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2003 DIGILAW 351 (PNJ)

Mohinder Paul, Ex. Constable v. State Of Punjab

2003-02-26

S.S.NIJJAR

body2003
Judgment S.S.Nijjar, J. 1. In this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders dated 13.08.1984, 26.11.1934 and 25.07.1987. He also seeks a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to reinstate him from the date he was dismissed from service with all consequential benefit. 2. The facts as pleaded by the parties in the writ petition, may briefly be noticed. 3. The petitioner was enrolled as Constable in the Punjab Police Department, District Ludhiana, on 08.07.1975. The petitioner claims that he has not been punished during the period of his service excepting the one punishment imposed by order dated 13.08.1984. On 12.03.1984, a charge-sheet dated 24.12.1983, was served on the petitioner. The substance of the charge-sheet is as under:- "You, constable Mohinder Paul No.379, when you were posted at Police Station, Samraia, absented yourself vide D.D. Report No. 10 dated 10.9.83 at 10 A.M. and you reported back at the police station at 5.15 P.M. dated 3.12.83. Thus, you remained absent for 2 months, 22 days, 7 hours and 15 minutes. You remained absent without permission and leave. You, constable Mohinder Paul No.379, returned after absence of 2 months, 22 days, 7 hours and 15 minutes, which is a grave violation of the discipline of the police force, which is condemnable." 4. A departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner. In the inquiry the petitioner was found guilty of the charge levelled against him. The Enquiry Report was examined by the Disciplinary Authority. By order dated 13.08.1984, the Disciplinary Authority ordered the dismissal of the petitioner from service. The petitioner filed an appeal against the order of dismissal which was also dismissed vide order dated 26.11.1984, Annexure P-10. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision petition which has also been dismissed by the Director General of Police, Punjab vide order dated 25.07.1987. 5. Written statement has been filed by the respondents and the case put forward by the petitioner has been controverted. It has been stated that the petitioner is a habitual absentee. Warning were issued to the petitioner from time to time for his wilful absence from duty. He had been warned on 10.03.1981, 31.05.1981, 24.09.1981 and 11.02.1982 for the aforesaid lapses on his part. It has been stated that the petitioner is a habitual absentee. Warning were issued to the petitioner from time to time for his wilful absence from duty. He had been warned on 10.03.1981, 31.05.1981, 24.09.1981 and 11.02.1982 for the aforesaid lapses on his part. The petitioner had been punished for absence from duty on a number of occasions and the period of absence had been treated as leave without pay on the following dates:- 23.05.1984 One day 12.06.1984 Two days 28.08.1984 23 days. In fact, another departmental enquiry is pending against the petitioner on the charges of remaining absent from duty. It is stated that the absence from duty is a serious act of misconduct and, therefore, he has rightly been dismissed from service. 6 In the replication, the petitioner has stated that department has taken a false stand. No details have been given as to whether the petitioner was ever warned in writing or orally. The averments made in the written statement are vague. These lapses were not included in the summary of allegations in the Show Cause notice served upon him. Therefore, these lapses could not be taken into consideration while imposing punishment. In the list of allegations, it has been alleged that the petitioner had remained absent from 10.09.1983 to 03.12.1983. This made a period of two months, 22 days, 7 hours and 15 minutes. No other period of absence was mentioned in the list of allegations. The petitioner had given a full explanation with regard to his absence. It is stated that the petitioner fell ill in May, 1983, because of an accident. Therefore, the petitioner had to take medical treatment from Civil Hospital, Samrala. However, since the X-ray Machine was out of order, he has referred to Civil Hospital, Ludhiana. This is borne out from the D.D. Report No.6 dated 08.05.1983. The petitioner reported back on duty on 11.05.1983 by report No. 15 at Police Station, D-Division, Ludhiana. He had been advised rest for six days by the Orthopaedic Surgeon. From Ludhiana, the petitioner proceeded under medical advice to S.G.T.B. Hospital, Amritsar, for further treatment. He was admitted in Civil Hospital till 08.06.1983. He was advised further rest for 10 days and for follow-up treatment after the period of 10 days. On 18.06.1983 the petitioner was advised rest for three days. From Ludhiana, the petitioner proceeded under medical advice to S.G.T.B. Hospital, Amritsar, for further treatment. He was admitted in Civil Hospital till 08.06.1983. He was advised further rest for 10 days and for follow-up treatment after the period of 10 days. On 18.06.1983 the petitioner was advised rest for three days. Even through, the petitioner had not recovered fully, he reported back for duty at