ORDER 1. Petitioner in this writ petition are assailing the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Land Acquisition Officer for the purpose of construction of houses for M.P. Housing Board. 2. It is averred in the petition that petitioner No. 1 Gulabi Nagar Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Maryadit is a Housing Society and has entered into an agreement to purchase the land from petitioners 2 to 5 on 21.8.1986. Notification under section 4 was published in the MP Gazette dated 27.1.1989 and declaration under section 6 was published in MP Gazette dated 27.10.1989 under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Petitioner No. 1 entered in agreement Annexure D dated 21.8.1986 to purchase the land, petitioner No. 1-Society is formed with a view to provide houses to the poor persons. 3. It is further submitted by the petitioner that proceedings under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 were initiated against holders, certain land was declared surplus. The holders have prayed for exemption under section 20 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. The provision of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act reveals that Act is having the overriding effect as provided under sectionA2 of the Act. The land belonging to petitioners 2 to 5 ought to have been exempted and matter is pending before the State Government for final decision for grant of exemption under section 20. Though the land was declared surplus but no final statement has been issued under section 9 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. 4. Petitioner further submits that invocation of section 17 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and dispensing with the enquiry under section 5A is bad in law, after six months of issuance of notification under section 4, declaration under section 6 was issued, earlier acquisition of these lands was withdrawn as per order dated 5.3.1988, thereafter the permission was given on 26.11.1988 to invoke the provisions of section 17 (1) of the Act. The petitioner is challenging the invocation of section 17, mind has not been applied as required under section 17 (4) and Government has granted exemption to other holders under section 20, exemption ought to have been granted in case of petitioners also. The petitioner is challenging the invocation of section 17, mind has not been applied as required under section 17 (4) and Government has granted exemption to other holders under section 20, exemption ought to have been granted in case of petitioners also. It is further submitted that purpose of the petitioner No. 1-Society is also to provide the houses to the members of the society, by not deciding the application for exemption under section 20 of Urban Land Ceiling Act the respondents have acted arbitrarily, double standards have been applied, same yardsticks have not been followed. 5. In the return filed on behalf of respondents it is pointed out that they have adopted the return filed in MP No.1708/90, an additional return has been filed for the specific purpose of present writ petition. In the return filed in MP No.1708/90, it is pointed out that land was declared surplus and petitioner No.2 had no authority to enter in any agreement to transfer the property to petitioner No.1 as such the entire petition is frivolous and not maintainable. Petitioner-Society has no locus standi to challenge the land acquisition proceedings. Land is required for the public purpose by the Housing Board to provide houses as per the scheme of the Housing Board, 60% of the houses are reserved for economically weaker sections and shelterless people. Element of public utility in the scheme is involved. Housing is an urgent need as such invocation of urgency clause is proper, enquiry under section 5A has been rightly dispensed with. Petitioner is bound by the outcome of the Urban Land Ceiling proceedings, acquisition of land has been properly made no interference is required. 6. Shri A.G. Dhande, learned senior counsel appearing for petitioners has submitted that since proceedings were earlior initiated and it was decided not to invoke urgency clause as reflected in order dated 5.3.1988, later grant of permission to invoke urgency clause is bad in law. His further submission is that section 42 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act has overriding effect, thus, when proceeding under section 20 of Urban Land Ceiling Act for grant of exemption to the land of the petitioners No.2 to 5 was pending consideration before the State Government, it was not open to invoke the provision of section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act to make acquisition of the land. This has an effect of defeating the intendment of the overriding effect created by section 42 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 since repealed. He has further submitted that purpose of petitioner No. 1-Society is to provide houses to the members. Thus, that has to be equated with the purpose for which the acquisition is being made by respondents as such it is not going to serve any useful purpose as the purpose of the Society petitioner No.1 is the same. 7. Shri Ashok Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for respondents-State has contended that provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act do not come in the way of acquisition of land made under the Land Acquisition Act, the two Acts have separate purpose. It is further submitted that land has not been exempted in case of petitioner and was declared surplus and petitioner No. 1-Society has no right to file the present writ petition and maintain it being simply holder of an agreement to purchase the land that too entered when ceiling proceedings were pending. 8. The first submission of learned counsel for petitioner is that the provision of Land Acquisition Act could not be invoked in view of section 42 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. Section 42 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regularion) Act reads as under: "42. Act to override other laws -- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or agreement or decree or order of a Court, tribunal or other authority." 9. Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act deals with the power to exempt. This power is exercisable by the State Government if land is held in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise, that, having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of the Chapter. 10. 10. As the fact stands the land has been declared surplus, only after the land is declared surplus, section 20 comes into play, land was found to be surplus, there is no order passed by the State Government under section 20 exempting the land held by petitioners 2 to 5. No order has been shown to exist of exemption under section 20 as on today on the other hand State Government has taken a decision to acquire the land for the purpose of M.P Housing Board which manifest the intention of the State Government which is writ large in the acquisition which was undertaken by issuance of notification under section 4 and declaration under section 6. Thus, I find that section 42 is no applicable in the instant case as no order under section 20 has been passed, on the other hand under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, land has been declared as surplus and has been acquired under Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of housing as per decision of State Government. 