JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. — The accused person in ICC No. 26 of 2001 pending in the Court of the S.D.J.M., Nilgiri have ap¬proached this Court invoking inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 inter alia with a prayer to quash the order dated 12.10.2001 of the S.D.J.M. taking cognizance of offences under Section 498-A/506/34 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act alleged against them. The order is challenged on two grounds. First, due to non-filling of any FIR with police as admitted by the complainant-opposite party, the S.D.J.M. ought to have rejected the complaint petition in limine; and secondly, as the facts stated in the complaint petition were vexatious and did not prima facie constitute any offence, the order taking cognizance is liable to be quashed. 2. The admitted case of both sides is that petitioner No.1 married the sole opposite party according to Hindu rituals on 11th of March, 2000. According to the complainant-opposite party due to failure in giving the promised dowry by her father, she was subjected to unsurmountable hardship, torture and even physical assault. Her in-laws with common intention snatched away all her ornaments and drove her out of her matrimonial home on 25.7.2000. Thereafter though her father approached petitioner No.1 and others several times, they declined to take the complainant-opposite party back to their house and having no other way out, the complainant-opposite party was constrained to file the com¬plaint petition on 26.3.2001. It is pertinent to mention here that in the complaint petition against column-6 the complain¬ant-opposite party has stated that she had not filed any FIR before police. 3. At the other hand, according to the accused-petitioners, soon after the marriage of petitioner No.1 with the complainant-opposite party, the husband petitioner No.1 found that the opposite party had conceived since 17.1.2000. Thereafter dissensions cropped up about the said fact and ultimate the father of the opposite party took away her to his house. It is further alleged that on 13.5.2000 petitioner No.1 went to the house of the father of the opposite party and requested him to allow him (petitioner No.1) to bring back his wife (opposite party) but he was not allowed to do so. Petitioner No.1 thereaf¬ter filed a petition before the Kanas Grama Panchayat on 30.5.2000 and a notice was issued to the opposite party. Petitioner No.1 thereaf¬ter filed a petition before the Kanas Grama Panchayat on 30.5.2000 and a notice was issued to the opposite party. As a counter-blast the opposite party in order to harass petitioner No.1 and his family members has concocted to file the aforesaid complaint case. 4. In course of hearing, learned counsel for the petition¬ers reiterated the stand of the petitioners and submitted that as according to the opposite party no information had been lodged with police even though the petitioners were alleged to have committed cognizable offences, the S.D.J.M. acted illegally in accepting the complaint petition. It is also forcefully submitted that column-6 of the complaint petition requiring the complainant to furnish a statement as to whether any complaint had been filed with police or not is not an empty formality. 5. The first point which needs determination is whether filing of an FIR with police is a sine qua non for accepting a complaint petition. Section 190 CrPC lays down the conditions requisite for initiation of a proceeding. It empowers a Magis¬trate to take cognizance of an offence under three eventualities- (a) Upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) Upon police report of such facts; and (c) Upon information received from any person other than police officer or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. 6. Reading the Section itself reveals that the Magistrate himself has power to entertain a complaint petition if the same is presented before him irrespective of the fact as to whether the matter has been reported to police or not. The different clauses of the Section under which cognizance can be taken are alternative and not mutually exclusive. It is significant to note that the three clauses are not divided by the word 'or' from each other and may overlap. There can possibly be no legal bar with regard to the clauses and it is manifestly clear that at least for the purpose of taking cognizance there is no watertight compartmentalisation of the said clauses under which the Magis¬trate may choose to issue process though non-reporting to police at the first instance may be a fact to be considered while ad¬judging the veracity or otherwise of the complaint petition. Thus the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as no FIR had been lodged with police the Magistrate ought not to have entertained the complaint petition is not sustainable in law. 7. The second point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that column-6 of the complaint petition requiring the complainant to disclose whether any FIR was lodged at the police station or not is an empty formality is also not tenable. Column-6 requires a statement to be made by the complainant regarding earlier information given to police which has to be considered vis-a-vis Section 210 CrPC. Section 210 CrPC stipulates the procedure to be followed by a Magistrate when there is a com¬plaint case and there is police investigation in respect of the same offence(s). If it is brought to the notice of the Magistrate that on the basis of FIR filed with police and investigation by police is in progress, it is open to him to take recourse to Section 210 CrPC. Thus the requirement of column-6 cannot be construed to be an empty formality. 8. The next question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that reading of the complaint petition would clearly reveal that only in order to harass the petitioners the complaint case was filed making vexatious allegations and if the same is allowed to continue, it would amount to abuse of the process of the Court, and therefore it is a fit case where the order of taking cognizance should be quashed in exercise of inherent power of this Court under Section 482 CrPC. 9. The case in which the High Court in exercising power under Section 482 CrPC may interfere in proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice have been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, AIR 1992 SC 604 , one of such cases being where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 10. In the case at hand, according to the averments made in the complaint petition, the marriage took place as long back as on 11.3.2000. 10. In the case at hand, according to the averments made in the complaint petition, the marriage took place as long back as on 11.3.2000. The opposite party left her matrimonial home as long back as on 25.7.2000. It is admitted in the complaint peti¬tion that the father of the opposite party had given certain utensils as dowry. Such admission, according to me, reveals commission of an offence under Section 3 of the Dowery Prohibi¬tion Act. But then, at this stage I am not inclined to delve into the matter and leave it open. Though in the complaint petition certain overt acts have been attributed to petitioner No.1, petitioner No.3 - the old mother of petitioner No.1, and peti¬tioner No.2 - a younger brother of petitioner No.1, which re¬vealed commission of cognizable offences, no FIR in that regard was lodged at any police station. Further from the documents filed in the case, it appears that the complainant-opposite party had been conceived at the time of her marriage with petitioner No.1 and the fatherhood of the conceived baby was not known. Though the complainant-opposite party went away to her father’s house, the documents further reveal that petitioner No.1 had made genuine efforts and had also requested her to come back to her matrimonial home, but she did not come back. All these facts clearly reveal that there is in fact a matrimonial dispute cen¬tring round the validity or otherwise of the marriage between petitioner No.1 and the complainant-opposite party and the dis¬pute is purely of a civil nature which needs determination by a Civil Court or a matrimonial Court. Filing of a complaint peti¬tion, and that too without informing the police, alleging commis¬sion of offences by the petitioners under Sections 498-A/506/34 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act at a belated stage, i.e. almost after one year, appears to be after-thought and an attempt to coerce or put the petitioners to harassment to satisfy the vengeance of the opposite party. Reading of entire complaint petition vis-a-vis the certificate issued by the Kanas Grama Panchayat and other documents also fortifies my view and I feel this is a fit case where continuance of the complaint case would amount to abuse of the process of Court. Reading of entire complaint petition vis-a-vis the certificate issued by the Kanas Grama Panchayat and other documents also fortifies my view and I feel this is a fit case where continuance of the complaint case would amount to abuse of the process of Court. The allegations made in the complaint petition also ipso facto do not satisfy me with regard to commission of any cognizable offence justifying registration of a case and investigating into the same and it appears that the criminal proceeding was actuated with mala fides. 11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case with the touchstone of the guidelines of the decision in Bhajan¬lal case (supra), I am inclined to hold that continuance of the proceedings in ICC No. 26 of 2001 in the Court of the S.D.J.M., Nilgiri would be an abuse of the process of law and accordingly I quash the said proceeding. The Criminal Miscellaneous Case is thus allowed. Crl. Misc. Case allowed.