Judgment Prabhat Kumar Sinha, J. 1. On 5.9.1998 in the evening hours, in between 7.00 to 7.15 P.M. a college going young boy, Abhishek, while he was taking tuition at the house of one Prof. J.C. Banerjee (P.W.11), was shot dead after he was called out of the house on some pretext for which on the statement, (Exhibit-14) of Rohan Prakash, said to be taking tuition along with him who subsequently was arraigned as one of the accused in the case, formal first information report (Exhibit-15) was registered. 2. The prosecution, in course of the trial, contended that murder was committed by appellant Arnit Das in conspiracy with the appellants Sidharth and Rohan Prakash, meticulously planned and hatched up on 4.9.1998 in the house of Sidharth. The Sessions Judge, Patna, after the trial, came to conclusion that the charges under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (The Code, in short), 302 read with section 34 of the Code, 302 read with section 120B of the Code and under section 27 of the Arms Act had been proved against appellant Arnit Das and sentenced him to death under section 302 of the Code which has invited Death Reference no. 3 of 2001, further sentencing him to imprisonment for life for the other two offences under the Code and to rigorous imprisonment for seven years under section 27 of the Arms Act. Appellant Sidharth, having been convicted under sections 302 read with section 34 of the Code, 302 read with section 109 of the Code was sentenced to imprisonment for life for all those offences. Appellant Rohan Prakash was convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Code and under section 302 read with section 120B of the Code and was sentenced to imprisonment for life on both the counts. The sentences were to run concurrently. 3. Besides the Death Reference, all the three appellants having filed, separately, appeals, the Death Reference and the appeals have been heard together and this judgment will dispose of all those. 4. Coming to the first information report registered on the statement of appellant Rohan Prakash, the facts narrated therein in brief were that Rohan Prakash, Abhishek, the deceased, Shweta, and Anvesha used to take tuition at the residence of Prof. 4. Coming to the first information report registered on the statement of appellant Rohan Prakash, the facts narrated therein in brief were that Rohan Prakash, Abhishek, the deceased, Shweta, and Anvesha used to take tuition at the residence of Prof. J. C. Banerjee from 5.00 to 6.00 P.M. and again from 7.00 to 8.00 P.M. From 6.00 to 7.00 RM., Pallavi alone used to take tuition there. On the fateful day he and the deceased, who was a student of Patna Science College, had come to take tuition at about 7.00 P.M., Pallavi also sitting there, when at 7.15 P.M. Rekha Banerjee, wife of the Professor came (inside) and informed that a friend of Abhishek was calling him at which Abhishek went outside, followed by Rohan Prakash who went to the front of the door to see as to who was calling. The informant also gave description of the person who had called Abhishek with whom Abhishek went out of the gate and proceeded on road no.8 of the same mohalla. After three to four minutes Rohan heard a sound of firing and the shouts of Mrs. Rekha Banerjee that shot had been fired. By the time Rohan Prakash came out of the room he heard a second sound of firing and when he opened the gate of the compound, Smt. Rekha Benerjee gripped his hand and advised him not go out as he also could be killed, but Rohan Prakash got his hand released and came out of the compound and saw that the assailant was making good his escape on a bicycle. He saw Abhishek lying prostrate on the ground with blood coming out, and then he took the injured in his lap. He saw a maruti car coming, belonging to Dr. Neel Kamal (father of Pallavi) on which car Abhishek was taken to his house in the same mohalla on road no.6 where Rohan Prakash narrated the incident to Dr. Ajit Singh, father of the deceased whereafter they brought the injured on the car to Shahi Clinic at road no.2 of thf same mohalla where treatment of Abhishek started. Rohan Prakash also revealed in the first information report that Abhishek had told him earlier that he was threatened by some student of the College which had caused him tension. Ajit Singh, father of the deceased whereafter they brought the injured on the car to Shahi Clinic at road no.2 of thf same mohalla where treatment of Abhishek started. Rohan Prakash also revealed in the first information report that Abhishek had told him earlier that he was threatened by some student of the College which had caused him tension. From prosecution story it will further appear that on some clue the Investigating Officer raided the house of appellant Arnit Das on 13.9.1998 in the same mohalla, where he as also his father, according to evidence of P.W.21, Zeyauddin Ahmad, the Investigating Officer, were present. As per evidence of P.W.21, in the house itself appellant Amit Das gave his statement, making a confession and also pointed out his bicycle on which he had fled away after committing the crime, and his apparels which he was wearing at the time of occurrence which were seized from his house and a seizure list (Exhibit-19/2) was prepared, also signed, besides witnesses, by the father of Amit Das endorsing that the pant and shirt were seized from the room of Arnit Das and the bicycle, from the verandah of the house. As per evidence of P.W.21 the father was also told that his son was confessing his guilt. 5. Appellant Arnit Das was arrested from his house and brought to the police station. On the next day (14.9.1998) he was produced before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna who by his order of the same day noted that Arnit Das had not complained about any ill-treatment at the hands of the escorting party and, assessing his age to be about 16 years, remanded him to the Senior Remand Home at Patna. It appears that having signed this order, a requisition was placed before him the same day, filed by the Officer-in-charge of the concerned Kadam Kuan Police Station, stating that Arnit Das had confessed his guilt before Police and wanted to make confession before a Judicial Magistrate, requesting the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate to depute a Magistrate to record the confession. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate ordered, subsequently in the same day, that the accused be produced before Sri Deepak Kumar Singh (P.W.7), Judicial Magistrate, for recording his confession. These two orders are Exhibit-6/2. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate ordered, subsequently in the same day, that the accused be produced before Sri Deepak Kumar Singh (P.W.7), Judicial Magistrate, for recording his confession. These two orders are Exhibit-6/2. Exhibit-6 is the order of the same day recorded by Sri Deepak Kumar Singh noting therein that Arnit Das was produced before him with the record, for recording his confession who was told by the court that he was not bound to make any confession and that his confession (if made) could be used against him. The learned Magistrate also noted in the ordersheet that two hours time was given to the accused to reflect before he made his confession. The Magistrate noted thereafter that the accused, having understood all the implications, wanted to confess voluntarily, whereafter his confession was recorded by the court (Exhibit-5), which recorded confession was sent back to the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. The main plank on which the prosecution has based its case is the confession of Arnit Das. Therefore, it is necessary to have a glance over the confession that Arnit Das is said to have made before the Judicial Magistrate. 6. In the confession so recorded, Amit Das said that Sidharth and Rohan Prakash were very good friends of his but they were rowdy elements. People having criminal antecedents used to visit the house of Sidharth, with fire arms. On 1.9.1998 Sidharth had told him to assault Abhishek, the deceased, but he refused to do that as he had no enmity with him. On 4.9.1998 at 5.00 P.M. he went to the house of Sidharth on being called by him, where co-accused Rohan Prakash and Sidharth along with his servant Laxman were sitting in the room of Sidharth situated in the ground floor itself, Arnit Das has given the situation, and description, of the room of Sidharth, also stating that the room was fitted with air conditionder, with a double bed, and a single bed also kept besides. Arnit Das noted four windows in this room out of which in one, the air conditioner was installed, the room also having attached bath room. There Sidharth told him that appellant Rohan Prakash was in love with Pallavi but she preferred Abhishek, also telling that he (Sidharth) had made many attempts to get Abhishek assaulted but fortunately Abhishek escaped. Arnit Das noted four windows in this room out of which in one, the air conditioner was installed, the room also having attached bath room. There Sidharth told him that appellant Rohan Prakash was in love with Pallavi but she preferred Abhishek, also telling that he (Sidharth) had made many attempts to get Abhishek assaulted but fortunately Abhishek escaped. When Arnit Das refused the proposal to murder Abhishek, Sidharth told that "setting" had already been done and, in any case, Abhishek would be killed within a day or two, but if Arnit Das killed Abhishek, Sidharth would introduce him to veteran criminals, including one Surajbhan. At that time Arnit Das sat with them for two to three hours. During this period Sidharth disclosed his plan telling that when Rohan Prakash and Abhishek came to take tuition from Professor J. C. Banerjee in his house situated at road no.8 of the same mohalla, Abhishek was to be called out, and killed. Sidharth also gave the description of Abhishek to Arnit Das and told Rohan Prakash that after the shot was fired at Abhishek, he would act as astonished and would also shout in order to dispel any suspicion against him. Sidharth also promised to provide fire-arm to Arnit Das. Thereafter, Arnit Das returned back. Again on 5.9.1998 at about 5.00 P.M. in the same room of Sidharth where, apart from Sidharth and Laxman, one unknown boy was also present, Sidharth provided him with a double barrel country made pistol, loading two cartridges in his presence, and also gave him two extra cartridges. Arnit Das kept the pistol and the spare cartridges in the pocket of his jeans and covered the same with his baggy tee-shirt. He evicted himself from the house of Sidharth at about 6.00 P.M. and came back to his home. At 6.30 P.M. he reached the gate of the house of Professor Banerjee which was shown to him by Sidharth. Thereafter Abhishek came along with a boy (who, as per evidence on the record, was younger brother of Abhishek having come with Abhishek to present Professor Banerjee a packet of chocolates, the day being" Teachers Day"). Mrs. Banerjee was sitting at that time at the outer verandah. At that time Arnit Das was still undecided as to whether or not he should kill Abhishek. Mrs. Banerjee was sitting at that time at the outer verandah. At that time Arnit Das was still undecided as to whether or not he should kill Abhishek. At about 7.15 P.M. Sidharth came to him and informed that the boy who had come with Abhishek had gone back hence he should now call Abhishek and kill him, further threatening that if he did not kill him, Sidharth would kill him (Arnit Das). Saying this, Sidharth went and stood at some distance. Thereafter, Arnit Das made enquiries about Abhishek from Mrs. Banerjee. On hearing his call, Abhishek and Rohan Prakash both came outside, and then Rohan Prakash pointed out Abhishek and went back, inside the room. Arnit Das asked Abhishek to come outside to see Sidharth and when he came out, Arnit took him about ten to twelve steps from the gate and there he told him that he was maintaining affairs with the college- girls, spoiling their career and, at the same time, caught with his right hand the lock of his hair. Abhishek jerked his hair free and caught hold of the left hand of Arnit Das at which Arnit took out, with his right hand, the pistol from his pocket and shot at Abhishek. When Abhishek tried to escape, Arnit fired the second shot which, however, did not hit him. Abhishek, after covering some distance, fell down. When Arnit ran towards his bicycle, he saw Sidharth standing and when he looked back he saw Rohan Prakash at the verandah of Professor Banerjee, shouting. Thereafter, he fled away. 7. Arnit Das further confessed that he came back to his home in a frightened state of mind whereafter, at quarter past eight, Sidharth came to him, applauding him for having accomplished the task assigned to him. The next day Laxman, the servant of Sidharth, came to his house and told him that Sidharth had asked him to go out of Patna but Arnit expressed his inability as his School was re-opening. Thereafter, on 7.9.1998 in the morning Laxman again came to his house asking him to go out and threatening him that if he was implicated, Sidharth would kill him. The same day in the morning he gave the country made pistol and two spare cartridges to Laxman at which time his friend Arko (P.W.8. Thereafter, on 7.9.1998 in the morning Laxman again came to his house asking him to go out and threatening him that if he was implicated, Sidharth would kill him. The same day in the morning he gave the country made pistol and two spare cartridges to Laxman at which time his friend Arko (P.W.8. Arko Partim Banerjee) resident of Langertoli, who was son of one N. N. Banerjee, was also present. Laxman went away with the pistol and the cartridges. Thereafter, Arnit Das remained inside his house but on 13.9.1998 Police interrogated him, and he revealed entire facts to the Police. This appellant admitted that he had given his statement voluntarily, also stating that he apprehended that criminal associates of Sidharth would kill him. 8. The appellants, in course of trial, have denied the allegations. Arnit Das denied even friendship with Sidharth and Rohan Prakash or having made extra-judicial confession to Arko Partim Banerjee (to be referred to as Arko). In his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he also denied having made any confessional statement before the Judicial Magistrate though the defence has claimed that on 16.9.1998 itself, through Exhibit-h, sent by Arnit Das from the Remand Home, he had retracted from his confession claiming that after having been picked up by the Police on the preceding day at about 6.00 to 6.30 A.M. he was brutally tortured by them and was dictated a confession and then was produced on 14.9.1998 before a Magistrate where the Police Constable was also standing. Arnit Das denied that he was involved in any crime or that his statement so recorded was voluntary. 