JUDGMENT - KANADE V.M., J.:---The appellants are the original defendants and respondents are the original plaintiffs. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred as original plaintiffs and original defendants. 2. The facts, in brief, are as follows: The plaintiffs filed a suit in respect of the suit land admeasuring 24 acres situated within the Municipal Council limits of Chikhali. The case of the plaintiffs, in the plaint, is that Nimbaji had five sons and the joint family consisted of Nimbaji, his wife and five sons. Nimbaji as a Karta of the family obtained some loan from the District Central Co-operative Bank, Buldhana for the development of Joint Family property. Nimbaji decided to sell 9 acres and 16 gunthas of land for the education of his son and for the marriage of his other son. The case of the plaintiffs is that when plaintiff No. 2 came to know about the intention of Nimbaji of selling the property, he approached him in the month of October, 1974 and requested him to sell some land to plaintiff Nos. 1, 3 and 4 and accordingly there was an agreement of sale of the portion of the land for a consideration of Rs. 47,000/- and out of this an amount of Rs. 27,000/- was given as earnest money to Nimbaji on 13-3-1975 and accordingly an agreement of sale (Ishar Chithhi) was executed and the plaintiffs were put in possession of the suit land. On the said date, defendant No. 6 Panditrao was not in the Town and, therefore, his signature could not be obtained and, therefore, the sale-deed was to be executed on 31-3-1975. The plaintiffs paid a balance of consideration of Rs. 20,000/- and the sale-deed was executed and registered on 31-3-1975. It is the case of the plaintiffs that on 3-4-1975 defendant No. 1 alongwith the others entered in the suit field and tried to disturb the possession in respect of area of 2 acres and 2 gunthas on the southern side of the suit land and that this was the subject-matter of the suit. A police complaint was filed and thereafter the suit was filed. 3. A police complaint was filed and thereafter the suit was filed. 3. After the suit was filed, the plaint was amended and it was contended that the plaintiffs had actually purchased 9 acres and 16 gunthas of land from Nimbaji on 12-2-1975 and the defendants 2 to 4 had purchased 12 acres and 15 gunthas of land from one Sonabai. It was further averred by the plaintiffs that Panditrao had executed an agreement of sale in favour of the defendants 2 to 5 illegally and that the said agreement was a fabricated document and that the said document had been brought into existence to defeat the claim of the plaintiffs. Further it was averred that Panditrao who was the co-parcener and who did not sign the initial agreement to sale had no right, title or interest in the suit land had sold it to defendants 2 to 5 as he was not the Manager of the family during the life time of his father Nimbaji. It was further averred that the land sold by Panditrao was not for legal necessity of the family and, therefore, the sale was void. It was further averred that an agreement of sale and sale-deed executed by Nimbaji, Karta of the family was for legal necessity and, therefore, it was binding on the whole family. Further, it was contended that the sale-deed executed by Panditrao in favour of defendant Nos. 2 to 5 was contrary to the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Land Ceiling and Holding Act, 1961 and also Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Lowering of Ceiling and Holding) Amended Act, 1972. 4. The defendants filed their Written Statement and admitted that Survey No. 218 was the joint family property and denied that the plaintiffs had purchased 9 acres and 16 gunthas of land. They also denied the possession of the plaintiffs. They denied that Nimbaji was the Manager and Karta of the family. It was alleged that Panditrao being an eldest was a Karta of the family. 5. Defendant No. 6 filed his Written Statement and denied the contentions of the plaintiffs after he was joined as party defendant when he intervened in the said suit. 6. The trial Court framed issues and the suit filed by the plaintiffs was decreed. 7. Against the said Judgment and Order, the defendants preferred an Appeal before the lower Appellate Court. Defendant No. 6 filed his Written Statement and denied the contentions of the plaintiffs after he was joined as party defendant when he intervened in the said suit. 6. The trial Court framed issues and the suit filed by the plaintiffs was decreed. 7. Against the said Judgment and Order, the defendants preferred an Appeal before the lower Appellate Court. Lower Appellate Court also dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants. The appellants/original defendants have filed the present Second Appeal challenging the concurrent findings given by the lower Appellate Court. The appeal was admitted on 11-4-1990 and the following order was passed: "Heard. Admit. Substantive questions of law "Annexure A" with the memo of appeal. Shri Chandurkar waives notice for all defendants. Stay of possession subject to the furnishing a solvent security of Rs. 30,000/- to the satisfaction of the trial Court within two months from today. R and P expedited." 