ORDER : N. Santosh Hegde, J. The appellant before us was charged for an offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and was tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi in SC No. 40 of 1995. On conclusion of the trial the learned Sessions Judge found him guilty of the offence charged and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. In default to pay the said fine, the appellant was also awarded a further sentence of 3 months' rigorous imprisonment. The appellant's appeal to the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 200 of 1996 having failed, he is before us in this appeal. 2. The prosecution case briefly stated is that the victim Mohd. Zafar Imam, a 15-year-old boy was working in the embroidery shop of the appellant and was also residing in a part of H. No. 4506, Second Floor, Lambi Gali, Kucha Pandit, Hauz Qazi, Old Delhi. It is the case of the prosecution that this boy was demanding his arrears of salary as he wanted to visit his parents in the village. The appellant being annoyed by such persistent demand on 6-4-1994 at about 10.30 p.m. in the room where the victim boy was staying, allegedly poured kerosene on the said boy and set him on fire. According to the prosecution case one of the neighbours on hearing the cries of the victim, namely, PW 3 Mumtaz Ahmad took the victim to Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Hospital (LNJP) at about 11.00 p.m. On being admitted in the hospital the doctor incharge Dr. Neeraj Kalra prepared the medico-legal certificate wherein he noted that the victim had informed that he was burnt by a person named Islam. He also noted that the victim was admitted at 11.00 p.m. on 6-4-1994 and the patient was fit for making statement. The further case of the prosecution is that on getting the information PW 17 who acted as the investigating officer for part of the investigation arrived at the hospital when the victim made a statement to him which is Ext. PW 17/A. Based on the said statement, an FIR was registered. On completion of the investigation, the prosecution lodged the chargesheet as stated above. 3. PW 17/A. Based on the said statement, an FIR was registered. On completion of the investigation, the prosecution lodged the chargesheet as stated above. 3. In support of its case the prosecution has examined PW 1 Mathew, Record Clerk of LNJP Hospital for proving the signatures of the two doctors, namely, Dr. Neeraj Kalra and Dr. Neeraj Gupta, who had signed the MLC and the statement of the victim Ext. PW 17/A respectively, since according to the prosecution the said two doctors were not available for tendering the evidence in court. The prosecution examined PW 2 Ali Kumaran who identified the dead body of Mohd. Zafar Imam who died around 6.40 a.m. on the next morning. PW 4 Dr. D. Harish who conducted the post-mortem reported to prove that the victim had died due to burns suffered by him. PW 5 Fazal Haque is the father of the deceased who on being informed by the police came to Delhi. He states that the victim was working in the shop of the appellant. PW 6 ASI B.L. Yadav, PW 9 Inspector Devender Singh and PW 10 HC Pritu Ram are official witnesses who speak about the investigation conducted by them. PW 3 Mumtaz Ahmad, PW 7 Ajgar Ali, PW 8 Atta Ullah and PW 12 Shafiq are public witnesses who according to the prosecution had either seen the victim when on fire or to prove that the victim had worked in the embroidery shop of the appellant. But these witnesses have not supported the prosecution case. 4. The entire prosecution case in the absence of any support from the independent witnesses is based on the statement made by the victim to PW 17, which is also treated as the complaint and was treated by the courts below as the dying declaration of the said victim. The courts below have accepted the said dying declaration Ext. PW 17/A. This statement, as mentioned above, is recorded by PW 17, the Inspector of Police in the hospital around 12.40 p.m., the exact time of which has not come on the record. According to the prosecution the victim was in a fit state of mind and was also in a medically fit condition to make the said statement wherein he has unequivocally stated that it is the appellant who has poured kerosene on him and burnt him. According to the prosecution the victim was in a fit state of mind and was also in a medically fit condition to make the said statement wherein he has unequivocally stated that it is the appellant who has poured kerosene on him and burnt him. It is to be noted at this stage that according to the medical records the victim had suffered almost 100% burns and he died on 7-4-1994 at about 6.40 a.m. 5. Ms. Madhur Dadlani, learned counsel appearing as amicus curiae for the appellant contended that the courts below seriously erred in placing reliance on the so-called dying declaration Ext. PW 17/A, which according to her does not even contain a certification by the doctor that the victim was in a fit condition to make such a statement. She also contended that though there was ample time for PW 17 to summon a Magistrate to record the dying declaration, he did not do so. Her further argument in regard to this dying declaration is that a bare perusal of the document even for a naked eye shows that there has been a manipulation in the preparation of this document inasmuch as a part of the contents of the document are written in a narrow space which indicates that the thumb impression in the said document was obtained on a blank paper and the contents of the paper were subsequently filled up. She also submitted that description of the incident given in the dying declaration seems highly artificial inasmuch as the language used, narration of the incident as also the use of certain technical words in the contents of the document shows that this could not have been the statement of an illiterate 15-year-old boy who was suffering from severe burns. 6. Shri Kailash Vasdev, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent State contended that the courts below have rightly placed reliance on the dying declaration made by the victim and neither the police nor the doctors who were parties to the recording of the dying declaration had any reason whatsoever to either prepare a false statement or to implicate the appellant. Learned Senior Counsel contended that MLC, Ext. PW 1/A itself clearly shows that the victim on being admitted to the hospital had specifically named the accused, which was recorded by Dr. Learned Senior Counsel contended that MLC, Ext. PW 1/A itself clearly shows that the victim on being admitted to the hospital had specifically named the accused, which was recorded by Dr. Neeraj Kalra and the said MLC also contained the opinion of the said doctor that the patient was in a fit condition to make a statement. He also contended that there is nothing extraordinarily suspicious about the manner in which the statement Ext. PW 17/A was recorded, either in its language or in the format of that dying declaration and the same can be relied upon for basing a conviction. 7. As noticed by us hereinabove, the only material which was available for the courts below to rely upon to base a conviction is the statement Ext. PW 17/A made by the deceased to PW 17. The said document which is scribed by PW 17 does not contain any certification by the doctor that the victim was in a fit state of mind and health to make a declaration of that nature. Though it is true that this Court has held that such a certification is not always necessary, in our opinion, when a statement of this nature is being recorded in a hospital if the prosecution fails to get such certification the document should be very cautiously considered. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the State that it contains the signatures of Dr. Neeraj Gupta who was treating the victim is of no assistance to the prosecution. The said doctor has not certified that the patient was in a fit condition to make the statement nor has he been examined in the court. In such circumstances, it would be extremely difficult for the court to accept the condition of the victim merely on an endorsement found in MLC. 8. It is also worthwhile to notice herein that even though PW 17 had sufficient opportunity to take the assistance of a Magistrate to record the dying declaration, admittedly no efforts were made to do so and the IO had proceeded to do so even without recording his own satisfaction as to the condition of the victim. Then again, it is to be noted that based on this dying declaration an FIR was registered around 2.20 a.m. in the morning of 7-4-1994. Then again, it is to be noted that based on this dying declaration an FIR was registered around 2.20 a.m. in the morning of 7-4-1994. The express report in regard to this reached the Jurisdictional Magistrate only the early next morning i.e. on 8-4-1994. This delay is also not explained by the prosecution. 9. The reliance placed by the two courts below on the entry made in MLC by the other doctor Neeraj Kalra to the effect that "patient is fit for statement" again in the absence of the evidence of the said doctor cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the victim in fact was in a fit condition to make the statement when it was recorded. Then again, as complained by the learned counsel for the appellant, a perusal of the dying declaration shows from its language and graphic details given therein that this could not have been the statement of a 15-year-old illiterate boy who must have been in severe agony and under sedation. Even the complaint of the learned counsel for the appellant that the spacing of the writing in the document also indicates that there is a possibility that the thumb mark of the victim being taken in a blank paper and the contents of the document inserted thereafter cannot be overruled. 10. In the above suspicious circumstances coupled with the fact that the prosecution has failed to give satisfactory explanation for the non-examination of the two doctors, we are of the considered opinion that it is not safe to rely upon the dying declaration to base a conviction. 11. In the said view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the two courts below have erred in placing reliance on this dying declaration and to base a conviction thereon. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed. The judgments of the two courts below are set aside. The appellant, if not required in any other case, shall be set at liberty forthwith. 12. We record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Ms. Madhur Dadlani, Advocate who appeared as amicus curiae in this matter and direct payment of Rs. 750 (seven hundred and fifty only) as fee of the learned amicus curiae. Appeal allowed.