JUDGMENT B. P. DAS, J. — The petitioner in this application under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short ‘Cr.P.C.’) has prayed for quashing the order dated 31.3.2001 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sadar, Cuttack in G.R.Case No. 1464 of 1994 corresponding to Lalbag P.S.Case No. 217 of 1994 taking cognizance of the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner under Secs. 120-B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (‘I.P.C.’ in short). 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the petition¬er, as disclosed in this application, is that the petitioner after serving under the State Govt. in various capacities retired on superannuation in the year 1995 and during the period from 24.7.1968 to 31.12.1969 he was posted as the Land Acquisition Officer, Cuttack. On 1.9.1994 the Addl. Land Acquisition Officer, Cuttack, lodged an F.I.R. with the Inspector-in-charge of Lalbag Police Station stating therein that for establishment of Aviation Research Center at Charbatia, Cuttack, certain lands in Mouza Jajbhairaba were acquired by the State Govt. for which necessary notification under Sec. 4 (1) and declaration under Sec. 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act were made on 7.5.1965 and 23.5.1965 respectively. In the F.I.R., which is enclosed to this applica¬tion as Annexure-2, it was further stated that the lands acquired by the State Govt. originally belonged to an ex-intermediary, namely, Sayed Mahammad Malia and others, who, during the year 1948-49, having left India for East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and settled there, one Janaki Ballav Das Mohapatra of village Tulsi¬pur, Dist. Cuttack, claiming himself to be the real owner raised a fraudulent and false claim for compensation in Land Acquisition Case No. 24 of 1967-68 in respect of an area of Ac. 0.14 decs. appertaining to plot No. 177 of Khata No. 256 in Mouza Jajbhaira¬ba, Touzi No. 8274. It was alleged in the FIR that said J.B.Das Mohapatra, who had no right, title or interest over the aforesaid land acquired by the State, as well as his son, Soumendra Nandan Das Mohapatra, had influenced the then Land Acquisition Collec¬tor, who under such influence and connivance passed a consolidat¬ed award in favour of said J.B.Das Mohapatra. On the death of J.B.Das Mohapatra, his son Soumendra Nandan Das Mohapatra, re¬ceived the awarded amount of compensation of Rs. 322/- on 15.10.1968 in respect of the acquired land. On the death of J.B.Das Mohapatra, his son Soumendra Nandan Das Mohapatra, re¬ceived the awarded amount of compensation of Rs. 322/- on 15.10.1968 in respect of the acquired land. As it appears from the record, a reference was made thereaf¬ter at the instance of certain persons claiming to be the land oustees to the learned Sub-Judge, 1st Court, Cuttack, in L.A.No. 3/1985 for determination of market value of the lands. The aforesaid FIR was registered as Lalbag P.S.Case No. 217 of 1994. After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted under Secs. 120-B and 420 of the I.P.C. against the present petitioner as well as the awardee-Soumendra Nandan Das Mohapatra. 3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, at no point of time till passing of the final award under Sec. 11 of the L.A.Act on 13.5.1968, the petitioner was in the picture as he joined as the Land Acquisition Officer, Cuttack, on 24.7.1968. It was further submitted that in due discharge of his statutory functions as the Land Acquisition Officer, the petitioner was duty bound to act upon the award on his joining as L.A.O. on 24.7.1968 and as he had little scope to interfere with the award passed under Sec. 11 of the L.A.Act, which under the law had attained its finality, he had to make payment in terms of the award passed by his predecessor in office and to do such acts subsequent to the award, like referring the matter to the Court under Sec. 18 of the Act for fixation of market value of the acquired land. Further, there was nothing in the FIR to make out a case either under Sec. 420 of Section 120-B of the I.P.C. against the petitioner and the allegations made in the FIR were about the passing of the consolidated award by the then L.A.O. Basing upon the extracts of the service book of the petitioner, Annexure-1, from which it appears that the petitioner joined as the L.A.O., Cuttack, on 24.7.1968, and even accepting the FIR and the charge-sheet, which are Annexures-2 and 3 respectively, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even taking all those materials in their entirety, no case was made out against the petitioner and continuance of the criminal pro¬ceeding would only give mental torture to a retired Govt. serv¬ant. 4. serv¬ant. 4. During the course of hearing of this application, this Court directed the Investigating Officer to file an affidavit disclosing the name of the officer who passed the award and the I.O. has accordingly filed an affidavit. In paragraph 6 of the said affidavit, which is most relevant reads thus : “6. That it appears from the records seized by this deponent that the award in the aforesaid L.A.Case No. 24 of 1967-68 has been passed on 13.5.68 by the Ex Land Acquisition Officer (Madan Mohan Mohanty) deciding the entitlement of different awardees. However