JUDGMENT A. K. PATNAIK, J. — The petitioner is the Additional General Secretary of State Non-Gazetted Officers Coordination Committee, Orissa. He has stated in the writ petition that he is a public spirited citizen who has fought against corruption, nepotism, mis-managements and favoritism in the past and he has filed number of Pubic Interest Litigations against financial corruptions committed by the bureaucrats. He has further stated in the writ petition that Dr. Hrushikesh Panda, I.A.S. is a dutiful, honest and competent officer with integrity and he has submitted various enquiry reports on allegations of corruption and mis-management. He has given illustrations of the manner in which Dr. Hrushikesh Panda has discharged his duties of different offices impartially and honestly. He has stated that Dr. Hrushikesh Panda is presently working as C.M.D. of IDCOL and having noticed various irregularities, corruption and mis-management, he has initiated action against about 32 employees of IDCOL. He has further stated that he was astonished to see reports in the newspaper on 30.3.2003 that the Orissa Legislative Assembly has resolved on 29.3.2003 to suspend Dr. Hrushikesh Panda and that the Speaker has directed the State Government to suspend Dr. Panda for his mis-behaviour with the Minister of State (S.C. & S.T.) and Shri Saharai Oram, Member of Legislative Assembly from Champua Constituency on 15.3.2003 at the Kalinga Iron Works Guest House at Barbil. The petitioner has also stated that the newspaper reports further reveal that notice for privilege motion was given and discussions on the allegations against Dr. Hrushikesh Panda were held on the floor of the Assem¬bly from zero hours to 9 P.M. on 29.3.2003. A copy of the newspaper reports in the daily ‘The Samaj’ dated 30.3.2003 has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure-3. He has further stated in the writ petition that on 29.3.2003 Dr. Hrushikesh Panda on coming to learn about enquiry against him from the Television immediately proceeded on leave from 31.3.2003 in order to facili¬tate an independent enquiry and that in his leave application he has denied the allegations of misbehaviour by him and request¬ed the Chief Secretary for his transfer out of IDCOL. Hrushikesh Panda on coming to learn about enquiry against him from the Television immediately proceeded on leave from 31.3.2003 in order to facili¬tate an independent enquiry and that in his leave application he has denied the allegations of misbehaviour by him and request¬ed the Chief Secretary for his transfer out of IDCOL. Shocked was astonished with the resolution adopted by the Orissa Legislative Assembly on 29.3.2003, the petitioner sent an open letter dated 31.3.2003 to the Chief Minister raising various questions, but the State Government without considering the false allegations made against Dr.Hrushikesh Panda illegally conceded and succumbed to the resolution adopted by the House and by order dated 31.3.2003 placed Dr.Hrushikesh Panda under suspension with imme¬diate effect in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings against him. A copy of the suspension order dated 31.3.2003 has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure-7. Aggrieved, the peti¬tioner has filed this writ petition with a prayer to quash the said resolution dated 29.3.2003 of the Orissa Legislative Assem¬bly adopted to initiate a Privilege Proceeding against Dr.Hrushi¬kesh Panda and to direct the State Government for his suspension. The petitioner has also prayed for setting aside the order of suspension in Annexure-7 to the writ petition. The petitioner has made a further prayer to the Court to direct the C.B.I. to investi¬gate into the allegations and take appropriate legal action against the culprits. 2. When the writ petition was moved by Mr M.S. Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner on 25.4.2003, the Court ad¬journed the matter to 30.4.2003 for hearing from Mr Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner at length on the locus standi of the petitioner and the maintainability of the writ petition. When the case was listed on 30.4.2003, Mr. M.S. Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Mahadev Mishra, learned counsel for the Secretary, Orissa Legislative Assembly-opp.party No.1 and Mr Sovesh Roy, learned Advocate General, for the State of Orissa were heard. 3. Mr. When the case was listed on 30.4.2003, Mr. M.S. Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Mahadev Mishra, learned counsel for the Secretary, Orissa Legislative Assembly-opp.party No.1 and Mr Sovesh Roy, learned Advocate General, for the State of Orissa were heard. 3. Mr. M.S. Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in a special reference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court in its opinion reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745 has clearly held that it was competent for the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain and deal with a petition challenging the legality of the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him by the Legislative Assembly for its contempt and for infringement of its privileges and to pass orders releasing a person on bail against whom action has been taken by the Legislative Assembly pending disposal of the writ petition. According to Mr Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, when the fundamental right to personal liberty and life is affected by any resolution of the Legislative Assembly the High Court always has the power under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with such resolution of the Legis¬lative Assembly. He argued that in the present case, the funda¬mental right to personal liberty and life of not only Dr. Hurshi¬kesh