, the legality of the new body is also under challenge, held that if that is the position as on today, on the expiry of the term of office by April 1993, the hearing of this appeal would become only academic inasmuch as no purpose will be served in going into the merits of the case. Further, new body is elected as observed in the impugned order. Whether the election took place in accordance with law and whether the elected body is a valid one, are all matters to be decided in the appropriate pending proceedings with which we are not concerned. ( 22 ) WE could hardly find any ratio in the above holding. From the perusal of the judgment, it appears that the only contention raised by the learned counsel for the Appellant in that case was that the newly elected body failed to produce the accounts and such a duty is cast on the elected body under the Act. ( 22 ) WE could hardly find any ratio in the above holding. From the perusal of the judgment, it appears that the only contention raised by the learned counsel for the Appellant in that case was that the newly elected body failed to produce the accounts and such a duty is cast on the elected body under the Act. Dealing with that contention, this Court held that if the elected body was in the office but failed to comply with the Chapter V of the Act, it is open to the competent authority under the Act to take appropriate action and to seek accounts from the said body. This Court was not called upon to decide the basic question as to under what circumstances, an issue could become an academic issue and under what circumstance on that count, the Court can refuse to decide on such issue much less in any detail or depth. ( 23 ) SRI. T. N. Raghupathy also placed reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of JAGATNARAY- ANSINGH SWARUPSINGH CHITHERE AND OTHERS Vs. SWARUPSING EDUCATION SOCIETY AND ANOTHER (Supra (1980 Maharastra Law Journal 372) ). In that case, S. C. Pratap, J. held that the Court cannot ignore the subsequent events and it must mould its order in the light of the subsequent events. In that case, the Appellants had challenged the change in the managing body and the term of the managing body expired by the time the appeal came up for final hearing and new elected body had already taken the charge of the committee. In that case, one Swarupsingh Education Society was a public trust and General Body Meeting thereof was held on 24th February, 1974 inter alia to elect the new Managing Committee. A new committee was accordingly elected. On 22nd April, 1974, the Society sent a change report in that behalf under Section 22 of the Act to the ACC, Akola. This was registered and accepted on the same day by the ACC, Akola without any notice, either public or individual and without any inquiry. When this change report and its acceptance came to the knowledge of the Appellants therein, they appealed against the same. This was registered and accepted on the same day by the ACC, Akola without any notice, either public or individual and without any inquiry. When this change report and its acceptance came to the knowledge of the Appellants therein, they appealed against the same. That appeal was allowed by the Deputy Charity Commissioner and the order passed by the ACC, Akola was set aside and the matter was sent back to the ACC for proper hearing and disposal. The order of the Deputy Charity Commissioner was assailed by the first respondent Trust by an application under Section 72 of the Act. The learned District Judge allowed the said application, set aside the appellate order of the Deputy Charity Commissioner and dismissed the appeal filed before the Deputy Charity Commissioner. Being aggrieved by the said order of the learned District Judge, an appeal was preferred to the High Court under Section 72 (4) of the Act. The High Court on merit found the order made by the ACC, Akola as illegal and in violation of the procedure. Despite this finding by the High Court, the High Court dismissed the appeal. The reasons given by the High Court for dismissal of the appeal are found in paragraphs (11) and (12) of the Judgment. They read as follows:-11. With all these findings in favour of the appellants, I am constrained to nevertheless dismiss the appeal in view of the subsequent developments. Court cannot ignore relevant subsequent developments occurring during the pendency of appeal and must, in the ends of justice, mould its order in the light thereof. In this context, I may refer to Civil Application No. 2498 of 1979 by respondent No. 1. Factual averments therein are not contested. Undisputed position, therefore, is that the term of the managing committee elected in February 1974 has already expired in February 1979 and a new managing committee has also been elected in March 1979. This new committee has also already taken charge. Mr. Nashikkar, the learned Advocate for respondent No. 1 trust, makes a statement before this Court that the old managing committee elected in February 1974 had neither sold nor purchased any immovable property nor had it taken any such major policy decision so as to adversely affect the interest of the public trust. The said managing committee had only carried on routine administration. Mr. The said managing committee had only carried on routine administration. Mr. Chandurkar, the learned Advocate for the appellants, has not drawn my attention to any such act by the erstwhile managing committee which can be said to be against the interests of the trust. Moreover, there are many in built provisions in the Act itself and the Rules thereunder operating as safety valve for protection of public trusts. Control of the Charity Commissioner is also there all throughout. In these circumstances, remand to inquire into the theoretical legality or otherwise of the 1974 elections already superseded by the 1979 elections become academic. 12. This is not to say or hold that the impugned order of the learned District Judge is necessarily good and valid. But subsequent developments have rendered it unnecessary to go into that question. Questions in the abstract or questions academic are normally not decided by Courts. Mr. Chandurkar submits that it was no fault of the appellants that before this appeal could reach hearing, the term of the erstwhile managing committee expired. That may be so. But when occasion has arisen today to consider what order should be passed on this appeal, the above developments due become relevant. Moreover, I am not prepared to totally absolve the appellants of blame for this situation, inasmuch as, nothing prevented them from moving this Court or perhaps even the authorities below for an appropriate interim order against the members of the erstwhile managing committee (emphasis is supplied by us ). Be that as it may and today faced with the situation aforesaid, this, in my view, is not a case where a order of remand can be successfully insisted upon. On the contrary, interests of justice and of the very public trust in question could be better served by drawing a curtain on the litigation which in the circumstances supra, has become infructuous. Keeping it nevertheless alive would be an exercise in futility. ( 24 ) WHAT weighed with the learned Judge in forming the above opinion is reflected in para 12 of the judgment itself. The learned Judge found that the Appellants had to blame themselves inasmuch as they did not move the High Court or the authorities under the Act for appropriate interim order against the members of the erstwhile managing committee. The learned Judge found that the Appellants had to blame themselves inasmuch as they did not move the High Court or the authorities under the Act for appropriate interim order against the members of the erstwhile managing committee. In the instant case, it is the case of the respondents group, the fact that the appellants group conducted the election on 23. 01. 2000 was not known to them and therefore, they could not seek appropriate direction from the Charity Commissioner, and immediately when they came to know that the ACC accepted the change report in Enquiry No. 193 of 2000, preferred a revision to the Charity Commissioner and the same is pending. ( 25 ) WITH respect, we state that we are not persuaded to accept the opinion of the Bombay High Court as good law. It may be that in a given case, the pendency of legal proceedings, does not fructify into vested legal rights. Subsequent developments which may render the decision making unnecessary with regard to questions raised in the original proceedings and in such cases the Court may refuse to decide such questions on the ground that they have become academic. If the Court has to take a changed circumstance into account for decision making, such changed circumstance should not be an event brought about by the party himself by his own conduct and over which he had control. The Supreme Court in RAMESHWAR AND OTHERS VS. JOT RAM AND OTHERS ( AIR 1976 SC 49 ) held one may as well add that while taking cautious judicial cognizance of post natal events, even for the limited and exceptional purposes explained earlier, no Court will countenance party altering, by his own manipulation, a change in. situation and plead for relief on the altered basis ( 26 ) THE Supreme Court stated the principles governing the impact of subsequent happenings or events on the decision making in the following words in para (9) of the same judgment:-9. The impact of subsequent happenings may now be spell out. First, its bearing on the right of action, second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its impotence to create or destroy substantive rights. The impact of subsequent happenings may now be spell out. First, its bearing on the right of action, second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its impotence to create or destroy substantive rights. Where the nature of the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. Patterson Vs State of Albama, (1934) 294 U. S. 600, 607, illustrates this position. It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where right have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. LACHMESHWAR PRASAD Vs. KESHWAR LA 1940 FCR 84 -AIR 1941 FC 5 falls in this category. Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs cannot deny rights to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary, Courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts of the time the relief is to be ultimately granted, the Court, even in appeal, can take note of such supervening facts with fundamental impact. Venkateshwaralu, AIR 1975 SC 1409 read in its statutory setting, falls in this category. Where the cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of the litigation, permit amendment and continue the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these are done only in exceptional situation and just cannot be done if this statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise, such change in cause of action or relief. All these are done only in exceptional situation and just cannot be done if this statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise, such change in cause of action or relief. The primary concern of the Court is to implement the justice of the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine ( See Chokalingam Chetty ; 54 Mad. LJ 88- (AIR 1927 PC 252 ). The law stated in Ramji Lal Vs State of Punjab, ILR (1966) 2 Punj 125= (AIR 1966 Punj; 374 (F. B )) is sound: courts do very often take notice of events that happen subsequent to the filing of suits and at times even those that have occurred during the appellate stage and permit pleadings to be amended for including a prayer for relief on the basis of such events but this is ordinarily done to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings or when the original relief claimed has, by reason of change in the circumstances, become in appropriate and not when the plaintiffs suit would be wholly displaced by the proposed amendment (see Steward vs. The North Metropolitan Tramways Company (1885) 16 QBD 178) and a fresh suit by him would be so barred by limitation. ( 27 ) IT is well established principle that the Courts can take notice of the subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly, but this can be done only in certain exceptional circumstances indicated by the Supreme Court in Para (9) of the judgment. However, this equitable principle which permits the Court to take into account subsequent events in moulding the relief cannot be pressed into service by the Courts to divest the rights already vested by a Statute. That is not the situation in this case. ( 28 ) A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in SYED JAEEL ZANE vs. VENKATA MURLIDHAR AND OTHERS (AIR 1981 A. P. 328= 1980 (1) ALt 43 (NRC)) held thus:. . . The inherent power of the Court to take notice of the subsequent circumstances to do complete justice between the parties and to mould the relief accordingly, is undoubted. Where such a course tends to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, it is all-the-more desirable that, the Court exercises its jurisdiction and inherent power in this direction. . . The inherent power of the Court to take notice of the subsequent circumstances to do complete justice between the parties and to mould the relief accordingly, is undoubted. Where such a course tends to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, it is all-the-more desirable that, the Court exercises its jurisdiction and inherent power in this direction. ( 29 ) THE following observations in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of BEG RAJ SINGH vs. STATE OF U. P AND OTHERS (Supra [ (2003) 1 SCC 726 ]) are quite apposite in the context of this case: the ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the court. A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i. e. the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment. Third party interests may have been created or allowing relief to the claimant may result in unjust enrichment on account of events happening in between. Else the relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum and for no fault of the petitioner. A plaintiff or petitioner having been found entitled to a right to relief, the court would as an ordinary rule try to place the successful party in the same position in which he would have been if the wrong complained against would not have been done to him. (emphasis is supplied by us ). ( 30 ) IN that case, the State of U. P. took a policy decision vide Government Order dated 25. 05. (emphasis is supplied by us ). ( 30 ) IN that case, the State of U. P. took a policy decision vide Government Order dated 25. 05. 1995 for remission of the lease of the riverbed Yamuna where sand and moram along with bajri boulder, reta or any one of them is found in mixed condition. The policy decision contemplated such areas as are completely new and have been searched by the applicant himself being leased out on first-come-first-serve basis. As provided by Government Order based on the opinion of the Directorate of Geology and Mining, the term of such lease shall normally be between three to five years. The petitioner in that case applied for one such sand mining lease in accordance with the policy decision contained in Government Order. The Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar granted the said lease to the petitioner therein. The lease was executed for a period of one year with effect from 03. 06. 1996. Before the expiry of the term of the lease, the petitioner sought for a renewal for another period of two years. The Collector granted such extension vide order dated 20. 12. 2000; the principal consideration for granting such renewal being that the lease, as originally executed, should have been for a period of one year, the petitioner was entitled to such extension for two years. The Government had taken a decision to hold an auction of the sand mining lease. Respondent No. 3, a competitor aspirant of the petitioner, preferred a revision before the State Government against the order of the Collector dated 20. 12. 2000. The revision was filed after expiry of one year and four months from the date of the order of extension. The State Government condoned the delay in filing the revision on the ground that the revision was filed within the period of limitation calculated from the date of the knowledge of Respondent 3. The issue as to locus standi was also decided in favour of Respondent No. 3. The State Government, vide its order dated 22. 04. 2002, set aside the order of the Collector influenced mainly by the consideration that the State Government having decided to hold an auction of the mining rights, the State Government was likely to gain higher revenue and, therefore, it was in public interest to transfer mining rights by holding an auction. The State Government, vide its order dated 22. 04. 2002, set aside the order of the Collector influenced mainly by the consideration that the State Government having decided to hold an auction of the mining rights, the State Government was likely to gain higher revenue and, therefore, it was in public interest to transfer mining rights by holding an auction. The petitioner preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad feeling aggrieved by the order of the State Government. The High Court Vide its order dated 13. 05. 2002, dismissed the writ petition holding that the order of Collector granting two years extension of mining rights to the petitioner was justified and the State Government was not justified in interfering and setting aside the order of the Collector. The High Court agreed that the initial lease should have been for a period of three years in which case there would have been no occasion for litigation. However still, the High Court denied the relief to the petitioner on the ground that auction would subserve public interest by fetching higher royalty to the State Government and further, because the period of three years calculated from the date of the original grant had in any case come to an end and therefore no relief could be allowed to the petitioner. Being aggrieved by the judgment of Allahabad High Court, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court by special leave. ( 31 ) BEFORE the Apex Court, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Allahabad High Court was not justified in denying the relief to the petitioner mainly on the ground that the period of three years calculated from the date of original grant had come to end and therefore no relief could be allowed to the petitioner. Dealing with that contention, the Apex Court held-6. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, as also the learned counsel for the State and the private respondent, we are satisfied that the petition deserves to be allowed. The ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the court. The ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the court. A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i. e. the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment. Third party interests may have been created or allowing relief to the claimant may result in unjust enrichment on account of events happening in between. Else the relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum and for no fault of the petitioner. A plaintiff or petitioner having been found entitled to a right to relief, the Court would as an ordinary rule try to place the successful party in the same position in which he would have been if the wrong complained against would not have been done to him (Emphasis supplied by us ). The present one is such a case. The delay in final decision cannot, in any manner, be attributed to the petitioner. No auction has taken place. No third party interest has been created. The sand mine has remained unoperated for the period for which the period of operation falls short of three years. The operation had to be stopped because of the order of the State Government intervening which order has been found unsustainable in accordance with stipulations contained in the mining lease consistently with GO issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Merely because a little higher revenue can be earned by the State Government that cannot be a ground for not enforcing the obligation of the State Government which it has incurred in accordance with its own policy decision. Merely because a little higher revenue can be earned by the State Government that cannot be a ground for not enforcing the obligation of the State Government which it has incurred in accordance with its own policy decision. ( 32 ) THE underlined observations of the Apex Court in Para (6) clearly show that if the applicant is entitled to a relief, and if he succeeds in the litigation, he should not be denied the relief solely on account of time lost in prosecuting the proceedings in judicial or in quasi-judicial forums provided loss of time in prosecution was not occasioned on account of factors solely attributable to such applicant. In the instant case, we do not find any serious lapse on the part of the respondents in prosecuting the proceedings either before the ACC or the Charity Commissioner of before the learned District Judge. It is an admitted fact that, when the appeals were pending before the Charity Commissioner, the appellants group without bringing it to the notice of the Charity Commissioner and to the respondents group and without seeking permission from the Charity Commissioner conducted the election on 23. 01. 2000 knowing fully well that its legitimacy in the office was in question in the appeals. Subsequently also the appellants group claims to have conducted the election on 25. 10. 2002 when M. A. Nos. 60, 61 and 62 of 2000 were pending before the learned District Judge. It is trite, if the Court were to find that the election held by the appellants group on 06. 