A. V. SRINIVASA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises from an order dated 14-1-2001 passed by the Court below in R. A. No. 14/96 setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court passed in O. S. No. 423/90 and remanding the matter for fresh trial and disposal in accordance with law. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this appeal, briefly stated, are as follows : the suit property is a piece of agricultural land bearing Sy. N. 82 and measuring 1 acre 2 guntas. The plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of the contract of sale entered into between himself and late Tayawwa. The plaintiff's case was that the original defendant-Tayawwa was given the suit property by her mother Laxmawwa and, therefore, under Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act she had become the absolute owner of the suit property and in that capacity she had entered into an agreement of sale with him. As she refused to execute the sale deed despite the plaintiff expressing his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, the plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish that Tayawwa was the owner of the suit property. In appeal, the Court below set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and remanded the matter back to the trial Court to consider the additional evidence produced in the case and then dispose of the suit in accordance with law. Hence the present appeal by the aggrieved defendant. ( 3 ) I have heard the learned Counsel Sri. Ashok R. Kalyan Shetty for the appellant. The respondent, though served, has remained absent and is unrepresented in this appeal. ( 4 ) THE question that arises for my consideration in this appeal is : whether the judgment of the Court below allowing the production of additional evidence and remanding the matter for taking in the additional evidence on record and for fresh disposal of the suit after considering the additional evidence is right in law ? ( 5 ) THE suit has been disposed of by the trial Court on merits. The trial Court had framed issued on all points of dispute and recorded its findings on those issues. ( 5 ) THE suit has been disposed of by the trial Court on merits. The trial Court had framed issued on all points of dispute and recorded its findings on those issues. On the point of ownership of the suit land the trial Court held that Tayawwa had no title over the suit property and, therefore, she could not have entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff. Before the Court below the plaintiff had produced certain mutation entries in proof of his case that the suit land originally belonged to Laxmawwa and to support his further case that the suit land was given by Laxmawwa to Tayawwa for maintenance. The Court below felt that the evidence produced in appeal goes to the root of the matter and since the trial Court had not the advantage of looking into this piece of evidence the Court below thought it fit to remand the case for fresh disposal. ( 6 ) THE trial Court having decreed the suit not on a preliminary point but on merits, the exercise of power of remand by appellate Court is under Rule 23-A of O. 41, C. P. C. Before exercise of the power under Rule 23-A the Court below ought to satisfy itself that retrial is called for, for proper adjudication of the case. Unless the Court below forms such an opinion it is precluded from acting under Rule 23-A. Rule 23-A speaks of an wholesale remand. The remand by the Court below under Rule 23-A being challenged by the appellant-defendant in this appeal, the question to be determined in this appeal is whether the resort to this power of wholesale remand by the Court below is justified on facts and in circumstances of the case. ( 7 ) THE additional evidence produced by the plaintiff are all mutation entries and at best they would be useful for the plaintiff to establish that the suit lands were in possession of Laxmawwa at some point of time. The trial Court has also referred to mutation entry No. 3909 wherein it is stated that the suit property is being given by Balanaik Naikappa and Laxmawwa Balappa Naik to Tayawwa and that henceforth the name of Tayawwa be mutated deleting their names. The trial Court has also referred to mutation entry No. 3909 wherein it is stated that the suit property is being given by Balanaik Naikappa and Laxmawwa Balappa Naik to Tayawwa and that henceforth the name of Tayawwa be mutated deleting their names. The trial Court after such reference to entry No. 3909 has proceeded further and observed that it is not shown in the varadhi that the suit lands were given to Tayawwa for her maintenance. The trial Court no doubt observed that the plaintiff has not produced the mutation entry to prove that Laxmawwa was the original owner of suit property but even the production of such mutation entries as additional evidence will not conclusively establish that Laxmawwa was the original owner of the suit lands. A stray observation by the trial Court that the plaintiff has not produced the mutation entries to show that Laxmawwa was the owner of the suit lands cannot serve as a basis for the Court below to set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court rendered by it after pronouncing to all aspects of the case, if in appeal before it the plaintiff comes up with such evidence. At best the mutation entries would go to show that Laxmawwa was in possession of the suit lands at some point of time and she parted her possession in favour of Tayawwa. It was for the plaintiff to establish that the suit lands were owned by Tayawwa. On the evidence, both oral and documentary, available before it the trial Court had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to prove it. When some evidence was sought to be produced as additional evidence in appeal, the Court below ought to have determined whether a wholesale remand was pre-eminently necessary to do justice between the parties. Towards this end the Court below ought to have examined the nature of evidence sought to be produced, whether such evidence would have the effect of altering the finality arrived at by the trial Court and it is only after reaching such conclusion that it would indeed alter the result of the suit, the Court below could exercise the power under Rule 23-A. The documentary evidence sought to be produced before it as additional evidence is not of such nature that it could upset the finding reached by the trial Court on the point. With the result, even if the additional evidence is taken on record and considered for purpose of determining whether or not Tayawwa had the legal right to enter into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff, the finding ought not to be any different than the one already arrived at by the trial Court. In Laxman Govindappa Kuri since dead by L. Rs. v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (4) KCCR 2608, this Court while dwelling on the conditions to be satisfied by a party seeking for remand of a case, held :"when an argument is advanced that a case be remanded for further evidence, it is necessary to first indicate to the Court as to what precisely is the evidence that the party desires to lead. The Court will examine the question as to whether this evidence was available on record on an earlier occasion. The question as to why it was not produced or led, question as to whether it appears to be an after thought or the result of some fabrication and above all, the Court will assess as to whether it appears if that evidence is led it would materially alter the earlier decision. It is condition precedent therefore that the material that has allegedly gone by default is produced before the superior Court and if the superior Court is satisfied that it had resulted in a miscarriage of justice or failure of justice, then alone would a remand be competent. "in my considered opinion, given the type and nature of evidence sought to be produced by the plaintiff as additional evidence, the Court below could not have formed an opinion that its production would have the effect of materially altering the final result of the suit. In Narayana Rao v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 Bom 271 and in Sulabha Gounduni v. Abhimanyu, AIR 1983 Ori 71 , it is held that mere mutation of the name was not sufficient but it must also be established that the female Hindu who possessed the property had some right of ownership over it. In the absence of evidence to show that Laxmawwa owned the suit property, no amount of evidence in proof of her possession would have any effect on the findings recorded by the trial Court on that issue. In the absence of evidence to show that Laxmawwa owned the suit property, no amount of evidence in proof of her possession would have any effect on the findings recorded by the trial Court on that issue. It is also my considered view that the additional evidence is not required either to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. In the said view of the matter there was absolutely no justification for the Court below to have made a wholesale remand of the case for a fresh trial and the remand so made is incompetent. ( 8 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Court below is set aside. The Court below is directed to take up the appeal in its original number and dispose of the appeal on merits on the evidence already available on record. However considering the fact that this second appeal has arisen on the miscellaneous side, the Court below shall dispose of the appeal without being influenced in any way by the observations made by me in the course of this order as they have all been made only for the limited purpose of disposing of the miscellaneous appeal. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .