Judgment ( 1. ) BY this writ petition preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for issue of appropriate writ for quashment of notifications issued vide Annexures P-l and P-2 respectively on 29-4-1998 and 29-4-1999 by the Government of Madhya Pradesh Commercial taxes Department in exercise of power under Entry I of the Schedule I to the madhya Pradesh Commercial Tax Act, 1994 (for brevity the Act) and further to quash the order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Tax contained in Annexure P-3 and to pass such other orders as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 2. ) WE may at the outset state that though the reliefs have been stated to be manifold, the quintessential nature of the reliefs is to penetrate as has been indicated hereinabove. ( 3. ) SANS unnecessary details, the facts which are requisites to be stated for dealing with the controversy in question that the petitioner is a manufacturer of centrifugal pumps which are meant for use in agricultural activities. It is a small scale industry engaged in such pumps exclusively used for agricultural purposes and is a registered dealer possessing the necessary certificate of Registration under the Act. Various averments have been asseverated highlighting how the pumps manufactured by the petitioner come within the conception of agricultural equipments and how that has been not so treated by the Commissioner of Commercial Tax under Section 68 of the act. We shall advert to this facet at later stage after burrowing through the facet of constitutional validity of the notifications which are sought to be assailed. ( 4. ) IT is urged in the petition that Section 15 of the Act deals with the tax free goods and a postulate is laid down therein that no tax shall be paid on the sales or purchase of goods specified in the second column of Schedule i, subject to the restriction and exceptions referred to therein. Sub-section (2)of the aforesaid Section empowers the State Government to issue notification to amend Schedule I. It is putforth that if anatomy of Section 15 is scanned in proper perspective, it would be clear that it is a positive power conferred on the State Government to include a particular item by notification and there is no power for exclusion. Sub-section (2)of the aforesaid Section empowers the State Government to issue notification to amend Schedule I. It is putforth that if anatomy of Section 15 is scanned in proper perspective, it would be clear that it is a positive power conferred on the State Government to include a particular item by notification and there is no power for exclusion. It is also putforth that in the Schedule I which was earlier in vogue from 1-4-1995 to 31-8-1997 in the Entry No. 1 it was provided in regard to certain agricultural implements worked or operated exclusively by human or animal agency specified by the State Government by notification in the official Gazette. A reference has been made to Entry No. 89 which was in vogue up to 31-3-1999. It is set forth that under Entry No. 94 which was in force from 1-4-1995 to 31-8-1997 it had included all kinds of agricultural implements that worked with the aid of power or tractor. But in the recent notification which came into existence on 29th April, 1998 there was a somersault and all these items were excluded in the notification dated 29-4-99. After serial No. (55) the following serial, namely, centrifugal pumps up to 3 H. P. has been added. ( 5. ) A return has been filed by the respondents contending, inter alia, that challenge to the notifications on the ground of transgression of statutory power is absolutely untenable and unsustainable as the notifications have been issued totally in consonance with the power conferred on the State Government. The order passed by the Commissioner has been justified on many a ground. It is urged that the Centrifugal Pumps manufactured by the petitioner are the constituents of the pump sets and distinct from pumping set as is understood in common parlance, and therefore, the order passed by the commissioner in exercise of power under Section 68 of the Act can not be flawed. ( 6. ) WE have heard Mr. P. M. Choudhary, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. K. Yadav, learned Government Advocate for the State. ( 7. ) THE submissions of Mr. ( 6. ) WE have heard Mr. P. M. Choudhary, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. K. Yadav, learned Government Advocate for the State. ( 7. ) THE submissions of Mr. Choudhary can be compartmentalized into three arenas: (a) if the language employed under Section 15 and Schedule i is read in proper conjunction, there remains no trace of doubt that the State government has been conferred limited power to include certain categories of agricultural implements and there is no discretion left with it to exclude any equipment that comes within the concept of ambit and sweep of agricultural implements; (b) the reliance on the State Government on Schedule I to derive the power for issue of notification is totally mis-conceived as that ignores section 15 of the Act and such keeping aside the principal statutory provision not only transgresses the very basis of delegation but on the contrary Tantamounts to excessive delegation; and (c) even assuming that the notification is sustainable or tenable in law, the case of the petitioner would come within the Entry No. 89 of the earlier schedule which was in vogue till 31-3-1999 but the Commissioner has grossly erred in interpretation of the said entry of the schedule and recorded a finding in a cryptic manner that the petitioner is not entitled to any benefit on that score and such a conclusion is sensitively susceptible. ( 8. ) MR. Choudhary, learned Counsel for the petitioner, to buttress his submissions has placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Ruchi Fabrics Ltd. , Indore Vs. State of M. P. , (1997) 18 tld 72 and other decisions which are related to the concept of pumps and pumping sets. We are not referring to said decisions for the Simon pure reason the nature of order we are going to pass the said exercise is not necessary. ( 9. ) MR. S. K Yadav sounding contra note submitted that the case of ruchi Fabrics Ltd. (supra) is distinguishable inasmuch as the said decision was rendered when the Schedule was differently styled and the Apex Court in that backdrop had held that the executive had transgressed the power conferred on it. ( 10. ) TO appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar, it is appropriate to refer to Section 15 which deals with the tax free goods. ( 10. ) TO appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar, it is appropriate to refer to Section 15 which deals with the tax free goods. The said provision reads as under :-"15. Tax free goods.