MAHEMMAD HABEEB SHAMS ANSARI, J. ( 1 ) PLAINTIFF-DECREE holder has filed the instant execution application for execution of the decree dated December 23, 1988. Application has been filed into Court on March 12, 2003 and affidavit in support of the tabular statement has been affirmed on behalf of the decree holder by Shri Shivbhagwan Bagaria on March 11, 2003. ( 2 ) DECREE is sought to be executed for the sum of Rs. 2,54,100/- being the rents, outstanding due and payable on and from the month of April, 2000 at the rate of Rs. 7,260/- for 35 months i. e. upto February, 2003. Thus, according to the decree holder as the judgment debtor committed default, plaintiff is entitled to execute the decree as per the prayers in the tabular statement. ( 3 ) MR. Suresh Agarwal, party in person placed before Court the affidavit-in-opposition filed by him. Objection has been taken therein with regard to the maintainability of the execution application on two grounds. Firstly, on the ground that execution application is barred by limitation. The decree is dated December 23, 1988 whereas the limitation prescribed for execution of such decree being 12 years having elapsed. Secondly, on the ground that the plaintiff was to get the lease deed registered with the Registrar at the cost of the defendants, which the plaintiff failed to carry out its obligation. ( 4 ) MR. Sarkar, learned Advocate assisted by Mr. I. L. Deyahia for the decree holder contended that the execution application is filed within the limitation period reckoned from the default committed by the defendant-judgment debtor. In other words, it is contended that as defendant defaulted in payment of rent on and from the month of April, 2000, the execution application is within limitation. ( 5 ) IT is by now well settled that ordinarily a decree becomes enforceable immediately after the judgment is pronounced. However, there may be situations when a decree may not be enforceable on the date it is passed. Usually, this situation arises where in the decree itself the right of the decree holder depends on the happening of certain event or on fulfillment of certain other conditions by the parties in the case or by an external agency, under any provision of law. In the instant case, the decree is dated December 23, 1988 and it is recited therein that; ?. . . In the instant case, the decree is dated December 23, 1988 and it is recited therein that; ?. . . The parties having agreed to the terms of settlement in the schedule hereunder written. It is declared with the consent of the parties. . . That the said terms of settlement be recorded and ought to be carried out and the same are ordered and decreed accordingly. . . . ? The terms of settlement are annexed to the decree being the schedule referred to in the decree. In my view, therefore, the decree was enforceable from December 23, 1988 as it was not dependent on happening of or fulfillment of any conditions prescribed in the decree. ( 6 ) THE provision of Limitation Act, which is applicable, in this case is Article 136, which reads as under; Description of Period of Time from which application Limitation period begins to run 136. For the Twelve [when] the decree or order execution of years becomes enforceable any decree   or where the decree (other than a   or any subsequent order decree granting   directs any payment a mandatory   of money or the delivery injunction or   of any property to be made order of any   at a certain date or at civil court. recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place; Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation. ( 7 ) AS per the above statutory provisions, the period of 12 years is to be computed from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable. Limitation starts by reason of the statutory provision as prescribed in the statue. It is well settled that time does not stop running at the instance of any individual, unless of course the same has statutory sanction, being conditional. It is equally well settled that the fixation of periods of limitation are bound to be to some extent arbitrary and may at times result in hardship. It is equally settled that limitation bars a remedy but does not extinguish a right. It is equally well settled that the fixation of periods of limitation are bound to be to some extent arbitrary and may at times result in hardship. It is equally settled that limitation bars a remedy but does not extinguish a right. ( 8 ) IN the light of the contentions raised before Court in the case of hand, the foremost question that arises for consideration is when did the decree sought to be executed in the present case become enforceable. Was it from April 2000 when the defendant committed default in payment of the rents or from the date of pronouncement of judgment being December 23, 1988. As already noticed [supra], the decree became enforceable on the date of its pronouncement on December 23, 1988. There is no stipulation in the decree with regard to the payment of monthly rents. The terms of settlement annexed as schedule to the decree envisaged a deed of lease being executed in terms thereof. The decree itself does not provide for recurring payment of rents or the dates such payment is to be made or for execution of the decree when default in making the payment of monthly rent takes place. ( 9 ) IN my view, therefore, the instant application filed beyond the prescribed period of 12 years under Article 136 of the Limitation Act is barred by limitation. ( 10 ) AS regards the contention of Mr. Sarkar that the terms of settlement constitute part of the decree and, therefore, any default in payment of rent as stipulated in the terms of settlement can be enforced by execution of decree, in my view, such contention is not open to the plaintiff decree holder for the reasons hereinafter stated. In terms of the settlement being schedule to the decree, it is provided in Clause 11 as under; ?leave is granted to obtain registration of the decree. ? Clause 