JUDGMENT : Arun Kumar Goel. J. :- Since all these appeals have arisen out of the same award which was passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Sirmaour at Nahan, except FAO Nos. 116 and 156 of 2002, as such these have been taken up together for hearing at the joint request of the learned counsel for the parties, who submitted that these be disposed of at the earliest keeping in view the interest of large number of claimants. While allowing this prayer of the learned counsel for the parties, these appeals were finally heard. FAO Nos. 116 & 156 of 2002 are against the same award passed by MACT (II), Solan. Learned counsel for the parties present in these two appeals stated that award is common, as such both may be heard alongwith other appeals. They also stated that accident in these two appeals is the same as in other cases. 2. Admitted facts in all these appeals are, that on the night intervening 7th and 8th August, 2000 bus No. HP-1575 was being driven by late Om Singh alias Bablu. Son of Rattan Singh. He was owner-cum-driver of this bus. It was carrying marriage party of Hardev Singh and was on its way from village Bhauri to Dingar kinnaur. At about 12 midnight when it reached near village Khanagan, an attempt was made by the bus driver to overtake Maruti Van No. HR-49-2628. This was carrying the bride groom Hardev Singh. 3. It is also the case of the respondents claimants that after hitting the Maruti Van deceased driver Om Singh, lost control of the bus. As a result of it, bus rolled down into the Khud. This accident was the result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the deceased driver. Consequently, number of persons died at the spot and some received injuries. One of such persons was RW-7. I have made special mention of RW-7 because it is the case of appellant that on his statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C. F.I.R. in question (Ext.P-1), was registered. 4. Vehicle being insured with the appellant-Insurance Company is not disputed. Consequently, number of persons died at the spot and some received injuries. One of such persons was RW-7. I have made special mention of RW-7 because it is the case of appellant that on his statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C. F.I.R. in question (Ext.P-1), was registered. 4. Vehicle being insured with the appellant-Insurance Company is not disputed. In fact, defence of the appellant during the course of proceedings before the learned Tribunal below was, and even at the time of hearing of these appeals is, that against the authorised capacity of 40 passengers plus two (driver and conductor), 63 were being carried in the bus in question at the time of its accident. Therefore, this is a clear out case of proved violation of the terms of contract of insurance (Ext.R-7), as well as of route permit where under the bus was being plied (Ext.R-3). 5. A defence based on the plea that deceased driver was not holding a valid driving licence at the time of accident was also set up by the appellant. However, on the basis of the evidence on record, learned counsel for the Insurance Company during the course of proceedings before the Tribunal below under issue No.4; stated that he was not going to argue on this point. Even otherwise there is enough and over-whelming evidence on record that he was having a valid driving licence where under he was authorised to drive the bus in question. Relevant documents in this behalf are Exts. R-8 to R-11-A. In these circumstances, this plea was rightly given up on behalf of the appellant during the course of proceedings before the learned Tribunal below. 6. Another fact that needs to be noted is that as many as 41 cases were filed before the Tribunal below, one was filed at Solan. Copy of the decision by the Tribunal at Solan is Ext, RX. 7. Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company made the following submissions in support of these appeals:- (a) Conditions of the Contract of Insurance (Ext.R-7) as well as route permit (Ext.R-3) having been violated by carrying 63 passengers against the authorised capacity of 40 plus two (driver and conductor), his client is not liable for payment of any compensation. (b) Bus at the time of accident had a stage carriage permit. (b) Bus at the time of accident had a stage carriage permit. The place of accident where the bus met with accident was not covered by Ext. R-3. By referring to this document, Mr. Sharma submitted that the bus could be plied as a stage carriage on Solan-Mangarh route via Narag, as per time table. By referring to the place of accident as well as statement of PW-16 and certificate (Ext. PW-16/A) produced by this witness, he submitted that the bus admittedly was being used as a contract carriage for carrying Barat (marriage party), from village Bhouri to Dingar Kinner, As such his client is not liable for payment of any compensation. 