JUDGMENT Ranjan Gogoi, J. 1. Both the writ petitions being inter-connected were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. The petitioner in CR. No. 4375/98, Shri Kalibor Ali Sheikh joined as a teacher in Hadurhat Dharmasala High School on 7.2.1972. At that time the respondent No. 4, Shri Nagendra Nath Roy, who is the petitioner in CR. No. 4459/98 was already in service having joined the said school in the post of Sanskrit Teacher (Classical Teacher) on 29.2.1966. Both the aforesaid persons graduated in the year 1974. The school in question was provincialised by order dated 1.3.1980 w.e.f. 23.2.1980, Thereafter, in the year 1995, the School was upgraded to a Higher Secondary School. The petitioner in Cr. No. 4375/98 Shri Khalibor Ali Sheikh was allowed to hold the charge of the Office of the Vice Principal of the School w.e.f. 10.8.1994 and thereafter, as the principal w.e.f. 30.3.1995. In the year 1993, a selection was held for the post of Vice Principal and the select list pursuant to the said selection was prepared and subsequently approved by the concerned authority on 15.5.1995. The respondent No. 4 Shri Nagendra Nath Roy was selected, whereas the petitioner Shri Khalibor Ali Sheikh was not included in the select list as he had not been called for the interview for selection. As in terms of the conditions prescribed in the select list, the same was not to be operated upon, in the event a person senior was not sent for interview, the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 4375/98, Shri Khaibor Ali Sheikh has instituted the writ proceeding in question contending, inter alia that he is senior to the respondent No. 4 and on that basis praying for appropriate directions of this Court restraining the authority from acting upon the select list in question. Thereafter, the second case i.e., CR No. 4458/98 was filed by Shri Nagendra Nath Roy, praying for directions of this Court for operation of the select list. As both the cases raised common questions of law on more or loss similar facts, an order for analogous hearing was passed by this Court and that is how the cases were heard together. 3. Mr. A.S. Choudhury, learned Sr. As both the cases raised common questions of law on more or loss similar facts, an order for analogous hearing was passed by this Court and that is how the cases were heard together. 3. Mr. A.S. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner in CR No. 4375/98 has contended that the petitioner Shri Khaibor Ali Sheikh is senior to the respondent No. 4, Shri Nagendra Nath Roy. Such seniority, it is contended, is, inter alia, on account of the fact that the respondent No. 4, Shri Nagendra Nath Roy was absent from the School in question during the period from 16.9.1975 to 3.7.1976 during which period he was working in another school, namely Kasokhana High School and the jurisdictional Inspector of schools had treated the aforesaid period to be a break in service and had ordered the Principal of the school to put up service records of the respondent No. 4 Shri Nagendra Nath Roy for necessary correction. The learned counsel has placed before the Court two communications enclosed at Annexures 9 and 10 to the writ petition, in support of the aforesaid submissions made. The learned counsel has further argued that the petitioner being a Sanskrit Teacher i.e., a Classical teacher was entitled to reckon his seniority in the cadre of general teachers w.e.f. 3.8.1990 in terms of the Govt. order dated 4.5.2001, a copy of which order has been placed before the Court. The seniority of respondent No. 4, Shri Nagendra Nath Roy, if counted from 3.8.1990, the petitioner Shri Khaibor Ali Sheikh is clearly senior to the said respondent No. 4. The learned counsel further submits that the materials on record disclose that the petitioner was not sent for interview for selection to the post of Vice Principal and, therefore, in terms of the conditions incorporated in the select list itself, the select list dated 15.5.1995 can not be put into operation. That apart, the learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that under the provisions of the Assam Secondary Education (Provincialised) Schools Rules, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 1982 Rules), the period of validity of the select list must be understood to be one year from the date of publication and that the select list in question had spent its force. In this regard, the learned counsel has argued that while the aforesaid 1982 Rules specifically provide a period of one year as the period of validity of the select list prepared for direct recruitment, though there is no prescribed period of validity with regard to the select lists for promotions, the aforesaid period of one year, though not spelt out in the 1982 Rules, must be held to be applicable in respect of the select lists prepared for promotion also. 4. Controverting the arguments advanced by Mr. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. S.K. Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 has argued that the materials on record do not establish that the competent authority has passed any order treating the period from 16.9.1975 to 3.7.1976 as a break in the service tenure of the Respondent No. 4. It has been argued that the communication enclosed to the writ petition (Annexures 9 and 10) relief upon in this regard, contain a tentative decision of the Inspector of schools and the final outcome thereof is not disclosed by the materials on record. The learned counsel further argued that at in so far as seniority of the Classical Teachers w.e.f. 3.8.1990 is concerned, the said matter is presently subjudice before the Court and the notification/order dated 4.5.2001 has been put to challenge in several writ petitions now pending before this Court. The said notification, therefore, ought to form the basis of this Court's decision. In so far as the period of validity of the select list is concerned, it has been argued by Mr. Goswami, learned counsel for the respondents that the 1982 Rules not having providing any expressed period of validity of the select list and this Court in the case of Khalilur Rahman and Ors. v. State of Assam reported in 2002(2) GLT 687 having taken the view that a select list for promotion prepared under the 1982 Rules does not become invalid on expiry of one year, the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner on the said score ought not to be accepted. 5. The rival contentions advanced on behalf of the parties have received due consideration of the Court. 5. The rival contentions advanced on behalf of the parties have received due consideration of the Court. In so far as the claim of seniority on the basis of notification dated 4.5.2001, by which the Classical Teachers have been granted seniority in the cadre of General Teachers w.e.f. 3.8.1990, is concerned, this court does not consider it proper to record any conclusion with regard to inter se seniority of the persons before the Court on the basis of the said notification in as much as the validity of the same, which is under challenge before this Court, is yet to be finally decided. In absence of any final decision of this Court, with regard to the validity of the said notification, any decision on the question of inter se seniority on the said basis may cause serious prejudice to either of the parties. It is, therefore, considered more appropriate to proceed to examine the other contentions advanced by the parties. 6. Regarding the period of validity of a select list for promotion prepared under the Rules in force it must be noticed that unlike in the case of the select list for direct recruitment, the select list for promotion does not contain any expressed period of validity. An attempt has been made to persuade this Court that the decision of the Apex Court in the case of the Union of India v. N.R. Banerjee reported in is an authority for the proposition that if under the Rules/orders in force, it is mandatory to have a yearly selection, the life of the select list must be understood to be of one year. As in the present case, under the 1982 Rules in force, there is a necessity of holding a yearly selection it has been argued that the select list in question must be understood to have become invalid by efflux of time. 7. In Union of India v. N.R. Banerjee (supra), the Administrative Instructions holding the field visualized preparation of a panel for filling up the vacancies occurring in the course of a particular year. Such a requirement was mandated except when vacancies did not exist or no eligible candidate was available. As the panel was to be prepared to fill up the vacancies occurring in the course of the year, the life of the panel was held to be of one year. Such a requirement was mandated except when vacancies did not exist or no eligible candidate was available. As the panel was to be prepared to fill up the vacancies occurring in the course of the year, the life of the panel was held to be of one year. If no panel has been prepared or if prepared had not been acted upon, the requirement spelt out in the aforesaid case is subsequent preparation of a year wise panel, meaning thereby, separate panels in respect of the posts available in each previous year. Such an exercise alone can ensure orderly conduct. Not only the right of an eligible person to be considered for inclusion in a panel upon the requisite eligibility being acquired is ensured but also the right of a person selected but placed at a position which may not warrant appointment, to have his case considered for inclusion in a subsequent panel is also protected. Such consequences will naturally not follow if the panel prepared for making appointments against the vacancies occurring in the course of the year is allowed to continue beyond the said period. The above discussions lead to irresistible conclusion that the select list prepared and approval in the instant case in the year 1995 had spent its force even before the present cases had been instituted and no relief as prayed for in either of the cases can be granted. As the select list itself has been held to have become inoperative by efflux of time, it will not be necessary to deal with any of the other contentions raised by the respective parties. 8. Consequently and in view of the above discussions, both the writ petitions shall stand dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Writ petition dismissed