Panda but also all other citizens of the State is affected by the impugned resolution dated 29.3.2003 of the Orissa Legisla¬tive Assembly for initiating a Privilege Proceeding against Dr. Hrushikesh Panda and for directing his suspension. He vehemently argued that it has now been held by the Supreme Court in various decisions that the right to life under Article 21 of the Consti¬tution is much more than mere survival and animal existence and includes all aspects of life which go to make a man’s life mean¬ingful, complete and worth living. He relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597, Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others. He relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597, Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746, The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipku¬mar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and others, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 109, State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 803, Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 and Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and others, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 101 in which very wide and expansive meaning has been given by the Supreme Court to the fundamental right of a person under Article 21 of the Consti¬tution. He further submitted that in this writ petition, the petitioner has also prayed for directing a C.B.I. enquiry to investigate into the allegations made by the Minister and the Member of Legislative Assembly. He vehemently argued that before the Orissa Legislative Assembly adopted the impugned resolution, the correct facts should have been ascertained and Dr. Hurshikesh Panda should have been given opportunity to reply to the allega¬tions. According to Mr Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, the High Court can entertain this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for violation of the fundamental right of personal liberty and life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 4. Mr Mahadev Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the Secretary, Orissa Legislative Assembly-opp.party No.1, on the other hand, submitted that by the impugned resolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly, no one’s right to personal life and liberty has been affected and the case of the petitioner in the writ petition is that proper procedure has not been followed while adopting the impugned resolution. Mr Mahadev Mishra submitted that the impugned resolution cannot be questioned in the Court of law on the ground of irregularity of procedure in view of the immunity granted under Article 212 of the Constitution to the proceedings of the State Legislature. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr Mishra relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and others, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1186, a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Jai Singh Rathi and others v. State of Haryana through the Chief Secy. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr Mishra relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and others, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1186, a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Jai Singh Rathi and others v. State of Haryana through the Chief Secy. to Govt., Haryana and others, A.I.R. 1970 Punjab & Haryana, 379 and a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in K.A. Mathialagan v. P. Srinivasan and others, A.I.R. 1973 Madras 371. 4. Mr Sovesh Roy, learned Advocate General, Orissa also submitted that the impugned resolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly cannot be a subject-matter of challenge before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of the provi¬sions of Article 212 of the Constitution. He further submitted that in so far as the order of the State Government placing Dr. Hrushikesh Panda under suspension is concerned, Dr. Hrushikesh Panda has himself challenged the said order of suspension passed by the State Government before the Central Administrative Tribu¬nal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack and the matter is now pending in this Court in a separate writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. 5. A copy of the resolution adopted by the Orissa Legisla¬tive Assembly on 29.3.2003 impugned in this writ petition has not been annexed to the writ petition and, therefore, we are unable to know the contents of the said impugned resolution. But from the statements made in the writ petition on the basis of the newspaper reports dated 30.3.2003 it appears that the Orissa Legislative Assembly has decided to initiate a Privilege Proceed¬ing against Dr. Hrushikesh Panda and to direct the State Govern¬ment to place him under suspension. No decision appears to have been taken by the resolution dated 29.3.2003 of the Orissa Legis¬lative Assembly to arrest Dr. Hrushikesh Panda so as to affect his personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. We fail to see as to how the aforesaid resolution dated 29.3.2003 of the Orissa Legislative Assembly affects the fundamental right to life of either Dr. Hrushikesh Panda and the citizens of the State at large including the petitioner. Hrushikesh Panda so as to affect his personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. We fail to see as to how the aforesaid resolution dated 29.3.2003 of the Orissa Legislative Assembly affects the fundamental right to life of either Dr. Hrushikesh Panda and the citizens of the State at large including the petitioner. The Orissa Legislative Assem¬bly has powers under Article 194 (3) of the Constitution to initiate action for breach of Privileges of the House and its members and its committees and so long as such action initiated by the Orissa Legislative Assembly does not affect the fundamen¬tal rights of either Dr. Hrushikesh Panda or any person under Article 21 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot interfere with such action of the Orissa Legislative Assembly under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of the provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution. 