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2003 DIGILAW 378 (PNJ)

Guman Singh, Workman, Faridabad Karamgar Union v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court

2003-03-05

SATISH KUMAR MITTAL

body2003
Judgment SATISH KUMAR MITTAL, J. 1. Guman Singh, workman, has filed the instant writ petition Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the award dated 18/02/1985 passed by the Labour court, Faridabad, vide which the industrial dispute raised by the petitioner, which was referred by the appropriate Government to the labour Court, was dismissed. While observing that the dispute was compromised between the parties. 2. In his petition, the petitioner has alleged that he was appointed as Turner on 1/01/1979 at a monthly salary of Rs.609/- by respondent No.1. In the year 1983, he was issued a charge sheet on the allegation that he was sleeping while on duty. It was alleged that a detailed reply to the aforesaid charge sheet was given by him to the Management denying the allegations and submitting that he was feeling sick and was not sleeping while on duty. The management, instead of holding enquiry to find out the truth of the allegation and without following the principle of natural justice and the rules and regulations of the Model Standing orders of the Company having the statutory force, terminated the services of the petitioner on 16/06/1983, the matter was referred to the Labour Court by the appropriate government for adjudicating the question as to whether the termination of services of the petitioner was justified or not and to what relief, he is entitled. 3. When the aforesaid dispute was pending before the Labour Court for adjudication on January 29, 1985, the petitioner workman made a statement before the Labour Court that after receiving Rs.3,700.00 he shall have no dispute with the respondent-Management and he shall have no right to reinstatement and re-employment. Then the counsel for the respondent management sought adjournment to bring the aforesaid amount of Rs.3,700.00 . Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to 18/02/1985 for bringing the bank draft by the Management for the aforesaid amount. On that date, the petitioner-workman stated that he is not ready to compromise the matter on receiving Rs.3,700.00 and his dispute may be decided on merits. The Labour Court, instead of deciding the case on merits, has held that the industrial dispute referred to it was compromised in view of the statements made by the parties on 29/01/1985 and in view of the said compromise, the dispute has been fully settled. The said order is under challenge in the instant writ petition. 4. The Labour Court, instead of deciding the case on merits, has held that the industrial dispute referred to it was compromised in view of the statements made by the parties on 29/01/1985 and in view of the said compromise, the dispute has been fully settled. The said order is under challenge in the instant writ petition. 4. In its written statement, the respondent management has contended that the petitioner workman himself made statement before the court on 29/01/1985 and he had agreed to settle all his claims on receiving the payment of Rs.3,700.00 . On the next date of hearing, though he refused to accept the aforesaid payment, but under the law once he had agreed to compromise the matter, then on subsequent date that there is no illegality in the order passed by the learned Labour Court as under the industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the matter can be, settled between the parties and an award made by the Labour Court on the basis of such settlement shall be deemed to be the impugned award. 5. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties. In my opinion, the impugned award passed by the Labour Court is wholly erroneous and the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Though on 29/01/1985, the petitioner-workman had made statement that after receiving Rs.3,700.00 and made statement that after receiving this amount he shall have no dispute with the management nor he will have any right to reinstatement or re-employment, but learned counsel for the Management sought adjournment to bring the aforesaid amount and the matter was adjourned to 18/02/1985 for payment of the aforesaid amount. It is also undisputed that on 18/02/1985, the workman refused to accept the aforesaid offer and made statement that he was not interested to compromise the matter with the Management on a sum of Rs.3,700.00 and requested to the court to decide his matter on merits. In my opinion, when the workman was not agreeing to the settlement, then the Labour Court should have decided the matter referred to it on merits. The alleged compromise recorded on 29/01/1985 cannot be considered as a binding compromise or settlement. It was merely on offer, which was withdrawn by the petitioner-workman on the next date of hearing. Since the petitioner had refused to accept the aforesaid amount. The alleged compromise recorded on 29/01/1985 cannot be considered as a binding compromise or settlement. It was merely on offer, which was withdrawn by the petitioner-workman on the next date of hearing. Since the petitioner had refused to accept the aforesaid amount. Therefore, the said compromise was no longer binding on him. In such a situation, the Labour Court should not have given the award to the effect that the reference in