the petitioner while continuing as the Land Acquisition Officer has disbursed the awarded amount to different awardees on several dates and therefore he has been implicated in this case.” From the aforesaid, it is crystal clear that the award in question was passed on 13.5.1968 by one Madan Mohan Mohanty, who had also decided the entitlement of different claimants, while he was posted as the L.A.O. and the petitioner had only disbursed the amounts to different awardees on different dates. The I.O. in paragraph 7 of the affidavit has stated that the petitioner was acting as the L.A.O. from 30.8.1968 to 31.8.1968, 31.8.1968 to 2.4.1969 and from 17.12.1969 to 31.12.1969. Hence the fact re¬mains, the award was passed on 13.5.1968 and the entitlement of different awardees was decided by Shri Madan Mohan Mohanty, the predecessor of the petitioner. In the aforesaid affidavit, it is disclosed that suits have been filed by the State Govt. for declaration of the title of the State Govt. over the present land as well as several other similar lands and the said suits are pending in the Court of the Civil Judge (S.D.), 1st Court, Cut¬tack. 5. The aforesaid contention on behalf of the petitioner has to be examined in the background of the facts narrated above. 6. It is well recognised by law that the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. may interfere with an order taking cognizance of the offence alleged to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, but that power can only be exercised with due care and caution, and sparingly, and in certain circum¬stances, which have been enumerated by the Apex Court in its decision reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 : State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and one of such circumstances is that where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the com¬plaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. In S.W.Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, 2001 (8) Supreme 216 , the Apex Court dealing with Section 482, Cr.P.C. pointed out : “........ No doubt, exercise of inherent power under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C. by High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions but in a case where ingredients of alleged offences are not satisfied even prima facie, it cannot be said that power under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C. should not be exercised to quash the process issued by a Magistrate.......” The Apex Court in the aforesaid S.W.Palanitkar’s case referred to its two earlier decisions in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, 1999 (8) SCC 686 , and Medchi Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. 2000 (3) SCC 269 and relied upon the fol¬lowing observations made in the latter case : “........ exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent power as envisaged under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C. to have the complaint or the charge-sheet quashed is an exception rather than a rule and the case for quashing at the initial stage must have to be treated as rarest of rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution...... In the event, however, the Court on perusal of the complaint comes to a conclusion that the allegations levelled in the complaint or charge-sheet on the face of it does not constitute or disclose any offence as alleged, there ought not to be any hesitation to rise up to the expectation of the people and deal with the situa¬tion as it required under the law.” 7. Keeping in view the aforesaid position of law, it is to be seen whether in the present case there is anything on record which make out a prima facie case against the petitioner as alleged accepting the prosecution case in its entirety. 8. The prosecution does not dispute the fact that the petitioner joined as the L.A.O. on 24.7.1968 and the award had been passed by his predecessor on 13.5.1968 under Sec. 11 of the L. A. Act. Section 12 of the L. A. Act provides - “12. 8. The prosecution does not dispute the fact that the petitioner joined as the L.A.O. on 24.7.1968 and the award had been passed by his predecessor on 13.5.1968 under Sec. 11 of the L. A. Act. Section 12 of the L. A. Act provides - “12. Award of Collector when to be final - (1) Such award shall be filed in the Collector’s office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as be¬tween the Collector and the person interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and the apportionment of the compen¬sation among the persons interested. (2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.” 9. From the facts of the case, it appears that Soumendra Nandan Das Mohapatra received the awarded amount on 15.10.1968. It is further revealed that on a reference made under Sec. 18 of the L. A. Act, the learned Sub-Judge, Cuttack, enhanced the valua¬tion fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer, which was ultimately challenged by the State Govt. in this Court and thereafter in the Apex Court. The FIR discloses that though J.B.Das Mohapatra had no right, title, interest or possession over the acquired land and had no scrap of paper in support of his claim, he and his son-S.N.Das Mohapatra influenced the then L. A. Officer, who, in collusion and connivance with the said fictitious claimants passed a consolidated award in favour of the J.B.,Das Mohapatra and after the death of J.B.Das Mohapatra, his son S.N.Das Mohapa¬tra received the compensation of Rs. 322/- awarded in respect of the acquired land of Ac. 0.14 decs. on 15.10.1988. 10. The FIR and the affidavit filed by the I.O. disclose that the present petitioner as the Land Acquisition Officer had only acted in accordance with the statutory provisions and discharged his statutory duties after the award was passed and made final. 11. In order to constitute an offence under Sec. 420, IPC, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the ingredients of ‘cheating’ as enumerated in Section 415, IPC which is as follows: “415. 11. In order to constitute an offence under Sec. 420, IPC, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the ingredients of ‘cheating’ as enumerated in Section 415, IPC which is as follows: “415. Cheating - Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’. Explanation - A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” The Apex Court in the case of Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B., AIR 1954 SC 724 , observed that in order to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in exist¬ence at the time when the inducement was offered. In the case of G.V.Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, 2000 (3) SCC 693 , the Apex Court indicated : “As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must, ‘dishonestly’ or ‘fraudulent¬ly’ induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fradulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional......” A guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, ‘mens rea’ on the part of that person, must be established (See AIR 1956 SC 575 : Jaswan¬trai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay). 12. In the case at hand, except saying that the petitioner had disbursed the awarded amount, no other act has been contributed to him which would make out an offence under Sec. 420, IPC alleged to have been committed by him. 13. So far as the offence under Sec. 120-B, IPC is con¬cerned, the same relates to criminal conspiracy and the punish¬ment for the said offence is the same as for abetment of such offence, which is the object of conspiracy. 13. So far as the offence under Sec. 120-B, IPC is con¬cerned, the same relates to criminal conspiracy and the punish¬ment for the said offence is the same as for abetment of such offence, which is the object of conspiracy. ‘Criminal conspiracy’ is defined in Section 120-A of the IPC as follows : “When two or more persons agree do to, or cause to be done - (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy : Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation-It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.” 14. Here, prima facie there is nothing to indicate that there was any agreement between the petitioner and others to do one or other of the acts described in the aforesaid section. The essence of criminal conspiracy, as the definition shows, is that there must be an agreement between two or more persons to do one or the other of the acts described in the section. The conspiracy consists not merely of the intention of two or more but in an agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. These ingredients are totally absent in this case so far as the present petitioner is concerned. Even if the entire story of the prosecution is accepted in its entirety, analysing the evidence and statements on record the irresistible conclusion would be that conspiracy, if any, has been hatched out and materialised the day the award was passed, which was prior to the joining of the petitioner as the Land Acquisition Officer. Whatever the petitioner had done, that was subsequent to the passing of the award and in terms of the statutory provisions of the L. A. Act. 15. Whatever the petitioner had done, that was subsequent to the passing of the award and in terms of the statutory provisions of the L. A. Act. 15. The Apex Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Samb¬hajirao Chandrojirao Angre, 1988 (1) SCC 692 , dealing with the quashing of cognizance held : “The legal position is well settled that when a prose¬cution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted alle¬gations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to contin¬ue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” 16. In the case at hand, I have already said that the petitioner neither passed the award nor is there anything to rope him in with the offences under Secs. 420 and 120-B of the I.P.C. The materials on record do not establish a prima facie case of commission of the offences as alleged against the petitioner under Secs. 420 and 120-B of the I.P.C. nor the ingredients of the said sections are satisfied in this case. As such, the chances of conviction of the petitioner in the criminal case are bleak and it will not be proper to allow the criminal proceeding to continue against the petitioner. I, therefore, quash the criminal proceeding in so far as the petitioner is concerned in G.R.Case No. 1464 of 1994 on the file of the S.D.J.M., Sadar, Cuttack. 17. The Criminal misc. case is accordingly allowed. Crl. Misc. Case allowed.