( 1 ) ALL these writ appeals are preferred against the common judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 12. 01. 1999 in Writ Petition No. 44302/95, 38374/98, 30792/98 and 3526 of 1997. Hence all these writ appeals were clubbed and heard together and they are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE Appellants are the owners of the Kalayana Mantapas which are let out to public to conduct various social and religious functions including marriages. In the writ petitions, the Appellant herein assailed the constitutional validity of the Karnataka Tax on Luxuries (Hotels, Lodging Houses and Marriage Halls) Act, 1979 (for short `the Act') as amended by Karnataka Act 6 of 1995. Several grounds were raised while assailing the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act. The learned Single Judge without finding any merits in the writ petitions, dismissed the writ petitions by a common order. Hence these writ appeals by the aggrieved writ petitioners. ( 3 ) WE have heard Sri S. Narayana, learned Advocate for the Appellants and Sri B. Anand, learned Government Advocate for Taxes. ( 4 ) SRI S. Narayana, while assailing the constitutional validity of the impugned amendment Act, would contend that Marriage halls have become places of necessity as people cannot afford to celebrate marriages in their houses or elsewhere, because of want of accommodation and other factors like electricity, water, car parking spaces and other facilities connected with the performance of marriages. Sri. Narayana contends since Marriage is a religious function, it falls outside the ordinary understanding of any luxury. Luxury provided in a hotel as defined in Section 2 (5) of the Act extends to air-conditioning, telephone, television, music, beauty parlour, swimming pool etc. and such an element of luxury is not present in the facilities provided in a marriage hall. Except the air-conditioning, the rest of the items referred to in the definition of charges for marriage hall in Section 2 (1-A) relate to basic and essential requirements of water, electricity and the like. Yet, the charges collected towards water and the rest which will not go to the account of the Appellant are taken as the one forming the charges for marriage hall to impose luxury tax in terms of Section 3c of the Act. The exemption from levy of tax fixed at Rs. Yet, the charges collected towards water and the rest which will not go to the account of the Appellant are taken as the one forming the charges for marriage hall to impose luxury tax in terms of Section 3c of the Act. The exemption from levy of tax fixed at Rs. 5,000/- per day is unmindful of its location and other connected factors and, therefore, it is irrational and arbitrary. Since the Appellants are subjected to service tax under the Finance Act and they are liable to pay it to the Central Government, such services could not be conceived as a luxury for the payment of tax under the Act. ( 5 ) ENTRY 62 of list II- State list of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India permits the State Government to impose tax on "tax on Luxuries, including Taxes on entertainment, amusements, betting and gambling". With that Constitutional sanction the Act was enacted in 1979 to levy "tax on Luxuries provided in Hotels and Lodging Houses". ( 6 ) THE Supreme Court in Express Hotels (P) Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat [1989 74 STC 157] has upheld the constitutional validity of the Act in Gujarat, enacted under Entry 62, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. ( 7 ) THE word "luxury" though not defined in the Constitution is defined in Sec. 2 (4-B) of the Act. It reads - "luxuries" mean commodities or services specified in the Schedule ministering to enjoyment, comfort or pleasure extraordinary to necessities of life". ( 8 ) THE charging Sec. 3c relates to levy and collection of tax on charges for marriage hall. The phrase "charges for marriage hall" before Amendment Act 5 of 2000 was defined in Sec. 2 (1-A) as - "charges for marriage hall" include charges for air-conditioning, chairs, utensils and vessels, shamiana, electricity, water, fuel, interior or exterior decoration and the like but do not include any charges for food and drinks". Explanation - If any question arises whether any charges are charged for Marriage Hall, such question shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of the State Government shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court". Explanation - If any question arises whether any charges are charged for Marriage Hall, such question shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of the State Government shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court". "marriage Hall" is defined in Sec. 2 (5-B) of the Act as- "marriage Hall" means Kalyana Mantap, Shadi Mahal, Community Hall, a building or part of a building where accommodation is provided for marriage or reception or matters related therewith, whether or not such marriage or reception or matter related therewith are regularly conducted" ( 9 ) IN India, the doctrine of "power to tax" is embodied in Article 265 of the Constitution. The Legislature is omnipotent in the exercise of the taxing prerogative, however, subject to the provisions of the Constitution. The right to impose taxes and to determine the circumstances under which they will be done is always a privilege of the concerned Legislature. Article 265 mandates that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty. Apart from the limitation by the division of the taxing power between the Union and the State Legislatures by the relevant entries in the Legislative Lists, the taxing power of either legislature is subjected to certain limitations imposed by the Constitution. For example, the taxing power of a legislature must not contravene Article 13 as held in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair vs. State of Kerala[ air 1961 SC 552 ]; it must not deny equal protection of the laws as guaranteed under Article 14 as held in State of Kerala vs. Kutty Naha, Haji K. Haji K, [ air 1969 SC 378 ] and it must not be discriminatory or arbitrary as held in Ayurveda Pharmacy v State of Tamil Nadu [ (1989)8 APSTJ 179], Regional Transport Officer-cum-Taxing authority, Rourkela v Steel Authority of India [1995 Suupl. (4) SCC 165], it must not constitute an unreasonable restriction upon the right of business guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) as held in Chandrakanth Krishnarao Pradhan V Jasjit Singh [ air 1962 SC 204 ]. Apart from these constitutional limitations on the law making power of the concerned Legislature, the other limitations on the taxing power of the legislature can be culled out from the provisions of Articles 274, 285, 286, 287 and 289. Apart from these constitutional limitations on the law making power of the concerned Legislature, the other limitations on the taxing power of the legislature can be culled out from the provisions of Articles 274, 285, 286, 287 and 289. ( 10 ) IT is true that taxation law is no exception to the doctrine of equal protection as held by the Apex Court in Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural ITO [ air 1963 SC 591 )State of M. P V. Gwalior Sugar Co. [1962 (2) SCR 619], Kunnathak Thathunni Moopil Nair V. State of Kerala (supra 1), State of A. P. V. Nalla Raja Reddy [ air 1967 SC 1458 ], Vishweshar Thirtha Swamiar V. State of Mysore [ 1972 (3) SCC 246 = air 1971 SC 2377 ], Ashwath Narayana Setty P. M. V State of Karnataka [ air 1989 SC 100 ]. Hence, a taxation law will be struck down as violative of Article 14 if there is no reasonable basis behind the classification made by the Legislature. However, if the taxation, generally speaking, imposes a similar burden on every one with reference to a particular kind and extent of property, on the same basis of taxation, the law shall not be open to attack on the ground that the result of taxation is to impose unequal burdens on different persons. There is no violation of Article 14 if there is a reasonable basis for the classification. ( 11 ) A power conferred on the legislature to levy tax must be widely construed. It must include the power to impose a tax and select the articles or commodities for the exercise of such power; it must likewise include the power to fix the rate and prescribe the machinery for the recovery of tax including provisions necessary to prevent evasion of tax. The Legislature can also appoint authorities for collecting taxes and may prescribe the procedure for determining the amount of taxes payable by any person. All these provisions are subsidiary to the main power to levy a tax. Nevertheless, all this is subject to the constitutional limitations as pointed out supra. Therefore, it becomes necessary that even tax statutes have to satisfy the test of reasonableness prescribed by Article 19 (6) and the fundamental right of equality before law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, all this is subject to the constitutional limitations as pointed out supra. Therefore, it becomes necessary that even tax statutes have to satisfy the test of reasonableness prescribed by Article 19 (6) and the fundamental right of equality before law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 12 ) IN tax matters, the State is allowed to pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates for taxation if it does so reasonably, as held by the Supreme Court in Balaji V. ITO [ (1961) 43 ITR 393 (SC)], B. Basavalingappa V. State of Karnataka [ (1985) 59 STC 1 , 6 (Kar)]. The entries in the Legislative Lists of the Constitution were not powers but were only fields of legislation and, therefore, the widest importance and significance should be given to the language used by the Legislature in various entries. In interpreting the fiscal statutes, we must also remember the provisions in a fiscal stature are not to be so construed as to furnish a chance of escape and means of evasion as held by the Full Bench of this Court in C. Arunachalam V. CIT [ilr 1984 2 Kar 1387 (FB ). A Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Shri Lakshmi Venkateswara Trading Co. V. State of A. P. [ (1974) 33 STC 192 (AP-FB)], has opined that the power to tax includes the power to pick and choose objects and persons for the purpose of taxation and to grant exemptions. In the matter of taxation laws, as held by Apex Court in M/s. Steelworth Ltd. V. State of Assam [1962 Supp. (2) SCR 589], Gopal Narain v. State of U. P. [ air 1964 SC 370 ], Ganga Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. State of U. P. [ air 1980 SC 286 ], Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1977) 5 SCC 536], Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [ air 1964 SC 925 ], State of Kerala v. Aravind Ramakanth Modawaddakar [ (1999) 7 SC 400], the Courts permit a greater latitude to the discretion of the Legislature in the matter of classification. State has wide discretion in respect of classification of objects, persons and things for the purposes of taxation. Ltd. v. State of Assam [ air 1964 SC 925 ], State of Kerala v. Aravind Ramakanth Modawaddakar [ (1999) 7 SC 400], the Courts permit a greater latitude to the discretion of the Legislature in the matter of classification. State has wide discretion in respect of classification of objects, persons and things for the purposes of taxation. The Legislature can devise classes for the purpose of taxing or not taxing, exempting or not exempting, granting incentives and prescribing the rates of tax, benefits or concessions as held by the Apex Court in State of U. P. v. Kamla Palace [ air 2000 SC 617 ]. ( 13 ) AS to what article should be taxed is a question of policy and there cannot be any complaint merely because Legislature has decided to tax certain articles and no others. The freedom of the Legislature is conceded not only in the choice of the articles to be taxed but also as regards the manner and rate of taxation, i. e. , to prescribe different rates for different categories of goods, persons and transactions, as held by the Supreme Court in Twyford Tea Co. , Ltd. v. State of Kerala [ air 1970 SC 1133 ]. It is also well settled that the Court