8. With a view to support these submissions, reliance was placed by him on Sections 2(40), 66, 72(21), 87(1) (a) and (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and also on Rule 65 (2) of H.P Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999. He also referred to the forms of Stage Carriage and Contract Carriage Permits which were required to be there for plying the bus. In addition to these, Sections 147 and 149 (2) (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 were also relied upon by Mr. Sharma. By referring to the provisions of Sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, he submitted that looking to the change in language of both the Motor Vehicles Act, i.e. of 1939 and 1988, the learned Tribunal below has fallen into grave error while passing the impugned award in these cases and prayed for allowing these appeals and exonerating the appellant of the liability fastened on it 9. Two pleas in the alternative and without in any manner conceding the claims of the respondents-claimants were also urged by Mr. Ashwani Sharma. These were that if all his submissions urged earlier fail, then on the basis of New India Assurance Company, Shimla Vs. Kamla and others as well as other connected cases, AIR 2001 SC 1419 is paid by his client in these cases by made recoverable by the appellant from the insured. Other plea was, that looking to the over-loading in the bus at the time of accident which according to him, was carrying 63 passengers, doctrine of proportionality may be invoked in these appeals and compensation be reduced by one-third, holding the appellant liable to the extent of 2/3rd only in all these appeals. 10. Other plea was, that looking to the over-loading in the bus at the time of accident which according to him, was carrying 63 passengers, doctrine of proportionality may be invoked in these appeals and compensation be reduced by one-third, holding the appellant liable to the extent of 2/3rd only in all these appeals. 10. All these pleas have been contested and resisted on behalf of the respondents-claimants by their learned counsel. By referring to the evidence on record they submitted that there being 63 passengers is neither proved nor established by any legally acceptable evidence. According to them, there is positive evidence that there were in all 30/35 persons travelling in the bus on the fateful day. Besides number of other persons were there at the roadside near Khanagan. They were waiting to board the bus. Some of them died in the accident whereas some were injured. According to them, accepting what is urged by the appellant to be correct for the sake of argument without conceding, still there is no legally acceptable evidence on the basis whereof it can be held that the number of passengers traveling in the bus at the time accident was beyond 30/35, in addition to those standing at roadside near Khanagan. Thus they have prayed for upholding the impugned award and have further prayed for dismissal of these appeals. 11. By ways of passing reference, it may be noted that when these claim petitions were pending before the learned Tribunal below with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties appearing in all the claim petitions after issues having been framed that all these cases were consolidated with claim petition No.22-MAC of 2000. Evidence was recorded in this case. 12. So far plea of violation of route permit and policy of insurance urged on behalf of the appellant is concerned, relevant documents are Exts. R-3, R-4 and R-7. Ext. R-3 is a Photostat copy of the route permit. Its perusal shows that stage carriage permit was issued in favour of Om Singh Panwar of Narag on Solan-Mangrah route via Narag (as per time table). Ext. R-4 is the Photostat copy of the Registration Certificate. At its page-3, seating capacity of the bus, including driver, was 42+2 only. 13. So far Ext. R-7. Its perusal shows that stage carriage permit was issued in favour of Om Singh Panwar of Narag on Solan-Mangrah route via Narag (as per time table). Ext. R-4 is the Photostat copy of the Registration Certificate. At its page-3, seating capacity of the bus, including driver, was 42+2 only. 13. So far Ext. R-7. Photostat copy of the policy of insurance is concerned, reference was made by Shri Sharma to the premium charged in the Schedule of Premium, as well as on Limitation as to Use. By referring to the schedule of premium it was submitted that it was for 40 passengers, i.e. Rs. 48000/-. Besides this amount, to cover the risk of driver and cleaner premium was also charged. On the basis of premium charged, it was reiterated by Shri Sharma that his client can not be fixed with any liability beyond what was contracted for. Suffice it to say in this behalf that it has come in the statement of Rs-10 Rakesh Kumar, Branch Manager, who had produced Ext. R-7 alongwith its conditions, that the policy brought by him does not contain the conditions of policy. He further stated that they did not keep the copy of conditions with the carbon copy of the policy as record in their office. IMTs admittedly formed part of the conditions of policy. And risk covered vide Ext. R-7 were the same, as those which formed part of its original. All exclusions were to be proved/established by the Insurance Company, if it wanted to succeed in its defence based on the conditions of policy. It is not the case of the appellant that any attempt was made to summon the original policy of insurance from the successors of the owner during the proceedings, nor in these cases any attempt had been made to seek leave of the Court for producing secondary evidence since original of Ext. R-7 was not coming forth. As such in my considered view conditions attached with Ext R-7 referred to in the statement of RW-10 cannot be accepted to be an integral part and parcel of the policy Ext. R-7 for being read in evidence. 