Samarala, on 25.07.1983. In Report No.20, dated 25.07.1983, the petitioner had stated that "1 have been ill. In this respect, I will produce medical (certificate) as and when required." On 10.09.1983, the petitioner was informed by Such a Singh of his village mat the petitioners wife was seriously ill because of pregnancy. The petitioner sought leave but it was refused. According to the petitioner, there was no reason for refusal of leave. Action of the respondents was mala fide. In these compelling circumstances, the petitioner had to leave for his village to look after his wife. On 03.12.1983, the petitioner reported back for duty. In the Daily Diary Report No.19, he had stated that "my wife had been ill." As noticed earlier, the respondents have denied the case set up by the petitioner. It is admitted that the X-ray Machine was out of order at Civil Hospital, Samrala. However, the medical treatment of the petitioner at Civil Hospital, Ludhiana, is denied. It is stated that the petitioner, in fact, remained absent from 10.05.1983 till 25.07.1983, a period of two months, 15 days and 4 hours. He did not produce any documentary proof i.e. medical certificate although he had specifically stated that he will produce the medical certificate, if required. The petitioner was again found absent from 10.09.1983 to 03.12.1983. Thereafter, he remained absent from 01.12.1984, A regular departmental enquiry was conducted and the petitioner was given full opportunity to defend himself. Before the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner did not produce any defence witnesses. He only submitted a two/three lines reply stating that he does not want to produce any defence witness. He also stated that he would produce the medical certificate with the written statement. He subsequently submitted a list of two witnesses, i.e. Dr. Gursharanjit Rai, Civil Hospital, Amritsar and Sucha Singh resident of Chalki Sujat. He however, produced only Sucha Singh as a defence witness. The doctor was not examined as a witness. No medical certificate was ever produced. 7. He subsequently submitted a list of two witnesses, i.e. Dr. Gursharanjit Rai, Civil Hospital, Amritsar and Sucha Singh resident of Chalki Sujat. He however, produced only Sucha Singh as a defence witness. The doctor was not examined as a witness. No medical certificate was ever produced. 7. The learned counsel for the parties have addressed arguments on the basis of the aforesaid pleadings. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel and perused the record. 8. It is submitted by Mr. Grewal, learned Senior Counsel that the enquiry has not been conducted in accordance with the police rules. The Enquiry Officer has failed to marshal the evidence and return firm findings. Consequently, the order of punishment is vitiated as it is based on the finding of Enquiry Officer. In support of this submission, learned counsel has relied on a Single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Shri J.S. Gulati v. Improvement Trust, Ludhiana and Ors.,1 1983 (2) S.L.R. 100. 9. On the other hand, it is submitted by Mr. Sran that the enquiry has been conducted in accordance with law. The petitioner did not even care to file a reply to the charge-sheet. He did not produce any witnesses in defence. The Enquiry Officer has noticed the evidence led by the parties and given the findings. 10. I am of the considered opinion that the judgment in J.S. Gulatis case (supra), is of no assistance to the petitioner. A perusal of the enquiry report shows that the prosecution had produced S.H.O., Police Station, Samrala, who produced the necessary record and proved the absence of the petitioner from 10.05.1983 to 25.07.1983 and from 10.09.1983 till 03.12.1983. The evidence of this witness went unrebutted. Although given an opportunity, the petitioner did care to cross-examine this witness. PW-2 H.C. Karampal Singh stated that the petitioner had gone to Civil Hospital, Ludhiana for X-ray examination on 08.05.1983. Since he did not return and reported for duty, his absence was recorded from 10.05.1983 till 25.07.1983. PW-4 H.C. Ravinder Pal Singh also deposed with regard to the habitual absence of the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer examined the statement of DW-1 Sucha Singh. Even Sucha Singh did not support the case of the petitioner. He stated that petitioners wife had delivered a child in the month of September, 1983. PW-4 H.C. Ravinder Pal Singh also deposed with regard to the habitual absence of the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer examined the statement of DW-1 Sucha Singh. Even Sucha Singh did not support the case of the petitioner. He stated that petitioners wife had delivered a child in the month of September, 1983. On the basis of appreciation of evidence, the Enquiry Officer has held the charge to be proved. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to be either perverse or based on no evidence. Therefore, the Enquiry Report cannot be said to be suffering from non-application of mind. 11. Mr. Grewal further submitted that there is non-compliance of Rule 16.7 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Volume-II (hereinafter referred to as the Rules"). The aforesaid rule needs as under:- "(1) Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct, proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. In making such an award regard shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claim to pension. (2) If the conduct of an enrolled police officer leads to his conviction on a criminal charge and he is sentenced to imprisonment, he shall be dismissed" Provided that a punishing authority may, in an exceptional case, involving manifestly extenuating circumstances, for reasons to be recorded and with the prior approval of the next higher authority, impose any punishment other than that of dismissal: Provided further that in case of conviction of an enrolled police officer is set aside in appeal or revision, the officer empowered to appoint him shall review his case keeping in view the instructions issued by the Government from time to time in this behalf. (3) When a police officer is convicted judicially and dismissed or dismissed as a result of a departmental enquiry, in consequence of corrupt practices, the conviction and dismissal and its cause shall be published in the Police Gazette. In other cases of dismissal when it is desired to ensure that the officer dismissed shall not be re-employed elsewhere, a full descriptive roll, with particulars of the punishments, shall be sent for publication in the Police Gazette." 12. It is submitted that the absence of the petitioner cannot be termed as gravest misconduct. Therefore, the petitioner could not have been dismissed from service. It is submitted that the absence of the petitioner cannot be termed as gravest misconduct. Therefore, the petitioner could not have been dismissed from service. In support of the submission, learned counsel has relied on a Single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of The Punjab State and another v. Balwant Singh, Ex.Constable, 1989(4) S.L.R. 105. In that case, it was held that the punishing authority was not alive to the facts with regard to the length of service, previous service record and the conditions in which the incident of firing had taken place. In that case, it had been held that the authorities and failed to record a finding that the petitioner was guilty of such gravest acts of misconduct, the cumulative effect of which go to prove incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. The aforesaid ratio would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case as in the present case it has been found that the petitioner is a habitual absentee. In the present case there is sufficient evidence before the authorities to hold that the petitioner is a habitual absentee. 13. Mr. Grewal has also cited another Single Bench judgment of this Court in, the case of Gurdev Singh v. The State of Haryana and Ors., 1976(2) S.L.R. 442. This was a case where a police constable had been summoned from residential quarter, was found to be under the influence of liquor. The order was set aside on the ground that there was no finding recorded of gravest misconduct. 14. In the case of State of Punjab and Anr. v. Achhar Singh, (1991-2)100 P.L.R. 475, this Court affirmed the findings of the Appellate Court holding that there was non-compliance of Rule 16.2 of the Rules. In that case, the Court held that mere absence from duty for a few days does not amount to gravest act of misconduct. 15. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Parkash Chand, Constable, (1992-1)101 P.L.R. 36, interpreted the Rule 16.2 of the Rules. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment it is held as follows:- "9. A number of judgments of this Court interpreting the above said rule have been cited before us. Our pointed attention has been brought to Bhagat Parsad v. Inspector General of Police and Ors., 1967 S.L.R. 807. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment it is held as follows:- "9. A number of judgments of this Court interpreting the above said rule have been cited before us. Our pointed attention has been brought to Bhagat Parsad v. Inspector General of Police and Ors., 1967 S.L.R. 807. Gurdev Singh v. The State of Haryana and Ors., 1976 (2) S.L.R. 442. Rattan Lal Ex.Constable v. The State of Haryana and Ors., (1983)85 P.L..R 159 and State of Punjab and Ors. v. Darshan Singh, 1989(1) S.L.R. 191 as also to Baldev Singh Ex.Constables case (supra). In Bhagat Parsads case (supra) the word "misconduct" used in the rule has been analysed and it has been emphasised that a distinction has to be drawn between "misconduct", "simplicitor," and "grave misconduct". It has also been held that the gravest act of misconduct while not being capable of being put in a strait jacket or confined to a definition must, however, relate to an action which is of the utmost gravity and grossly flagrant. It implies a matter of the utmost seriousness. 10. Keeping in view what has been said above, the argument of the counsel for the respondent does appear to be unexceptionable. It is essential for the Punishing Authority to apply its mind and to record a specific finding as to whether the conduct of the delinquent official which has been complained of is of such a grave nature that it must lead inflexibly to his dismissal. As already indicated above, reliance has also been placed by the respondent on Gurdev Singhs case (supra), in which the respective scope of Rules 16.2 and 16.24 (1) were discussed. It was held by the learned Single Judge that it was incumbent upon the Punishing Authority to record a finding that the misconduct attributed to the delinquent official was the gravest act of misconduct and in the absence of such a finding the order could not be sustained. In Baldev Singh Ex.Constables case (supra) which overruled Gurdev Singhs case, aforesaid, interpretation of Rule 16.2 was not involved but the aforesaid decision was rendered on the basis of the interpretation put on Rule 16.24(1). We are, therefore, of the view that Gurdev Singhs case (supra) in so far as it deals with interpretation of Rule 16.2 still holds the field. We are, therefore, of the view that Gurdev Singhs case (supra) in so far as it deals with interpretation of Rule 16.2 still holds the field. We have gone through the matter independently as well, and find that the aforesaid decision lays down the correct law and needs to be reintegrated to the above extent. The order impugned herein does not indicate that the punishing authority was alive to the requirement of Rule 16.2 and it has not recorded any finding that the act of the respondent amounted to the gravest act of misconduct which required his dismissal from service. The order is, therefore, unsustainable and the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is correct to that extent." 16. In all the aforesaid cases, this Court has come to the conclusion that the order of dismissal would be vitiated if it does not record a finding that the misconduct was such that it could be termed as gravest act. In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority was fully alive to the provisions of the Rules. The Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana, has passed a speaking order. He, after scrutinising the evidence and the enquiry report, has come to the conclusion that the absence of the petitioner is a grave violation of the discipline. It is noticed that the petitioner after examining only one defence witness, gave it in writing on 24.05.1984 that he does not want to produce any more witness. Thereafter, he was allowed seven days time for filing his reply. He did not even care to file the reply. On 24.07.1984, the petitioner was called by the Disciplinary Authority. He had been served necessary Show Cause Notice proposing punishment of dismissal from the police department. A copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner along with the Show Cause Notice. He was then given 10 days time to challenge the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority observed as under:- "The reply of constable Mohinder Paul No.379 has been awaited to date; but his reply has not been received. Nor he himself has appeared. Therefore, this departmental enquiry has been gone through carefully. After this examination, I have come to the conclusion that this constable is in the habit of absenting himself from time and again. Even now he is absent. That the charge of his absenteeism is fully well proved. Nor he himself has appeared. Therefore, this departmental enquiry has been gone through carefully. After this examination, I have come to the conclusion that this constable is in the habit of absenting himself from time and again. Even now he is absent. That the charge of his absenteeism is fully well proved. It is not desirable to retain such an employee in the Police Department. Therefore, I dismiss this constable according to the punishment proposed in the show cause notice from the date of the issue of this order. He cannot avail of any benefit of any kind." 17. A perusal of the aforesaid order shows that the Disciplinary Authority has taken into consideration all the relevant factor for coming to the conclusion that it is not desirable to retain a habitual absentee in the police department. The appeal filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order, has also been dismissed by the Appellate Authority by passing a speaking order. Even the Revisional Authority has passed a speaking order after going through the record. 18. Mr. Saran has submitted that there has been full compliance of Rule 16.2 of the Rules. According to the learned counsel, substantial justice has been done. The inquiry has been held in accordance with law. The petitioner was given opportunity of personal hearing. Merely because the order did not record that the absence from duty was the gravest act of misconduct would not render the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority illegal. In support of this submission, learned counsel has relied on a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court given in the case of State of Punjab and Ors. v. Sukhwinder Singh, Civil Appeal No.4751 of 1998 (Arising Out of SLP No.(C)10524 of 1998), decided on September 11, 1998. In that case, a constable had absented himself from duty for a period of 65 days and 14 hours. He was dismissed from service with the observations that "he cannot become a good employee and he is not fit for the department." The department appeal and the revision having been dismissed, Sukhwinder Singh filed a writ petition in this Court. The writ petition was allowed. The order of dismissal was set aside. The petitioner was directed to be reinstated in service. The writ petition was allowed. The order of dismissal was set aside. The petitioner was directed to be reinstated in service. The State of Punjab filed an appeal in the Honble Supreme Court which was allowed by the Supreme Court on 11.09.1998, with the following observations:- "The High Court was right in noting that the respondent was a member of a disciplined force and that absence from duty was unbecoming of a member of such force. It was in that light that the High Court should have looked at the repeated acts of the respondents absence from duty. The fact that the respondent is a member of the Scheduled Castes is neither here not there for the purposes of considering whether or not he is guilty of misconduct and breach of discipline, nor the fact that he had gone to give his pay to his mother and was detained on account of her illness. It is necessary that members of the police forces should attend the duties which they have been allocated and not absent themselves. This is a paramount public interest that must over-weigh private considerations. The High Court was, therefore, in patent error in looking benignly at the numerous acts of absence of the respondent. That the order of dismissal did not use the "mantra" of "gravest act of misconduct" is not determinative. The substance of that conclusion is to be found in that order. When a policeman is repeatedly absent from duty, it cannot but be reasonably concluded that there is incorrigibility in this continued misconduct." 19. I am of the considered opinion that the aforesaid ratio of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The petitioner has been found to be repeatedly asset from duty. 20. Undoubtedly, the police force is a disciplined force. A Division Bench of this Court considered a similar situation in the case of Ex. Constable Sat Pal v. The State of Haryana and Ors., 1998(4) S.L.R. 151. In that case, a constable had been dismissed from service on account of 8 months absence from duty. The precise argument raised by Mr. Grewal were also raised on behalf of the petitioner in the aforesaid case, which have been noticed in paragraphs 5 and 11 of the judgment, which are as under;- "5. Mr. In that case, a constable had been dismissed from service on account of 8 months absence from duty. The precise argument raised by Mr. Grewal were also raised on behalf of the petitioner in the aforesaid case, which have been noticed in paragraphs 5 and 11 of the judgment, which are as under;- "5. Mr. Balhara contended that the impugned order is vitiated as the charge levelled against the petitioner was vague; the Enquiry Officer had himself cross-examined the witnesses; the provisions of Rule 16.2 had not been complied with, the petitioners past record was taken into consideration without giving him any opportunity to show cause against it and that the appellate authority had not passed a speaking order. Mr. Balhara also referred to certain decisions in support of his claim. The claim on behalf of the petitioner was controverted by the counsel for the respondents. 11. Mr. Balhara then contended that absence from duty is not a grave act of misconduct so as to call for the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. The authority while passing an order of dismissal has also to take into consideration the delinquent employees length of service etc. In the present case, the authorities have not noticed these facts and have awarded the extreme penalty without any justification. 21. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel, the Division Bench in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the judgment observed as follows;- "14. Mr. Balhara had referred to certain decisions to contend that absence from duty cannot be considered to be a grave act of misconduct and that failure to notice the length of service would vitiate the order. There is no quarrel with the proposition. If an employee over-stays leave on account of good reason, the extreme penalty of dismissal may not be awarded. In the present case, it has been found that the petitioner had remained absent without informing the authorities and he had acted with gross carelessness by leaving his job without entrusting the rifle to any person. The charge having been proved, it cannot be said that the respondents had acted illegally in ordering his dismissal from service. 15. We may also notice that the petitioner was a member of the disciplined force. The job demand a high sense of responsibility. Leaving the rifle without entrusting it to even a colleague was a totally irresponsible act. The charge having been proved, it cannot be said that the respondents had acted illegally in ordering his dismissal from service. 15. We may also notice that the petitioner was a member of the disciplined force. The job demand a high sense of responsibility. Leaving the rifle without entrusting it to even a colleague was a totally irresponsible act. The petitioner has not even cared to submit an application before leaving the job. Still further, no evidence was proved before the court to indicate that the petitioner had a good reason for being absent from duty. In this situation, it cannot be said that the authorities have erred in taking the view that the petitioner deserved the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. 16. Mr. Balhra referred to the decisions in Union of India v. Giriraj Sharma, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 215. State of Punjab v. Parkash Chand, 1992(1) S.L.R. 174, Bhim Singh v. Haryana State, 1991(2) P.L.R. 190, State of Punjab and Anr. v. Achhar Singh, 1991(2) P.L.R. 475, State of Haryana v. Lakhan Lal, 1991(2) P.L.R. 595 and Mahipal v. State of Haryana, 1994(4) S.L.R. 311. It is not necessary to notice these decisions in detail as in State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar and Anr., A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 736. it has been held that absence from duty would amount to a grave charge and that there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the punishment." 22. I am of the considered opinion that the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 23. Mr. Grewal has also argued that the past record of the petitioner could not have been taken into account without issuing a show cause notice to the petitioner. This sub mission is also without any basis. Requisite Show Cause Notice was issued to the petitioner together with a copy of the enquiry report. The petitioner has acknowledged the receipt of the enquiry report and the Show Cause Notice on 24.07.1984. The petitioner never appeared before the Disciplinary Authority. No reply was filed challenging findings recorded in the enquiry report. The Appellate Authority has also noticed that the petitioner had been absent from duty willfully for a total period of four months, 14 days, 11 hours and 15 minutes. This point was not argued before the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority. No reply was filed challenging findings recorded in the enquiry report. The Appellate Authority has also noticed that the petitioner had been absent from duty willfully for a total period of four months, 14 days, 11 hours and 15 minutes. This point was not argued before the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority. It is sought to be raised for the first time before this Court. I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner never having raised the point with regard to the past record before the departmental authorities, cannot be permitted to raise the same for the first time in this Court. On the basis of the material before this Court, it would not be possible to hold that the requisite show cause notice was not given to the petitioner. In any event, the petitioner having chosen not to challenge the enquiry report before the departmental authorities cannot be said to have been prejudiced if the Disciplinary Authority has taken into account the period of absence which did not form part of the charge sheet. The punishment of dismissal could have been awarded to the petitioner for the proved misconduct of wilful absence from duty. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority are liable to be set aside for breach of rules of natural justice. 24. Mr. Grewal further contended that the order of dismissal was vitiated as length of service rendered by the petitioner was not taken into consideration while passing the order of dismissal. However, Mr. Sran has submitted that merely because the order does not make a reference to the length of service put in by the petitioner would not render the same illegal. The length of service of the petitioner was already a part of the record. In the case of The State of Haryana and Ors. v. Gurdev Singh, 1981(3) S.L.R. 130 a Division Bench of this Court held as under;- "We also agree with the learned counsel for the State that it is not necessary for the punishing authority to specifically mention in the impugned order about the length of service put in by a delinquent officer which was already a part of the record and was well-known. The learned single Judge has set aside the impugned order of punishment taking this as the second ground. The learned single Judge has set aside the impugned order of punishment taking this as the second ground. Accordingly, we upset the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in this regard." 25. In any event, the petitioner had rendered only 9 years of service at the time when the order of dismissal was passed. Therefore, the service rendered by the petitioner would not be pensionable under the relevant rules as he had not completed 10 yeas of qualifying service. Therefore, no injustice can be said to have been done if the period of service rendered by the petitioner was not taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority at the time when the order of punishment was passed. 26. For the reasons recorded above, I find no merit in the present writ petition. It is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.