would be slow to interfere with the Legislative discretion in the matter of choice of persons, transactions or objects or different rates, even if no reasons are disclosed for such choice, unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical, in the circumstances of the case. ( 14 ) NOW in the premise of the above noted well settled principles governing the challenge to constitutional validity of taxation law, let us consider the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. ( 15 ) THE definition of `luxury' provided in a hotel defined under Section 2 (e) of the Gujarat Tax on Luxuries (Hotel and Lodging Houses) Act, 1977 is similar to the definition defined under Section 2 (5) of the Act. In the case of Express Hotels Private Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and another [ (1989) STC Vol. 74, 157], various contentions were raised to assail the constitutional validity of the provisions of the statute. In the case of Express Hotels Private Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and another [ (1989) STC Vol. 74, 157], various contentions were raised to assail the constitutional validity of the provisions of the statute. The Supreme Court while examining the scope of entry 62 held that the concept of tax on `luxury' in entry 62 list II, of the seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, cannot be limited merely to tax things, tangible and corporeal in their aspect as `luxuries'. The Supreme Court observed that, while it is true that frugal or simple food and medicine may be classified as necessities, articles such as jewellery, perfume, intoxicating liquor, tobacco, etc. , could be called articles of luxury. But the legislative entry cannot be exhausted by such cases, illustrative of the concept. The Supreme Court held that entry 62 encompasses all the manifestations or emanations of the notion of "luxuries". In other words, the element of extravagance of indulgence that differentiates "luxury" from "necessity" cannot be confined to goods and articles. There cannot be elements of extravagance or indulgence in the quality of services and activities. What follows from the observation of the Supreme Court is that legislative intent has to be given the widest liberal meaning of the connotation. The mere fact that the use of an article popular among poor sections of community, would not detract from its description or nature of being an article of user. In that view of the matter and in the premises of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgement of the Supreme Court in (1989 STC Vol. 74 Page 157), the provisions of charging Section 3-C providing for levy and collection of tax on charges for marriage halls cannot be considered ultra vires the legislative power of the Karnataka State Legislature. Although as rightly contended by Sri Narayana on account of lack of space, it would not be possible or everyone to perform the marriage at the place of his residence, it cannot be denied that even now certain sections of the society namely, the most affluent as well as most downtrodden, perform marriages at their residences for obvious reasons, namely, affluence and abject poverty of the above two segments of the society. Further, the charging section has taken care that if the charges are less than Rs. 5000/- per day, then, no tax could be levied. Further, the charging section has taken care that if the charges are less than Rs. 5000/- per day, then, no tax could be levied. The classification made by the State Legislature is founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes the persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and that that differential has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. ( 16 ) THERE is no merit in the contention that the luxuries under Section 2 (4-B) are the commodities or service specified in the schedule and since no such specification is made in the schedule the charging section is not operative. This contention is untenable because the operation of the charging section cannot be determined or restricted by the definition clause. The charging section creates a charge on the luxury provided in a marriage hall and is not restricted to the luxuries only in respect of commodities or services for which the other section has taken care. ( 17 ) SRI Narayana's contention that the charges for marriage halls include the charges for electricity, water and fuel which are needed for preparation of food and drink and since the food and drink have been excluded from the total charges, electricity, water and fuel cannot be subjected to tax is, again, not tenable. Suffice it to state that the levy of tax under Section 3 is on the 'charges provided in a marriage hall'. The Section contemplates the charge on daily basis. The definition of 'charges for marriage hall' include certain charges so that the charges which are collected are not bifurcated in such a manner so as to escape the liability which has been created by the charging section. The question raised by Sri Narayana as to whether the charge for water and electricity can be charged for food and drink is a point which could be adjudicated in accordance with the explanation to Section 2 (1-A) by the Government. Therefore, the above ground urged by Sri Narayana could hardly be a valid ground to assail constitutional validity of a statute. ( 18 ) WE also do not find any merit in the last contention of Sri Narayana that the imposition of charges for marriage hall by the impugned amendment Act is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. Therefore, the above ground urged by Sri Narayana could hardly be a valid ground to assail constitutional validity of a statute. ( 18 ) WE also do not find any merit in the last contention of Sri Narayana that the imposition of charges for marriage hall by the impugned amendment Act is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. It is well settled law that a law made by parliament or Legislature can be struck down by Courts only on two grounds and those two grounds are, viz. , (1) lack of legislative