- (1) No tax shall be payable on the sales or purchase of goods specified in the second column of Schedule i, subject to the restriction and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof. (2) The State Government may in respect of any goods, by notification amend Schedule I, so as to include therein any goods not already specified or may relax or omit any of the conditions and exception set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof. " ( 11. ) ON a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is luminously clear that no tax should be levied in respect of goods specified in the second column of Schedule I subject to the restriction and exceptions set out in the said Schedule. Sub- section (2) of the aforesaid Section authorises the State government to issue notification to amend so as to include therein any goods not already specified. In addition the said provision also empowers the State government to relax or omit any of the conditions and exceptions set out in the corresponding entry in the third column. In the case of Ruchi Fabrics Ltd. (supra), Their Lordships were considering Section 10 of the M. P. General sales Tax Act and Schedule I as it then stood. Present Section 15 is pari materia to the earlier Section 10. Schedule I as it stood then covered "all varieties of cloth manufactured in mills or power looms by the hand looms including processed cloth". In the said case, the State Government in exercise of power conferred on it under Section 10 (2) amended Schedule I as a result whereof certain cloth that was covered by Schedule I, as it originally stood got excluded. This Court placed reliance upon Section 21 of the Madhya Pradesh General clauses Act, 1957. The Apex Court interpreting Section 10 (2) held as under "the High Court fell into error, Schedule I was a part of the original statute, that is to say, it was a creation of the legislature. This Court placed reliance upon Section 21 of the Madhya Pradesh General clauses Act, 1957. The Apex Court interpreting Section 10 (2) held as under "the High Court fell into error, Schedule I was a part of the original statute, that is to say, it was a creation of the legislature. By virtue of Section 10 (2) of the statute the State Government was given the power, by notification, to amend Schedule I only "so as to include therein goods not already specified or may relax or omit any of the conditions and exemptions set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof. The legislature, therefore, empowered the State Government to amend schedule I only to this extent that it could widen the scope thereof either by including therein goods which had not already got its benefit or by relaxing or removing conditions which were a prerequisite for obtaining the exemption hereunder. No power was conferred by the statute upon the State Government in any way to curtail the scope of Schedule I. Having regard to the express terms of Section 10 (2) reliance upon Section 21 of madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act was uncalled for. In any event, under Section 21 the power to issue a notification, order, rule or bye-law conferred by, a Madhya Pradesh Act is to be read as including a power to add to, amend vary or rescind the notification, order, rule or bye-law so issued. Section 21 has no application to a case such as this where the Schedule (Schedule i) is a part of the statute itself and not be creation of a notification, order, rule or bye-law. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 12. ) THE question that falls for adjudication in present case is whether the aforesaid decision would apply on all fours after an amendment to the Schedule has taken place. The distinctive features are worth noting. In the earlier case, the Schedule I included "all varieties of cloth manufactured in mills or power looms or hand looms including processed cloth". The State government amended the notification which was issued pursuant to power conferred under Section 10 (2), as a result of which certain categories of cloth which were covered by Schedule I stood excluded. In the earlier case, the Schedule I included "all varieties of cloth manufactured in mills or power looms or hand looms including processed cloth". The State government amended the notification which was issued pursuant to power conferred under Section 10 (2), as a result of which certain categories of cloth which were covered by Schedule I stood excluded. The Apex Court was of the view that in view of the language employed in the section, the State Government could not have issued a notification excluding the items which were included in the Schedule. It could only have added or included thereto. The present factual score is slightly different. Section 15 which corresponds to the earlier Section 10 remains as it is, but Schedule I has gone through a sea change. We are presently concerned with, the agricultural implements. Entry/item no. 1 of Schedule I was amended on 1-9-1997. At that juncture it read as under:-"agricultural implements as specified by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette. " ( 13. ) SCHEDULE I was again substituted by M. P. State Amendment Act, 2000 w. e. f. 15-3-2000. The Entry No. I remains the same. There has been no change whatsoever. Annexure P-l was issued in pursuance of the amended entry in Schedule I. Annexure P-2 is in addition to the notification issued vide annexure P-l. Thus, there remains no iota of doubt that both the notifications are fall out or the consequence of the notification issued under Entry No. 1 of schedule I. Submission of Mr. Choudhary is that when the primal provision only empowers for inclusion, the agricultural implements, namely, pumps could