9. The learned trial court has found the confession of Arnit Das to be validly and legally recorded and voluntary one, on which reliance could be placed for convicting Arnit Das even if he had retracted from that, though the learned lower court has also pointed out that there was hardly any question of retraction from the confession when in his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Cr.RC.) Arnit Das had denied having made any confession before any Magistrate or having signed over any such recorded confession. 10. 10. Appellant Sidharth, in course of trial had taken plea of alibi stating that he was taking tuition, at the relevant time, from Sri Mohan Prasad (D.W.2) and from another tutor between 6.00 P.M. to 9.00 P.M. It was also suggested on his behalf that mother of the deceased, wife of Dr. Ajit Singh, was a Director of a pharmaceutical company and Dr. Ajit Singh wanted Dr. Utpal Kant, father of Sidharth, to prescribe medicines of that company to which entreaties Dr. Uptal Kant paid no heed resulting in bitterness between the two. Appellant Rohan Prakash denied the allegation that he had any hand or was involved in the alleged offence claiming in his statement under section 313 of the Cr.RC. that he had always regarded Pallavi as his sister. He claimed that the events, as mentioned in the first information report, were true. 11. All the three appellants had taken the plea of being juveniles. As a matter of fact, Arnit Das had claimed that he was a juvenile on the date of occurrence which was enquired into by the authorised court under section 32 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 ("1986 Act", in short). In the enquiry the court held him not to be a juvenile, that is, below the age of sixteen years. The appeal against that order was filed which was dismissed by the Sessions Judge, Patna. Against that a criminal revision was preferred before this court which also was dismissed. Thereafter, Arnit Das preferred Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) no. 729 of 2000 (Cr.Appeal no.469 of 2000) before the Supreme Court, where also the appeal was dismissed. However, besides affirming the findings of the three courts, including that of this court, the Supreme Court also concluded that the crucial date for determining the question was the date when the accused was brought before the competent authority. Against that finding, a Review Petition (Criminal) no. 1290 of 2000 was filed by Arnit Das urging that the view taken by the two judges of the court was contrary to the view taken by the three judges of the court in the case of Umesh Chandra V/s. State of Rajasthan; (1982)2 S.C.C. 202 in which it was held that the relevant date for considering as to whether or not the accused was juvenile, was the date of occurrence. That Review Petition was referred to a Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court which held that the matter about age was already settled as it was already held, from the lowest court to the Apex Court, that the accused was not a juvenile on the date of occurrence, hence the question referred to the larger Bench was only of academic character which was needed not to be answered. Arguments of Sri S.P. Mukherjee, Advocate, appearing for Arnit Das on this score I will advert to later. 12. Learned counsel of all the three appellants have also argued, which is argument in alternative so far appellant Arnit Das is concerned, that before judgment in the sessions case was delivered, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 ("Act of 2000", in short) had come into operation and by virtue of section 20 and allied provisions and rules, the benefits of the Act 2000, which had raised the age of a person, to be a juvenile, to 18 years, would be available to all the three appellants. These arguments also, in detail, will be discussed later. 13. The judgment of the lower court has been assailed by the learned counsel of the appellants on different grounds, which can, broadly, be catalogued as below (1) The confession of Arnit Das (Exhibit-5) was neither voluntary nor was legally recorded, nence had no evidentiary value. (2) Extra-judicial confession of Arnit Das, allegedly made before Arko just after the occurrence, cannot be taken into consideration against any of the appellants either on law or on facts. (3) Confession of Arnit Das could not have been considered as substantive evidence against other co-accused with the help of section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act ("the Act" in short) as the confession was made after the occurrence had already taken place and all the three appellants had been arrested since anything said or done or written by a co-accused after the object of conspiracy had been achieved and, in any case, after the arrest of the accused, could not be considered as evidence against other co-accused under section 10 of the Act. (4) It was argued on behalf of the appellants Sidharth and Rohan Prakash that even if the confession was found to be voluntary and legally admissible, but since that cannot be taken into consideration with the help of section 10 of the Act, the confession which in any case was retracted from, had no evidentiary value against these appellants, and independent evidence against them being meagre or even non-existent, that could not connect them with the alleged crime. (5) Evidence of Arko and Birendra Mohan Shahi, P.W.5, was not at ali reliable as their statements had come many days after the alleged occurrence, in the case of P.W.5, more than a month after the occurrence, both also having some connection with the family of the deceased. In the like manner, evidence of P.W.6, Rajiv Ranjan, which essentially is against appellant Sidharth, suffered from many infirmities and his evidence, his being admittedly close to the family of the deceased, also was not believable. (6) Appellant Arnit Das was not only entitled to benefits under the 1986 Act, but he and the other two appellants also were entitled to the benefits under the Act of 2000 even if they are held to be guilty of having committed the offence, in conspiracy with each other. (7) In any case, sentence- of death against Arnit Das was not warranted under law. 14. I will first take up the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants about the evidentiary value of Exhibit-5, the confession of Arnit Das. 15. But before that matter is taken up, the related matter of his extra-judicial confession made to P.W.8, Arko, may be taken up. According to this witness, on 5.9.1998 at about 7.30 P.M. he had gone to the house of his friend Arnit Das, and finding him in a state of nervousness he asked for the reason. Arnit Das told him that he had committed murder of Abhishek in front of the house of Prof. J.C. Banerjee, by firing upon him. When the witness did not believe that, Arnit took out two empty cartridges and gave the same to him asking him to return the same-next morning. When even after that this witness remained doubtful, Arnit exhibited a double barrel fire arm to this witness, but even then he did not believe and came back. J.C. Banerjee, by firing upon him. When the witness did not believe that, Arnit took out two empty cartridges and gave the same to him asking him to return the same-next morning. When even after that this witness remained doubtful, Arnit exhibited a double barrel fire arm to this witness, but even then he did not believe and came back. This witness has said that Arnit was his friend and he used to go to his house for taking exercises. 16. Having read in the newspapers about attack on Abhishek next day, he again visited house of Arnit Das, returned him cartridges and asked him as to what he had done. According to this witness even Arnits parents had came to know that Arnit was concealing something. On being asked by Arnit Das to return back, this witness went away but the same day when he went there again he saw one Laxman, servant of Sidharth, there, who told Arnit that Sidharth (appellant) had advised him to go away to Bengal. On 7.9.1998 this witness again went to the house of Arnit and found Laxman there. Arnit handed over the pistol and the cartridges to Laxman whereafter they talked privately and Laxman went away. Thereafter, though he once again went to his house but could not meet him. The Police came to the house of this witness on 14.9.1998 and got his statement recorded. His statement was also recorded same day (14.9.1998) under section 164 Cr.P.C, which is on the record. 17. It may be mentioned that even Arnit Das in his statement under section 313 Cr. P.C. had admitted that he and this witness were students together in Don Bosco Academy though he denied that they were friends. This witness (P.W.8) was asked about his acquaintances with the accused persons in course of cross-examination on behalf of Arnit Das and he has given details as to when which of the accused was a student of that School or of a College, showing good acquaintance. This witness said that the Police had recorded his statement at his house itself and thereafter had taken him to the court (for his statement). At that time his parents were not present in the house, but when they returned, this witness told them as to what statement he had given to the Police. 18. This witness said that the Police had recorded his statement at his house itself and thereafter had taken him to the court (for his statement). At that time his parents were not present in the house, but when they returned, this witness told them as to what statement he had given to the Police. 18. So far cross-examination of this witness is concerned, nothing significant to discredit his testimony has been taken by the defence, but the learned counsel for the appellants have attacked his testimony on several grounds, namely, - (1) That the appellants in their statements under section 313 Cr.P.C. have denied their friendship with Arko and there is no independent evidence to show that the appellants and Arko were friends and Arko was in a position to know about them, or even that Laxman was servant of Sidharth. It was argued that no evidence has been brought on the record to prove that Arnit Das was so friendly with Arko that he would have, just after the occurrence, revealed his complicity in the murder; (2) Arko, in his evidence, has admitted that his father and mother of the deceased were teachers in the same College, in the same Department (Botany). It was argued that for this reason Arko was induced to give the statement that he gave to the Police; (3) Arnit Das in his confession had admitted presence of Arko on 7.9.1998 but did not say about his presence earlier though Arko has claimed that. Likewise Exhibit-5 did not reveal that Arnit Das had earlier made confession to Arko. (4) Though Arko has claimed to have known about the complicity of Arnit Das in the crime on the date of occurrence itself, still for the first time he revealed that to the Police on 14.9.1998 on which ground alone his testimony should not be believed. (5) Through Exhibit-25/1 the Police forwarded Arnit Das on 14.9.1998 to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate with a memo of evidence in which though it was mentioned that he was willing to confess his guilt, but it was not stated that he already had made extra-judicial confession to Arko. Likewise in Exhibit-27 which was another requisition sent by Police to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for recording confessional statement of Arnit Das on 14.9.1998 itself, this fact was not mentioned. 19. Likewise in Exhibit-27 which was another requisition sent by Police to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for recording confessional statement of Arnit Das on 14.9.1998 itself, this fact was not mentioned. 19. In so far as the argument on behalf of the appellants about friendship of the appellants or of Arnit Das with the witness Arko is concerned, it has been submitted that evidence is not on the record. But, as already pointed out, Arnit Das in his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. had admitted that they both were students in the same School and in his confession also at one stage he had told about the presence of Arko showing good acquaintance with him, so much so that he not only gave his address, but also the name of Arkos father. In his evidence Arko has claimed, in the beginning of deposition itself, that Arnit Das was his friend and he subsequently also said that he used to go to his house to take exercises. Whatever cross-examination on this point was made, this witness has given satisfactory replies and his claim that Arnit Das was his friend has not been exposed to doubts. Arko in his evidence also has said about servant of Sidharth having come to Arnit Das. It has come in the evidence of P.W.21 that the Investigating Officer had gone to the local Don Bosco Academy, a School, and learnt there that the three appellants were students of that School, though in different sections. Therefore, it can hardly be argued that on this point there was no evidence on record. Sri S. P. Mukherjee, learned counsel for appellant Arnit Das, has relied upon some decisions in this regard. It was pointed out that their lordships of the Apex Court in the case of Makhan Singh V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 S.C. 1705 , did not believe that the appellant had gone to P.W.3 Amrik Singh and had made extra-judicial confession to him. That was in the circumstance that Amrik Singh had claimed that the appellant told him that since Police was after him, he was confessing before him so that he might not be unnecessarily harassed, but there was nothing on the record to indicate that Amrik Singh had any influence upon the Police, or any status to protect the appellant from harassment. There was no other corroborative evidence about the extra-judicial confession. There was no other corroborative evidence about the extra-judicial confession. Another decision relied upon is reported in A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1595; Heramba Brahma V/s. State of Assam, in which case the accused persons had made confession to another undertrial prisoner in jail awaiting trial which was accepted by the High Court without examining the credentials of such a witness, and without ascertaining the words actually said. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held the extra-judicial confession to be unworthy of belief, also observing that the court in such circumstances should also have looked into the reason or motive for confession and the person selected in whom the confidence was reposed. However, the facts of that case are not applicable to the facts of this case in which extra-judicial confession is said to have been made to a friend. It was pointed out that in the case of Rahim Beg V/s. State Of U.P.; (1972)3 S.C.C. 759 ; their Lordships of Supreme Court had observed that there was no history of previous association between the witness and the two accused who are said to have made extrajudicial confession, so as to justify the inference that the accused could repose confidence in him. This decision also will not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. 20. In the decision reported in 1976 Cr.L.J. (J. & K. High Court) 1629, Mazhar Ali V/s. State, extra-judicial confession, which was retracted was found unreliable holding that such retracted confession must be assured by corroborative evidence to base conviction on that. This decision also is not applicable as we will see that there are sufficient corroborations for the extrajudicial confession, or for the judicial confession made by Arnit Das. 21 Judgment in the case of Surendra Kumar V/s. State of Punjab; 1999 Cr.L.J. 267, was also pointed out in which four accused were said to have run to P.W.6 and made joint confession though not having any particular relationship with him. That was disbelieved. This decision is also not applicable in the facts of this case. On the other hand, Sri S.D. Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, has submitted that it will always depend upon the circumstances of the case as to whether or not extra-judicial confession made to a person should be accepted as true and voluntary. This decision is also not applicable in the facts of this case. On the other hand, Sri S.D. Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, has submitted that it will always depend upon the circumstances of the case as to whether or not extra-judicial confession made to a person should be accepted as true and voluntary. Learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka V/s. M. N. Ramdas; A.I.R. 2002 Supreme Court 3109, in which, under the circumstances of that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had believed the testimony of a stranger to whom the respondent was said to have made extra-judicial confession about his killing a friend. 22. Along with the point that though the aforesaid extra-judicial confession, claimed to have been made on the date of occurrence itself, soon after the crime was committed, still for the first time Arko revealed that to the Police on 14.9.1998,I will also examine the claim of the appellants that evidence of this witness as well of P.W.5, Birendra Mohan Shahi, should not be given credence on account of such delay in making statement before police. In support of this argument on behalf of Arnit Das certain decisions have been placed. In the case of Dwarikadas Gehanmal V/s. State of Gujarat; 1999 (1) P.C.C.R. 159, P.W.4 had claimed that while making sought his help on 12.2.1988 but for the first time the witness told about that to the Investigating Officer on 16.2.1988. On this ground, and in view of the circumstances of that particular case, the conduct of the witness was not found to be that of an ordinary witness. Similar is the case of Ram Khelari V/s. State of Rajasthan; 1999 (1) P.C.C.R. 158, in which extra-judicial confession made before P.W.5 was revealed by him after twenty days which also was not accepted. 23. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court, in the case of State of Orissa V/s. Brahmanand; A.I.R. 1976 S.C.2489, it was pointed out that their Lordships found one circumstance to be very important to doubt the veracity of the prosecution case itself, that a witness who claimed to have seen the assault and also to have witnessed other activities, did not mention the name of the respondent as the assailant for a day and half. The explanation that she did not do so on account of fear of the respondent was not accepted. However, their Lordships also concurred with a number of other infirmities in the prosecution evidence that were discussed by the High Court. 24. Reliability or otherwise of a judicial confession or an extra-judicial confession would depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. While considering the facts of this case and the evidence on record it must be remembered that none of the appellants were criminals and it has also come on the record that they had no criminal history. They were very young people who had just finished the School grade. Arnit Das, as per evidence, had committed such a heinous offence on having been urged by a co-accused. If that evidence (confession) is to be believed, till the last moment he was undecided as to whether or not to kill Abhishek but eventually he did that when approached and threatened by co-accused Sidharth. An immature mind does not function in the way the mature minds do, or the mind of an experienced person would function. If the murder did weigh heavily on the mind of Arnit Das and then he told one of his friends about the crime that he had committed, when the turmoil in mind for having committed such an offence was still present, that would not be unnatural. In so far as delay is concerned, it cannot be taken as a general rule that whenever there had been some delay in making statement to the Police, the witness must be disbelieved. There are scores of reasons for which the witnesses, even having knowledge about the crime, are wary to approach the authorities, particularly the Police. There may be fear of some trouble at the hands of the persons who had committed the crime or with a view of steering oneself clear of any controversy particularly when the crime has been committed by someone known, as also for a variety of other reasons. This is more so at a place where law and order situation is not what it should have been. In the case of Bodh Raj V/s. State of J. & K.; (2002)8 S.C.C. 45 , similar plea was taken about delayed examination of witnesses. This is more so at a place where law and order situation is not what it should have been. In the case of Bodh Raj V/s. State of J. & K.; (2002)8 S.C.C. 45 , similar plea was taken about delayed examination of witnesses. Their Lordships held that there could be no rule of universal application that if there was any delay in examination of a particular witness, the prosecution version would become suspect particularly if there was acceptable explanation for the delay. Referring to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ranbir V/s. State of Punjab; (1973) 2 S.C.C. 444 , their Lordships also noted that where the accused raised a plea that there was unusual delay in the examination of the witnesses, the Investigating Officer had to be specifically asked as to the reasons for such delayed examination. In this case also such specific question, calling upon P.W.21 to explain the delay, has not been asked. 25. It is apparent from the evidence in this case that some of the witnesses did not come forward but had to be sought after by the police. The name of Arko came to the knowledge of the Police in the statement of Arnit Das for the first time and soon thereafter the Police visited him at his house and recorded his statement and sent him to the court for getting his statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. P.W.21 has said that he again had visited the locality where occurrence had taken place and had attempted to find clues from persons of the locality but he could not succeed. P.W.5, Birendra Mohan Shahi, was a man living near the place of occurrence. So far occurrence is concerned, his evidence is only that he had heard two firing sounds and then someone saying-"Amit Ab Bhago". It has been claimed that as per his evidence earlier his family was living near the house of the grand father of the deceased, hence he was an interested witness, but this witness, while admitting that he was known to the father of the deceased, also claimed acquaintance with the father of the appellant, Sidharth. The learned lower court has rightly noted that had this witness been interested one, and wanted to oblige the prosecution, he could well have come out with more, his residing near the place of occurrence. The learned lower court has rightly noted that had this witness been interested one, and wanted to oblige the prosecution, he could well have come out with more, his residing near the place of occurrence. In the circumstances of the case, I do not think that the evidence of these two witnesses can be disbelieved on that score if otherwise found to be reliable. 26. So far as not mentioning the fact of extra-judicial confession in the memo of evidence is concerned, the Investigating Officer in his evidence has said that the Incharge Prosecutor had advised him not to reveal every fact so that secrecy was maintained. This, therefore, is not an important point. 27. Simply because Arko was son of a Professor who was working in the same Department with the mother of the deceased, is hardly a ground to disbelieve his testimony if it is otherwise acceptable. It is evident from his evidence that this witness did not volunteer himself to be a witness but gave his statement when the Police came to his house in absence of his father. 28. In the last it was also argued that extra-judicial confession was very weak evidence. There are several decisions of the Apex Court as per which if extra-judicial confession was otherwise acceptable, conviction may be based upon that. In the case of Narayan Singh V/s. State of M. P., AIR 1985 S.C. 1678 two of the witnesses had claimed that the accused had made extra-judicial confession before them which was brushed aside by the trial court, holding the same to be a weak type of evidence. Their Lordships of the Apex Court held that it was a wrong view of the law and that it was not open to a court to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession was a weak type of evidence, further holding that its credibility depended upon the nature and circumstances, as well other factors. Their Lordships believed the evidence of those two witnesses in that regard holding that their evidences were sufficient to warrant a conviction. 29. Their Lordships believed the evidence of those two witnesses in that regard holding that their evidences were sufficient to warrant a conviction. 29. In the case of Meghar Singh V/s. State of Punjab, 1975 Cr.L.J. 1102, their Lordships of the Supreme Court ruled out the contention that extra-judicial confession was a piece of tainted evidence, and held that on such evidence conviction could be based if the court believed the witness to be one whom the confession was made, and the court was satisfied that the confession was voluntary, and also held that, if any corroboration of the confession was required, that was only by way of abundant caution. Similar view was taken by the Apex Court in the case of Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh V/s. State of Vindhya Pradesh; A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 322. 30. A confession can be made to any person, but if that is made before a Judicial Magistrate, requirements of sections 164 Cr.P.C. have to be fulfilled. If that is made to a private person, then the maker can be convicted on the basis of that if, in view of attending circumstances in a particular case, the court finds the evidence of the witness to whom such confession was made to be reliable. 31. In this context it was also argued that the confession of Arnit Das does not mention that he had earlier made any confession to Arko. This point is of no significance as in his judicial confession Amit Das was telling the court about the circumstances under which the crime was committed. He was hardly required to tell everything that was done by him after the offence was committed. It was also argued that in the confession Arko has been named only in context with what had happened two days after the occurrence. As already stated, Arnit Das in a confession about the commission of crime may not have narrated everything that happened after the occurrence which were not necessary to explain as to his and the roles of other co-accused in the actual commission of the crime. 32. It was also argued that in evidence of Arko as well in the confession, reference has come of one Laxman, said to be the servant of appellant Sidharth, but it has not been proved by other evidence that there was such a person who was employed as servant. 32. It was also argued that in evidence of Arko as well in the confession, reference has come of one Laxman, said to be the servant of appellant Sidharth, but it has not been proved by other evidence that there was such a person who was employed as servant. However, the name of Laxman had transpired in the confession as well in the evidence of Arko as the servant of Sidharth. From the evidence of P.W.21, the Investigating Officer, and also P.W.20 Kedar Roy, a Sub-Inspector of Police, it is clear that the Police had made hectic search to locate Laxman who did the vanishing trick, and even his house was located by police, which was searched by witness Kedar Roy on having received a requisition to find out Laxman, from P.W.21. The house of Laxman was searched and some articles were seized therefrom (seizure list, Exhibit-19). A supplementary case diary was written by P.W.20 which also has been proved (Exhibit-20).There is no cross- examination of Arko on the point to show that he wrongly had described the person, who had come to Arnit Das, as Laxman, servant of Sidharth. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances. I find that the evidence of Arko is reliable one and that from the evidence it has been proved that just after the occurrence Arnit Das, when this witness had gone to his house, may be in his disturbed mental state, had confessed what he had done. About the criticism of the evidence of Arko on the ground that Arnit Das in his confession did not name his accomplices, suffice it to say that this rather makes the evidence of Arko more reliable because soon after the occurrence if the offender told about his complicity in the crime to a friend, it was but natural that at that moment he was more concerned about himself. It would not have been natural if it was claimed that Amit Das had given a detailed account of everything that had happened since 4.9.1998. 