RAJENDRA PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) BOTH the matters relate to an agricultural land bearing S. No. 83 measuring 5 acres 30 guntas situate at Anugondanahalli. The parties are common in both the cases. Common arguments have been advanced by both sides. Both the matters involve common questions of facts and law. Hence, the following common judgment. ( 2 ) WRIT Appeal No. 4677/1999, an appeal filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8. 3. 1999 passed in W. P. No. 34965/1998 wherein the learned Single Judge had allowed the writ petition and remanded the matter to the Land Tribunal to rehear the parties and to pass appropriate orders. Writ Petition No. 17991/1999 is a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying the court for issue of a writ, direction or order declaring the order of the Land Tribunal dated 30. 11. 1981 passed in LR (A)/1/1476/74-75 as illegal. ( 3 ) THE court has heard the arguments of both sides. ( 4 ) SRI H. Subramanya Jois, learned senior counsel for the appellant, strenuously contended that the material on record clearly shows that the order impugned in the appeal is illegal and improper. The learned Single Judge had not considered the facts in issue in the right perspective. On the material on record, the learned Single Judge ought to have held that the application submitted by R-3 before the Land Tribunal was highly belated and R-3 had not made out any grounds for condoning the delay. The general circular issued by the Government and referred to by Respondent No. 3 and the Land Tribunal relates to the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act and as such the same cannot ensure to the benefit of R-3 in any way. The learned counsel also contended that the material on record clearly shows that the appellant is a bonafide purchaser of the land in question after the statutory period of regrant and the Land Tribunal had also issued an endorsement to the effect that there is no Form No. 7 pending in respect of the land in question. The learned counsel also contended that the material on record clearly shows that the appellant is a bonafide purchaser of the land in question after the statutory period of regrant and the Land Tribunal had also issued an endorsement to the effect that there is no Form No. 7 pending in respect of the land in question. The material on record also goes to show that the appellant has made vast development of the land by raising huge loan from the K. S. F. C. and has been running a bricks kiln in an industrial shed and the said concern has been registered with the Directorate of Industries and Commerce as a small scale industry. The material on record also goes to show that R-3, who has no locus standi, had also filed two original suits in this regard and has also been prosecuting a writ petition in respect of rejection of Form No. 7 filed for grant of occupancy right submitted by his brother more than 18 years ago and has also been prosecuting an application stated to have been submitted by him before the Land Tribunal on 29. 5. 1991. The learned counsel strenuously contended that the material on record clearly goes to show that R-3 has resorted to unrighteous litigations and the same has resulted in unnecessary harassment to the appellant. The learned counsel also contended that there is no question of vesting of land under Section 44 of the Land Reforms Act. There has been inordinate unexplained delay in R-3 filing the said writ petition. The learned counsel also contended that once the Land Tribunal had finally decided the claim of the brother of the appellant in this regard and had rejected the claim, and the order of the Land Tribunal had become final, at this stage, it is not open either for the brother of R-3 or R-3 to resort to reopen the proceedings of the Land Tribunal which had become final and as such the writ petition lacks total bonafides. The learned counsel also contended that Annexure- P had not been issued under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel also contended that the order of the learned Single Judge is totally unsustainable in law and hence he prayed for allowing the appeal and for quashing Annexure-V, second order of the Land Tribunal dated 20. 8. The learned counsel also contended that Annexure- P had not been issued under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel also contended that the order of the learned Single Judge is totally unsustainable in law and hence he prayed for allowing the appeal and for quashing Annexure-V, second order of the Land Tribunal dated 20. 8. 1998 and also for dismissal of the writ petition. ( 5 ) THE learned Government Pleader strenuously contended that the material on record clearly shows that the order impugned in the writ appeal is legal and valid and the learned Single Judge, after considering the facts in issue in the right perspective, had remanded the case to the Land Tribunal for enquiry and no grounds are made out to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. He also contended that there had been unexplained inordinate delay on the part of R-3 in coming up with the said writ petition and the delay in this regard has not at all been explained and there are absolutely no grounds to allow the writ petition. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for R-3 strenuously contended that the material on record clearly shows that the order impugned in the appeal is legal and proper. The learned Single Judge, after considering the facts in issue in the right perspective, had arrived at a right conclusion. The material on record clearly goes to show that R-3 had submitted an application on 29. 