8. The substantial questions of law raised in Annexure A to the Appeal memo on which Second Appeal has been admitted are reproduced hereinabelow: "A) Whether a suit for mere possession by the plaintiffs is maintainable without a prayer for cancellation of the sale-deed in favour of the defendants when admittedly the sale-deed in favour of the defendants when admittedly the sale-deed in favour of the defendants is earlier in point of time than that of the plaintiffs.? B) Whether the co-parcener selling his share to the defendants earlier to the sale by father as a Karta is a necessary party in a suit for possession filed by the subsequent purchasers from the father ? C) Whether the purchases from father as a Karta can get a valid title with respect for the share of a co-parcener who has already executed a sale-deed of his share either to the sale by father ? D) Whether the question as to legal necessity was redundant in the present case ? E) Whether the co-parcener who has sold his share in the Joint Family property to the defendants can challenge the subsequent sale by the father Karta in favour of the plaintiffs on ground of want of legal necessity? F) Whether the defendants Nos. D) Whether the question as to legal necessity was redundant in the present case ? E) Whether the co-parcener who has sold his share in the Joint Family property to the defendants can challenge the subsequent sale by the father Karta in favour of the plaintiffs on ground of want of legal necessity? F) Whether the defendants Nos. 1 to 5 who have purchased the share of the defendant No. 6 earlier to the sale by father Karta were obliged to file a suit for partition with a prayer to allot the land purchased by them from defendant No. 6? G) Whether the defendants can challenge the transfer by Karta in favour of the plaintiffs for want of legal necessity to justify and save the earlier sale-deed in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 by defendant No. 6 in his share? 9. In order to decide the said substantial questions of law which are framed by the Court at the time of admission it would be necessary to peruse the few facts. In the present case Nimbaji and his four sons sold a portion of the land of the Joint Hindu Family to plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 4. Defendant No. 6 who is the fifth son of Nimbaji did not sign the sale-deed. Defendant No. 6 Panditrao, however, by a separate sale-deed sold a portion of the Joint Family Property to original defendants Nos. 1 to 5. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, is that they are the owners of the suit land by virtue of sale-deed which was executed by Nimbaji the Karta of the Joint Hindu Family which was sold for legal necessity by Nimbaji and that the said sale was binding on Panditrao who was the member of the Joint Family Property and, therefore, even though he had not signed the Agreement of Sale it was binding on him and absence of his signature, therefore, did not make the sale void or illegal. 10. The case of defendant No. 6 Panditrao is that he was the Karta of the family and, therefore, as a Karta he had sold the part of the Joint Family Property to defendants Nos. 1 to 5. 11. In view of the two sale-deeds which are executed the dates of the agreement of sale and sale-deeds would be relevant. 10. The case of defendant No. 6 Panditrao is that he was the Karta of the family and, therefore, as a Karta he had sold the part of the Joint Family Property to defendants Nos. 1 to 5. 11. In view of the two sale-deeds which are executed the dates of the agreement of sale and sale-deeds would be relevant. Nimbaji and his four sons entered into an Agreement of sale with plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 4 for sale of 9 acres and 6 gunthas out of 24 acres and 31 gunthas of land of Survey No. 218 by an agreement of sale dated 18-3-1975. Thereafter, on 31-3-1975 the registered sale-deed was executed by Nimbaji and his four sons for consideration of Rs. 47,000/-. It is an admitted position that neither the agreement of sale dated 18-3-1975 nor the sale-deed dated 31-3-1975 was signed by defendant No. 6 Panditrao who is the eldest son of Nimbaji. 12. Panditrao defendant No. 6, on the contrary, has alleged that on 29-3-1975 he sold the property to defendants Nos. 1 to 5 for Rs. 9,500/-. Thus, it is alleged that two days prior to sale-deed dated 31-3-1975 executed by Nimbaji and his four sons in favour of the plaintiffs, Panditrao had sold part of the property to defendants Nos. 1 to 5. It is alleged by Shri Panditrao that unregistered agreement of sale was executed on 5-11-1974. All these documents have been proved by both the parties. 13. The plaintiffs contended that agreement of sale dated 5-11-1974 in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 5 was fabricated, false and ante dated document which was manufactured to defeat the plaintiffs agreements dated 18-3-1975 and was subsequently prepared. Subsequently, it was contended by the plaintiffs that though the defendants sale-deed is dated 19-3-1975 and that of plaintiffs is dated 31-3-1975 since Pandurang had no right to sell the property, the said sale-deed was not binding on Nimbaji and other four sons. 14. The trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record gave a finding in favour of the plaintiffs and held that the plaintiffs had proved that they were the owners by virtue of the registered sale-deed dated 31-3-1975. 14. The trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record gave a finding in favour of the plaintiffs and held that the plaintiffs had proved that they were the owners by virtue of the registered sale-deed dated 31-3-1975. The trial Court further gave a finding that Nimbaji had executed a sale-deed as Karta of Joint Hindu Family and that they were put in possession of the field by virtue of the registered agreement of sale. The trial Court also held in favour of the plaintiffs that on that ground of legal necessity. The trial Court further held that the defendants Nos. 1 to 5 had taken illegal possession of the suit field admeasuring 2 acres and 2 gunthas on or about 30-6-1975. The trial Court, however, did not accept the case of the defendants that Panditrao was acting as a Manager neither it accepted the fact that there was a partition and separation of the family between 5-11-1974 and 16-2-1975. Agreement of sale dated 5-11-1974 also was held to be a fabricated document. The case of the defendants is that they had become the owners by virtue of registered sale-deed dated 29-3-1979 was also not accepted. Thus, the suit of plaintiffs was decreed. The Appellate Court also has given concurrent findings on these issues. 15. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and respondents at length. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has taken me through the judgment and order passed by the lower Appellate Court. 16. From the perusal of the Judgment and Order of the Appellate Court, it is no doubt true that the Judgment and Order of the lower Appellate Court is not happily worded. The Appellate Court though on one hand proceeds to consider the evidence on the point of legal necessity and after discussing the same prima facie comes to the conclusion that there appeared to be no legal necessity to sell the suit field as compared to the consideration of Rs. 47,000/-, the expenses in respect of the marriage of Sudhakarrao and expenses in respect of the education of Shivajirao were very meagre. 47,000/-, the expenses in respect of the marriage of Sudhakarrao and expenses in respect of the education of Shivajirao were very meagre. However, without giving conclusive findings the Appellate Court then proceeds to examine the question whether the findings on legal necessity was necessary for the purpose of deciding the main issue involved in the present suit and in this context thereafter comes to the conclusion that the issue was not relevant because the plaintiffs by sale-deed dated 31-3-1975 had purchased undivided interest. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants heavily came down on the said findings of the Appellate Court and submitted that the said approach of the Appellate Court was clearly contrary to law. In my view, though the Appellate Courts Judgment is not happily worded the findings of the Appellate Court will have to be read in the context in which they have been given. If the said findings are read out of context then clearly it appears that the reasoning of the lower Appellate Court is not correct. In para No. 18 of the Judgment, the learned Judge observed as follows: "Thus, it is sufficient to say that Nimbaji act of selling 9 acres and 16 gunthas of land for Rs. 47,000/- for the purpose of meeting need of a hardly of Rs. 5 to 7 thousands is not be fitting. He is not authorised to do it in the capacity of Manager. This will be nothing but exceeding limits of authority as contemplated by law and secondly acting illegality. Naturally purchaser cannot get a valid title to the property which is purchased by him from Manager without any legal necessity." This findings, however, will have to be read in the context of subsequent findings which has been given in paragraph 21 which reads as follows: "In respect of second fold of Mr. Sawles argument that defendants should have brought suit for setting aside alienation. I have to say at length. Mr. Sawle argued that defendants should have got set aside the alienation and then should have asserted their title on the basis of their sale deeds. For this arguments Mr. Sawle relied on A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 576, (Sunilkumar v. Ramparkash)1. In this authority the Honble Supreme Court has ruled that .......... I have to say at length. Mr. Sawle argued that defendants should have got set aside the alienation and then should have asserted their title on the basis of their sale deeds. For this arguments Mr. Sawle relied on A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 576, (Sunilkumar v. Ramparkash)1. In this authority the Honble Supreme Court has ruled that .......... "A suit for permanent injunction by co-parcener against father, a Karta for restraining him from alienating the house property belonging to Joint Hindu Family for legal necessity would not be maintainable because co-parcener had got the remedy of challenging the sale and getting it set aside in a suit subsequent to completion of sale." Relying on this principle and by applying analogy Mr. Sawle argued that defendants should bring suit to set aside alienation in favour of plaintiffs, which they have not done till today. Unless this alienation is set aside it cannot invalidate transfer in favour of plaintiffs and without that defendants cannot claim title. I do agree with Mr. Sawle to some extent but not on the line of analogy applied by him. My opinion is on different line which I am going to elaborate below." 17. The lower Appellate Court further observes in para 22, line 20, page 24 as follows : "Now as stated earlier want of legal necessity is not going to create any right in favour of the defendants, nor it is going to deprive the plaintiffs of any right. Hence, the legal necessity can not be a fact in issue and it can not be a relevant fact. Therefore, the evidence which is led pertaining to the legal necessity is obviously irrelevant and inadmissible". The lower Appellate Court thereafter has proceeded to consider the effect of an agreement executed by the defendants which is false and fabricated and in the said context the lower Appellate Court came to the conclusion that an agreement of sale which is executed by Nimbaji on 31-3-1975 was valid. 18. It is no doubt true that the reasonings adopted by the lower Appellate Court does not appear to be sound. However, section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure to consider the issues which are not considered by the lower Appellate Court. Section 103 reads as follows : "103. However, section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure to consider the issues which are not considered by the lower Appellate Court. Section 103 reads as follows : "103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.