10. 1996 is illegal, any further election held by such invalid group to elect the members of the managing committee of the society, should also be held as illegal. Therefore, simply because the appellants group claims that it held elections on 23-1-2000 and 25-10-2002 to the Managing Committee of the Society, the challenge made by respondents group to the election held by appellants group on 06-10-1996 and change report submitted by that group to ACC and the order made by the ACC, the validity of which is assailed in the appeals filed before the Charity Commissioner, would not become academic. We say this because, if the Court finds that the election of the appellants group on 06-10-1996 and the acceptance of the change report by that group by the ACC, are invalid or illegal for any reason and the election of the respondents group held on 06. 10. 1996 and the change report submitted by that group was wrongly rejected by the ACC, then, it becomes necessary for the Court to restore the validity elected Managing Committee. It may be true that even in such event, the respondents group is obligated to conduct fresh election to the committee of the management of the society. If the election conducted by the respondent group on 06-10-1996 to the committee of the management is found to be legal in terms of bye-laws of the society, that committee of management alone is entitled to continue in office, despite expiry of the term of three years till new committee of management is elected and installed in accordance with bye-laws. Therefore, despite the fact that the term of the committee expired in 1999 itself and despite the fact the appellants group claims to have conducted two more subsequent elections to the committee of the management, the validity of the election claimed to have been conducted by both the groups on 06. 10. 1996 still survives for decision on merits because the fate of the subsequent developments and subsequent elections held by the appellants group would be determined on the basis of the findings of the Court on the validity of the election held on 06. 10. 1996 by the appellants group. In that view of the matter, the contention of Sri. T. N. Raghupathy that issue brought before the Court has become academic and learned District Judge ought to have allowed the Miscellaneous Applications filed by the appellants group and set aside the order of the Charity Commissioner passed in the appeals filed by the respondents group, is not acceptable to us. ( 33 ) AS regards the merits, primarily two questions arise for consideration: (1) whether the admission of 38 members as life members of the society on 28. 08. 1996, as claimed by the respondent group, is factually correct and legal and (2) whether the participation of those 38 members in the election held on 06. 10. 1996 is a fact and whether their participation is valid. 08. 1996, as claimed by the respondent group, is factually correct and legal and (2) whether the participation of those 38 members in the election held on 06. 10. 1996 is a fact and whether their participation is valid. ( 34 ) ACCORDING to the respondents Group on 28. 08. 1996, 38 persons were admitted as life members of the society by the Managing Committee of the society by passing a resolution. Membership of the society consists of the following four categories: 1. The membership of the Association shall consist of the following categories: (a) PATRONS: Persons paying Rs. 5000/- or more in lump or within a period of two years shall be called PATRONS. (b) DONORS: Persons paying Rs. 1000/- in lump or within a period of two years shall be called DONORS. (c) LIFE MEMBERS: Persons paying Rs. 500/- in lump or within a period of two years shall be called LIFE MEMBER. (d) HONORARY MEMBERS: Persons rendering any kind of meritorious service to the cause of education in general may, at the discretion of the Managing Committee, be enrolled as Honarary Members without any pecuniary obligation. ( 35 ) PARAGRAPH (2) and (3) of BYE-LAW (B) which deals with Mode of Enrolment read as follows: 2. The right without obligation to state reasons either way, of admitting or refusing admission to any kind of membership shall subject to Such direction or restrictions as the General Body may impose, vest in the Managing Committee whose decision shall, subject to appeal to the General Body, by the aggrieved person within a reasonable time from the date of intimation of such decision, be otherwise final. 3. A complete categorywise Register of members shall be maintained with their full names and addresses. This Register shall be deemed to be conclusive evidence of membership and shall be open to inspection during office hours by any member or any other person duly authorised in that behalf. ( 36 ) AS could be seen from Paragraph (2), the Managing Committee is empowered to enroll members of the society and in exercise of that power, the Managing Committee in its meeting held on 28th August 1996 admitted 38 persons as life members. ( 36 ) AS could be seen from Paragraph (2), the Managing Committee is empowered to enroll members of the society and in exercise of that power, the Managing Committee in its meeting held on 28th August 1996 admitted 38 persons as life members. The relevant proceeding of the Managing Committee dated 28th August 1996 reads as follows: the Managing Committee Meeting was held on Wednesday the 28th August 1996 at 6 P. M. sharp, in V. V. Sangh Office in the premises of V. B. Darbar P. U. College, Bijapur. The following Members attended the meeting. The following Members are present. 1. Shri N. K. Kulkarni Hon. Secretary 2. Shri G. K. Galagali Jt. Hon. Secretary 3. Shri K. R. Arjungi Member 4. Shri R. B. Mutalik Desai Member 5. Shri R. B. Patil Member 6. Shri S. R. Bagalkotkar Member 7. Shri R. P. Chakkalki Member as the President was absent at the Meeting so also Vice President was not present and there is a quorum for the Meeting, hence Shri N. K. Kulkarni, Hon. Secretary moved the proposal to occupy the chair to Shri S. F. . Bagalkotkar, Member and it was seconded by Shri R. B. Patil, Member. The proposal was unanimously accepted by the house. The Minutes of the previous meeting were read and confirmed. The following resolutions are passed in the Meeting. 1. It is resolved to postpone the approval of the Staff Selection Committee Report, till it is finalised. 2. It is unanimously resolved to accept 38 thirty eight application seeking permission to be the life members of the V. V. Sangh, Bijapur. The part payment made by the 38 members which is less than Rs. 200/- and the same is resolved that the said money be kept with the Hon. Secretary, as the same is permissible within the Rule III (3) of the Bye Laws of the V. V. Sangh. The Meeting was terminated with thanks to the Chair. Sd/-PRESIDENT vidya VARDHAK SANGHA bijapur ( 37 ) THE above meeting was attended by seven members of the Managing Committee. The President and Vice President were not present. However, quorum was there to conduct the Meeting. Pursuant to the above resolution of the Managing Committee, the names of 38 members are entered in the membership register. Sd/-PRESIDENT vidya VARDHAK SANGHA bijapur ( 37 ) THE above meeting was attended by seven members of the Managing Committee. The President and Vice President were not present. However, quorum was there to conduct the Meeting. Pursuant to the above resolution of the Managing Committee, the names of 38 members are entered in the membership register. In the course of hearing of these appeals, we have secured the original membership register as well as the original proceeding of the Managing committee dated 28. 08. 1996 and perused the same. We have no good reason to think that the entries made in the membership register and/ or the proceedings dated 28. 08. 1996, incorporated in the proceedings register are manipulated or concocted as contended by Sri Raghupathy. On the other hand, we are satisfied that the proceedings were drawn up and entries are made in the membership register by the Managing Committee which was in office at the relevant point of time in a normal course. At this stage itself, it is relevant to notice that the resolution passed by the Managing Committee dated 28. 08. 1996 was not assailed by anybody and according to the respondent Group, the members of appellant and respondent groups acted upon that resolution. In support of the contention that 38 persons were admitted as life members on 28. 08. 1996 itself, the respondents group has produced evidence to show that life membership fee at the rate of Rs. 500/- was collected from each person and a total sum of Rs. 19,000/- was deposited to the credit of the society on 05. 10. 1996. The original vouchers for demonstrating that life membership fees were collected from each of 38 members were placed before us for our perusal. Certified copy of the resolution and the receipt for deposit of Rs. 19,000/- have been produced before the Charity Commissioner. Exhibit D-29 is the original membership register maintained by the society right from the year 1,952. We have perused the original membership register and we are fully satisfied that there is nothing to show that the names of 38 persons as life members entered in the register without their being any resolution of the Managing Committee on 28. 08. 1996. ( 38 ) IT is, however, the contention of Sri Raghupathy that resolution dated 28. 08. We have perused the original membership register and we are fully satisfied that there is nothing to show that the names of 38 persons as life members entered in the register without their being any resolution of the Managing Committee on 28. 08. 1996. ( 38 ) IT is, however, the contention of Sri Raghupathy that resolution dated 28. 08. 1996 or entries made in the membership register or the proof of having collected membership fee of Rs. 19,000/- from 38 persons and depositing the same in Bank of India to the credit of the society were not produced before the ACC, the original authority and, therefore, these documents should be eschewed from the decision making. Contesting the above claim of Sri Raghupathy, Sri G. S. Vishveshwara, learned Senior Counsel would point out that admittedly an application was made before the Charity Commissioner to produce additional evidence in support of the claim of the respondent Group which included the above documents also, and unfortunately, the Charity Commissioner did not formally make an order on the said application and simply because no formal order as passed by the Charity Commissioner, it cannot be said that those documents have no evidentiary value in decision making, particularly when nothing is placed by the appellant Group to doubt the relevancy and integrity of those documents. Sri Raghupathy, would maintain that since the respondent Group did not press the application filed before the Charity Commissioner for production of additional evidence, that