competence, and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. It is also well settled law that no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. The Supreme Court in State of A. P. V. Mc Dowell and Co (1996) SCC 709. , in para (43) has observed: ". . . . No Court in the United Kingdom can strike down an Act made by Parliament on any ground. As against this, the United States of America has a Federal Constitution where the powers of the Congress and the State Legislatures to make laws is limited in two ways, viz. , the division of legislative powers between the States and the Federal Government and the fundamental rights (Bill of Rights) incorporated in the Constitution. In India, the position is similar to the United States of America. The power of Parliament or for that matter, the State Legislature is restricted in two ways. A law made by Parliament or the Legislature can be struck down by Courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz. , (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in part III of the Constitutional or of any other constitutional or of any other constitution provision. There is no third ground. A law made by Parliament or the Legislature can be struck down by Courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz. , (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in part III of the Constitutional or of any other constitutional or of any other constitution provision. There is no third ground. ( 19 ) IT is relevant to note that in the field of taxation, the Courts have permitted the Legislature to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for tax purposes, so long as it refrains from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes as could be seen from the decisions in East India Tobacco Company v. State of A. P (1962) 13 STC 529 (SC) = 1963 (1) SCR 404 , P. M. Ashwatha Narayana Shetty v. State of Karnataka (1988) Supp. 3 SCR 155, Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India (1989) 74 STC 102 (SC) = 1989 2 SCR 918 , Kerala Hotel and Restaurant Association v. State of Kerala (1990) 77 STC 253 (SC) = (1990) 1 SCR 516 . Imposition of purchase tax at different rates for sugar mills and khandasari units was upheld by the Supreme Court in Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. V. State of U. P. (1980) 45 STC 36 (SC) = (1980) 1 SCR 769 . ( 20 ) IT is, however, true that it will become the duty of the Constitutional Courts under our Constitution to declare a law enacted by the Parliament or the State Legislature as unconstitutional when the Parliament or the State Legislature has assumed to enact a law which is void, either from want of constitutional power to enact it, or because the constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed, or where the law infringes the fundamental rights enshrined and guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or any other substantive constitutional provisions. It is needless to state that Legislature and Judiciary are co-ordinate organs of the State, or equal dignity and status under the constitutional scheme. It is permissible for the Constitutional Courts to declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. It is needless to state that Legislature and Judiciary are co-ordinate organs of the State, or equal dignity and status under the constitutional scheme. It is permissible for the Constitutional Courts to declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. The Court while declaring a law as invalid or unconstitutional is only enforcing the legislative will and the limits imposed by the Constitution on the law-making bodies. No Court can declare a statute unconstitutional and void, solely on the ground of unjust and harsh provisions, or because it is supposed to violate some natural, social, political or economic rights of citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is, in fact, prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by the Constitution. Strictly speaking, the Courts are not guardians of all kinds of rights are secured and protected by some constitutional provision which comes within the judicial congnizance. In 'a treatise on the Constitutional Limitations' by Thomas M. Cooley, it is stated that the Court cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with the law-making power; and that any legislative act which does not encroach upon the power apportioned to the other organs of the State, being prima facie valid, must be enforced, unless restrictions upon the legislative power can be pointed out in the Constitution itself, and the case shown to come within them. In the same Treatise, it is also stated that the Courts are not at liberty to declare statutes void because of their apparent injustice and impolicy, unless it shall be found that those rights are placed beyond legislative encroachment by the Constitution not are the Courts at liberty to declare an enactment unconstitutional, because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution, but not expressed in words or discernible from the context. It is not permissible to limit the legislative power of the Legislatures by judicial inter position, except so far as the expressed words a written Constitution gives that authority to the Court. It is not permissible to limit the legislative power of the Legislatures by judicial inter position, except so far as the expressed words a written Constitution gives that authority to the Court. Further, it is aptly stated therein that the law making power of the State recognises no restraints, and is bound by none except such as or imposed by the Constitution itself placing reliance on the holding in Sill v. Village of Corning [15 NY 303]. ( 21 ) IN conclusion, we do not think that the Karnataka State Legislature in enacting the impugned Amendment Act has exceeded its law-making power or contravened any of the provisions of the Constitution on the basis of which we could legitimately annul the impunged legislation. Therefore, we uphold constitutional validity of the impugned legislation. The writ appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. --- *** --- .