JUDGMENT M.F.Saldanha, J.--Interesting points of law, of some consequence fall for determination in this group of appeals. We summarise the propositions that have emerged in the course of the arguments as follows. While the Appellant in the first of these appeals contends that admittedly the lands in question were Watan lands covered by the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950 and that their father was the Watandar, in the year 1950 a Sale Deed was executed whereby the lands in question were purchased by the present claimants or their forefathers as the case may be. The contention raised is that there was a restriction on alienation and that consequently, even though a registered Sald Deed has been executed for due consideration that the transaction is bad in law. What is further argued in support of this contention is that the Watan lands in question could only have been regranted to the original holders, that this was done sometime in the year 1962, and that this circumstance further vitiates the alienation that has taken place in the year 1950. Admittedly, the lands in question have been acquired, the compensation was determined by the S.L.A.O and the claimants namely the purchasers whom the Reference Court has preferred to as the claimants of the first part, filed an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for referring the case to the Court for purposes of considering the enhancement of compensation. The second interesting aspect of the dispute has emanated at this point of time because the present Appellant who represents the claimants of the second part or rather the original Watandar did not file any application for purposes of making a reference to the Civil Court. These persons appeared for the first time while the proceedings were before the Reference Court and applied to the Court for being impleaded as persons interested. The contention raised was that they represented the original land holders or owners and furthermore that since it was their contention that the lands could not have been alienated in law, that the Reference Court would have to determine as to who is the original party and in whom the original title and interest of the acquired lands really vested and award compensation to that party. 2. The Reference Court permitted the present Appellants to intervene. 2. The Reference Court permitted the present Appellants to intervene. The parties were heard and the Reference Court rejected the claim put forward by the present Appellants on a variety of grounds which we shall deal with. M.F.A. 3028 of 1995 is directed against that order. At the same time, the Reference Court determined the value of the acquired lands at Rs.28,000/- per Acre and it is in respect of this enhancement that the State has filed the remaining three appeals particularly on the ground that having regard to the fact that these lands suffered from several disqualifications, the S.L.A.O. had valued them at Rs.40/- per Acre and that the enhancement granted by the Civil Court was abnormally high and is liable to be substantially pruned. 3. We shall first dispose of the three appeals filed by the State with the observation that on a review of the order passed by the S.L.A.O., we are constrained to observe that it almost borders on absurdity. We do not dispute the fact that in certain circumstances land prices may be abnormally high and there may be instances in which the lands in question for a variety of reasons may not fetch a particularly fancy price irrespective of where the lands are located and what the handicaps are. There is a basic minimum price below which one cannot conceive of a valuation. We are also conscious of the fact that there are a number of factors which need to be taken into consideration while determining the market value but we have time and again observed that the Government needs to take serious cognizance of the fact that at the stage of making of the Awards, it is not the function of the S.L.A.O. to come out with a ridiculous figure on the ground that the Reference Court will always be there to review the case. Not only does a reference take time, it also involves waste of valuable judicial time and more importantly, we do not approve of situations in which S.L.A.Os. abdicate their statutory and moral duties. The law prescribes the procedure of a reference which is more in the nature of an appeal or rather, a corrective and the law presumes that the S.L.A.O. who is the basic quantifying authority will act responsibly and reasonably. In the majority of cases the S.L.A.Os. abdicate their statutory and moral duties. The law prescribes the procedure of a reference which is more in the nature of an appeal or rather, a corrective and the law presumes that the S.L.A.O. who is the basic quantifying authority will act responsibly and reasonably. In the majority of cases the S.L.A.Os. being Departmental Officers virtually bend over backwards in favour of the State to an extent of doing gross injustice to the claimants without taking cognizance of the very basic factual and legal aspect that where an agriculturist or a land owner is being deprived of land once and for all that it is absolutely essential that a fair amount be awarded. This Court has time and again had to lay down that the principles that are being followed by the S.L.A. Os. are virtually one century old and that most of these principles hardly pass the test of fairness having regard to the current economic conditions coupled with sociological considerations. Where the lands which are the source of livelihood and the source of residence and shelter are taken away, it is assumed that the compensation package would include a rehabilitation programme and that the land owner or the farmer will not be reduced to the level of a landless pauper. The Land Acquisition Act prescribes that the compensation be computed and that the same be awarded and we are pained to note that by the time the various notifications are issued and the Award is made, that an abnormally long period of time elapses thought the Government is in a hurry to take over possession. The fact that some provisions have been made for interest, solatium etc. is absolutely no compensation for the trauma that ensues during the interim period. We refer to this principle only in order to illustrate that this is one more classic instance where after the lengthy exercise even the basic norms have virtually been thrown to the winds and a quantum has been fixed that is not only an absurdity but nothing short of a cruel joke. The learned Government Advocate did very strenuously submit before us that the basic value of these lands for the reasons pointed out is unusually and abnormally low and that the S.L.A.O. has given his reasons for the quantification. The learned Government Advocate did very strenuously submit before us that the basic value of these lands for the reasons pointed out is unusually and abnormally low and that the S.L.A.O. has given his reasons for the quantification. We have at the same time taken note of the fact that the lands are located hardly six Kms. from Bagalkote Town and that the location of the lands themselves is sufficient to give a much more higher potential. The claimants have pointed out that the lands in question are in the vicinity of a built up and developed area consisting of an Engineering College, Seeds Corporation, Housing Colony, etc. and that while the agricultural potentiality might have been very low, what needed be taken into account was that the entire area was surrounded by N.A. plots. It is also very close to the municipal limits. After taking all the relevant factors into consideration the Reference Court has fixed the valuation at Rs.28,000/- per Acre. It is true that the learned Government Advocate's first submission was that the enhancement is shocking because the value is raised from Rs.40/- per Acre to Rs.28,000/- per Acre but we have already pointed out that the original valuation was an absurdity and after carefully reviewing the grounds on which the Reference Court has fixed the figure at Rs.28,000/- per Acre, we hold that this figure is an absolute reality. In our considered view, the working out of the valuation done by the Reference Court is reasonable and correct but we did take note of the fact that the learned Judge has not only proceeded cautiously but that at all stages, his computations have been on the low side rather than on the high side. This Court has in numerous cases upheld orders of the Reference Court. We have even pitched the compensation slightly higher than the absolutely correct value only for one reason that the Supreme Court and the High Courts have adopted the inflexible principle that if the claimants are being totally deprived of their property that the compensation must always lean on the liberal side. We would categories the present valuation as being modest and had there been an appeal filed by the claimants demanding further escalation, undoubtedly, we would have considered that aspect. We would categories the present valuation as being modest and had there been an appeal filed by the claimants demanding further escalation, undoubtedly, we would have considered that aspect. As the record stands, in our considered view, the figure of Rs.28,000/- per Acre meets with our total approval and consequently, the three appeals filed by the State stand dismissed. 4. Coming to the main appeal, the Appellants learned Counsel has vehemently submitted that having regard to the provisions of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act that he had every right to appear before the Reference Court and agitate the question of compensation. We hasten to add that the learned Government Advocate as also the learned Advocate who represents the claimants on appeal raised a preliminary objection that the Appellant had absolutely no locus standi to appear before the Tribunal and that the intervening application has wrongly been allowed. Mr. Hosmath submitted that Section 28A makes provisions for persons who have not filed an application under Section 18 asking for a reference to the Civil Court for enhancement of compensation would still have locus standi to demand compensation in certain circumstances and that his case is squarely covered by this Section. We have very carefully considered the argument and we have also examined the provisions of Section 28A and the least we can say is that the submission constitutes a total misreading of the law, Section 28A was added on to the Land Acquisition Act for the limited purpose of making provision for situations in which similarly situated claimants who may not have applied for a reference and who may not have agitated the case further after the Award was made by the S.L.A.O. should not be deprived of enhanced compensation which the Court may award in respect of other claimants relating to the same acquisition. The Government was conscious of the fact that with the minimum limitation in the way of land owners and particularly agriculturists that not many of them have the capacity to either apply for enhancement or agitate the proceedings before the Reference Court. What was happening was that in respect of several mass acquisitions, one or more of the capable or more persistent claimants would apply for a reference to the Civil Court. What was happening was that in respect of several mass acquisitions, one or more of the capable or more persistent claimants would apply for a reference to the Civil Court. The Civil Court would hear the parties and enhance the compensation and this could have also happened even at a later stage if the proceedings were carried to the High Court and the incongruous legal position arose whereunder those of the claimants who had not agitated their cases further and who would have received the higher compensation had they done so were unfairly deprived of the higher amounts and Section 28A makes provision for that class for persons. In other words, it is condition precedent that the applicant under Section 28A should have been a claimant in the Land Acquisition proceedings and is one who has accepted the Award and not carried proceedings further and only such a person is given the privilege of applying for higher compensation. In this case, the Appellants were not among the original claimants. They have appeared at a very late point of time when the case had already reached the Reference Court and in our considered view, there could be no question of Section 28A being made applicable in their case. After carefully considering the ambit and scope of the law, we need to uphold the preliminary objection which is to the effect that the Appellants in the special circumstances of the present case had no locus standi to appear before the Reference Court and that consequently, as a necessary extension of this principle that they have no locus standi to prefer an appeal against that decision. The Respondents are right when they point out that the Reference Court had no jurisdiction to add the Appellants on as a party and furthermore that the jurisdiction of the Reference Court was circumscribed to the short question of adjudicating between the State and the claimants namely the acquiring authority as to whether the compensation awarded by the S.L.A.O. was fair and just or whether it required enhancement. The Appellants learned Advocate drew our attention to three decisions reported in: 1) A.I.R. 1981 Gau 9 2) Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. The Appellants learned Advocate drew our attention to three decisions reported in: 1) A.I.R. 1981 Gau 9 2) Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR's., AIR 1980 SC 1118 3) A.I.R. 1985 Pat 249 in support of his contentions that it was within the ambit and scope of the Reference Court to have allowed the Appellants to intervene. We have carefully perused the ratio of these decisions and we find that none of the principles laid down therein are of any assistance to the Appellants. On the contrary, these decisions have absolutely no relevance to the facts and the issues in the present appeal. 