Group cannot be permitted to place reliance of those documents on the so called additional evidence and sought to draw support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in ASSOCIATED HOTELS OF INDIA LTD. , V. S. B. SARDAR RANJIT SINGH (Supra ( AIR 1968 SC 933 ) in support of his contention. Sri Raghupathy would also contend that the ground stated by the respondent Group for not producing the additional evidence before the original authority, i. e. , the ground of loss of memory, would not be a good ground to permit production of additional evidence subsequently. ( 39 ) IT is a fact that though the respondent Group made necessary application to produce additional evidence before the Charity Commissioner, unfortunately, the Charity Commissioner did not pass order on that application. ( 39 ) IT is a fact that though the respondent Group made necessary application to produce additional evidence before the Charity Commissioner, unfortunately, the Charity Commissioner did not pass order on that application. This lapse on the part of the Charity Commissioner should not result in injustice to either of the parties provided, there is nothing to show that the additional evidence sought to be produced are either concocted or not relevant. Having perused the original records, we are of the considered opinion that there will be failure of justice if the documents produced by the respondent Group as additional evidence before the Charity Commissioner are not taken into account. It is not that those documents were sought to be produced before Charity Commissioner behind the back of the appellant Group. It is a matter of record that a copy of the application for additional evidence was served on the appellant Group and the appellant Group also filed their objections. Although there is no specific provision in The Bombay Public Trust Act to enable the High Court to admit fresh evidence in appeal, still the High Court being a Court of Conscience, it may not be illegal, if it takes into account the additional evidence produced by the respondent Group to do justice and avoid miscarriage of justice. The High Court as a Court of Conscience would not permit technicality to defeat justice. The mere fact that the Charity Commissioner did not pass a formal order on the application for additional evidence should not deter this Court from taking into account the evidence sought to be brought on record particularly when the Court is satisfied that the evidence sought to be brought on record are relevant as well as unimpeachable. Therefore, the contention of Sri Raghupathy that this Court should not take into account the evidence sought to be brought on record is not acceptable to us particularly because those documents form part of the record placed before us and we hold that the evidence led in the case is a satisfactory proof to hold that the Managing Committee of the society admitted 38 persons as life members by passing the resolution dated 28. 08. 1996. ( 40 ) BYE-LAWS 2 (A) and 2 (B) provide for General Body and Annual General Meeting respectively. These Bye-Laws are found in Chapter-III of the Bye-Laws. 08. 1996. ( 40 ) BYE-LAWS 2 (A) and 2 (B) provide for General Body and Annual General Meeting respectively. These Bye-Laws are found in Chapter-III of the Bye-Laws. Bye-Law No. 2 (A) in Chapter-III provides that the General Body shall consist of all duly enrolled members of the society whose names stand in the Register of Members in force for the time being. Bye-Law 2 (B) provides for convening Annual General Meeting and such a meeting could be convened by the President or any of the Vice presidents in the absence of the, President, at least once in every official year and may be convened oftener if necessary. Strictly speaking, it is only in such an Annual General Meeting election of the office bearers of the society will have to be held. When this is the position in the Bye-laws, Sri B. V. Darbar, the then President of the Society issued a notice to convening Special General Body Meeting of the members fixing the date as 06. 10. 1996 at 3. 00 P. M. at the premise of V. B. Darbar P. U. College. The Agenda was to dissolve the then Managing Committee and elect new Managing Committee for the period 1996-1997 to 1999-2000. Although according to respondent Group the convening of the Special General Body meeting on 06. 10. 1996 was irregular and illegal for certain grounds urged before us, we do not think it necessary to deal with those contentions for more than one reason. First the term of office bearers elected on 06. 10. 1996 spent itself long back and it is high time, a fresh election to elect the office bearers of the Managing Committed should be held without any further delay and such a course is imperative if we keep in mind the provisions of the bye-laws of the society and the objectives of the Act. Therefore, we proceed on the assumption that the Special General Body meeting convened by the then President on 06. 10. 1996 by issuing notice dated 07. 09. 1996 was in accordance with the bye-laws of the society. We confine ourselves to see whether on 06. 10. 1996 the elections held by the appellant Group or the respondent Group to the committee of Management is valid. 10. 1996 by issuing notice dated 07. 09. 1996 was in accordance with the bye-laws of the society. We confine ourselves to see whether on 06. 10. 