33. In view of the aforesaid I find that the learned iower court has rightly relied upon the evidence of Arko. 34. Now coming to the Judicial confession recorded by P.W.7, Deepak Kumar Singh, Judicial Magistrate on 14.9.1998, criticism of that was based on various grounds and in support of those grounds certain decisions were also cited. 33. In view of the aforesaid I find that the learned iower court has rightly relied upon the evidence of Arko. 34. Now coming to the Judicial confession recorded by P.W.7, Deepak Kumar Singh, Judicial Magistrate on 14.9.1998, criticism of that was based on various grounds and in support of those grounds certain decisions were also cited. The arguments, in that regard made on behalf of the appellants, particularly by Sri S.R Mukherjee, can be noted below. It was submitted that though P.W.7 had claimed, and it also was the prosecution case, that Arnit Das was given two hours time for reflection, but the evidence showed that he was brought to the civil court at about 1.30 P.M. as it had come in the evidence of P.W.21 that he had gone to the court at 1.30 P.M. It also had come that Amit Das firstly was produced before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, who remanded him to Senior Remand Home and then on requisition of the Police, deputed P.W.7 to record the confession. It was argued that if thereafter he was sent to the court of P.W.7 and after formalities he was given two hours time for reflection then how could he have reached the Remand Home on the same day at 3.00 P.M. as is explicit from Exhibits-l/1 and I/2; the entries made in the Gate Register of the Senior Remand Home. However, P.W.21 never had claimed that he had accompanied Arnit Das when he was forwarded to the court. From the materials it is clear that on the same day subsequently, the Investigating Officer had forwarded Arko and other witnesses for recording of their statements under section 164 of the Cr.P.C.This point has been fully discussed in the judgment of the lower court in paragraph 35, onwards, where the learned Sessions Judge rightly has come to the conclusion that there was nothing on the record to conclude that Arnit Das was produced before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at 1.30 P.M. when P.W.21 had come to the court. 35. 35. Other points are (1) The Magistrate was bound to reduce in writing the questions and answers put to the accused which could have revealed that he had made a searching enquiry to find out as to whether the confession was voluntary or it was tainted because of any torture or any pressure exerted by the Police, or any inducement offered by them, or otherwise was made out of any fear; (2) The rules in that regard framed by the Patna High Court were not adhered to; (3) At least twenty four hours time should have been granted to the accused to reflect; (4) The accused was not asked as to why he was making confession nor the Magistrate revealed his identity to him nor the accused was assured that even if he did not make the confession, he would not be sent back to Police custody. 36. To augment the aforesaid points the learned counsel for the appellants have relied upon following decisions -1985 Cr.L.J. 1079; (Henrey West Muller V/s. State of Assam), (1994)3 S.C.C. 569 (Kartar Singh V/s. State of Punjab), A.I.R. 1957 S.C.637 (Sarwan Singh V/s. State of Punjab), A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1579 (Dagdu V/s. State of Maharashtra), A.I.R. 1978 S. C. 1544 (Devendra Prasad V/s. State of U. P.), A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2007 (State of M. P. V/s. Daya Ram), A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 980 (Shivappa V/s. State of Karnataka), A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2503 (Mahabir Singh V/s. State of Haryana), and A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 445 (Pritam V/s. State of M. P.). In the light of the arguments of the learned counsel of the appellants an enquiry may be made as to whether or not the confession of Amit Das can be held to be voluntary one and truthful, not promoted by any coercion, threat or inducement, and whether the Judicial Magistrate had properly recorded the confession. 37. P.W.7, in his evidence, has stated that on having received the order of the incharge Chief Judicial Magistrate (Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate) with which Arnit Das was also presented before him, he explained to Arnit Das that he was not bound to make the confession which, if made, could be used against him. 37. P.W.7, in his evidence, has stated that on having received the order of the incharge Chief Judicial Magistrate (Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate) with which Arnit Das was also presented before him, he explained to Arnit Das that he was not bound to make the confession which, if made, could be used against him. He also said that he gave two hours time to the accused to reflect but even after that the accused was ready to confess though he again repeated what he had said to him, This witness said that having been satisfied that the accused was confessing without any pressure, he recorded his confession in nine pages (Exhibit-5). On that statement Arnit Das also certified that he had read over the recorded confession and had understood that and finding that to be correct he was putting his signature. He also signed on every page of the recorded confession (Exhibit-1 series). The Magistrate also signed on every page. Thereafter the confession was returned to the Incharge Chief Judicial Magistrate. 38. This wtness has been fully cross examined on behalf of the appellants. This witness admitted that in his ordersheet, Exhibit-6, he had not written that he had tested the mental condition of the witness. He also admitted that he did not question as to why Arnit Das was willing to confess his guilt. He also admitted that a constable had produced Amit Das before him and had identified him, but he also said that he had not sent back the accused (after his confession) with the constable. This witness also said that Arnit Das was sent back with his orderly peon. This witness also said that Arnit Das had remained in his court, not with the police. 39. As seen, in the ordersheet which is Exhbit-6 it has been mentioned that accused was explained that he was not bound to make confession and that the same could be used against him, as well that the accused was given two hours time for reflecton. It was also mentioned that accused voluntarily wanted to make his confession and, therefore, his confession was recorded. 40. It was also mentioned that accused voluntarily wanted to make his confession and, therefore, his confession was recorded. 40. At the bottom of Exhibit-5 the Magistrate has given the certificate as required under section 164 of the Cr.P.C, also noting that Arnit Das was warned that if he made a confession that could be used against him and that Magistrate believed that his confession was voluntarily made. From a reading of Exhibit-5 it will appear that Magistrate had made enquiries from him as to whether he wanted to make confession and, if so, whether voluntarily, as also if he knew that the confession could be used against him. Question no. (4) put by the court was as follows:- "You are further warned to think again because your statement made can be used against you.The court wants to give you full opportunity for it." Arnit Das answered that he had thought over the matter and wanted to make confession voluntarily, after which confession was recorded in question and answer form, the Magistrate not putting any leading question. 41 In so far as revealing the identity by the Magistrate is concerned, this question (4) clearly stated that the court (Nayayaiaya) wanted to give him full opportunity (to reflect). There the identity was revealed that it was before a court where the accused was produced. 42. In so far as revealing of identity is concerned, the Criminal Court Rules, framed by Patna High Court, state that confession should be recorded in open court during court hours but in any exceptional circumstance, different procedure may be adopted, it is particularly when the confession is recorded at a place which is not the court and it is not during the court hours, that the Magistrate recording the confession must identify himself. But when an accused, who is educated one, is produced before the court, it could hardly be argued he did not understand that he was before a court of law. In any case, question no.4 put by the Magistrate revealed his identity, to be a court. 43. In so far as time for reflection is concerned, there is nothing to doubt the testimony of the Magistrate that two hours time was given to the accused for reflection and during that period the accused was kept in the court. In any case, question no.4 put by the Magistrate revealed his identity, to be a court. 43. In so far as time for reflection is concerned, there is nothing to doubt the testimony of the Magistrate that two hours time was given to the accused for reflection and during that period the accused was kept in the court. Rule 21 (i) of the Criminal Court Rules states that whenever possible, the accused confessing his guilt should be allowed few hours time for reflection. How much time would be sufficient for reflection would differ from case to case. It is ultimately the satisfaction of the Magistrate that the confession is voluntary which will matter because it is the Magistrate recording the confession who has dealt with the accused, had an opportunity to talk to him and to watch his demeanour. When the Magistrate says that he was satisfied that the confession was voluntary, ordinarily that should not be doubted. 44. No doubt two days after recording of the confession Arnit Das sent in an application that the confession was result of coercion by Police and was not voluntary. But it is evident from this letter that it was prompted by some legal advice. In this letter Arnit Das also wrote that confession was recorded in presence of Police. This is a legal and technical point which a person of tender age having no brush with law was hardly supposed to know. In some cases even twenty four hours time would not be sufficient whereas in some cases even lesser time would be required. 45. In so far as complaint against Police is concerned, High Court Rule 29 (iii) provides that the Magistrate should satisfy that the confession was voluntary but it was not necessary to invite complaints of police ill-treatment, though if spontaneously made, cognizance of that should be promptly taken and such complaint of pressure should be investigated. The rules provide that a detailed confession should be recorded with the formal warning and a remand to the Police custody should not be allowed. 46. These precautions and other precautions as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants are mainly meant to erase effects of any pressure or coercion by the Police, or inducement made to the accused before he is produced before the Court. 46. These precautions and other precautions as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants are mainly meant to erase effects of any pressure or coercion by the Police, or inducement made to the accused before he is produced before the Court. Inference in that regard may also be had from the evidence on record of a particular case. 47. In so far as the instant case is concerned, it has come in the evidence of P.W.21 that when Police reached house of Arnit Das he was present there and there itself, in his house, his statement making confession was recorded and at his instance, the bicycle allegedly used by him in fleeing away from the scene of occurrence and the clothes that he was wearing at that time, which were also produced in the court, were seized from the house. This witness said that father of Arnit Das was also told that Arnit Das was making a confession. Seizures were made in presence of his father who gave such an endorsement on the seizure list. This means that his father was also present in the house all through. It was after that, as per evidence on record, that Arnit Das was arrested and brought to the Police Station where he was kept for the day and the next day he was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate for recording his confession. It is also evident from the record that soon after the occurrence Arnit Das had made extra-judicial confession before Arko and evidence of Arko in that regard has been found to be acceptable. Obviously, though Arnit Das is said to have committed an offence, he does not appear to be of such strong mind so as to keep things to himself. It is also obvious that before he made his confession before Police, there was hardly any question of the Police coercing him, torturing him or tutoring him to make a confession in the own house of the accused where his father was also present. Nor his father came to the court to blame that or to deny that any seizure was made in his presence. Nor his father came to the court to blame that or to deny that any seizure was made in his presence. In such circumstances, when twice the accused made his confession on his own, before Arko and before the Police the very first time he met them, that would tend to support that he was in a willing state of mind to make his confession. These circumstances negate the contention made on behalf of the appellants that the confession made was a result of coercion or torture. Moreover, when Arnit Das was produced before the incharge of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate and then before P.W.7, nowhere he complained of any coersion by Police. There is no evidence that during the period Arnit Das was before P.W.7, any Police personnel was even present. Rather evidence is that though Arnit Das was brought to P.W.7 by a Police constable, he had to be sent back with the orderly peon of the Court, 48. In so far as the question of Magistrate not telling Arnit Das at the time of recording confession that even if he did not make confession he would not be sent back to the Police custody is concerned, it has been seen that when before making his confession he was produced before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, he had ordered to remand him to the Senior Remand Home whereafter, by a subsequent order, the accused was sent for getting his confession recorded. Therefore, it has to be presumed that the accused knew, before making confession, that after his confession he was to be sent to the Remand Home, where he, indeed, was sent. Therefore, the Magistrate not telling him this will not vilify his confession. 