11. The Apex Court in S.S. Darshan v. State of Karnataka and others [ AIR 1996 SC 671 ] has held that acquisition of the land under Land Acquisition Act, section 4 cannot be challenged on the ground that purpose of acquisition is different than permitted under master plan. The provision of Act being different, Land Acquisition has to be seen in the context of Land Acquisition Act only. The Apex Court has held in para 11 thus: "11. The last submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the user of the acquired land shown in the master plan being different, there cannot be a conversion of the user except in accordance with the provisions for making the change in the land use. It is not a case of change of user by the owner of the land but one of acquisition by the State under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This argument also had no merit." 12. That apart, in my opinion, the overriding effect given by section 42 is for giving overriding effect to the purpose enumerated under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, I do not find any repugnancy is created by the acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act. Land Acquisition Act is having a different intendment and is an independent Act. That apart, in my opinion, the overriding effect given by section 42 is for giving overriding effect to the purpose enumerated under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, I do not find any repugnancy is created by the acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act. Land Acquisition Act is having a different intendment and is an independent Act. Even otherwise there is no order in existence in favour of petitioners of grant of exemption under section 20 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Hence section 42 of Urban Land Ceiling Act does not come into play. 13. Coming to the next submission as to invocation of the urgency clause under section 17, same cannot be faulted as housing is an urgent need and is a national requirement. Simply by the fact that on earlier occasion decision was taken on 5.3.1988 not to have resort to the provision cannot come in the way when need is shown to be urgent, requirement is for purpose of housing which is a national need. In Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1999 SC 436 ], it was held that purpose of acquisition for invocation of urgency clause is also one of the relevant considerations. In Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra and others [ AIR 1977 SC 183 ], acquisition of land for residential purpose has been held to be a public purpose. In Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi etc. v. State of Gujrat and another [ AIR 1968 SC 870 ] question arose about the satisfaction of Government on the question of urgency. It was held that not only the protection under Article 166 (2), but, there was also presumption of regularity of the official act. In Sanjay Gandhi Grih Nirman Sahakari Samstha Maryadit v. State of M.P. [ AIR 1991 MP 72 ], it was observed that the Court cannot sit on the satisfaction of the authority. In Gurunam Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1995 Punjab & Haryana 62], it was held that the urgency is a matter of subjective satisfaction. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others [ (2000) 7 SCC 296 ] it was held that satisfaction can be justified if it exists on record and need not be reflected with reference to every piece of particular land and declaration under section 6 is enough. 14. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others [ (2000) 7 SCC 296 ] it was held that satisfaction can be justified if it exists on record and need not be reflected with reference to every piece of particular land and declaration under section 6 is enough. 14. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that considering the nature of the purpose of acquisition and in totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, invocation of section 17 (1) is proper. 15. Yet another aspect for consideration is whether petitioner No. 1 is having the right to maintain the writ petition. Land has not been purchased by petitioner No. 1, he is having an agreement only in his favour. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in 1992 All. CJ 1248 has held that a person having agreement to sale cannot be said to be person aggreived, hence cannot challenge acquisition of land. It has been held by the Apex Court in U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and another v. M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and other [1996 AIR SCW 743 = (1996) 3 SCC 124 ] that a purchaser after issuing of notification under section 4 cann01 challenge the land acquisition. In this case property has not been purchased by petitioner No.1, only an agreement to purchase exists. However, question is not of much importance in instant case as the owners petitioners 2 to 5 are also parties to the writ petition. As merely holder of an agreement cannot challenge the acquisition. Thus, the submission raised that purpose of petitioner No. 1-Society is housing and the same has to be treated at par with the purpose of acquisition for Housing Board is of no avail. It is established that land is required for the Housing Scheme by the M.P. Housing Board in which 60% houses are reserved for economically weaker sections. The land of co-operative society can also be acquired is laid down by Apex Court in Kendriya Karamchari Sahakari Grih Ninnan Samiti Ltd. and another v. The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and others [ AIR 1988 SC 1 ]. 16. The land of co-operative society can also be acquired is laid down by Apex Court in Kendriya Karamchari Sahakari Grih Ninnan Samiti Ltd. and another v. The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and others [ AIR 1988 SC 1 ]. 16. It is contended that final statement under section 9 of Urban Land Ceiling Act was not issued as such it cannot be said that declaration of land as surplus has attained finality; it is clear that land was declared surplus, petitioners were seeking exemption which has not been granted by the State so far, no order under section 20 of Urban Land Ceiling Act has been passed, that apart land acquisition is under Land Acquisition "Act which is independent of ceiling proceedings and even if proceeding under Ceiling Act is pending that does not come in the way of acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act. 17. Resultantly, I find no merit in the petition. It is dismissed. No order as to costs. Security, if deposited be refunded to the petitioners.