12 reads as under; ?in case, the said defendant commits any default in complying with any of the terms of the decree passed the plaintiff will be entitled to execute the decree forthwith. ? ( 11 ) IF the contention of Mr. ? Clause 12 reads as under; ?in case, the said defendant commits any default in complying with any of the terms of the decree passed the plaintiff will be entitled to execute the decree forthwith. ? ( 11 ) IF the contention of Mr. Sarkar is to be understood, as I understand the same to be, that as the decree incorporates the indenture of lease in the terms of settlement, the decree can be executed for the default committed by the defendant of any such provision contained in the indenture of lease. It is true that in the terms of settlement lease and the terms governing the same have been incorporated amongst other terms. Thus, by the decree for the first time right, title or interest in immoveable property has been created in favour of the defendant-judgment debtor. The decree in question has not been registered and in my view, unless so registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, it is not enforceable. It was thereupon contended by Mr. Sarkar that under section 17 (2) of the Registration Act, decree or order of Court including a decree or order on a compromise is exempt from registration. ( 12 ) SUB section (1) of section 17 mandates that the instruments enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) shall be registered compulsorily if the property to which they relate is immoveable property, the value of which is Rs. 100/- or upwards. When the document purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest therein, whether vested or contingent, it has to be registered compulsorily. In Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, 1995 (5) SCC 709 Supreme Court observed that the Court must enquire whether a document has recorded unqualified and unconditional words of present demise of right, title and interest in the property and included the essential terms of the same; if the document, including a compromise memo, extinguishes the rights of one and seeks to confer right, title or interest in presenti in favour of the other, relating to immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- and upwards, the document or record or compromise memo shall be compulsorily registered. 100/- and upwards, the document or record or compromise memo shall be compulsorily registered. In the same judgment, it was observed that sub section (2) of section 17 of the Act engrafts exception to the instruments covered only by Clauses (b) and (c) of sub section (1 ). It was further observed that Clause (vi) of sub section (2) of section 17 relates to any decree or order of Court, except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding. On the construction of the said Clause (vi), Supreme Court was of the view that the exception engrafted is meant to cover that decree or order of a Court, including a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which declares a pre-existing right and does not by itself create a new right title or interest in presenti in immoveable property of the value of Rs. 100/- or upwards. The legal position qua Clause (vi) was summarised in that judgment as under: ? (1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp duty and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not require registration. In a converse situation, it would require registration. (2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first time right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 or upwards in favour of any party to the suit the decree or order would require registration. (3) If the decree were not to attract any of the clauses of sub-section (1) of section 17, as was the position in the aforesaid Privy Council and this Court's cases, it is apparent that the decree would not require registration. (4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of compromise, as was the position in Lahore case, benefit from the terms of compromise cannot be derived, even if a suit were to be disposed of because of the compromise in question. (5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the ? (4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of compromise, as was the position in Lahore case, benefit from the terms of compromise cannot be derived, even if a suit were to be disposed of because of the compromise in question. (5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the ? subject-matter of the suit or proceeding?, clause (vi) of sub-section (2) would not operate, because of the amendment of this clause by Act 21 of 1929, which has its origin in the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council, according to which the original clause would have been attracted, even if it were to encompass property not litigated. ? ( 13 ) JUDGED in the light of the above, it will be seen that by incorporation of indenture of lease in the terms of settlement, the decree created a right or title in the defendant as tenant on and from 1st day of April, 1981 for a period of 35 years. It is not a declaration of pre-existing right. The case on hand thus squarely falls under proposition (2) above. The decree required registration. Such decree not having been registered, the contention of Mr. Sarkar has to be rejected. ( 14 ) IN the circumstances and for the reasons aforestated, it must be held that the objection as to the maintainability of the execution application on the first ground taken by the defendant-judgment debtor herein that it is barred by limitation has to be upheld. ( 15 ) IN view of the conclusions, as above, with respect to registration of decree the second ground taken by the judgment debtor as regards the registration of the lease deed has to be and is accordingly rejected. ( 16 ) IN the result, the execution application is liable to be and is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed