JUDGMENT 1. - Vide this order, application under Section 482 Cr. PC. moved on behalf of the complainant on 6-2-2003 is being decided. It has been prayed vide this application that order-sheet dated 31-1.2003 may be corrected and the order dictated in the open Court dismissing the petition may be restored. 2. Reply to this application is filed on behalf of the accused petitioner. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and learned Public Prosecutor. 4. The relevant facts in brief are that police after investigation filed a charge-sheet against the accused petitioner and others under Section 147, 148, 302/149 I.P.C. After committal of this case, the Sessions Case No. 112/2001 was registered which is pending trial in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Hindaun City. An application under Section 439 Cr.PC. was filed on behalf of the accused petitioner in the Court of learned Trial Judge, who vide his order dated 13-1-2001 directed the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hindaun City to inquire the age of the accused petitioner, as it was pleaded on behalf of the accused petitioner that he was below 18 years of age at the time of the occurrence. Learned A.U.M. after inquiry held vide order dated 8-2-2002 that the accused petitioner is not below the age of 18 years. 5. Thereafter, an application was moved on 26-10-2002 before the learned Trial Judge with a prayer that the date of birth of the accused petitioner was 1-1-1986 and thus he was below 18 years of age. It was further averred that the learned A.C.J.M. did not consider the entire evidence, hence the order dated 8-2-2002 should be set aside and the case be sent to the Juvenile Justice Board for determining the age of the accused petitioner. This application was dismissed vide order dated 12-11-2002 that inquiry regarding the age of the accused petitioner has already been finalised. Both the orders dated 8-2-2002 and 12-11-2002 were challenged by the accused petitioners vide this S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 65/2003 filed under Section 482 Cr.PC. 6. It is not disputed as mentioned in the application filed on behalf of the complainant on 6-2-2003 that this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was heard and order was dictated in the Court in presence of learned counsel for the parties and learned Public Prosecutor on 31-1-2003. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised two objections. 6. It is not disputed as mentioned in the application filed on behalf of the complainant on 6-2-2003 that this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was heard and order was dictated in the Court in presence of learned counsel for the parties and learned Public Prosecutor on 31-1-2003. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised two objections. First objection was that the learned A.U.M. had no jurisdiction, rather the Juvenile Justice Board was empowered to determine the age of the accused petitioner. Reliance was placed upon Ramdeo Chauhan alias Raj Nath v. State of Assam, (2001) 5 S.C.C. 714 . But this objection was not accepted. The second objection raised 4 was that on merits the findings of the learned A.C.J.M. regarding the age of the accused petitioner, being illegal should be set aside. But no decision on merits was given by this Court on the ground that findings regarding the age were not challenged in this petition and the accused petitioner may file another petition on merits. 7. Thereafter, on the same day counsel for the parties Shri Anurag Sharma for the accused petitioner, Shri A.K. Gupta for the complainant and learned Public Prosecutor were orally informed by the Court that it would be just and proper to decide the second contention raised by learned counsel i.e. this petition should be heard and decided on the merits also. Unfortunately, these facts could not be recorded in the order-sheet dated 31-1-2003 and for that I regret. Hence this petition was fixed for arguments as agreed by counsel for parties on 7-2-2003. But, arguments could not be heard on 7-2-2003, 18-2-2003 and 20-2-2003. Arguments were heard on 21-2-2003 and the order was kept reserved and the same was pronounced in the Court on 26-2-2003. 8. Vide order dated 26/2/2003 it was held that in view of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (in short the Act, 2000), it seems unnecessary in the instant case to decide the question as to whether the learned A.C.J.M. was competent or not to determine the age of the accused petitioner as the Sessions Case No. 112/2001 was and is pending before the learned Trial Judge and in accordance with Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act, 2000, learned Trial Judge was empowered to hold inquiry regarding the age of the accused petitioner. Regarding merits of the case, it was held by this Court that the learned A.C.J.M. failed to consider the material evidence oral as well as documentary and further he did not afford an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. Therefore, the orders dated 8-2-2002 and 12-11-2002 were set aside with a direction that the learned Trial Judge after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties would decide afresh the age of the accused petitioner within a period of one month. 9. Learned counsel for the complainant argued that since the order was dictated in the open Court on 31-1-2003, this Court became `functuous officio' according to Section 362 Cr.PC. Section 362 Cr.P.C. is applicable to the judgment delivered by Trial Courts. It provides that save as otherwise provided by this Code or any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. Obviously, the Section 362 Cr.RC. has no application in the instant case as the order dictated in the Court was taken down in short-hand but transcript of the same was not prepared and thus question does not arise for signing the same, because prior for to that both the counsel for the parties were informed by this Court to hear the petition on merits also. 10. Learned counsel for the complainant relied upon two judgments and contended that this Court had no power to re-hear this petition. In Surendra Singh and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1954 SC 194 , it was held that a judgment is the final decision of the Court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by formal pronouncement or delivery in open Court. Up to the moment the judgment is delivered, Judges have the right to change their mind. Therefore, however much a draft judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the Court. Up to the moment the judgment is delivered, Judges have the right to change their mind. Therefore, however much a draft judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the Court. In the case before the Hon'ble Apex Court, Hon'ble two Judges of the High Court heard an appeal in a criminal case and joint judgment was prepared and it was signed by one Judge and sent to other Judge but before its delivery he died and in these facts it was held that judgment, if delivered by the other Judge, is not a valid judgment. In Dhanna and others v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1963 Rajasthan 104 , facts were that a criminal appeal was heard by this Court in absence of the accused appellants and their counsels and judgment was delivered on merits in open Court but before the transcript of the judgment was prepared, an application was moved for hearing the counsel for the appellants. It was held that the appeal cannot be re-heared. It was further held that inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. (old Act) may and should be exercised very sparingly only when the facts of the case justify. 11. I have given thoughtful consideration to the above contentions advanced by learned counsel for the complainant. In view of both judgments cited hereinabove, I am of the opinion that both the judgments are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. At the cost of repetition it is stated that arguments on merits were 'not heard on 31-1-2003 although learned counsel for the accused petitioner argued this petition on merits also. What was held by this Court on 31-1-2003 has already been stated hereinabove. Thus no decision on merits was given by this Court on 31-1-2003. On the very day i.e. 31-1-2003 counsel for the parties were informed by this Court to hear this petition on merits also and no objection whatsoever was raised by learned counsel for the complainant and this fact has been admitted in reply of the application dated 6-2-2003. It is also significant to say here that this petition was adjourned four times after 31-1-2003 for hearing the arguments and the arguments were heard on 21-2-2003. It is also significant to say here that this petition was adjourned four times after 31-1-2003 for hearing the arguments and the arguments were heard on 21-2-2003. It is not disputed that learned counsel for the complainant raised this objection on 21-2-2003 that this Court had already dictated the order in the open Court on 31-1- 2003, hence this Court has no power to re-hear this petition. But the application dated 6-2-2003 was not brought on the notice of the Court and thus this application escaped my notice. Accused petitioner in para 2 of his reply has admitted this fact that counsel for the complainant had argued the matter on 21-2-2003 at length but the application in question was not even pressed into. It is also observed that unfortunately I was under the impression that learned counsel for the complainant is not serious on the point that this Court has no power to re-hear this petition, otherwise there was no reason not to discuss this aspect of the matter. 12. Now one more point arises as to whether this Court altered its decision vide order dated 26-2-2003 13. As stated hereinabove this Court came to this conclusion on 31-1-2003 that learned A.U.M. had jurisdiction to determine the age of the petitioner while vide order dated 26-2-2003, it was held that it is unnecessary to determine this question as to whether A.C.J.M. had jurisdiction or not to determine the age in view of specific provisions of Section 6(2) of the Act, 2000. On merits this Court did not decide this petition on 31-1-2003 and it was observed that the petitioner may approach again for the decision on merits and vide order dated 26-2-2003 it was held on merits that since the Sessions case is pending before the learned Trial Judge, he should determine the age of the accused petitioner in view of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act, 2000. Thus the question of determining the age was remanded to the learned Trial Judge and it shows that this Court did not decide the question of age finally on merits. In my humble opinion, no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the complainant vide order dated 26-2-2003. Transcription of the order taken down in short-hand on 31-1-2003 is on the record. In my humble opinion, no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the complainant vide order dated 26-2-2003. Transcription of the order taken down in short-hand on 31-1-2003 is on the record. To avoid multiplicity of the proceedings and to secure the ends of justice, it was thought proper to hear this petition on merits also and the facts of this case justify to exercise the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.PC. 14. Consequently, this application dated 6-2-2003 is hereby dismissed.Application Dismissed. *******