14. Once this conclusion is arrived at IMT Nos. 12 -18 subject to which premium was charged cannot be looked into for any purpose whatsoever. R-7 for being read in evidence. 14. Once this conclusion is arrived at IMT Nos. 12 -18 subject to which premium was charged cannot be looked into for any purpose whatsoever. Another reason to take this view is that it is not the case of RW-10 that on the basis of the contemporaneous official record at its Parwanoo Branch that the conditions attached with the policy (Ex.P-7) are in fact the same as were attached with the policy of insurance issued to the deceased owner driver Om Singh. So far proof of all exclusions by appellant is concerned, this matter is no more res-integra in view of the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Narchinva V. Kamat and another etc. V. Alfredo Antonio Doe Martine and others, AIR 1985 SC 1281. 15. Now coming to the other plea of Shri Aswani Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, that the number of passengers were 63 at the time of accident in the ill fated bus, as against its authorized capacity of 42+2 as per Ext. R-3 the route permit, and 40+2 as per Ext. R-7 the policy of insurance. 16. He laid emphasis on the statements of RW-5 head Constable Kamal Dev, MHC Police Station, Panchhad, RW-6 S.I. Dilshad Mohammed, Police Line, Nahan, and of Gokal Chand RW-7 who was one of the occupants of the bus in question and on whose statement, Ext. P-1 the F.I.R. was registered. Now, reference to the statements of these witnesses as also to F.I.R. Ext. R-1, Route permit Ext. R-3 and again to Insurance Policy Ext. R-7 will be made. 17. RW-5 Head Constable Kamal Dev had brought the original F.I.R. No. 16 of 2000, dated 8.3.2000 under Sections 279, 337 and 338 IPC of Police Station, Pachhad. He has placed on record an its attested copy of Ext. R-1. In cross-examination, he stated that this F.I.R. was recorded on the basis of Ruqua, sent by S.I. Dilshad Mohammad from the spot. 18. Dilshad Mohammad has appeared as RW-6. And according to him on receiving information of the accident, he came to the spot and recorded the statement of Gokal Chand RW-7, under Section 154 Cr.P.C. Then he sent Ruqua to police Station for registration of the F.I.R. He further stated that during the investigation he had found 44 persons having died and 15 having received injuries in this accident. According to him, injured examined by the witness had informed him at the spot that all of them had been travelling in the bus in question. In addition to these, there were three more persons who sustained injures in the accident but were discharged after first aid. RW-7 being one of the occupants as stated by him, (Gokal Chand). According to RW-6, bus deliver in a precarious condition was sent to P.G.I. Chandigarh, but he died on way. He had prepared sitemap and on its production, it was to be marked as Ext. R-2. But it is not there on the Exhibit File. When cross-examined, RW-6 denied the suggestion that Gokal Chand had not told him in his statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C. that there were 63 passengers in the bus. He, however, admitted that the bus was carrying a Baraat from village Sarol to Dingar Kinnar and was not picking passengers on the way. 19. When a reference is made to the statement of RW-7 Gokal Chand, he stated that he was one of the occupants of the bus involved in the accident on 7.3.2000. He sustained injuries on his person. He admitted having made the statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C. at the spot to S.I. Dilshad Mohammad. But this PW was not confronted with his such statement or with contents of Ext. PW-1, the F.I.R. No. plausible reason could be given by Mr. Sharma for such vital omission. Particularly in view of the defence set up by the appellant before the Tribunal below and also in this appeal. In cross-examination, he stated that he did not know the number of passengers in the bus, therefore, he did not tell S.I. in his statement that there were 63 passengers in it. In his further cross-examination, he stated that when the accident took place at night, there were 30-35 occupants in the bus. No doubt, RW-6 S.I. Dilshad Mohammad had stated that RW-7 had given the number of persons travelling in the bus to be 63. However, when the maker of the statement stepped in the witness box, he has categorically stated not having given the number at 63. He also stated that he had not given number in his statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C. at 63. Though in his further cross-examination he stated that there were 30-35 occupants in the bus. However, when the maker of the statement stepped in the witness box, he has categorically stated not having given the number at 63. He also stated that he had not given number in his statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C. at 63. Though in his further cross-examination he stated that there were 30-35 occupants in the bus. In my opinion it was incumbent on the appellant to have confronted RW-7 with his statement under Section 154 Cr. P.C. As such there is no positive evidence on record produced by the appellant for holding that number of persons travelling at the time of accident was 63. 20. With a view to support the case of the respondents/claimants, reference was made by their learned counsel, to the statement of PW-32 Dhanvir Singh. According to this witness, on 7.3.2000 he was standing at roadside a place known as Khanagan, as he was to join the marriage party. There were other persons with him there, including Sham Singh and Satish. III fated bus No. HP-16-1575 came at a high speed and went down the Dhank (precipice). As a result of this accident, two persons standing on the road i.e. Satish and Sham Singh died, besides others were also victims of this accident and were roped towards the Dhank. Both of them (Satish and Sham Singh), died at the spot. In his further cross-examination, he has admitted that there were 5/6 persons standing there. In cross-examination by the appellant, he stated that he was not aware that at the time of the accident there were 63/64 passengers in the bus. However, he denied the suggestion that Sham Sing hand Satish were sitting in the bus. He did not report the matter to the police. Suggestions that he was not present at the spot or the accident had not taken place in his presence were denied by this witness. He also denied the suggestion that the deceased driver was not driving the bus in a rash and negligent manner, or that Sadique Lala was driving this bus. 21. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, plea urged by learned counsel for the appellant that route permit and insurance policy was violated, therefore, his client is not liable cannot be accepted. 21. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, plea urged by learned counsel for the appellant that route permit and insurance policy was violated, therefore, his client is not liable cannot be accepted. Firstly, there is no evidence with certainty and exactitude that 63 persons were travelling in the ill fated bus at the time of accident particularly in the face of the statement of RW-7. And on the basis of statement made by RW-7 in Court, no benefit can be derived by the appellant out of F.I.R. Ext. R-1 There is no material brought on record not even from the criminal file, by the appellant though it had examined as many as 16 witnesses in this case including RW-6. 22. In addition to this I have no reason to disbelieve the statement of PW-32 that in addition to the passengers in the bus 5/6 persons were standing on the roadside, besides this witness. Two of whom died at the spot and others were roped towards the Dhank in the accident. There is no rebuttal to this statement produced by the respondents/claimants, though a suggestion is given to PW-32 that two persons who were stated to have died while standing at the spot, we re in fact travelling in the bus. Such a suggestion was denied by him. 23. In Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji Keshaji Modi and others, A.I.R. 1981 SC 2059, while dealing with Section 95(2)(a) of Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, Supreme Court was interpreting the words "any one accident". It was held that in the context of purpose of this Act, it signifies as many accidents as number of persons injured in an accident. While over-ruling the decision of Karnataka High Court, Supreme Court held that the limit of compensation of Rs. 20,000/- extends to each claimant Though in language of Section 149 as well 147 of 1988 Act (supra), as compared to Sections 95 and 96 of 1939 Act, there is marked difference, still on the basis of the reasoning of this Supreme Court in case of each one of the claimants in all these appeals it is held to be a separate accident. 24. Another reason, to take this view is that in all 41 claim petitions were filed at Nahan in District Sirmaur. Whereas one claim petition was filed at Solan. Thus, in all 42 petitions have been filed. 24. Another reason, to take this view is that in all 41 claim petitions were filed at Nahan in District Sirmaur. Whereas one claim petition was filed at Solan. Thus, in all 42 petitions have been filed. Appellant with a view to establish that number of passengers travelling in the bus in question was 63, was also required to produce cogent, reliable and legally acceptable evidence as to who were the other persons. This is in the nature of exclusion to avoid liability, which it has miserably failed to prove on record. Rather this position is strengthened from the number of passengers given by RW-7 as well as of those standing at Khanangan as PW-32, who were roped in this accident. As also RW-7 having not been confronted with his statement recorded under section 154 Cr.P.C. Persistent harping on Ext. P-1 i.e. F.I.R. will be of no consequence, much less help to the appellant, to advance its case in these appeals. 25. So far plea of the appellant based on Ext. R-3 and Ext. R-7 is concerned, for the disposal of these appeals suffice it to say that firstly there is legally acceptable evidence of 30/35 persons travelling in the bus at the time of accident. Secondly, on the basis of statement of RW-6, it cannot be said that number of persons traveling in the bus was 63 at the time of accident. Therefore, there is no question of violation of route permit Ext. R-3. So far number of persons travelling is concerned, keeping in view the Registration Certificate Ext. R-4, 42+2 were permitted to be carried. Admittedly, premium for 40 persons had been charged as is evident from Annexure R-7 and as was argued in these appeals. 26. Ext. RW-16/A was pressed into service by the appellant with a view to support its contention that the bus was plying as contract carriage and not stage carrier for which purpose permit had been issued. 27. Question that needs to be seen is, whether the so called violation, is of such a character that it will compel the Court to reject the claim of the respondents. Answer would be no. Reference is being made in this behalf, to a decision of this Court reported in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. V. Bishan Das and others, 1987 Sim. L.C. 218. Answer would be no. Reference is being made in this behalf, to a decision of this Court reported in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. V. Bishan Das and others, 1987 Sim. L.C. 218. What was held and is relevant for the present appeals is as under "1. m The defenes open to the Insurance Company are only those which are specified in sub-section (2) of Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereafter referred to as the Act1) and the only manner of its avoiding liability is through the proof of defences therein mentioned {See: British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Caption Itbar Singh and others, AIR 1959 SC 1331 at 1334 and Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Kokilaben Chandravandan and others, 1987 (1) Scale, 648 at 654: (1987 (1) TAC 471 (SC).}. The contract between the insurer and the insured may permit the insurer to avoid his liability under various circumstances. However, if those circumstances do not fall within the purview of sub-section (2) of Section 96 of the Act, the insurer cannot invoke them in aid and escape liability for the third party risk. The terms of the contract between the insurer and the insured, which determine their inter-se rights and liability, are hot and should not be confused with the statutory liability of the insurer for the third party risk. The remedy available to the insurer in such a case is to proceed against the insured for the breach of the contract and to claim reimbursement of the amount paid to satisfy the award." 28. A Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in National Insurance Company v. Rajindra Hematsinh and others, 1985 (II) ACC 494, held that in the case an accident between a private luxury bus and State Transport bus, because of such rash and negligent driving by the driver of the luxury bus, for payment of compensation awarded by the Tribunal inspite of the contention that it was not liable as no valid permit was issued, it was held that insurance Company will be liable even if permit was not issued by the RTO. 29. Supreme Court in case B.V. Nagaraju v. M/S. Oriental Insurance Co. 29. Supreme Court in case B.V. Nagaraju v. M/S. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Divisional Office, Hassan, AIR 1996 SC 2054, while considering the liability of Insurance Company for the alleged breach by carrying human beings in a goods vehicle more than the number permitted, held that it was not so fundamental a breach so as to afford ground to the insurer to eschew liability altogether. In this case exclusion of terms of insurance policy were read down to serve main purpose of the policy. While allowing the appeal for the claimants, against the decision of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, it was held as under "7. It is plain from the terms of the Insurance Policy that the insured vehicle was entitled to carry 6 workman, excluding the driver. If those 6 workmen when travelling in the vehicle, are assumed not to have increased any risk from the point of view of the Insurance Company on occurring of an accident, how could those added persons be said to have contributed to the causing of it is poser, keeping apart the load it was carrying. Here, it is nobodys case that driver of the insured vehicle was responsible for the accident. In fact, it was not disputed that he oncoming vehicle had collided head-on against the insured vehicle, which resulted in the damage. Merely by lifting a person or two, or the cleaner of the vehicle, without the knowledge of owner, cannot be said to be such a fundamental breach that the owner, cannot be said to be such a fundamental breach that the owner, should, in all events, be denied indemnification. The misuse of the vehicle was somewhat irregular though, but not so fundamental in nature so as to put an end to the contract unless some factors existed which, by 0 themselves, had gone to contribute to the causing of the .accident In the instant case, however, we find no such contributory factor. In Skandies case (AIR 1987 SC 1184) this court paved the way towards reading down the contractual Clause by observing as follows (at pp. In Skandies case (AIR 1987 SC 1184) this court paved the way towards reading down the contractual Clause by observing as follows (at pp. 1191 and 1992 of AIR): “.....When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependants on the own hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the-insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of reading down the exclusion clause in the light of the main purpose of the provisions so that the exclusion clause highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose. The theory which needs no support is supported by Carters "breach of Contract" vide paragraph 251 To quote: Notwithstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a sole, usually referred to as the "main purpose rule", which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promisor1 contractual obligations. For example, in Glynn V. Margetson & Co. (1893 AC 351 (357), Lord Harsbury, L.C. stated: it seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking as the whole instrument, and seeing what one must regard... as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract. Although this rule played a role in the development of the doctrine of fundamental breach, the continued validity of the rule was acknowledged when the doctrine was rejected by the House of Lords in Suissee Atlantigue Societed, Armement Maritime S.A.N.V. Rot-terdamshe Kolen Central, (1967) 1 AC 361. Accordingly, wide be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose, or object of the contract." 8. The National Commission went for the strict construction of the exclusion clause. Accordingly, wide be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose, or object of the contract." 8. The National Commission went for the strict construction of the exclusion clause. The reasoning that the extra passengers being carried in the goods vehicle could not have contributed, in any manner, to the occurring of the accident, was barely noticed and rejected sans any plausible account: even when the claim confining the damage to the vehicle only was limited in nature. We, thus, are of the view that in accord with the Skandias case (AIR 1987 SC 1184), the aforesaid exclusion term of the insurance policy must be read down so as to serve the main purpose of the policy that is indemnify damage caused to the vehicle, which we hereby do. 9. For the view above taken, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi is set aside and that of the State Commission is restored in its entirely, but without any order as to costs". 30. A learned Single Judge of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Gurpal Singh find another v. Jagan Nath and others. (2000 ACJ 885), while considering the fact that number of passengers in bus exceeded the permitted number of 52, thus, there was violation of the terms of policy, which exempted the insurance company. While considering the question whether the insurance company could be absolved of its liability merely because a few extra passengers boarded the bus, the answer was in the negative. Relevant paragragh is extracted herein below: "10. It also appears that merely because the bus was over loaded, the Tribunal was not entitled to absolve the insurance company of its liability. It is only when the owner or his representative is negligent that the third partys right to claim compensation arises. Once the negligence is established, the insurers liability follows. In the present case, it is clear that the passenger had died as the conductor had pushed him out of the bus. There was an act of negligence on the part of the employee of the owner. For this, the owner was liable to pay the compensation. Once the negligence is established, the insurers liability follows. In the present case, it is clear that the passenger had died as the conductor had pushed him out of the bus. There was an act of negligence on the part of the employee of the owner. For this, the owner was liable to pay the compensation. Since the owner was duly insured, the insurer cannot be absolved of its liability merely because of its liability merely because a few extra passengers were alleged to have boarded the bus." 31. On the other hand, Mr. Sharma placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Gujarat High Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Rajiben and others, 2002 ACJ 404. When a reference is made to this decision, there was a specific prohibition of use of vehicle for conveyance of passengers for hire or reward in the policy. In this case matador was hired for purchasing and bringing one electric motor. When the hirer was returning alongwith electric motor in the matador, it met with an accident and the hirer sustained fatal injuries. Contention of the insurance company, that in view of the conditions of permit, the owner of goods was permitted to travel in the vehicle. However, the permit was not placed on record, extracts of permit produced did not show that carriage of passenger was permitted. In these circumstances, insurance company was held not liable. This judgment does not advance the case of the appellant in these appeals in any manner, and in fact is clearly distinguishable because of the circumstances those were peculiar to this case. 32. Taking into account the view that has been taken in this judgment regarding number of passengers being there i.e 63, having not been accepted, submission based on the doctrine of proportionality and then to reduce the entire compensation by 1/3rd is also rejected. 33. Now coming to the plea of the appellant insurance company based on the provisions of Motor Vehicle Act 1988 and the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999. These questions will not arise for determination, because it has been held as a question of fact that there was no breach of any condition of policy and even if there was breach, still for the purpose of respondents, the appellant cannot be exonerated of its liability to satisfy the awards in all these cases. 34. These questions will not arise for determination, because it has been held as a question of fact that there was no breach of any condition of policy and even if there was breach, still for the purpose of respondents, the appellant cannot be exonerated of its liability to satisfy the awards in all these cases. 34. So far the alternate plea urged by Mr. Ashwani Sharma to entitle his client to recover the amount from the parents of the deceased owner-cum-driver of the bus is concerned. This is permissible in law keeping in view the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company, Shimla Vs. Kamla and others as well as other connected cases, AIR 2001 SC (1) 1419. However, in this case, it cannot be accepted, for the view that has been taken on the basis of the evidence as discussed hereinabove. A correction in calculation in FAO No. 68 of 2003, National Insurance Company Vs. Jai Dev & others, which has arisen out of petition No.150-MAC/2 of 2000, needs to be made. In paragragh-47 of the impugned award dependence was found at Rs.1500. P.M. Then after applying the multiplier of 9, compensation has been worked out at Rs. 2,16,000/-. Whereas it should be Rs. 1,62,000/- (Rs. 1500 X 12 X 9). This mistake in calculation is ordered to be carried out in this case in the impugned award which is subject matter of FAO showing the awarded amount at Rs.1,62,000/- instead of Rs.2,16,000/-. Rest of the award remains as it is. A typographical error in MAC petition No.136-MAC/2 of 2000, Devendar Singh & Another Vs. Shanta Devi & Another, (FAO No.72 of 2003) also needs to be carried out. In this case, learned Tribunal below has applied the multiplier of 17. However, while working out the compensation what is mentioned is "1500x12x15=3,06,00/-. Though calculations have been made by taking the multiplier of "17", but it is shown as "15". This typographical error is ordered to be corrected as "1500x12x17 = 3,06,000/-". In FAO No. 17 of 2003, appellant is the mother and respondent No.1 is the widow of deceased Vijay Singh. This case has arisen out of the award in MAC Petition No. 191 -MAC/2 of 2002. By means of impugned award a total sum of Rs. 2,52,0000/- was granted as compensation to Bimal Devi widow. Out of this amount a sum of Rs. This case has arisen out of the award in MAC Petition No. 191 -MAC/2 of 2002. By means of impugned award a total sum of Rs. 2,52,0000/- was granted as compensation to Bimal Devi widow. Out of this amount a sum of Rs. 30,000/- has been ordered to be paid to Tara Devi, mother of Vijay Singh. Though an attempt was made by Shri Tara Singh Chauhan, learned counsel for the appellant, to persuade the court that respondent No.1 Bimal Devi is not the widow of Vijay Singh. As accordingly to him, she is the widow of Ranvir Singh who had died 15 years ago. He further submitted that as widow, Bimla is getting pension also. And above all she is residing in the house of Ranvir Singh. Thus, per Mr. Chauhan, the entire compensation should have been paid to the appellant Tara Devi mother of the deceased. All these pleas have been controverted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.1. With a view of sustain the impugned award, Shri Kanwar laid great stress on Ext.PW-24/A, as well as on the statements of PW-7, PW-24 and PW-42. According to him, when a reference is made to the statement of PW-24, official from the Registrar of Marriages, (Sirmaur at Nahan), it is abundantly clear that deceased had solemnized marriage with his client after the death of her first husband Ranvir Singh. Whereas Mr. Chauhan to further support his case, pointed out the that respondent No.1 Bimal Devi, had admitted in her statement as PW-45., that she was residing in the house of her previous husband Ranvir Singh and was getting pension as his widow. Much capital was being made by Shri Chauhan out of this admission. Subsistence of a valid marriage is one thing. Drawing pension of her previous husband claiming to be his widow is another. In law both have separate consequences. Marriage, in