5. 1991 before the Land Tribunal for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question and the Land Tribunal, after considering the facts in issue in the right perspective, had granted occupancy rights as sought for by R-3. The material on record also goes to show that R-3 had submitted Form No. 7 in this behalf before the Land Tribunal in pursuance of the Government Circular and as such the application was maintainable in law. The material on record clearly goes to show that the regrantee had no right of alienation of the land in question for a period of 15 years. The learned counsel also contended that R-3 is a protected tenant in view of the provisions of Section 8 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act. The material on record clearly goes to show that the regrantee had no right of alienation of the land in question for a period of 15 years. The learned counsel also contended that R-3 is a protected tenant in view of the provisions of Section 8 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act. The learned counsel also contended that, patently, the land in question is a tenanted land and there had been vesting of the land in the State Government in view of the order of the Land Tribunal, which is impugned in the writ petition and the provisions of Section 77 of the Land Reforms Act lays down the procedure for disposal of the surplus lands. The learned counsel also contended that the entry in the revenue record is of no legal consequence and the appellant, who is stated to be a purchaser of the land in question, has no locus standi at all to fight out the lis as he was a totally unconcerned person in the year 1974 as on the date on which the amended provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act had come into force. The learned counsel also contended that the learned Single Judge was totally justified in remanding the case to the Land Tribunal for rehearing the matter, particularly in the light of the statutory provisions and the settled position of law in this regard. The learned counsel also contended that the appellant could as well urge the grounds to substantiate his claim before the Land Tribunal. The learned counsel also contended that as on the date of the alleged sale deed, the vendors had not been the owners and they could not have conveyed any right, title or interest in the land in question in favour of the appellant and such being the case, the appellant could not derive any title to the land in question and as such he has absolutely no locus standi in the instant proceedings. The learned counsel also contended that R-3s claim is not liable to be turned down even on the ground of delay in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned counsel relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions: (a) A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2157. (b) A. I. R. 1998 S. C. 1070. The learned counsel also contended that R-3s claim is not liable to be turned down even on the ground of delay in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned counsel relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions: (a) A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2157. (b) A. I. R. 1998 S. C. 1070. Placing reliance on the ratios laid down in the said decisions, he prayed for dismissal of the writ appeal and also for allowing the writ petition. ( 7 ) WE have carefully gone through the material on record and have given our anxious thoughts over the rival contentions raised. ( 8 ) IN the first instance, we would take up Writ Petition No. 17991/1999 for consideration. As stated earlier, this writ petition is filed by R-3 for declaring Annexure-B, order of the Land Tribunal dated 30. 11. 1981 in LR (A)/1/1476/74-75, as illegal and to direct the Land Tribunal to consider the application submitted by his brother for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question. From the material on record, it is seen that the brother of R-3 had submitted Form No. 7 before the Land Tribunal for grant of occupancy rights in respect of three lands including the land in question i. e. , land bearing S. No. 83 measuring 5 acres 30 guntas situate at Anugondanahalli. The Land Tribunal, after enquiry, granted occupancy rights in respect of two items of land and had turned down the claim of the brother of R-3 so far as the land in question, particularly on the ground that the land in question related to a village office and there was no regrant. The brother of R-3 A. R. Nanjundaiah - 7th respondent, did not challenge the said order at all in any form or forum. Virtually the said order had become final. The fact that the land in question related to a village office is not at all in dispute. The order impugned had been passed on 30. 11. 1981 and the writ petition had been filed in the year 1999 i. e. , after a lapse of 18 years. It is contended in the writ petition that the petitioner could not know about the order till 1993. Patently, the writ petitioner and R-7 are natural brothers hailing from Anugondanahalli. The order impugned had been passed on 30. 11. 1981 and the writ petition had been filed in the year 1999 i. e. , after a lapse of 18 years. It is contended in the writ petition that the petitioner could not know about the order till 1993. Patently, the writ petitioner and R-7 are natural brothers hailing from Anugondanahalli. In view of the same, in the opinion of this court, the contention of the writ petitioner to the effect that he was not at all knowing the order impugned till 1993 is unacceptable. Moreover, the provisions of the Constitution of India provide for invoking the writ jurisdiction under extraordinary circumstances, subject to a rider that the party concerned should invoke the writ jurisdiction within reasonable time. Though there is no time limit prescribed for invoking the writ jurisdiction, the same has to be invoked within reasonable time. The phrase reasonable time will have to be considered keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of the case. Patently, in the case on hand, there has been delay of nearly 18 years by the petitioner in invoking the writ jurisdiction. As stated earlier, both the petitioner and R-7 are living in the same village and the land in question is also situated in the very village. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, this court is of the considered opinion that the inordinate delay by the writ petitioner in invoking the writ jurisdiction has not at all been properly explained and at any rate, the reasons offered by the writ petitioner does not satisfy the vanity of law. Moreover, it is pertinent to mention that the order impugned had been in respect of Form No. 7 submitted by R-7 for grant of occupancy rights. Though there has been an allegation to the effect that his brother A. R. Nanjundaiah had colluded with the appellant and has been declining to claim occupancy rights, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the participation of R-7 before the Land Tribunal, it is clear that the say of the writ petitioner in this regard is unacceptable. It is not made clear as to what is the locus standi of the writ petitioner to challenge the order of the Tribunal after a long lapse of 18 years in respect of a claim made by R-7. It is not made clear as to what is the locus standi of the writ petitioner to challenge the order of the Tribunal after a long lapse of 18 years in respect of a claim made by R-7. There is no clear material forthcoming that R-7 had submitted Form No. 7 as Manager of the joint family. In other words, the Form No. 7 submitted by R-7 was in his own individual capacity. Such being the case, we are unable to understand as to how the appellant could be treated as an aggrieved party to invoke the writ jurisdiction after a long lapse of time. The facts and circumstances of the case show that there had been unjustifiable laches and undue delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this court. In this context, it is necessary to mention that in a decision reported in (2000) 6 SCC 562 (Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Jyothishchandra Bishwas), the Apex Court has held that delay of 15 years in invoking the writ jurisdiction was unjustifiable. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the ratio laid down in the said decision, we are of the considered opinion that the claim of the writ petitioner is totally unjustifiable and the same is liable to be dismissed in the ends of justice. ( 9 ) NOW, coming to Writ Appeal No. 4677/1999, at the outset it should be mentioned that the entire proceedings in this regard originate from a Form No. 7 submitted by R-3 and his brother A. R. Nanjundaiah (whose claim had been rejected by the Tribunal vide order annexed in the writ petition detailed supra ). These two applicants had submitted Form No. 7 before the Tribunal seeking grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question on 29. 5. 1991. The bone of contention of the appellant is that the said application was a belated application and the Tribunal ought not to have entertained and considered the said application. The said applicants tried to take shelter under a Government Circular issued in Kam. E. 177. ISM. 87 dated 16. 3. 1991. A copy of this circular has been made available and is marked as Annexure-P in the proceedings. On careful perusal of the said circular, it is seen that it confines to the lands covered under Inam Abolition Act and claims thereunder. E. 177. ISM. 87 dated 16. 3. 1991. A copy of this circular has been made available and is marked as Annexure-P in the proceedings. On careful perusal of the said circular, it is seen that it confines to the lands covered under Inam Abolition Act and claims thereunder. Patently, the applicants had submitted their application under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. Such being the case, the applicants, at any rate, could not have taken shelter under this circular. The Land Tribunal should have considered this aspect in the first instance and thereafter should have ventured to consider the case on merits. In the course of arguments, no submission had been made on behalf of R-3 contending to the contrary to the contents of the circular and the submission of the appellant in this regard. In other words, patently, the claim of the applicants in this regard is totally barred and the Tribunal had no option but to turn down their claim. We also hasten to add that out of the two applicants, vide proceedings of the Tribunal dated 4. 9. 