not have been excluded. Heavy reliance has been placed on Ruchi fabrics Ltd. (supra ). We have already indicated that when the decision in ruchi Fabrics Ltd. (supra) was rendered, the schedule was totally different. Items were provided in the schedule itself. The powers was conferred on the state Government to amend the schedule by Notification to include certain entries or items. To elaborate : the power was conferred to expand or extend but presently Schedule I in clear cut terms stipulates that the State Government can make the agricultural items tax free by bringing them within the net of a notification published in the official Gazette. Notifications have been published. To elaborate : the power was conferred to expand or extend but presently Schedule I in clear cut terms stipulates that the State Government can make the agricultural items tax free by bringing them within the net of a notification published in the official Gazette. Notifications have been published. No one claim that a particular agricultural equipment or implement should be brought within that notification. The matter would have been different, when a particular agricultural equipment would have been included in the Schedule and that would have been amended by issuing a notification. When a power conferred on Schedule I by the Legislature authorises in categorical terms the question of any kind of inclusion or exclusion, in our considered view, does not arise. Section 15 and Schedule I have to be read in a conjoint and harmonious manner and so read, we do not find that the notification runs counter or contravenes the mandate of Section 15 of the Act. On the contrary it is in consonance with the Entry I of Schedule I. ( 14. ) NEXT submission of Mr. Choudhary is that non-inclusion of pumps in the Entry I is totally and unreasonable. To bolster his submission, he has taken us through the previous entry to show that initially the entry included all types of agricultural implements worked or operated exclusively by human or animal agency but later on in the Entry No. 94 all kinds of agricultural implements worked with the aid of power or tractor were included and, therefore, there is no justification to exclude the agricultural implements worked with the aid of power or tractor. What the entry was in 1997 is of no consequence whatsoever. The State Government has vide Annexure P-l enumerated 55 entries but there was no specification. By notification dated 29-4-1999 serial No. (56) has been added which reads "centrifugal pumps up to 3 H. P. " It is the submission of Mr. Choudhary that categorisation of pumps up to 3 H. P. is unreasonable and has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The submission is that the petitioner company is in the manufacture of centrifugal pumps which can go up to 10 H. P. and all are utilized for the purpose of agriculture and agriculture being the general term covering a genus, classification or curtailment with the equipment up to 3 H. P. is arbitrary. The submission is that the petitioner company is in the manufacture of centrifugal pumps which can go up to 10 H. P. and all are utilized for the purpose of agriculture and agriculture being the general term covering a genus, classification or curtailment with the equipment up to 3 H. P. is arbitrary. The aforesaid argument on a first blush looks quite attractive but on a deeper probe pales into sans-vitality. The State Government has exercised its discretion and provided that the centrifugal pumps up to 3 H. P. would be covered. We do not find the classification is unreasonable or invites the frown of Article 14 of the constitution of India. We find the classification made by the State Government is totally reasonable and does not suffer from any kind of irrationality. That apart, no one can claim that a particular item has to be included in the notification unless such exclusion is totally arbitrary or unreasonable; The state Government has been given the discretion but the discretion must meet the requirement of Article 14. When we have already held it meets the requirement, we are not impressed by the proponent of Mr. Choudhary on that score. So we have no hesitation to hold that both the notification are intra vires. ( 15. ) THE last submission of Mr. Choudhary is that the items which are manufactured by the petitioner are covered under Entry No. 89 of the earlier Schedule. Entry No. 89 as it stood then reads as under :-"pumping sets below 10 Horse Power and accessories thereof. " it is submitted by Mr. Choudhary that the petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of pumps below 10 H. P. and accessories thereof, and hence it is entitled to the benefit which was to be given in terms of Entry No. 89 of the previous schedule. Learned Counsel has tried to build up a contention to show that there is no distinction between the pump and pumping set. He has also putforth that the Commissioner has not dealt with that aspect but has passed a cryptic order. To appreciate the aforesaid submission, we have perused the order contained in Annexure P-3. On a scrutiny of the same, we find that the commissioner has not addressed himself properly in that regard but has given an observation in regard to the difference. To appreciate the aforesaid submission, we have perused the order contained in Annexure P-3. On a scrutiny of the same, we find that the commissioner has not addressed himself properly in that regard but has given an observation in regard to the difference. As the matter has to be analysed from various facets we think that the Commissioner should adjudicate the controversy afresh. Ergo, we quash the order passed by the Commissioner and direct the Commissioner to deal with the aforesaid aspect in accordance with law. We may hasten to add that the Commissioner shall pass a reasoned and cogent order. As the matter has been pending for long, the Commissioner shall issue a notice to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the order. Needless to say that it would be open to the petitioner to raise all his contentions before the Commissioner in this spectrum and the commissioner shall deal with therein accordance with the law. ( 16. ) THE writ petition is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.