5. As an alternate argument, the Appellants learned Counsel advanced very lengthy arguments with regard to the legal position under the Watans Act. Normally, we would not have considered these arguments at all having regard to the fact that we have held that the Appellants have no locus standi to prefer these appeals but we do make a concession because the Appellants learned Counsel started with the interesting proposition that he is seriously questioning the very title of the claimants and that this is something which goes to the root of the matter because in his primary submissions he contended that the claimants have no right, title or interest in the lands and that consequently, it would be a total illegality if they were allowed to receive the compensation. What the learned Counsel submitted before us was that admittedly these were Watan lands and that they had been alienated in breach of Section 5 of the Act which prohibits an alienation. Consequently, it was his submission that having regard to the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the two decisions reported in Shrishailagouda and Others Vs. Gurusangappa Ramasangappa Desai and Another, AIR 1980 SC 1759 , that the sale will have to be treated as a void transaction. Consequently, it was his submission that having regard to the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the two decisions reported in Shrishailagouda and Others Vs. Gurusangappa Ramasangappa Desai and Another, AIR 1980 SC 1759 , that the sale will have to be treated as a void transaction. Learned Counsel submitted that if the Watans Act prohibited an alienation, that there could be no valid sale and if the sale was void that the claimants have no locus standi and that the Court will have to hold that the title and interest in the land is deemed to have continued with the Appellants and secondly the entire complexion of the case will stand altered in so far as the Appellants would be entitled to the compensation and the claimants would be totally disqualified in law. This is the limited reason why we have very carefully examined the elaborate submissions that were canvassed before us and we need to point out that the Respondents learned Counsel as also the learned Government Advocate were both quick to answer these submissions with the short argument that the Sale Deed of 1950 is a registered Sale Deed for consideration, that there is a presumption of validity and legality in respect of that transaction and the submission was that in the absence of that transaction having been challenged before a competent Court. In the absence of the sale transaction having declared to have been null and void that it is not open to the Appellants and that too after the lapse of fifty years to raise the contention that the Sale Deed should be treated as being void. 6. Our simple answer to the Appellants arguments is that there is a presumption of legality in respect of the transaction of 1950 in so far as it is a registered Sale Deed and it is not open to this Court while examining the appeal with regard to the limited question of quantum in a land acquisition proceeding to go into the question of validity of alienation of 1950. Mr. Hosmath went to the extent of submitting that it is necessary for the Reference Court to examine all contentions that fall for determination between the parties. Mr. Hosmath went to the extent of submitting that it is necessary for the Reference Court to examine all contentions that fall for determination between the parties. We must say to the credit of the learned Judge who presided over the Reference Court that he has very correctly answered this submission when he pointed out that the Reference Court acting under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act is not a Court before which a party can ask for a declaration to the effect that a forty year old sale be declared to be null and void. The law prescribes an entirely different procedure for situations in which a sale is called into question and the Reference Court was perfectly justified in having refused to examine this issue as being outside its jurisdiction. Not only do we uphold the finding but we need to amplify on it by pointing out that in the first instance the challenge is belated and secondly it has been raised before the wrong forum and in the wrong form in so far as the primary duty of the party challenging the sale was to have done so before a Court of competent jurisdiction within the prescribed period of time. There is a principle of finality that applies to all proceedings and to all transactions and we need to apply that principle because the doctrine of finality presupposes the fact that once a transaction or an order has reached a stage of finality that it cannot be reopened and that too at a hopelessly belated point of time. Consequently, we refuse to examine the question because in our considered view this is neither the stage nor the occasion to do it and since the sale in question has not been challenged and since the sale is on record the Reference Court was fully justified in acting on the basis of that sale. Niceties of legal hair splitting and questions with regard to competency of the original Watandars to alienate the lands etc. are not issues that can be agitated at this point of time in this proceeding and we have already indicated that we refuse to do so on the basis of well settled principles of law. 7. Having regard to the aforesaid position, M.F.A. 3028 of 1995 fails and stands dismissed with costs. We uphold the order passed by the Reference Court. 7. Having regard to the aforesaid position, M.F.A. 3028 of 1995 fails and stands dismissed with costs. We uphold the order passed by the Reference Court. The authorities to act in consonance thereof. We need to issue a further direction in the interest of the original claimants which is to the effect that there have been enough of delays and enough of time lag and we direct that all the formalities leading right up to the disbursement of the amounts relating to the deposited amounts due, disbursal thereof shall be completed within an outer limit of four months from today. Learned Government Advocate to convey these directions to the concerned authorities.