1997, it is clear that the brother of R-3 i. e. , second applicant, did appear before the Tribunal and made a submission praying for deletion of his name from the proceedings and particularly on the ground that he had not been a signatory to Form No. 7. Accordingly, an order came to be passed by the Tribunal and the same has become final. In other words, only R-3 and his alleged claim remains to be considered. The discussion supra and the facts and circumstances of the case disclose that the claim of R-3 was barred by time. In fact, the Chairman of the Tribunal, while considering the case of the applicant, considered this aspect in the proper perspective and also made a mention that Form No. 7 seeking occupancy rights under the provisions of Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act should have been submitted on or before 30. 6. 1979 and the claim of the applicants had been turned down mainly on that score. ( 10 ) INCIDENTALLY, it may also be mentioned that the Chairman had also considered that the land in question was an inam land and on 5. 6. 1972, there had been an order of regrant and that order had not been challenged by any of the said applicants. ( 10 ) INCIDENTALLY, it may also be mentioned that the Chairman had also considered that the land in question was an inam land and on 5. 6. 1972, there had been an order of regrant and that order had not been challenged by any of the said applicants. However, by majority, a decision came to be passed granting occupancy rights in respect of the land in question in favour of R-3. This had been the subject matter of Writ Petition No. 3496/1998 and the learned Single Judge, on 8. 3. 1999, passed the order allowing the writ petition and the matter had been remitted to the Land Tribunal for rehearing. The legality and validity of the said order is in question before us. The discussion supra clearly shows that the claim of R-3 was barred by time and the Tribunal ought not to have ignored this aspect. In this context, it is necessary to mention a decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1998 SC 1070 , wherein it has been held that it cannot be said that Section 48-A of the Act is capable of more than one interpretation -one leading to injustice and another permitting avoidance of such injustice to tenants. Therefore, the application filed under Section 45 long after the date specified under Section 48-A would be barred by Section 48-A. The ratio laid down in this decision also supports our view. ( 11 ) NOW, the other point that requires our consideration is regarding the locus standi of R- 3. To deal with this aspect, we feel it necessary to mention a few facts which are required to be mentioned to arrive at a just conclusion. The land in question had been as service inam land attached to erstwhile hereditary office of Shanbhogues which office came to be abolished by enacting the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. The material on record also goes to show that the Assistant Commissioner of Doddaballapura Sub-Division, by order dated 5. 6. 1972, regranted the land in favour of A. R. Seetharamaiah and in favour of A. R. Venkataramaiah. This also goes to show that the land had been regranted prior to coming into force of the amended provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 6. 1972, regranted the land in favour of A. R. Seetharamaiah and in favour of A. R. Venkataramaiah. This also goes to show that the land had been regranted prior to coming into force of the amended provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. By virtue of the provisions of the Act and the precedent law, it is clear that there was no vesting of land under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act as contended by the learned counsel for R-3. In this regard, it is also necessary to mention that the brother of R-3 had already fought out the litigation before the Land Tribunal seeking grant of occupancy rights and his claim had been turned down by the order of the Land Tribunal, which had been the subject matter of the writ petition referred to above. The order of the Land Tribunal had not been challenged and the same had become final. The appellant had purchased the land in question from R-7 vide registered sale deed dated 3. 4. 1993. The material on record also goes to show that the Land Tribunal had also issued an endorsement that there was no tenancy claim pending in respect of the land in question. The material on record also goes to show that the appellant had got converted the land in question and had also raised a loan of Rs. 13. 5 lakhs from K. S. F. C. and has been running a bricks kiln industry in the land. ( 12 ) SO far as R-3 and his claim is concerned, it is necessary to mention that the brother of R-3 had fought out the litigation nearly 18 years earlier to submission of the second application seeking grant of occupancy rights. The material on record goes to show that R-3 has tried to maintain a claim on the basis of Form No. 7 submitted on 29. 5. 1991 which was highly belated and the Tribunal ought not to have considered the case of R-3 on merits at all. R-3, by virtue of the said writ proceedings, also wants to revive the order of the Tribunal, which had been passed almost 18 years ago, through the said writ proceedings. In other words, R-3 wants to proceed with two parallel proceedings in respect of the land in question, which is totally impermissible in law. R-3, by virtue of the said writ proceedings, also wants to revive the order of the Tribunal, which had been passed almost 18 years ago, through the said writ proceedings. In other words, R-3 wants to proceed with two parallel proceedings in respect of the land in question, which is totally impermissible in law. In other words, R-3 cannot be permitted to ride two horses at a time, one to prosecute the said writ proceedings and another to pursue his Form No. 7 submitted by him on 29. 5. 1991, It is necessary to mention that the law permits a litigant to fight out a litigation and seek redressal in respect of his claim in one form and in only one forum. A litigant cannot be allowed to proceed with two parallel proceedings and seek redressal. The fact that R-3 has been prosecuting both the proceedings even as on today goes to show that R-3 has been fighting out an unrighteous claim in a most unceremonious way. So far as the writ petition is concerned, the discussion supra goes to show that the writ petition is devoid of merits and so far as the claim of R-3 so far as the writ appeal is concerned, the Form No. 7 submitted by him is totally barred by time. It may not be out of context, if it is mentioned that the object of legislation in that area is to protect the interests of a tenant and see that the tiller would get the land for cultivation. But, the way in which R-3 has been fighting out the litigation goes to show that atleast there are no bonafides in his claim and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, if cannot be said that R-3 has been trying to protect his interest as a farmer to have the benefit of the land, but it is totally otherwise. In addition, it is also necessary to mention that R-3 had filed a suit in O. S. No. 186/1984 before the City Civil Court for partition and the same had ended in dismissal vide judgment dated 19. 6. 1987. R-3 had filed yet another suit in O. S. No. 894/1996 before the erstwhile Civil Judge again for partition and the same is pending adjudication. 6. 1987. R-3 had filed yet another suit in O. S. No. 894/1996 before the erstwhile Civil Judge again for partition and the same is pending adjudication. These aspects atleast go to show that the claim of R-3 and his say in this regard is not as straight and simple as it appears to be. ( 13 ) IN this regard, we feel it necessary to mention that this High Court, in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Gouravva and ors. , reported in 1993 (4) Kar. L. J. 399, has held thus: by a careful consideration of the scope of Section 8 it is seen that the tribunal gets jurisdiction to grant occupancy under the Act in favour of the lessee in respect of the lands governed by the Act of 1961 (KVOA Act) only if it is established that the land was lawfully leased and the lease was subsisting as on 1. 3. 1974 in which case only the rights and liabilities of the regrantee under Section 5, 6 or 7 are, subject to the provision of the Act of 1961 (KVOA Act), governed by the tenancy law and not otherwise. On careful perusal of the said decision, it is seen that the Tribunal would get jurisdiction to grant occupancy rights in respect of the lands covered under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act only if it is established that the said land was lawfully used and the lease was subsisting as on 1. 3. 1974. From the material on record, it is seen that R-3 had failed to establish that there had been a lawful lease and the lease was subsisting as on 1. 3. 1974. Even considering the case of R-3 on merits, in view of the law laid down in the said decision, it is clear that the claim of R-3 is totally unjustifiable. ( 14 ) IT is also necessary to consider the other submission made by the learned counsel for R-3 that the purchase of land by the appellant had been within the statutory period and as such the transfer of land is null and void and such transfer will have to be cancelled, and the land should vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. In this regard, the learned counsel for R-3 had relied upon the provisions of Section 5 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act. In this regard, the learned counsel for R-3 had relied upon the provisions of Section 5 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act. On careful perusal of the said provision of law, it is seen that the proceedings in this behalf will have to be at the instance of the Government for resumption of the land and to deal with the same in accordance with Law. Patently, no such proceedings have been initiated and having regard to the position of R-3 in the case, in our opinion, he has no locus standi to question the said proceedings. ( 15 ) THE discussion, supra clearly goes to show that the said writ petition is devoid of merits and on account of the laches and delay on the part of the writ petitioner -R-3, this court cannot exercise its writ jurisdiction and grant any relief claimed in the writ petition. The discussion also goes to show that the Form No. 7 submitted by R-3 before the Tribunal on 29. 5. 1991 was totally belated and the Tribunal ought not to have entertained the claim in this regard and the whole exercise done by the Tribunal and also by the learned Single Judge are of no legal consequence. Hence, we have no hesitation to hold that the Form No. 7 submitted by R-3 on 29. 5. 1991 is liable to be rejected and consequently, all other proceedings in this behalf become non-est. ( 16 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in the writ petition and the order impugned in the writ appeal is illegal and invalid and the same require to be interfered with by this court to meet the ends of justice. ( 17 ) IN the result, we pass the following order: the Writ Petition is dismissed and the Writ Appeal is allowed as prayed. The order impugned in the Writ Appeal is hereby set aside and consequently, the Form No. 7 submitted by R-3 on 29. 5. 1991 stands rejected. Parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .