JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Petitioner is aggrieved with the order dated 31st May, 2003 passed by Sub Judge 1st Class Court No. 2, Una in CMA No. 63 of 1996 in Civil Suit No. 120 of 1993. 2. Admitted facts of this case are that Civil Suit No. 120 of 1993 was filed by the petitioner before the trial Court. During its pendency, on the joint request of both the parties, case was ordered to be fixed on 18th November, 1995 in Lok Adalat for compromise. 3. Order passed by the trial Court on 10.11.1995 in the suit in this behalf, for ready reference is extracted hereinbelow:— "On the request of both the parties, the case is fixed for 18.11.1995 in Lok Adalat for compromise/ 4. Fact remains that after recording statements of the petitioner as well as original defendant No. 1, Ved Parkash (whose legal representatives are present respondents), a decree came to be passed on 18.11.1995. 5. Record shows that the petitioner felt aggrieved by this decree dated 18.11.1995. As such he preferred an application for setting aside this compromise decree and for restoring the suit to its original number for further trial and decision in accordance with law, under Section 151 read with order 23 Rule 3 CPC. This was registered as CMA No. 63 of 1996. What was stated in this application has material bearing in this case as such those are also extracted hereinbelow:— "1. That the above said civil suit was pending in this Honble Court and was fixed for evidence of the plaitniff on 10.11.1995 when this case was entrusted to the "Lok Adalat" wherein the parties had compromised this Civil Suit on 18.11.1995 vide their separate statements on the same date. And as per the compromise arrived at between the parties, this Honble Court has duly passed a compromising decree dated 18.11.1995. The copies of statements and copy of the compromising decree dated 18.11.1995 are attached herewith for your kind perusal. 2. That after a plain reading of the decree and the statement recorded therein, the Honble Court has directed that the defendant must register the registry regarding the suit land within ten days. Now if one looks towards the statement of the plaintiff recorded on the same date, it transpires that plaintiff have to received 0-2 mls from the defendant. 2. That after a plain reading of the decree and the statement recorded therein, the Honble Court has directed that the defendant must register the registry regarding the suit land within ten days. Now if one looks towards the statement of the plaintiff recorded on the same date, it transpires that plaintiff have to received 0-2 mls from the defendant. There is no compromise about the giving and taking of the land in exchange and to get the registry of the suit land, 3. That even assuming that the land in exchange is to be taken and given, then what will be about the land that is found in possession of the defendant beyond 0-2 mls and what will be its market price to be given to the plaintiff. 4. That it is further pertinent to point out that the suit land is 0-5 mls, while the encroachment shown by L.C. beneath the defendant is to the tune of 0-6 mls. Now as per this decree, if the registry of suit land (0-5 mls) is to be registered what will be the fate of 0-1 mls left in excess of 0-5 mls suit land. 5. That the compromise so entered into between the parties and the consequent passing of the decree dated 18.11.1995 is thus vague, uncertain and it is impossible to give effects to it. 6. That because of the element of uncertainty and vagueness involved in the compromise (which is a form of a contract), it is impossible to enforce the compromise and it is thus void from the very inception and is liable to be set aside. 7. That this application is made after providing due opportunity to the defendant/respondents/JDs to obey the compromising decree and their consequent failure to do so due to vagueness and uncertainty in compromise and decree passed consequently. 8. That this application has been made in good faith and in bona fide manner without any unreasonable delay. An affidavit is attached herewith. 7. That this application is made after providing due opportunity to the defendant/respondents/JDs to obey the compromising decree and their consequent failure to do so due to vagueness and uncertainty in compromise and decree passed consequently. 8. That this application has been made in good faith and in bona fide manner without any unreasonable delay. An affidavit is attached herewith. It is, therefore, prayed that this application under Section 151 read with Order 23 Rule 3 CPC be accepted and the compromising decree dated 18.11.1995 be set aside and civil suit No. 120/93 titled as "Sanjeev Kumar v. Ved Parkash etc.", decided on 18.11.1995 be restored to its original number for further trial and decision in accordance with the law, in the interests of justice." When put to notice, respondents contested and resisted this application. Thereafter the learned trial Court framed following issues on 29.5.2001:— 1. Whether the compromise in the civil suit No. 120/93 is vague, uncertain and unenforceable? OPA 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative whether the decree and judgment are liable to be set aside? OPA 3. Whether the application is not maintainable? 4. Relief. 6. After recording evidence, impugned order dismissing the same has been passed by the Court below. Hence this revision at the instance of the petitioner. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and with their assistance, have also examined the record of the court below in the suit file as well as of the application. 8. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that decree is void for want of certainty, thus it is not enforceable in law. He further urged, that the application under Section 151 CPC was maintainable in the same Court for recall of the decree as in the present case. Thus he prayed for allowing the revision and consequently to relegate the parties to the stage that was there in the main suit by setting aside the compromise decree. 9. All these pleas were contested and resisted by Mr. Thakur, learned Counsel for the respondents. According to him, this revision is not maintainable. Reason beign that firstly trial Court has committed no jurisdic-tional error in passing the impugned order. He also pressed into service the bar created under Section 21(2) of The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. 9. All these pleas were contested and resisted by Mr. Thakur, learned Counsel for the respondents. According to him, this revision is not maintainable. Reason beign that firstly trial Court has committed no jurisdic-tional error in passing the impugned order. He also pressed into service the bar created under Section 21(2) of The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. At the same time he submitted that decree is certain and is enforceable in accordance with law. He further pointed out that there is no ground eixsting in the circumstances of this case which may call for interference with the impugned order while examining this revision under Section 115 CPC. 10. Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner to support his plea, that application lies to the same Court placed reliance of a decision of Honble Supreme Court in Banwari Lai v, Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R.) and another, AIR 1993 SC 1139. He laid great emphasis on this decision and urged that if in a case of compromise, application is maintainable, there is no reason why in a case settled before the Lok Adalat, such an application is not maintainable. 11. In this behalf certain provisions of CPC as well as of The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 need to be noted. Order 23 Rule (3-A) of the CPC, Order 43 Rule (1-A) and Section 21(2) of the aforesaid Act of 1987 are as under:— "Order 23. xxx [3-A. Bar to suit.—No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. "Order 43. xxx [1-A.Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal against decrees.— (1) Where any order is made under this Code against a party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced against such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal against the decree, contend that such order should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced. (2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded.]" "21. (2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded.]" "21. Award of Lok Adalat.—xxx (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the disptue, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award." 12. In terms of Rule (3-A) supra, no suit lies to challenge a decree on the ground that the compromise on which it was based was not lawful. Whereas Rule (1-A) of Order 43 supra, is an exception to the general rule, as contained in Rule (3-A) supra. This is one side of the matter On the other hand, Section 44 of the Evidence Act permits a party to prove that the judgment, order or decree delivered by a court it was not competent to deliver the same "or was obtained by fraud or collision". That is admittedly not the case of the petitioner. 13. In addition to these provisions, Section 21 sub-section (2) of 1987 Act, supra, speaks of finality being attached to every award of Lok Adalat and the same being binding on all the parties to the dispute. Here also no appeal lies against such an award. 14. In view of these provisions of law, reliance placed by Mr. Sharma on the decision of Banwari Lais case (supra) is wholly mis-conceived. Allegations in this case before the Supreme Court were that compromise was not lawful. At the same time, material on record indicated that it was not lawful within the meaning of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, therefore, order recording compromise could be recalled. In this case order regarding compromise was also challenged on the ground that the counsel in collision with the defendnat in the suit had played a fraud on him by filing a fabricated petition of compromise, although no compromise had in fact taken place between the parties £nd details of fraud were mentioned in the petition. It is for this reason and circumstances, it was urged before the Supreme Court that the compromise was void, illegal and against the requirements of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. It is for this reason and circumstances, it was urged before the Supreme Court that the compromise was void, illegal and against the requirements of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. It was in this background that application came to be filed and matter was decided by the Supreme Court in the background of the facts peculiar to the said case. 15. Further under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, a compromise has to be lawful Purpose to see that it is lawful is that, in a given case, it can be enforced in a court of law. And also that a court of law is not privy to something which is not according to law and/or is contrary to law. 16. In this behalf it may be appropriate to notice that except for urging that because impugned decree is uncertain, therefore, it is void within the meaning of Section 29 of the Contract Act, Mr. Sharma stated that his clients case is not based on fraud nor collusion muchless on inducement etc. 17. A void contract has been defined in Section 2(g) of the Contract Act. It reads as under:— " xxx (g) An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void; …” When confronted with this provision of law, learned counsel could not satisfy the court that decree passed by the Lok Adalat on compromise based on the statements of the parties was not enforceable in law. In addition to this a perusal of the statements relied upon by Mr. Sharma, and the order as well as decree of the trial Court clearly indicates that it is not had for want of uncertainty. Any of the grounds on which an agreement can be avoided in law is not the basis to avoid the decree in question. 18. So far maintainability of application in question is concerned, this plea also cannot be accepted. Mr. Sharma had pointed out that maintaining an appeal against an award of Lok Adalat is barred under Section 21(2), but not an application like present one. If this argument is taken to its logical end, it would mean that in the absence of there being any plea of fraud, collusion etc., still a litigatn like petitioner can be permitted to maintain the application and thus over-come an award of the Lok Adalat, like impugned decree in the present case. If this argument is taken to its logical end, it would mean that in the absence of there being any plea of fraud, collusion etc., still a litigatn like petitioner can be permitted to maintain the application and thus over-come an award of the Lok Adalat, like impugned decree in the present case. Purpose of enacting Section 21 and other provisions of 1987 Act is one, i.e. to give finality to a Us intra parties at some stage. And when major relief of appeal is barred, then allowing an application to claim it will by circumventing, as well as"defeating a provision of law like Section 21(2), supra cannot be permitted. 19. That being the position, the application was not maintainable before the trial Court. Besides this, decision relied upon by Mr. Sharma in Banwari Lals case (supra), is totally distinguishable being on its own facts and is thus wholly inapplicable to the present case. 20. Mr. Sharma also placed reliance on a decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Smt. Santosh Gupta v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, 2003 (3) PLR 658, and urged that impugned decree could not have been passed as the Lok Adalat is barred to adjudicate upon rights of the parties in the absence of a compromise/settlement between the parties. This decision is again wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case because in the instant case on the joint request of the parties under Section 20(l)(i)(a) of The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, matter was referred to the Lok Adalat. Statements of the petitioner and original defendant Ved Parkash were recorded before Lok Adalat. This resulted in passing of the impugned decree. No other point is urged. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this revision petition which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.