1996 the elections held by the appellant Group or the respondent Group to the committee of Management is valid. Once we decide this question, we propose to direct the fresh election to the committee of the Management in accordance with the bye-laws of the society and the provisions of the Act by directing that Managing Committee, which was validly elected in the election held on 06. 10. 1996 to hold election within a specified time. ( 41 ) ACCORDING to the appellant Group on 06. 10. 1996 there were only 71 members in the meeting whereas according to the respondent Group 80 members including 38 members admitted on 28. 08. 1996 were present. It is a specific case of the respondents Group that on 06. 10. 1996, 13 Managing committee members resigned, but, Sri B. V. Darbar, the President and Sri Galagali, Joint Secretary, did not resign; among the 13 Managing Committee members who resigned, 7 belonged to the respondents Group and 6 to the appellant Group; at that stage according to the respondents Group there was a serious dispute between the two Groups on the question of conducting election on 06. 10. 1996; certain members of the respondents Group questioned the action of the President in convening the special General Body Meeting on the ground that there was a deadlock in the administration of the society and since the President was unable to give any proper reply, that led to commotion and disturbance and galata and in that circumstance, Sri B. V. Darbar, President and his supporters went away taking some records of the society. It is the further case of the respondent Group that after the President went away Sri P. B. Kulkarni, presided over the meeting and elections were conducted and 14 office bearers were elected and the said list has been produced before the ACC which was registered as Enquiry Case No. 1005 of 1996. It is the further case of the respondent Group that after the President went away Sri P. B. Kulkarni, presided over the meeting and elections were conducted and 14 office bearers were elected and the said list has been produced before the ACC which was registered as Enquiry Case No. 1005 of 1996. ( 42 ) IN the premise of the above factual matrix and the evidence on record, insofar as the merit is concerned, the only thing to be seen in this appeal filed under Section 72 (4) of the Act is whether the concurrent findings recorded by the Charity Commissioner and affirmed by the learned District Judge calls for our interference on any permissible ground. It is well settled that though a different opinion than the one formed by the trial Court or the first appellant Court could be formed on the basis of the same evidence, nevertheless, the Appellate Court should not substitute its opinion in place of the opinion formed by the trial or the first Appellate Court. Keeping this limitation in mind, and having perused the concurrent findings recorded by the Charity Commissioner and the learned District Judge, we do not find any flaw in the findings. In other words, the findings recorded by the Charity Commissioner and the District Court are well founded and based on substantive legal evidence. It may be true as contended by Sri Raghupathy that the learned District Judge is not right in holding that neither the Charity Commissioner nor the ACC has the power to go into the question of validity of enrolment of 38 persons as life members and it is only for the Managing Committee to decide as to who is the Member and who is not the member. But, as pointed out above, we are fully satisfied that 38 persons were enrolled as life members on 28. 08. 1996. For the reasons stated by us while concluding that 38 members were validly admitted as life members of the society by the Managing Committee by passing appropriate resolution of 28. 08. 1996 in terms of the bye-laws of the society, the findings recorded by the ACC contrary to our findings cannot be sustained. If that finding of the ACC could not be sustained and if the fact pleaded by the respondent Group that 38 persons were admitted as life members of the society on 28. 08. 08. 1996 in terms of the bye-laws of the society, the findings recorded by the ACC contrary to our findings cannot be sustained. If that finding of the ACC could not be sustained and if the fact pleaded by the respondent Group that 38 persons were admitted as life members of the society on 28. 08. 1996 is accepted as correct, the claim put forth by the appellant Group should fall to the ground. In addition, the Charity Commissioner, as well as the learned District Judge in great elaboration examined the entire evidence on record and highlighted the falsity of the claim put forth by the appellant Group. The reason given by the ACC to disbelieve the evidence of D. W-l to D. W-71 reflects the height of perversity on the part of the ACC. There was absolutely evidence to prove that the witnesses were won over by the respondents Group and the opinion of the ACC is based on conjectures and surmises. ( 43 ) IN conclusion, we do not find any substantive or weighty grounds to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge who has confirmed the order of the Charity Commissioner in the appeals. The Appeals are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. The Managing committee elected by the respondent Group (B Group) which is a legally elected body to administer the affairs of the society is directed to conduct and conclude fresh elections to the Managing Committee of the society strictly in accordance with the bye-laws of the society and law within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.