D. P. KUNDU, J. ( 1 ) THE Court: In this writ proceeding the writ petitioner has challenged order No. 36 dated 5th September, 2002 and order No. 43 dated 15th January, 2003 passed by the Fourth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal (hereinafter referred to as the said Tribunal) in case No. VIII-100/2000. ( 2 ) BY virtue of order No. 115-IR dated 19. 7. 2000 issued by the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department, the following issues were referred to the said Tribunal for adjudication. Issues1. Whether the dismissal of Shri Tapan Prasad Banerjee (Ticket No. 3986) from his service with effect from 30. 1. 98 is justified2. What relief, if any, is he entitled to ( 3 ) BY virtue of a purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 the said Tribunal passed a". . . . NO-DISPUTE award on footing that there exists no dispute between the parties". The relevant lines from the aforesaid award dated 15. 5. 2002 are set out herein below: "after the receipt of the reference usual notices were sent to the parties for their appearance and for filing written statement. Both the parties file their respective written statements in due course. Thereafter the case was fixed for hearing. It reveals from the record that the workman has taken several adjournments on different pretext. Today is also fixed for hearing on validity of the domestic enquiry. The learned advocate for the company is present and the workman is absent on repeated calls. At that time learned advocate for the workman named Shri Swapan Bhattacharya personally appeared before the Court and submits that his client has no instruction to proceed with the case and he further submits that in so many occasions he contracted with his client but he did not turn up so necessary order may be passed by this Tribunal. The totality would go to show that the workman is not at all diligent to proceed with the case and he is in habit of adjournment after adjournments and this day took no steps. It, therefore appears that it is of no use to drag the matter any further and it is a fit case passing a no-dispute award. I, therefore, pass a no-dispute award on footing that there exists no dispute between the parties. This is my award. The award be sent to the Government. It, therefore appears that it is of no use to drag the matter any further and it is a fit case passing a no-dispute award. I, therefore, pass a no-dispute award on footing that there exists no dispute between the parties. This is my award. The award be sent to the Government. " (emphasis added) ( 4 ) THE concerned workman by an application signed by him on 18. 6. 2002 before the said Tribunal prayed for restoration of the case No. VIII-100/2000 by setting aside the aforesaid purported award dated 15. 5. 2002. ( 5 ) THE writ petitioner opposed the aforesaid prayer of the workman for restoration by setting aside the aforesaid purported award dated 15. 5. 2002. ( 6 ) THE said Tribunal by an order No. 36 dated 5. 9. 2002 ordered as follows:"ordered that the workman's petition dated 18. 6. 2002 for setting aside the 'no Dispute Award' passed by this Tribunal on 15. 5. 2002 be allowed on contest without any cost. The 'no Dispute Award' passed by the Tribunal on 15. 5. 2002 is set aside and the case is restored to its original file. To 26. 09. 02 for hearing over the validity of the domestic enquiry. Parties must come ready on the date fixed. " ( 7 ) THE writ petitioner filed an application dated 26. 9. 2002 before the said Tribunal for reviewing of the order No. 36 dated 5. 9. 2000 passed by the said Tribunal. ( 8 ) THE said Tribunal by an order No. 43 dated 15. 1. 2003 rejected the aforesaid application dated 26. 9. 2002 filed by the writ petitioner for reviewing for recalling order No. 36 dated 5. 9. 2002 passed by the said Tribunal, on contest, with exemplary cost of Rs. 200/- and fixed 10. 2. 2003 for hearing over validity of the domestic enquiry. The relevant lines from the said order No. 43 dated 15. 1. 2003 passed by the said Tribunal are set out herein below:"considering the facts and circumstances and in view of my earlier observation in the body of the order the instant petition for reviewing or recalling the order passed by this Tribunal on 5. 9. 2002 be rejected with exemplary cost. Hence is ordered: that the petition dated 26. 9. 2002 filed by the company for reviewing or recalling order No. 36 dated 5. 9. 9. 2002 be rejected with exemplary cost. Hence is ordered: that the petition dated 26. 9. 2002 filed by the company for reviewing or recalling order No. 36 dated 5. 9. 2002 passed by this Tribunal be rejected on contest with exemplary cost of Rs. 200/ -. To 10. 02. 03 for hearing over validity of the domestic enquiry. Parties must come ready on the date fix. " ( 9 ) AS stated hereinabove, in the present writ proceeding, the writ petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order No. 36 dated 5. 9. 2002 and order No. 43 dated 15. 1. 2003 passed by the said Tribunal. ( 10 ) DR. Banerjee, learned senior advocate for the writ petitioner argued that the learned Tribunal on 18. 6. 2002 the date when the application for recalling and set aside of the award was made, had become functus officio. The term 'functus officio' means 'having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority. Applied to an officer whose term has expired and who has consequently no further official authority; and also to an instrument, power, agency etc. , which has fulfilled the purpose of its creation, and is therefore of no further virtue or effect",. Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. ( AIR 1981 SC 606 ) laid down the principles as to when, a Tribunal under the said Act becomes functus officio. In paragraph-14 of the reported decision, Supreme Court, inter alia, held as follows:"sub-SECTION (3) of section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continues till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 17-A. Under section 17-A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under section 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference under section 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under section 17-A. " (emphasis added) ( 11 ) DR. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under section 17-A. " (emphasis added) ( 11 ) DR. Banerjee, the learned senior advocate for the writ petitioner, has drawn the attention of the Court to section 17-AA which was inserted in the said Act by section 4 of the West Bengal Act 34 of 1983 [the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1983]. This West Bengal Act 34 of 1983 received the assent of the President of India vide Notification No. 2818l dated 23rd November, 1983 which was published in the Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary dated 23rd November, 1983. By virtue of section 8 of West Bengal Act 57 of 1980 [the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1980] a new section 17-B was inserted in the said Act after section 17-A. This West Bengal Act 57 of 1980 received the assent of the President of India vide Notification No. 2648l dated 30th November, 1981 which was published in the Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary dated 30th November, 1981. Section 17-B which was inserted in the said Act after section 17-A by virtue of section 8 of West Bengal Act 57 of 1980 was subsequently renumbered as section 17-AA of the said Act by virtue of section 4 of West Bengal Act 34 of 1983. Both West Bengal Act 57 of 1980 and West Bengal Act 34 of 1983 received the requisite assent of the President of India. Clause (2) of Article 254 of our Constitution reads as follows:"254 (2 ). Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the considered of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State: provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. " ( 12 ) ADMITTEDLY when the Legislature of the State of West Bengal legislated section 17-AA, at that material time, sections 17 and 17-A of the said Act were already there in the statute book. In case of any repugnancy between the State law and Central law, section 17-AA enacted by the State Legislature having received the assent of the President of India, shall prevail in the State of West Bengal. ( 13 ) SUB-SECTIONS (1), (2) and (4) of the said section 17-AA which was inserted in the said Act by State Amendment reads as follows:"17-AA. Pronouncement and commencement of award, etc.-Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 17 and 17-A- (1)every award, other determination or decision by an Arbitrator or a Labour Court or a Tribunal shall be pronounced on a date notified for the purpose and shall be dated and signed by the person or persons pronouncing the award, determination or decision and such award, determination or decision once signed and dated shall not be altered save in the manner provided in this Act; (2)the award, determination or decision of an Arbitrator shall be pronounced in his office and the award, determination or decision of a Labour Court or a Tribunal shall be pronounced in open Court; (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4)every award, other determination or decision referred to in clause (1) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its pronouncement; provided that if the appropriate Government is of opinion, in any case where the award, other determination or decision has been given by an Arbitrator or Labour Court or a Tribunal, in relation to an industrial dispute in which it is a party, that it will be inexpedient on public grounds affecting national economy or social justice to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, other determination or decision, award, determination or decision the appropriate Government may, by notification, declare that such award, determination or decision shall not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty days; (5 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (6 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (6 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (7 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (8 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (9 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (10 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " (emphasis added) ( 14 ) THE said section 17-AA contains non-obstante clause with a view to give the provisions contained in the said section 17-AA, in case of conflict, an overriding effect over the provisions contained in sections 17 and 17-A of the said Act. Law relating to non obstante clause has clearly been laid down by Supreme Court in Union of India v. G. M. Kokli ( AIR 1984 SC 1022 ); Chandraverkar Sita v. S. Guram ( AIR 1987 SC 117 ); Narcotics Control Bureau v. Krishanlal ( AIR 1991 SC 558 ); M/s. Oriental Paper and Industries