---In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal- (a) which has not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower Appellate Court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in section 100." 19. In this view of the matter, if the evidence on record is taken into consideration, it is obvious that the said land was sold by Nimbaji and his four sons for legal necessity. Once it is established that there was a need of the Joint Hindu Family in respect of the educational expenses and marriage expenses, the quantum of that need cannot be considered vis a vis the consideration. The law requires that needs should be established and it is not necessary to consider the fact whether the consideration which is received is in excess of that need. In my view, therefore, the findings of the trial Court in respect of legal necessity is correct and I confirm the same. 20. In this view of the matter, the submission of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in respect of sale can not be accepted. In view of this, the question raised in Ground (D) does not survive. So far as Ground (A) is concerned, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs who have purchased the suit property from Nimbaji the Karta of joint Hindu Family who has sold the suit property for the benefit of the members of the Joint Hindu Family for legal necessity. There is a concurrent finding which has been given by the Court in respect of the existence of legal necessity. There is a concurrent finding which has been given by the Court in respect of the existence of legal necessity. Once, it is proved that the said sale deed which is executed by the Karta of the Joint Hindu Family is valid, the plaintiffs are entitled to seek decree in respect of delivery of possession, in respect of the 2 acres and 2 gunthas which is disputed suit property. Thus, in my view, Ground (A) does not raise any substantial question of law. So far as Ground (B) is concerned, the defendant No. 6 was a co-parcener who has sold his share to the defendants, was added as party defendant No. 6 and he was duly heard in the trial Court as well as in the lower Appellate Court. In this view of the matter, the question whether he was a necessary party in a suit for possession filed by the subsequent purchaser from the father does not arise when in fact he was added as defendant after the suit was filed. 21. So far as Ground (C) is concerned, it is an established position in law that Karta of Joint Hindu Family can sell the entire share of the other co-parcener, if there is a legal necessity. In the present case, the Karta having sold the suit property to the plaintiffs, the purchasers of the property in the said transactions obviously get valid title even in respect of the share of co-parcener who had not signed the agreement. 22. So far as Ground (E) is concerned, the said ground as to whether co-parcener who has sold his share in the Joint Family Property can challenge the subsequent sale by father on the ground for want of necessity. The trial Court has held that Karta has sold the suit property on the account of legal necessity and that findings has been confirmed by me for the reasons stated hereinabove. This ground, therefore, does not survive. 23. So far as Ground (F) is concerned, the ground is as to whether defendants No. 1 to 5 who have purchased the share of defendants No. 6 earlier to the sale by father Karta were to obliged to file a suit for partition. This ground, therefore, does not survive. 23. So far as Ground (F) is concerned, the ground is as to whether defendants No. 1 to 5 who have purchased the share of defendants No. 6 earlier to the sale by father Karta were to obliged to file a suit for partition. This ground also would not survive on account of the findings given by both the Courts below that the entire transaction which is executed by defendant No. 6 was a fraudulent transaction and the earlier agreement of sale which was executed on 5-11-1974 was found to be bogus. Both the courts have further held that defendant No. 6 was not the Karta or Manager of the Joint Family Property and I have, therefore, come to conclusion that the agreement of sale executed by him is fraudulent. The Appellate Court has rightly come to the conclusion that even if this was accepted as true, the defendants Nos. 1 to 5 had no authority to take possession illegally and that proper remedy which was available to them was to file a suit and get the possession. In this view of the matter, the said ground is answered accordingly. 24. Ground (G) is similar to the ground which is raised in Grounds (D) and (E) which I have already answered. In this view of the matter and in view of the fact that there is a concurrent findings given by both the courts below on all aspects and the findings as to the legal necessity has been confirmed by this Court, the Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed and the judgment and Order passed by the lower Appellate Court is confirmed. 25. In the result, the Second appeal is dismissed. The Judgment and Order of the lower Appellate Court is confirmed. Under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. On the request of the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, the possession of the appellants is protected for a period of 6 weeks from the date on which the Judgment is signed. Private copy to be supplied after the Judgment is signed. Second appeal dismissed. -----