6. In M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and others (supra) cited by Mr Mishra, the Supreme Court after coming to the conclusion that the fundamental right of the petitioner as claimed by him was not affected by the action taken by the Legis¬lature for breach of privilege held : “10. It now remains to consider the other subsidiary ques¬tions raised on behalf of the petitioner. It was contended that the procedure adopted inside the House of the Legislature was not regular and not strictly in accordance with law. There are two answers to this contention, first, that according to the previous decision of this Court, the petitioner has not the fundamental right claimed by him. He is, therefore, out of Court. Secondly, the validity of the proceedings inside the Legislature of a State cannot be called in question on the allegation that the procedure laid down by the law had not been strictly followed. Article 212 of the Constitution is a complete answer to this part of the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. No Court can go into those questions which are within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature itself, which has the power to conduct its own business. Possibly, a third answer to this part of the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that it is yet premature to consider the question of procedure as the Committee is yet to conclude its proceedings. Possibly, a third answer to this part of the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that it is yet premature to consider the question of procedure as the Committee is yet to conclude its proceedings. It must also be observed that once it has been held that the Legislature has the jurisdiction to con¬trol the publication of its proceedings and to go into the ques¬tion whether there has been any breach of its privileges, the Legislature is vested with complete jurisdiction to carry on its business. Even though it may not have strictly complied with the requirements of the procedural law laid down for conducting its business, that cannot be a ground for interference by this Court under Art.32 of the Constitution. Courts have always recognised the basic difference between complete want of jurisdiction and improper or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. Mere non-compliance with rules of procedure cannot be a ground for issuing a writ under Art.32 of the Constitution; vide Janardan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, 1951 SCR 344 : ( AIR 1951 SC 217 ).” From the aforesaid decision, it is clear that once the Court finds that the Legislature has jurisdiction in the matter relat¬ing to breach of privilege, the Court will not interfere with the proceedings of the Legislature on the ground that the procedure of law laid down for the conduct of the business of the House has not been strictly complied with. 7. In the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution cited by Mr. M.S. Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner the right to personal liberty of a person was affected by the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him by the Legislative Assembly for its contempt and for infringement of its privileges and hence, the Supreme Court held that a writ petition in the nature of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution was maintainable and the High Court had powers to entertain and deal with the writ petition and pass orders for releasing the person on bail pending disposal of the writ petition. Paragraph-59 of Special Reference opinion of the Supreme Court as reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745 (supra) at page 767 is quoted herein below : “59. Let us first take Art.226. Paragraph-59 of Special Reference opinion of the Supreme Court as reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745 (supra) at page 767 is quoted herein below : “59. Let us first take Art.226. This Article confers very wide powers on every High Court throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Govern¬ment, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohi¬bition, quo warranto, certiorari or any of them for the enforce¬ment of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the language used by Art. 226 in conferring power on the High Courts is very wide. Art.12 defines the ‘State’ as including the Legislature of such State, and so, prima facie, the power conferred on the High Court under Art.226(1) can, in a proper case, be exercised even against the Legislature.If an application is made to the High Court for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, it would not be competent to the House to raise a preliminary objection that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application because the detention is by an order of the House. Art. 226(1) read by itself, does not seem to permit such a plea to be raised. Art.32 which deals with the power of this Court, puts the matter on a still higher pedestal; the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the fundamental rights is itself a guaranteed fundamental right, and so, what we have said about Art. 226(1) is still more true about Art. 32 (1).” In the aforesaid opinion, the Supreme Court also dealt with the immunity granted to the proceedings of the Legislature and the extent of such immunity. In paragraph-62 of the said opinion as reported in the A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745, the Supreme Court ob¬served : “62. Similarly, Art.212 (1) makes a provision which is relevant. It lays down that the validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. In paragraph-62 of the said opinion as reported in the A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745, the Supreme Court ob¬served : “62. Similarly, Art.212 (1) makes a provision which is relevant. It lays down that the validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. Art.212(2) confers immunity on the officers and members of the Legislature in whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution for regu¬lating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the Legislature from being subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers. Art.212(1) seems to make it possible for a citizen to call in question in the appropriate Court of law the validity of any proceedings inside the Legislative Chamber if his case is that the said proceedings suffer not from mere irregularity of proce¬dure, but from an illegality. If the impugned procedure is ille¬gal and unconstitutional it would be open to be scrutinised in a Court of law, though such scrutiny is prohibited if the complaint against the procedure is no more than this that the procedure was irregular. That again is another indication which may afford some assistance in construing the scope and extent of the powers conferred on the House by Art. 194(3).” It will be clear from the said opinion of the Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution that the proceedings of the State Legislature cannot be called in question on the ground of alleged irregularity of procedure in view of the provisions of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution. Similarly, the exercise of powers by the officers or members of the Legislature vested in them by or under the Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining an order, in the Legisla¬ture cannot be called in question in any Court. Hence, the pro¬ceedings of the State Legislature cannot be challenged on the ground of mere irregularity of procedure. But as has been held by the Supreme Court in the said opinion, the same can be scruti¬nised by the Court to find out if the same is illegal or uncon¬stitutional. Hence, the pro¬ceedings of the State Legislature cannot be challenged on the ground of mere irregularity of procedure. But as has been held by the Supreme Court in the said opinion, the same can be scruti¬nised by the Court to find out if the same is illegal or uncon¬stitutional. In the present case, the petitioner has not been able to show as to how the resolution dated 29.3.2003 of the Orissa Legislative Assembly for initiating action for breach of privilege was illegal or unconstitutional. The petitioner has not been able to show that the Orissa Legislative Assembly was pro¬hibited by any constitutional provision or law to initiate action for breach of privilege against Dr. Hrushikesh Panda. 8. Regarding suspension of Dr. Hrushikesh Panda, it is the State Government which has the power to place Dr. Hrushikesh Panda under suspension and the petitioner’s case is that the State Government has passed the orders placing Dr. Hrushikesh Panda under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings pursuant to the direction in the impugned resolution dated 29.3.2003 of the Orissa Legislative Assembly. Orders of the State Government placing Dr. Hrushikesh Panda under suspension have been challenged by Dr. Hrushikesh Panda himself before the Cen¬tral Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack. The orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack refusing to grant interim stay of the order of suspension have also been challenged in this Court in a separate writ peti¬tion under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by Dr. Hrushikesh Panda. As to whether or not the State Government can only on the basis of such direction in the impugned resolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly suspend Dr. Hrushikesh Panda will be decided in the said petitions filed by Dr. Hrushikesh Panda before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack or before this Court. On these facts, we see no good reason as to why we should entertain this Public Interest Litiga¬tion filed by a person other than Dr. Hrushikesh Panda for re¬dressal of the grievance of Dr. Hrushikesh Panda against the impugned resolution directing suspension and the order of suspen¬sion. 9. On these facts, we see no good reason as to why we should entertain this Public Interest Litiga¬tion filed by a person other than Dr. Hrushikesh Panda for re¬dressal of the grievance of Dr. Hrushikesh Panda against the impugned resolution directing suspension and the order of suspen¬sion. 9. Coming now to the prayer for directing a C.B.I. inves¬tigation into the allegations and take appropriate legal action against the culprits, it is not in every case that the High Court directs investigation by the C.B.I. It is only where the High Court finds that the investigation into any particular allegation is not fair and proper and such investigation by the C.B.I. is necessary in the public interest, the High Court considers di¬recting the C.B.I. to conduct an investigation. In the present case, no such case has been made out by the petitioner for di¬recting any investigation by the C.B.I. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to entertain the writ petition and we accordingly dismiss the same. No. costs. B. P. DAS, J. I agree. Petition dismissed.