Ltd. v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1991 SC 672 ). The principle laid down by Supreme Court is that non obstante clause, in case of conflict, has an overriding effect over the provision or provisions of the Act or Acts mentioned in the said non obstante clause. ( 15 ) THAT being the position in law as discussed hereinabove, the provisions of the said section 17-AA, in the State of West Bengal shall prevail over the provisions contained in section 17 and 17-A of the said Act because in the non obstante clause of the said section 17-AA only section 17 and section 17-A of the said Act have been mentioned. ( 16 ) IN Grindlays Bank Ltd. case (supra), Supreme Court had no opportunity of considering the provisions of the said section 17-AA. Sub-section (1) of section 17-A of the said Act laid down that an award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under section 17 of the said Act. Sub-section (1) of section 17 of the said Act laid down that every arbitration award and every award of Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall, within a period of thirty days from its receipt by the appropriate Government, be published in such a manner as the appropriate Government thinks fit. ( 17 ) IN the State of West Bengal, after the said section 17-AA came into force, the provisions regarding the date when an award shall become enforceable has undergone a sea change. Publication of the award by the appropriate Government is no longer a requisite condition precedent for enforceability of an award. ( 18 ) FROM sub-section (3) of section 20 of the said Act it is evident that the intention of the Legislature is that proceedings before an Arbitrator under section 10a or before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of the reference of the dispute for arbitration or adjudication, as the case may be, and such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable. ( 19 ) FOR determining the question when such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded the decisive point at issue is the date on which the award becomes enforceable and the key word is "award". ( 20 ) THUS the proceedings with regard to a reference under section 10 of the said Act before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable. The Tribunal becomes functus officio from the date next to the date on which the award becomes enforceable. For determining the question whether the proceedings before the Tribunal is continuing or not date on which "other determination or decision" not being an "award" becomes enforceable is not a criteria to be taken into consideration. ( 21 ) NOW it is to be considered whether purported award dated 15. 5. For determining the question whether the proceedings before the Tribunal is continuing or not date on which "other determination or decision" not being an "award" becomes enforceable is not a criteria to be taken into consideration. ( 21 ) NOW it is to be considered whether purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 passed by the said Tribunal is an "award" within the meaning of section 2 (b) of the said Act. Section 2 (k) of the said Act defined the term "industrial dispute". The terms 'award' and 'industrial dispute' have been defined in the Act as follows:"award" means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or Nation Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under section 10a. ""industrial dispute" means "any dispute or difference between employees and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. " ( 22 ) THE definition of "award" in section 2 (b) of the said Act has two parts. The first part covers a determination, final or interim, of any industrial disputes. The purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 which is under challenge in the present writ proceeding, at no stretch of imagination, can come within the first part of the definition of "award" in section 2 (b) of the said Act. The second part takes in a determination of any question relating to industrial dispute. But the basic postulate common to both the parts of the definition, is the existence of an industrial dispute, actual or apprehended. The word "determination" used in section 2 (b) of the said Act contemplated by the definition is of the industrial dispute or a question relating thereto, on merits. Sub-section (1) of section 10 expressly makes formation of opinion by the appropriate Government, "that any industrial dispute existence or is approached", a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of making a reference. Sub-section (4) of section 10 gives a mandate to the Tribunal to confine its adjudication to those points of dispute which have been specified in the order of reference or are incidental thereto. Sub-section (4) of section 10 gives a mandate to the Tribunal to confine its adjudication to those points of dispute which have been specified in the order of reference or are incidental thereto. Supreme Court in Cox and Kings (Agents) Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1977 Lab IC 897), in paragraph 26 of the reported decision, inter alia, laid down the law as follows:"from a conjoint reading of clause (b) of section 2 and sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 10 it is clear that in order to be an 'award' within the second part of the definition, a determination must be- (i) an adjudication of a question or point relating to an industrial