question was fully settled. The word award has been defined in Clause (b) of Sec.2 of the Act as under: "an interim or final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, industrial Tribunal or National Industrial tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Sec.10-A. " 6. In my opinion, the word determination used in the above definition implies adjudication upon relevant material by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. Once a reference has been made under Sec.19 (1)of the Act, it cannot be rescinded or cancelled. It can also not be dismissed for default because that would amount to putting an end to the proceedings otherwise than by adjudicating upon the dispute. Thus, when the workman was not agreeing to compromise the matter, the Labour Court was bound to determine the controversy on merits. The statement made by the petitioner on 29/01/1985 cannot be termed as a legally binding settlement between the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the Management, while referring to Sec.2 (p) and 18 of the act has tried to persuade this Court that a settlement arrived at by the Workman and the management otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings shall be binding on the parties. The word settlement has been defined in Sec.2 (p) of the Act in the following terms: "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer. " 8. " 8. According to the aforesaid definition, it is clear that in order to reach the settlement within the meaning of Sec.2 (p) of the Act, it has to be a written agreement between the management and the Workman and the same should have been signed by the parties in such manner as may be prescribed. Sec.18 (1) of the Act further provides that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in conciliation proceedings shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. From the above provisions it is clear that for a binding settlement there must be two requirements i. e. (i) it has to be a written statement signed by both the parties and (ii) it should be in the prescribed manner or proforma rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central)Rules, 1957 prescribes the manner in which a memorandum of settlement should be arrived at. Rule 58 of the rule as under: "58. Memorandum of settlement: (1) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings or otherwise, shall be in Form H. (2) The settlement shall be signed by:- (a) in the case of an employer, by the employer himself, or by his authorised agent, or when the employer is an incorporated company or other body corporate, by the agent, manager or other principal officer of the corporation; (b) in the case of the workmen, by any officer of a trade union of the workmen or by five representatives of the workmen duly authorised in this behalf at meeting of the workmen held for the purposes; (c) in the case of the workman is an industrial dispute under Sec.2-A of the act, by the workman concerned. From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the legislation has built a safeguard against the possible misuse of the settlement to be arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings or otherwise by providing that such an agreement should be in proper form and signed by the parties. In the similar circumstances, while interpreting Rule 62 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957, the Hon ble Supreme Court of India in Adil K. Patel V/s. Tata Iron Steel Co. Ltd and others, 2997-III-LLJ (Suppl)-164 has held as under: "these requirements are not empty formalities. They are intended to protect the interests of the workmen. In the similar circumstances, while interpreting Rule 62 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957, the Hon ble Supreme Court of India in Adil K. Patel V/s. Tata Iron Steel Co. Ltd and others, 2997-III-LLJ (Suppl)-164 has held as under: "these requirements are not empty formalities. They are intended to protect the interests of the workmen. That purpose will be frustrated if these requirements are not strictly construed or duly complied with. In other words, the requirements contained in clause 2 (p) and rule 62 are mandatory and non- compliance of these requirements will have a serious dent on the binding effect of any settlement arrived at between the parties. " 9. In the instant case, it is evident that the alleged settlement arrived at in the Court was not on the prescribed performa. Even otherwise, I am of the opinion, that the alleged settlement, vide which the petitioner-workman abandoned his all claims for a meagre amount of Rs.3,700.00 was not a fair and just settlement. 10. In view of the aforesaid legal position, i am of the view that the statement made by the petitioner on 29/01/1985 cannot be termed to be a binding settlement within the meaning of Sec.2 (p) of the Act. The impugned award passed by the Labour Court is not a valid award within the meaning of the Act; and the learned Labour Court should have decided the industrial dispute referred to it on merits when the petitioner-Workman had refused to accept the offer made by the management. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I allow the instant writ petition and set aside the impugned order dated February 18, 1985 passed by the Labour Court. The matter is, accordingly, remanded to the Labour Court, faridabad, to decide the industrial dispute on merits as per law.