49. There are a large number of circumstances, as also fully discussed in the judgment of the learned lower court recorded in paragraph 22 of the judgment, corroborating the confession made by Arnit Das. However, the evidences corroborating the confession of Arnit Das t will discuss later while dealing this question also in relation with the co-accused, but suffice it to say that the circumstances pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge in paragraph 22 sufficiently corroborate the confession made by Arnit Das on material points. 50. However, the evidences corroborating the confession of Arnit Das t will discuss later while dealing this question also in relation with the co-accused, but suffice it to say that the circumstances pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge in paragraph 22 sufficiently corroborate the confession made by Arnit Das on material points. 50. The Apex Court in the case of Ammini V/s. State of Kerala; (1998)2 S.C.C. 301, while dealing with the confession of accused considered the objections of the lower court in not believing the confession on various grounds. In that case also the confessing accused had claimed, while retracting from the confession, that he had made that under pressure and force applied by the Police. Apex Court noted that except the bare allegation there was no material on the record that the Police had pressurised the accused or had forced him to make the confession. The failure of the Magistrate to enquire from the accused as to whether a promise was made by the Police to make him approver was found of no consequence as the Magistrate had warned him that if he made a confession, that was likely to be used against him. Their Lordships also held that in absence of any requirement that separate reasons had to be recorded for believing that the confession was made voluntarily, it was not proper for the trial court to doubt its genuineness on the ground that the reasons were not recorded separately, though the satisfaction of the Court was recorded in the memorandum. 51. This decision applies to the facts and circumstances of this case. Their Lordships also did not find any merit in the contention that the confession was recorded within a short time after the accused was produced before the court. Similarly, in the case of Ram Prakash V/s. State of Punjab; A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1, in which accused was produced from Police custody in which he had remained for about last fifteen days, and confession was recorded by the magistrate soon thereafter, their Lordships upheld the voluntariness of the confession as the magistrate had taken adequate steps to find out whether the confession was voluntary. 52. At the top of the confession the learned Magistrate had noted that the proforma for recording confession was not available. 52. At the top of the confession the learned Magistrate had noted that the proforma for recording confession was not available. For this reason confession could not be recorded in the proforma provided under the Criminal Court Rules framed by the High Court. 53. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find that the Magistrate had complied with the requirements of section 164 Cr.P.C. while recording confession and that the circumstances of the case show that the accused had made the confession voluntarily which was truthful. On this score also I agree with the findings of the learned lower court. 54. Now I will take up the arguments advanced on behalf of appellants Sidharth and Rohan Prakash that there was no evidence on the record which could be considered against these appellants under section 10 of the Act. Before proceeding with the arguments, section 10 of the Act may be reproduced. "S. 10. Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design.Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it." 55. This section lays down that in prosecution for conspiracy when concert and connection between the persons charged have been reasonably established, the statements, acts, writings or deliberations of each conspirator, in reference to their common intention are admissible as evidence against others. This principle is based on the theory of agency. The concert once having been proved, the principle that applies is that each party is a agent for all the others, hence any act done by one in pursuance of the common design is admissible against the fellow conspirator. 56. This principle is based on the theory of agency. The concert once having been proved, the principle that applies is that each party is a agent for all the others, hence any act done by one in pursuance of the common design is admissible against the fellow conspirator. 56. Sri Rajendra Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant Sidharth, has argued that anything said or done or written by one of the conspirators is evidence against others only till the conspiracy is subsisting, it was argued that, however, a statement made by a conspirator with reference to the past act done in the actual carrying out of the conspiracy after the conspiracy was not subsisting, was not admissible under section 10 of the Act. Argument was that the words "common intention" signify such common intention existing at the time when the thing was said, done or written by one of them. In other words, things said or done or written while the conspiracy was on foot are relevant as to the common intention, but are not admissible when the narrative or the statement or a confession is made to a third party after the common intention is no longer operative and has ceased to exist as against the co-conspirator. Sri Singh mainly has based his arguments on the decision in the case of Mirza Akber (A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 176). It was observed therein that the words, written or spoken, may be a declaration accompanying an act and indicating the quality of the act as being an act in the course of the conspiracy, or the words written or spoken may in themselves be acts in the course of the conspiracy. This being the principle their Lordships held that the words of section 10 must be construed in accordance with it and were not capable of being widely construed so as to include a statement, such as a confession, made after arrest by one conspirator in absence of the other with reference to past acts done in the actual course of carrying out the conspiracy, after it had been completed. Learned counsel also relied upon some other decisions in this connection which I will deal presently. 57. Learned counsel also relied upon some other decisions in this connection which I will deal presently. 57. In the case of N. Ramaratnam (A.I.R. (31) 1944 Madras 302) accused 1 had agreed to supply accused 2 with only one packet of explosive which was utilized on 14.11.1943 by accused 2for blowing up a bridge which attempt proved futile, whereafter the accused were arrested. On 15.11.1943 accused 2 sent a letter asking accused 1 if he could supply more explosives. A question arose whether this letter was evidence against accused 1 under section 10 of the Act. It was held that accused 1 had agreed to supply only one packet of explosive for one act of destruction which act when carried out on the 14th November, such common intenton could not be said to be existing on a subsequent date so as to make the letter admissible as against accused 1. The decision in the case of Mirza Akber (supra) was relied upon. In the case of Sardul Singh V/s. State of Bombay; A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 747. their Lordships held that where the charge specified the period of conspiracy, the evidence of acts of co-conspirators outside the period was not receivable in evidence, as the rule in section 10 confined the principle of agency in criminal matters to the acts of the co-conspirators within the period during which it could be said that the acts were "in reference to their "common intention", that is to say, "things said, done or written, while the conspiracy was on foot." 58. In the case of State of Gujarat V/s. Mohammad Atik; A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1686, it was observed, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Swarup V/s. State of Maharashtra (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 682), that a post arrest statement made to a Police Offcer, whether it was a confession or otherwise, touching involvement in the conspiracy, would not fall within the ambit of section 10 of the Act. 59. Arguments have been made that once the object of conspiracy has been achieved, the co-conspirators ceased to be the agent of others and, in any case, after arrest, the agency is demolished and, thereafter, nothing said, done or written would be admissble in evidence against a co-conspirator under secton 10, be that a confession made before a Magistrate. 59. Arguments have been made that once the object of conspiracy has been achieved, the co-conspirators ceased to be the agent of others and, in any case, after arrest, the agency is demolished and, thereafter, nothing said, done or written would be admissble in evidence against a co-conspirator under secton 10, be that a confession made before a Magistrate. This theory was developed in some decisions of the Supreme Court for example, in the case of State V/s. Nalini; (1999)5 S.C.C. 253 . Honble K. T. Thomas observed that whether a particular accused had ceased to be a conspirator or not was a matter which could be decided on the facts of that particular case. It was pointed out by his Lordship that normally a conspirators connection with the conspiracy would get snapped after he was nabbed by the Police and kept in their custody but there were also cases in which a conspirator would continue to confabulate with the other conspirators and persist with the conspiracy even after his arrest, hence it was not possible to lay down a proposition of law that conspirators connection was necessarily cut off with his arrest. Honble D. P. Wadhwa in the same judgment also held that the provisions of section 10 would apply only during the existence of conspiracy but there were exceptions to that such as principle of res gestae and in a given case, it might be that once the conspirator was nabbed there would be an end of conspiracy but that was not of universal application if there was still agreement to do the illegal act. 60 On the other hand, Sri S. D.Yadav, Government Advocate has also relied upon certain decisions of the Apex Court. In the case of Ammini (supra) there was a retracted confession on the record of the case. The trial court had held that even if the judicial confession was regarded as voluntary and true it could be used only against the accused who made it and not against other accused. In the case of Ammini (supra) there was a retracted confession on the record of the case. The trial court had held that even if the judicial confession was regarded as voluntary and true it could be used only against the accused who made it and not against other accused. This situation was answered by their Lordships as follows: "The High Court found the trial court wrong on this point in view of section 10 of the Evidence Act which provides that where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commiit an offence, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well as for the purpose of providing the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it. The High Court held as there was reasonable ground to believe that Ammini and other accused had conspired together and, therefore, the confession made by A-4 could be used against other accused also." Their Lordships noted that same contentions as were urged before the High Court were also urged before the Supreme Court. Noting that, their Lordships said "We agree with the reasons given by the High Court for rejecting that." 61. Sri Yadav also relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra V/s. Damu; (2000)6 S.C.C. 269 . Exhibit-88 in that case was the judicial confession of a co-accused made after his arrest in which he had implicated himself as well co-conspirators. The Supreme Court, in that case, after examining the scope and admissibility of evidence under section 10 of the Act held as follows: "In this case, there can be no doubt, relying on Ex. 88 that there are reasonable grounds to believe that all the four accused have conspired together to commit the offences of abduction and murder of the children involved in this case. So what these accused have spoken to each other in reference to their common intention as could be gathered from Ex.88 can be regarded as relevant facts falling within the purview of section 10 of the Evidence Act. So what these accused have spoken to each other in reference to their common intention as could be gathered from Ex.88 can be regarded as relevant facts falling within the purview of section 10 of the Evidence Act. It is not necessary that a witness should have deposed to the fact so transpired between the conspirators. A dialogue between them could be proved through any other legally permitted mode. When Ex.88 is legally proved and found admissible in evidence, the same can be used to ascertain what was said, done or written between the conspirators. All the things reported in that confession referring to what A-1 Damu Gopinath and A-3 Mukinda Thorat have said and done in reference to the common intention of the conspirators are thus usable under section 10 of the Evidence Act as against those two accused as well, in the same manner in which they are usable against A-4 Damu Joshi himself." 62. In the aforesaid case the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State vs. Nalini (supra) and the case of State of Gujarat vs. Mohammad Atik (supra) also have been referred to. 63. Sri Rajendra Singh, arguing on behalf of appellant Sidharath, made an attempt to explain away this judgment by stating that conspiracy originally was to sacrifice five children but only three children having been sacrificed before the accused were arrested, the conspiracy had not ended. 