JUDGMENT By Court. -Admittedly, on 3.1.1981 the Respondent no. 3 was appointed as Assistant Teacher in St. Ignatius High School, Gumla. He was placed under suspension on 5.1.1985 on certain charges. On 24.3.1985 charge sheet was issued and in the departmental proceeding he was given warning on 2.4.1985 and thereafter order of his suspension was revoked. He was issued another warning on 4.7.1985 and was again put under suspension on 23.12.1985. On 19.1.1987 another charge sheet was issued against him for his alleged misbehavior with District Education Officer, Gumla on 2.1.1987 and he was suspended also. He never either replied the charges against him from time to time in writing or filed any explanation or show cause. Ultimately on 10.9.1987 the Managing Committee of the school took decision to terminate his services with effect from 15.11.1987. However, on his accepting certain terms and conditions in writing on 19.10.1990 he was reinstated in school service on 1.11.1990. Again on 21.3.1991 the Managing Committee decided to remove him from service on account of his absence from duty without information. He, thereafter on 7.5.1991 got himself enrolled as an Advocate and started practicing at civil courts, Gumla. 2. In December, 1992, he filed an application, purporting to be under section 28 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') before the Respondent no. 2, the competent authority under the Act, for payment of arrears of his salary for the period from 19.1.1987 to 14.11.1987 and again from 15.11.1987 to 30.11.1992. It was registered as Case No. M.P. 102 of 1992. The School contested the case inter alia on the ground that the present proceeding under the Act was not maintainable. The said case was dismissed as not maintainable on 15.1.1993. 3. The Respondent no. 3 filed another case under section 28 of the Act, which was registered as B.S. Case No. 1 of 1995. Respondent no. 2, vide order dated 29.12.1995, passed in the said case directed the Managing Committee of the School to pay arrears of salary for the aforesaid period plus a sum of Rs. 10,00,000.00 as compensation. 4. The School preferred an appeal under section 28(7) of the Act before the appellate authority, namely, the Industrial, Ranchi which was dismissed as barred by time on 15.1.2000. 5. 10,00,000.00 as compensation. 4. The School preferred an appeal under section 28(7) of the Act before the appellate authority, namely, the Industrial, Ranchi which was dismissed as barred by time on 15.1.2000. 5. The School thereafter filed CWJC No. 496 of 2000 (R) before this Court, which was allowed on 14.3.2001 by the learned Single Judge. The order dated 15.1.2000 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi, the appellate authority was set aside and direction was given to decide the maintainability of the application against the School under the Act and thereafter to pass the appropriate orders in accordance with law. 6. However, against the said order of the learned Single Judge the School has filed present Letters Patent Appeal which was admitted on 3.8.2001 and operation of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 14.3.2001 was stayed. 7. The respondent no. 3, on the other hand, filed I.A. No. 774 of 2001 in the present Appeal by way of cross objection, challenging the remand order passed by the learned Single Judge. 8. Mr. S.K. Ughal, counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that on the ratio of a decision of the Apex Court in Ruth Soren vs. Managing Committee, East ISSDA and others [2001 (1) Jhr. CR 1 (SC)], a proceeding under section 28 of the Act was not maintainable, as the School, which is an educational institution is not "Establishment" within the meaning of Section 26(2) of the Act. Hence, neither the respondent no. 2 nor the Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi, had any jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by Respondent no. 3, who was an Assistant Teacher of the School and was dismissed from service. 9. On the other hand, Mr. A.K. Sahani, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 3 submitted that the School in question is engaged in making of its own profit and, therefore, it can be said that it is carrying on business and, therefore, the provisions of the Act were applicable in the present case and a proceeding under section 28 of the Act at the instance of the Respondent no. 3 was maintainable. 10. Section 26(2) of the Act defines "Establishment". 3 was maintainable. 10. Section 26(2) of the Act defines "Establishment". In our opinion, the relevant question to be examined in the present case is whether an educational institution imparting education falls within the definition of "Establishment" carrying on a business, trade or profession or any work in connection with or incidental or ancillary thereto. 11. In Ruth Soren (supra) the Apex Court considered this aspect of the matter and observed that the "Establishment" as defined under the Act is not as wide as 'industry', defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. The concept of industry, as defined under the business, trade, undertaking manufacture or calling of employers and also includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft • or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. It was, therefore, held in the said case that in a School there is an organised activity between the employers and employees to impart education. Such an activity, though may be industry, will not be a profession, trade or business for the purpose of Article "19(1)(g) of the Constitution, would not be one failing within the scope of "Establishment" under the Act. 12. In University of Delhi vs. Ramnath [ 1963 (2) LLJ 335 ] the Apex Court held that imparting education is not industry, as the work of the University cannot be assimilated to the position of trade, calling, business service and hence cannot be industry. 13. We are, therefore, of the view that the present case is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in Ruth Soren (supra) and as such no useful purpose will be served on remand of the matter either before the statutory appellate authority or the competent authority under the Act. Only question of law is to be decided herein, as the facts are not in dispute. 14. Accordingly, the order dated 29.12.1995 passed by the S.D.O. Gumla, the competent Authority under the Act, the Respondent no. 2, the order dated 15.1.2000 passed by the statutory appellate authority and the order dated 14.3.2001 passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside and consequently B.S. Case No. 1 of 1995. filed under section 28 of the Act by the respondent no. 3 before the competent Authority under the Act, stands dismissed as not maintainable. 15. In the result, the Appeal is allowed, but without costs.