my considered view, it established on record. What is the effect of Bimla Devi getting pension widow of Ranvir Singh is not the question before this court to be determined nor the Tribunal constituted to adjudicate a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is the right forum for this purpose. How the matrimony between Bimla Devi & the deceased vide Ext. PW-24/A was either broken or put to an end by parties, Mr. How the matrimony between Bimla Devi & the deceased vide Ext. PW-24/A was either broken or put to an end by parties, Mr. Chauhan was unable to point out anything from the record. Faced with this situation, Shri Chauhan wanted to make some capital from the statements of RW-11 and RW-12. Suffice it to say that non-inclusion of the name of a wife and for that matter a family member in the panchayat record has got penal consequences under the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act. But then the further question again arises is, whether this will nullify a legal marriage. The answer would be no. Shri Chauhan urged that the mother being class-1 heir, awarded amount of compensation should be apportioned equally. Suffice it to say in this behalf that the age of the deceased as well as of the claimant Tara Devi his mother, as also of Bimla Devi widow are material and relevant for determining the compensation as well as for apportionment it. In my considered view, looking to the longevity of age in the present day set up, compensation awarded to appellant Tara Devi needs to be enhanced but not as was urged by Shri Chauhan. In view of the age of Tara Devi appellant, the impugned award in paragraph-79 is upheld, however, its apportionment is modified keeping in view the age of the appellant which at the time of her statement was 62 years and of respondent No.1 Bimla Devi who was then 42 years of age. Consequently, it is ordered that out of the total award compensation in this case, a sum of Rs. 75,000/- with proportionate interest will be paid to Tara Devi & the balance with proportionate interest to Bimla Devi. Any amount paid to either of them shall be deducted out of this sum in terms of the award by the Tribunal below or released by this Court. However, the amount received by Tara Devi as ex-gratia or otherwise will be over & above this sum of Rs. 75000-/. Now taking up FAO No. 156 of 2002, National Insurance Company Vs. Saroj Bala and others, as well as FAO No. 116 of 2002, Rattan Singh and Another Vs. Smt. Saroj Bala and others, I have heard learned counsel for the parties in both these appeals also. These appeals have arisen from the award passed by MACT (II), Solan. 75000-/. Now taking up FAO No. 156 of 2002, National Insurance Company Vs. Saroj Bala and others, as well as FAO No. 116 of 2002, Rattan Singh and Another Vs. Smt. Saroj Bala and others, I have heard learned counsel for the parties in both these appeals also. These appeals have arisen from the award passed by MACT (II), Solan. In view of what has been held in the preceding paras, award in both these appeals is modified by holding that the parents of the deceased in both the appeals shall not be liable for the payment of awarded compensation to the Insurance Company and their appeal (FAO No. 116 of 2002) deserves to be allowed. It is ordered accordingly. It is further held that it is the insurance company who is liable for payment of the awarded compensation and its appeal FAO No. 156 of 2002 stands dismissed subject to this modification. Mr. Thakur urged that his clients i.e. parents of the deceased driver-cum-owner Om Singh of the bus, are not liable for payment of any amount either to the respondents/claimants or to the appellant as they did not incur any personal liability. He pointed out that in case they have inherited anything from the deceased, their liability is limited to that extent only and not beyond it. This is the correct legal position. However, it is a different matter that this question does not arise in these appeals in view of what has been held hereinabove in the preceding paras. No other point is urged. In view of the aforesaid discussion, as well as subject to corrections in FAO Nos. 68 and 72 of 2003, as well as modification of apportionment in FAO No. 17 of 2003, all these appeals, except FAO No. 116 of 2002 and FAO No. 156 of 2003 being without any merit, are dismissed with no order as to costs. So far FAO No. 156 of 2002 arising out of the award passed by MACT (II), Solan are concerned, in both these two appeals award is modified by holding that parents of the deceased shall not be liable for the payment of awarded compensation to the Insurance Company. Their appeal is allowed and it is further held that it is the Insurance Company who will be liable for payment of the awarded amount. Their appeal is allowed and it is further held that it is the Insurance Company who will be liable for payment of the awarded amount. With this direction, appeal of the Insurance Company i.e. FAO No. 156 of 2002 is dismissed. Interim orders passed in all these appeals shall stand vacated forthwith and all pending applications also stand disposed of, in view of the orders passed in the main matter. -