64. It does not appear from the judgment that any evidence had come on the record that even after arrest of the accused persons the conspiracy amongst them had continued for sacrificing more children. In that view of the matter, once they were arrested, the conspiracy would be deemed to be no longer on foot. Moreover, the learned lower court in its judgment also has mentioned the case of Bhagwan Das Keshwani V/s. State of Rajasthan; A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 898, in which it was observed that statement of one accused under section 342 of the old Cr.P.C. implicating a co-accused could be used against that other accused as in case of conspiracy better evidence than acts and statements of a co-conspirator in pursuance of conspiracy was hardly available. 65. 65. Sri Singh also argued that the judgments relied upon by the prosecution, which also have found mentioned in the judgment of the lower court, were of two judges of the Apex Court whereas the appellants have relied upon judgments of the Benches of three judges. 66. In this regard a decision of three judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Tribhuvan Nath V/s. State of Maharashtra; A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 450, may be referred to. In that case one accused, under section 342-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 had voluntarily stepped into the witness box as a witness in defence and, in his evidence, had incriminated his co-accused who were being jointly tried with him. A question arose as to whether the trial Judge was right in using such evidence given by that accused as against other accused. Their Lordships held "The position with regard to such evidence is that when a person, accused along with others, voluntarily steps in the witness box as a witness in defence, he is in the same position as an ordinary witness......and is, therefore, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution counsel and evidence brought out in such cross-examination can be used against his co-accused (see King V/s. James Paul 1920-2 K.B. 183 at P. 185). If such a witness incriminates his co-accused the other accused, jointly tried wth him, has the right to cross-examine him if he wants so to do.......but once his evidence as a witness for the defence is on the record, under section 10 of the Evidence Act, 1872 , evidence, as to the communications between one conspirator and the other during the time that the conspiracy is going on ana relating to implementing that conspiracy, is relevant evidence. The statements by one accused to another and the evidence as to the acts done by him disclosing participation by the other accused in the conspiracy are also relevant. As to whether they merit reliance or not is another queston depending upon their credibility." 67. The statements by one accused to another and the evidence as to the acts done by him disclosing participation by the other accused in the conspiracy are also relevant. As to whether they merit reliance or not is another queston depending upon their credibility." 67. No doubt, the aforesaid has been laid down with regard to an accused who offers himself to be a witness in defence and makes himself open to cross-examine by the prosecution as well by other accused, if he incriminates the co-accused, but the principle involved is same as in the case of Damu (supra) so much so that the evidence of an accused as a defence witness is given when the conspiracy cannot be said to be on, but it has been held that such evidence can be considered as against a co-accused who also is co-conspirator, under section 10 of the Act. The only difference in between the evidence of an accused coming as a defence witness and the confession of a co-accused is that the accused as witness can be cross-examined by the co-accused which facility is not available in the case of a confession brought on the record. That can be overcome by seeking corroboration to such confession on material points. 68. Admittedly conspiracies are hatched up for doing an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means in secrecy, not in the open within the hearing of persons other than co-conspirators, if conspiracy is hatched up within the confines of four walls as in the present case, then hardly any evidence other than what may be revealed by one conspirator making judicial or extra-judicial confession, including evidence of an approver, can be available. If such evidence is altogether shut out, then even if such evidence may be on the record, prosecution would stand barred to prove that two or more persons had entered into such a conspiracy. 69. If such evidence is altogether shut out, then even if such evidence may be on the record, prosecution would stand barred to prove that two or more persons had entered into such a conspiracy. 69. As already seen there are decisions on this law point which have followed decision in the case of Mirza Akber (supra), some improvement noticed in certain decisions such as in the case of Nalini (supra), yet on the other hand there are decisions which have allowed evidence of an accused in defence, to be considered against a co-conspirator under section 10 of the Act not only to prove what a co-conspirator had said, done or written in reference to the common intention, but also to prove that that person was a party to the conspiracy. To me it appears that for this one reason could be that when evidence of, say, an independent witness, deposing about what was said, done or written by a conspirator in past could be considered being the evidence admissible under the Act, a confession made by a co-accused, also being evidence admissble under the Act, stating the same, i.e. what was said, done or written by a co-conspirator in the past, could also be considered against a co-accused-conspirator in the peculiar circumstances obtaining in a case of conspiracy, to overcome which section 10 of the Act was brought on the statute book. However, in so far as proving the charge of conspiracy against a co-accused is concerned, such evidence should receive corroboration by other evidences on the record, on material points. 70. There is another aspect of the matter which does not appear to have been fully explored by the learned lower court. Under section 30 of the Evidence Act when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by an accused affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the court may take into consideration such confession as against such other persons as well as against the person who makes such confession. Under section 30 of the Evidence Act when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by an accused affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the court may take into consideration such confession as against such other persons as well as against the person who makes such confession. On behalf of the appellants it has been argued that though section 30 of the Evidence Act provides that a confession could be considered against co-accused who is being tried jointly, it has been held in many decisions of the Apex Court that the use of such confession against co-accused should be only to render support to other evidences already on the record if the other evidences prove the guilt of the co-accused but the court still wants some assurance for holding the accused guilty, and in such case the court could also look into the confession of co-accused, more so if the confession has been retracted. The case of Salehbhai M. Mohamadali V/s. State of Gujarat; (1992)1 S.C.C. 742 , has been referred to in this regard. 71. In this regard a decision of three judges of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Prakash vs. State of Punjab (supra) may be referred to. Their Lordships in that case have held that section 30 of the Evidence Act made it clear that where more persons than one were being tried jointly for the same offence, a confession made by any one of them affecting himself and anyone of his co-accused could be taken into consideration by the court not only against the maker of the confession but also against his co-accused. The Evidence Act, their Lordships further held, nowhere provided that if the confession was retracted it could not be taken into consideration against the co-accused or the confessing accused. However, it was further observed that the amount of credibility to be attached to a retracted confession would depend upon the circumstances of each particular case since as a matter of prudence and practice, a court would not ordinarily act upon such confession to convict a co-accused in absence of strongest and fullest corroboration on material particulars. However, it was further observed that the amount of credibility to be attached to a retracted confession would depend upon the circumstances of each particular case since as a matter of prudence and practice, a court would not ordinarily act upon such confession to convict a co-accused in absence of strongest and fullest corroboration on material particulars. Their Lordships, in that case, examined the confession of the co-accused and found that to be voluntary and true and corroborated in material particulars regarding the general story told by him in his confession, connecting the appellant with the murder of the deceased. 72. No doubt, a retracted confession is a weak evidence against the co-accused. Still it can be considered in evidence against the co-accused if there is sufficient corroboration on material points. 73. A case of conspiracy differs from other crimes. It has been recognized by the judicial courts that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is hardly available. Therefore, a charge of conspiracy under section 120A of the Code, punishable under section 120B of the Code, can be proved either by direct evidence, if available, or by circumstantial evidence. Whether or not there was conspiracy between two or more accused, in many cases necessarily has to be inferred from the conduct of the conspirators or the circumstances obtaining in that case. Because it was ordinarily very difficult to prove a charge of criminal conspiracy by direct evidence, specially for this section 10 in the Act was incorporated as an exception to the general rule. Therefore, in my opinion, while considering a confession of an accused against co-accused under section 30 of the Evidence Act, the confession, including a retracted one, could be considered and from other evidences on the record it has to be found out as to whether the confession was sufficiently corroborated on material points. 74. To prove an offence under section 120B of the Code, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved by necessary implication (See A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1062; Md. Usman Md. Hussain V/s. State of Maharashtra). 75. Now, keeping in view what has been discussed earlier, the corroborating evidence on the record may now be examined. Usman Md. Hussain V/s. State of Maharashtra). 75. Now, keeping in view what has been discussed earlier, the corroborating evidence on the record may now be examined. In this regard, I will discuss the entire corroborating evidence on the record, whether, corroborating the confession of Arnit Das as against him, or corroborating his confession as against appellants Sidharth and Rohan Prakash under section 30 of the Evidence Act, or proving the complicity of these two appellants under section 10 of the Act. 76. (i) (a) Just after the occurrence Arnit Das, when he happened to meet Arko (P.W.8) confessed that he had shot Abhishek. Evidence of Arko has already been found to be reliable. In such confession he also described the place of occurrence, which was the place of occurrence as narrated by other witnesses including P.W. 21. (b) In the confession Arnit Das said about coming of the servant of Sidharth to his house asking him to go out of Patna which was corroborated by P.W.8. (c) As per confession on 7.9.1998 Laxman again came whom the weapon of murder was handed back. This also was corroborated by P.W.8. (ii) In the confession it has been claimed that Arnit Das had fired two shots at Abhishek of which only one had hit him. P.W.11, Prof. J.C. Banerjee, P.W.5 B.M. Shahi and P.W.6 Rajiv Ranjan have supported that they had heard sound of two firings. The learned counsel for the appellants have attacked the testimony of P.W.6, Rajiv Ranjan stating that the witness having claimed that he had heard two sounds of firing while he was passing through Road no. 8 (murder having taken place on this road) was a chance witness, and his testimony should be taken with a pinch of salt in view of his admission that he was acquainted with the family of the deceased since years. However, it appears that whatever he had heard or seen, he had narrated to Dr. Ajit Singh (P.W.18), father of the deceased next morning itself and that very day his statement was recorded by the Police. In so far as the first objection is concerned, when murder is committed on a road then the pedestrians who happen to pass through that road at the relevant time are not chance witnesses, but natural ones. Ajit Singh (P.W.18), father of the deceased next morning itself and that very day his statement was recorded by the Police. In so far as the first objection is concerned, when murder is committed on a road then the pedestrians who happen to pass through that road at the relevant time are not chance witnesses, but natural ones. This witness, an Assistant in the Civil Courts, has admitted that he sometimes used to make purchases of sundry items for the family of the deceased on their behalf. As per his evidence he was coming through Road no. 8 and had heard sound of two shots while he was at the western end of the park on that road. First information report also mentions about two firing sounds. Exhibit-21 is the sketch map prepared by the Investigating Officer which shows that in between the park and the house of Prof. J. C. Banerjee only a road intervenes (Road no. 8 C). This corroborates that when this witness was on Road no. 9, near the park, he was in a position to hear the sound of firing. From this map it is also clear that the house of Prof. J.C. Banerjee was at the junction of Road no. 8 and Road no. 6 whch was towards south on which, at some distance was situated the house of the deceased. Therefore, it would not unnatural for one to take the route of Road no.8 in order to reach the house on Road no.6. On behalf of the appellants it has not been denied that Abhishek had died of one gun shot injury inflicted in his abdomen. P.W.3, Dr. Arbind Kumar Singh, who had conducted autopsy upon the dead body of Abhishek and the evidence of Dr. A. A. Hai (P.W.15), who had examined the deceased while he was lying injured, also support