dispute, which has been specified in the Order of Reference or is incidental thereto, and (ii) such adjudication must be one on merits". (emphasis added) ( 23 ) IN Cox and Kings (Agents) Ltd. case (supra) it as contended that a question, whether or not an industrial dispute existing itself be a question relating to an industrial dispute within the intendment of the second part of the definition. After examining the said contention Supreme Court in paragraph 25 of the reported decision observed "the contention appears to be attractive but does not stand a close examination". (emphasis added) ( 24 ) BY the purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 the said Tribunal did not determine the questions or points specified in the Government Order of Reference. Nor was it an adjudication on merits of any industrial dispute or a question relating thereto. There was no determination on merits of an industrial dispute or a question relating thereto. The purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 passed by the said Tribunal does not possess the attributes essential to bring it within the definition of an "award". ( 25 ) THIS Court is of the view that decision of the Tribunal "no dispute award on footing that there exists no dispute between the parties" does not fall within the definition of the term "award" under the said Act. ( 26 ) DR. Banerjee, the learned senior advocate for the writ petitioner referred to Rule 27 of the West Bengal Industrial Dispute Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules ). The said Rule 27 reads as follows:"27. ( 26 ) DR. Banerjee, the learned senior advocate for the writ petitioner referred to Rule 27 of the West Bengal Industrial Dispute Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules ). The said Rule 27 reads as follows:"27. Correction of errors and review of an award.- The Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or Arbitrator may- (i) correct any clerical or arithmetical mistake arising from an accidental slip or omission in any award made by it or him, and (ii) review an award on that ground of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record,, either of its/his own motion or on the application of any of the parties; (iii) for sufficient cause set aside after notice to the opposite party or parties, as the case may be ex parte award or an award on the footing that the industrial dispute under reference is no longer in existence either on its/his own motion or on the application of any of the parties: provided that no correction shall be made without previous notice to the parties or the opposite party, as the case may be: provided further that no application for review under clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of the 15th day from the date of the award. " ( 27 ) DR. Banerjee strongly relied upon the second proviso to clause (iii) of Rule 27 of the said Rules. A bare perusal of the aforesaid Rule 27 makes it clear all the provisions contained in Rule 27 relate to an "award" within the meaning of section 2 (b) of the said Act. This Court has already recorded its finding that the purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 passed by the said Tribunal is not an "award" within the meaning of section 2 (b) of the said Act. Therefore, Rule 27 of the said Rules has no manner of application in respect of the said purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 passed by the said Tribunal. ( 28 ) AS the purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 passed by the said Tribunal is not an "award" within in the meaning of section 2 (b) of the said Act, the proceeding before the Tribunal is still continuing and shall not be deemed to have concluded. Therefore, the Tribunal has not yet become functus officio. ( 28 ) AS the purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 passed by the said Tribunal is not an "award" within in the meaning of section 2 (b) of the said Act, the proceeding before the Tribunal is still continuing and shall not be deemed to have concluded. Therefore, the Tribunal has not yet become functus officio. The Tribunal was competent and had jurisdiction to entertain the application of the workmen signed by him on 18. 6. 2002 and passed the order No. 36 dated 5. 9. 2002. The writ petitioner filed the application dated 26. 9. 2002 before the said Tribunal for reviewing the order No. 36 dated 5. 9. 2002 questioning the competence, jurisdiction and authority of the Tribunal to set aside the purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 and to restore the case to its original file. The main ground of attack was that on expiry of thirty days from the date of pronouncement of the aforesaid purported award dated 15. 5. 2002 the Tribunal has become functus officio. It has already been discussed hereinabove that till no the Tribunal has not become functus officio. Therefore, the order No. 43 dated 15. 1. 2003 passed by the said Tribunal rejecting the aforesaid application of the writ petitioner dated 26. 9. 2002 is also not illegal and cannot be interfered with. ( 29 ) IN view of the discussions made hereinabove this Court is of the view that the writ petition has no merit. The writ petition is dismissed. Interim order, if there be any, is vacated. No order as to costs. Xerox certified copy, if applied for, by the parties be made available to the parties as expeditiously as possible. Writ Petition dismissed