that the deceased had died of one fire arm injury. These evidences on record support that part of confession. (iii) In the confession Arnit Das has said that just before the occurrence Abhishek had reached the house of Prof. Banerjee with another boy and subsequently he was informed by a co-accused that the boy who had come with Abhishek had gone back, hence the crime as planned should be accomplished. These evidences on record support that part of confession. (iii) In the confession Arnit Das has said that just before the occurrence Abhishek had reached the house of Prof. Banerjee with another boy and subsequently he was informed by a co-accused that the boy who had come with Abhishek had gone back, hence the crime as planned should be accomplished. P.W.11, Prof, Banerjee has said that at that time Abhishek had come with his younger brother, Utkarsh at about 7.00 P.M. and had brought some packets of chocolates, the day being the "teachers day" and after he had blessed both of them, Utkarsh went away and he started teaching Rohan and Abhishek. (iv) In confession it has been state. that thereafter Arnit Das asked Mrs. J. C. Banerjee (who was sitting at the outer verandah) about Abhishek and on hearing his call Abhishek and Rohan both came out and Rohan having pointed towards Abhishek, went inside. Here it may also be recalled that in the confession it has come that co-accused Sidharth had described Abhishek to Arnit. Obviously, Abhishek was not known to Arnit Das from before. P.W. 11 in his evidence has said that a person asked his wife if Abhishek was there and requested her to call him on which Abhishek came out followed by Rohan Prakash but Rohan Prakash, thereafter, returned to the room and sat on a chair. Therefore, this part of confession is also corroborated. It has been argued that no witness has said that Rohan Prakash had pointed towards Abhishek. However, "pointing" can be done even with a slight nod of head or a slight raising of one finger which would easily be missed by persons not looking for that, but would be noticed by a person who is looking for that. Even Rohan Prakash in the first information report has supported this version. However, learned counsel for the appellants with supporting authorities have argued that First Information Report could be used only for contradicting or corroborating the person who made it and not otherwise. However, it is well settled that first information report lodged by an accused can be taken into consideration if that amounts to admission, not confession. Rohan Prakash has been asked questions under section 313 of the Cr. P.C. about his statements as given in the first information report and he has admitted having made those statements. However, it is well settled that first information report lodged by an accused can be taken into consideration if that amounts to admission, not confession. Rohan Prakash has been asked questions under section 313 of the Cr. P.C. about his statements as given in the first information report and he has admitted having made those statements. In that view of the matter also statements made in the first information report can be considered against him. (v) Arnit Das had claimed that he had shot at Sidharth on the road which was supported by RW.21 and other witnesses. (vi) Arnit Das confessed that after having committed the offence he fled away on his bicycle. When Arnit Das was arrested by P.W.21 at his residence, he pointed out the bicycle (Material Exhibit-IV) which was so used by him and the clothes (Material Exhibits-V, V/1, VI and VII). The Investigating Officer had seized those articles and the seizure list (Exhibit 19/2) was also signed by the father of Arnit Das (Exhibit-31) who admitted that those material Exhibits were so seized by the Police. It was argued that these material Exhibits are of common use and could be found anywhere, in any house, hence no importance could be attached on their seizure. However, the importance of these seizures lie in the fact that those were pointed out by Arnit Das himself while he had made a confessional statement before Police at his residence. (vii) In his confessional statement Arnit Das has given the situation and description of the room of Sidharth in his house where the conspiracy was hatched up. Learned lower court in the judgment has noted that the description given by P.W.21 after his having inspected that room tallied with the description as given by Arnit Das. However, on behalf of Arnit Das it has been pointed out that though this appellant said about four windows in the room, the Investigating Officer had found only two windows. This I find to be a minor discrepancy, otherwise the situation of the room and other details tally, which has not been questioned on behalf of the appellants, such as the situation of the room and the room having been fitted with air conditioner, and with attached bath room which could be narrated by a person who had visited that house and that room. It may be noted that the Investigating Officer had visited that room after Arnit Das had made confession before him. (viii) P.W.6 has said in his evidence, and has stood test of cross-examination on this, that after hearing sound of two firings while he was on Road no.8, he saw appellant Sidharth running away from the place of occurrence towards his house (situation of his house in the same Mohalla having been fully described by P.W.21), which was closeby, in a perplexed (Badhawas) condition. Having seen him this witness asked as to what had happened but he did not make any reply and fled away towards his house which fact he had informed father of the deceased in the early morning next day and told the same facts to the Investigating Officer the same day. This witness has fully narrated his activities on the date of occurrence when everybody was busy with saving the life of Abhishek. Simply because he was a person known to the family of the deceased cannot be a ground to disbelieve him when this witness, on the point of what he had seen or heard, has gven satisfactory replies in course of cross-examination. Learned lower court has noted in the judgment that if he was a witness set up for the purpose of this case, nothing could have prevented him from even claiming to be an eye-witness of the occurrence. This piece of evidence goes a long way to prove the complicity of Sidharth. (ix) In the confession Arnit Das has claimed that while he had gone to the place of occurrence to commit crime, Sidharth was also there and there also he had exhorted him to kill Abhishek. P.W.5 has said that after hearing the firing sounds he also heard a person saying "Arnit Ab Bhago". This supports that another accomplice was present at the place of occurrence, which, according to the confession, was Sidharth. This evidence implicates both Sidharth and Arnit. P.W.6 also had said that the deceased used to tell him that his relation with accused Sidharth was not good for last seven to eight months. This is a general statement given by him, not put to any damage in cross-examination but which statement was not given before police. This evidence implicates both Sidharth and Arnit. P.W.6 also had said that the deceased used to tell him that his relation with accused Sidharth was not good for last seven to eight months. This is a general statement given by him, not put to any damage in cross-examination but which statement was not given before police. P.W. 18 and 19, father and uncle of the deceased have given a detailed account of difference of the deceased with the appellants but P.W.21 has admitted that those statements were not given by them before him. Learned lower court has discussed the law on the omission of certain facts in the statement made before Police pointing out that all the omissions are not contradictions. In any case on these points I am not considering the evidences of P.W. 18 and 19 which are in quite detail but which were not disclosed before the Police Officer, at least by the father of the deceased, having come to know in the next morning itself that Sidharth was seen running away from the place of occurrence. That might have been because at that time Abhishek was still hovering between life and death and having been pre-occupied with the condition of his son P.W.18 failed to narrate all the facts. It is by way of care that I am not considering their evidence about previous enmity between the decease and the appellants. (x) Conduct of Rohan Prakash on the date of occurrence also indicates his being a partner in the conspiracy. Taken independently his actions may appear to be innocuous, but taken together they strongly suggest his being a co-conspirator whereas the prosecution only has to reasonably prove, that a particular accused was one of the conspirators before recourse to section 10 could be taken to. (a) When Abhishek was called by Arnit Das at the time Abhishek and Rohan Prakash were taking tuition inside a room in the house of Prof. Banerjee, it was but natural for Abhishek to come out, his not suspecting any foul play, but there was no reason for Rohan Prakash also to come out of the room but, according to Arnit Das, he had done so to point out Abhishek. (b) In the first information report itself Rohan Prakash has said that after hearing two firing sounds he came out of the house and wanted to to out when Mrs. (b) In the first information report itself Rohan Prakash has said that after hearing two firing sounds he came out of the house and wanted to to out when Mrs. Banerjee caught hold of his hand trying to prevent him from going outside. Mrs. Banerjee asked him not to go out else he could be killed. But he came out getting his hands freed from her clutches and then saw a young man who, after making firing, was going away on a bicycle towards west. It is not natural that when just outside the gates two firings had taken place which were recognised as such by this appellant, he would have dared to go out without caring for consequences and, without having seen the occurrence, recognizing the fleeing person as the one who had fired the shots, and still not shouting to have him caught by any pedestrian or the persons on the road on cycle or on any vehicle. But considered in the perspective of the confession maw by Arnit Das, such acts are quite explainable, Rohan Prakash would have gone out to his injured friend if he had known that he had nothing to fear about so far his own safety was concerned and, if the killer was in conspiracy with him, he would have given him opportunity to flee away without making any attempt to catch him, though he was bold enough to rush outside in force of firings, by not even shouting after the fleeing accused so that others could catch him. A question here may arise as to why then he had given full description of the killer. That is easy to explain. It has come in evidence that Mrs. Rekha Banerjee had also seen the person firing at Sidharth and had given his description and one suspect, Abhishek Anand who was called to the Police Station was let off because his description did not tally with what was narrated by Mrs. Banerjee. This being so, this appellant could not have given another description of the killer so as to have doubts raised against him instantly. (xi) Arko, in his evidence, had said that the appellants were friends. Arnit Das in his statement under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has admitted that they were both reading in the same School. Banerjee. This being so, this appellant could not have given another description of the killer so as to have doubts raised against him instantly. (xi) Arko, in his evidence, had said that the appellants were friends. Arnit Das in his statement under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has admitted that they were both reading in the same School. In the evidence of P.W.21 it has come, as already seen,that all the appellant were reading in the same School. Obviously Arko was also reading in the same School. His evidence, on this point, not seriously questioned in cross-examinaton, stands out. In the confession of Arnit Das also it has been claimed that he and appellants were known from before. As against this, there is only denial of the other appellants about their acquaintance with Arnit Das. Therefore, there is evidence on the record to show that Rohan Prakash knew Arnit Das from before. Still, while giving out description of the assailants he did not name him, which also tends to prove his being one of the conspirators. In so far as the killing is concerned, as already seen, confession of Arnit Das is sufficient to hold him guilty of that. In so far as charge of conspiracy is concerned, and so far Arnit Das is concerned in that regard, the same need not be proved by any other evidence, that having been confessed by him in Exhibit-5. It has been proved that he was one of the conspirators and he has fully described as to who others were his co-conspirators, and the points specifically discussed about appellant Sidharth and Rohan Prakash, as above, prove sufficiently that they were also involved in the conspiracy alongwith Arnit Das. Apart from complicity of Sidharth and Rohan Prakash, the points discussed above independently corroborate the confession of Arnit Das, proving his role in the crime, as well of the other two appellants. 77. Those points which relate to appellants Sidharth and Rohan Prakash, in my opinion, provide reasonable grounds to believe that they had conspired alongwith Arnit Das to eliminate Abhishek by murdering him. In view of that, section 10 of the Act will be applicable in their case. 77. Those points which relate to appellants Sidharth and Rohan Prakash, in my opinion, provide reasonable grounds to believe that they had conspired alongwith Arnit Das to eliminate Abhishek by murdering him. In view of that, section 10 of the Act will be applicable in their case. On the basis of entire evidence on the record I find that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubts that the appellants had conspired together to kill Abhishek which act was accomplished in concert with each other. 78. There is sufficient evidence on record to corroborate the confession of Arnit Das and in view of the evidences on record and the law on the point, the charges against Sidharth and Rohan Prakash also stand proved when the confession of Arnit Das is considered against them, with corroborative evidences. 79. All the appellants aforesaid have adduced evidence in their defence. The defences of each of the appellants have been meticulously and fully considered by the learned Sessions Judge who came to the conclusion that those evidences would not help the appellants. On a careful consideration of what has been discussed in this regard by the learned Sessions Judge, I am inclined to agree with the findings arrived at by the learned lower court. 80. Some other points were also argued on behalf of the appellants which I will presently discuss. A minor point was that since P.W.5, B. M. Shahi, had admitted that he was dismissed from the service of the Bank, his evidence was not at all credible. But this witness also told the Court that a writ petition against that order was pending. Therefore, on this ground his evidence need not be thrown out of the window. It may also be noted here that learned counsel have, particularly for appellants Arnit Das and Rohan Prakash, on the points that were catalogued in the judgment which according to the learned lower court proved their complicity, attacked those points individually, one by one, making an attempt to show that any particular point was not sufficient to prove the complicity of the appellants. However, those points need not be considered separately, rather they have to be considered together so as to find out what those evidences, when considered together, proved. 81. Learned counsel for the appellants also argued that a number of witnesses named in the charge-sheet have not been examined. However, those points need not be considered separately, rather they have to be considered together so as to find out what those evidences, when considered together, proved. 81. Learned counsel for the appellants also argued that a number of witnesses named in the charge-sheet have not been examined. Stress has been given on non-examination of two witnesses, namely, Haridwar Singh and Mrs. Rekha Banerjee, wife of P.W.11. Haridwar Singh was said to be an eye-witness of the occurrence who had identified both Sidharth and Rohan Prakash at the test identification parade, telling the Magistrate the circumstances in which he had seen those two appellants at the time of occurrence which incriminated them. It has been pointed out that though this witness could not be examined in the Court but what he had said or done in course of investigation hate have been made use of by the learned lower court. It was pointed out that a number of witnesses were examined to show that Haridwar Singh indeed had seen the occurrence and had identified two of the appellants. However, I do not find that the learned lower court has used statement of this witness, or the role Haridwar Singh had played in course of investigation in aid of the prosecution case, rather the learned lower court has noted and discussed those evidences in detail as also the fact that despite efforts of the prosecution and of the court, Haridwar Singh could not be brought to the witness-box, only to conclude that his non-examination, in the circumstances of the case, would not invite adverse inference against the prosecution. On this limited point I agree with the conclusion of the learned lower court. 82. In so far as non-examination of Mrs. Rekha Banerjee is concerned, P.W.11 said in his evidence that she was lying seriously ill, also counting the diseases she was suffering from, ostensibly to tell the court as to why she could not come as a witness. 83. No doubt Mrs. Rekha Banerjee was an important witness, having seen the assailant. But as already discussed elsewhere in this judgment that many witnesses, even enlightened ones, are reluctant now a-days to help the police or the court by volunteering themselves as a witness to the occurrence which reluctance is for a variety of reasons. 83. No doubt Mrs. Rekha Banerjee was an important witness, having seen the assailant. But as already discussed elsewhere in this judgment that many witnesses, even enlightened ones, are reluctant now a-days to help the police or the court by volunteering themselves as a witness to the occurrence which reluctance is for a variety of reasons. From evidence of P.W.21 it is clear that he had asked her even in writing, in course of investigation, to attend the test mdentification parade of the accused, but she had refused to do so Therefore, this witness was an unwilling witness to render any help to the prosecution even when the case was under investigation. In view of these, I do not think that her non-examination would cause any serious prejudice to the prosecution case, if that was otherwise proved. 84. It was also argued that P.W.6 had seen appellant Sidharth fleeing away from the place of occurrence and had given such statement the very next day, then how it was that the police searched his house on 10.9.1998. A question was also raised as to why then Sidharth was not arrested soon after his name came out in the statement of P.W.6. 85. In this regard evidence of P.W.21 may be referred to. The same question was raised on behalf of appellant Rohan Prakash in course of arguments. P.W.21 in his evidence, while being cross-examined by appellant Sidharth, had said that it was mentioned in paragraph 126 of the case diary that in a review of the case with Senior Police Officers, it was found that Sidharth, a resdent of the same Mohalla and Rohan Prakash, who also was residing in the same Mohalla, were involved in the case and were planning to leave the city. In that review it was ordered that they should be arrested. This was mentioned in the case diary dated 10.9.1998 as asserted by P.W.21. The subsequent paragraphs, according to this witness, mentioned as to how then the Investigating Officer had proceeded to visit their houses when both the appellants were found present. 86. An argument was made that motive was not proved for committing the crime. This was mentioned in the case diary dated 10.9.1998 as asserted by P.W.21. The subsequent paragraphs, according to this witness, mentioned as to how then the Investigating Officer had proceeded to visit their houses when both the appellants were found present. 86. An argument was made that motive was not proved for committing the crime. I have already mentioned about what has come on the record in that regard, as also that in view of the omissions made in their statements under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by P.W. 18 and 19, their narrations about the motive in the court were not being considered. It will appear that P.W.10, Hemant Ratnakar Tirki had given complete statement before police in course of investigation as to how Sidharth was aiming to harm physically the deceased, in the college. Obviously, this witness had turned hostile. Sri Yadav relied upon a number of decisions to show that simply because a witness had turned hostile that did not mean that his entire evidence should be over-looked. However, it is well settled that simply because a witness has turned hostile, the entire evidence need not be kept out of consideration but such evidence which supports the prosecution or the defence, can be considered, and evaluated, but since this witness has not supported any part of his statement given before the Police, his evidence may not be considered in favour of the prosecution. 87. Relying upon a decision in the case of Nathuni Yadav V/s. State of Bihar; (1998)9 S.C.C. 238 , Sri Yadav argued that it was held by their lordships of the Supreme Court that in a criminal trial motive shown by the prosecution might be weak for commission of a graver offence, but that by itself would not be fatal to the prosecution case as it could not be presumed that there could be no criminal act without motive and that prosecution must prove the motive. 88. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh V/s. Jeet Singh; (1999)4 S.C.C. 370 , it was pointed out by their lordships of the Apex Court that undoubtedly it was sound principle to remember that every criminal act was done with a motive, but its corollary was not that no criminal offence would have been committed if the prosecution had failed to prove the precise motive of the accused to commit the crime. When the prosecution succeeded in showing the possibility of some ire of the accused towards the victim, it was held, the inability to further put on record the manner in which such ire would have swelled up in the mind of the offender to such a degree as to impel him to commit the offence, could not be construed to be a fatal weakness of the prosecution. Their lordships also noted that it was almost impossible for the prosecution to unravel the full dimension of the mental disposition of an offender towards the persons whom he offended. 89. In this case evidence about the motive has come in the shape of Ext.5, the confession of Arnit Das. 90. It was also pointed out that one broken spectacle was found near the place of occurrence but it had not been proved that the same belonged to any of the appellants. This evidence has to be kept out of the consideration since the police does not appear to have made any attempt to find if that spectacle belonged to any of trie appellants. 91. On behalf of Rohan Prakash it was argued that till he was arrested on 10.8.1999, there was no suspicion against him, at least no such evidence had been brought on the record. But, in this regard evidence of P.W.21, as to under what circumstances these two appellants were arrested on 10.8.1999 has already been discussed. It was in a review meeting that it was found, on evaluation of information and evidences collected, that Sidharth and Rohan Prakash were also concerned with the offence. The Police have various sources and resources to know about the complicity of a person with any crime which they cannot be compelled to disclose. Similar is the view taken by their lordships of the Apex Court in the case of Damu (supra). 92. It was also argued that there was no evidence of entering into conspiracy, against Rohan Prakash, till the confession was made by Arnit Das. It was argued that once his mother filed a petition in the court about his arrest without evidence, the police manufactured the evidence by getting his name introduced in the confession. In this regard suffice it to say that if by the evidence on the record it is found proved that Rohan Prakash was one of the conspirators, then, this speculative point need not be gone into. In this regard suffice it to say that if by the evidence on the record it is found proved that Rohan Prakash was one of the conspirators, then, this speculative point need not be gone into. 93. Therefore, I do not find that the other points argued by the learned counsels for the appellants would affect the finding of this court about complicity of the three appellants, already arrived at. 94. Lastly, all the three appellants have claimed benefit under Act of 2000. Sri S.P. Mukherjee, learned Advocate arguing for Arnit Das had also challenged the finding of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, the Court authorised to deal with the matters under 1986 Act, which Court had held that Arnit Das was not below sixteen years of age on the date of occurrence. Learned counsel attempted to persuade this court to accept his criticism of the order passed in the enquiry under section 32 of the 1986 Act and urged not to take into consideration, in that regard, even the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in appeal, of this Court in revision and of the Apex Court in Criminal Appeal no. 469 of 2000 which all courts had upheld the findings of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna. As already stated, a review petition thereafter was filed in the Supreme Court which was referred to a larger Bench which Bench refused to answer the question raised in the reference about the date on which the age of an accused should be reckoned to find out as to whether or not he was a juvenile. Their Lordships observed that there was clear finding by the lower court that the accused (Arnit Das) was not below sixteen years of age on the date of occurrence, which was confirmed by the three superior courts, hence the matter rested there. 95. Sri Mukherjee argued that none of the courts had taken into consideration certain decisions which gave two years of fluctuating time in assessing the age of the accused. I have mentioned these arguments only to reject the same. When this matter about Arnit Das has been decided up to the Apex Court, it is not open to this Court to re-open the matter and re-consider the same in the light of certain judgments referred to by the learned counsel. I have mentioned these arguments only to reject the same. When this matter about Arnit Das has been decided up to the Apex Court, it is not open to this Court to re-open the matter and re-consider the same in the light of certain judgments referred to by the learned counsel. When the order was confirmed by the Apex Court, the matter rested there so far this case was concerned. Now no other finding can be arrived at. 96. Sri Mukherjee and also the learned counsel for the other two appellants have argued that by virtue of section 20 of the Act of 2000 the appellants were bound to get benefit of this Act at least in so far as their punishment was concerned. 97. This point also has been discussed in detail by the learned lower court. Without going into the details of the claim I will start from the premises that on the date of occurrence the appellants were below eighteen years of age. On this the materials that have come on the record have been discussed in the judgment of the lower court. However, admittedly none of these appellants had remained below eighteen years of age on the date (1.4.2001) the Act of 2000 came into force. 98. Now the question for determination in this regard is whether, if the appellants were below eighteen years of age on the date of occurrence who admittedly crossed age of eighteen years before the Act of 2000 came into force, they would be entitled to the benefits of the Act of 2000 under section 20 of the Act. Sri Ganesh Prasad Singh, learned counsel arguing on this particular point on behalf of Sidharth, has laid stress upon the provisions under sections 20 and 3 of the Act of 2000 as well upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Umesh Chandra V/s. State of Rajasthan; (1982)2 S.C.C. 202 . Section 20 and section 3 of the Act of 2000 may first be reproduced- "20. Section 20 and section 3 of the Act of 2000 may first be reproduced- "20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence." "3. Continuation of inquiry in respect of juvenile who has ceased to be a juvenile.Where an enquiry has been initiated against a juvenile in conflict with law or a child in need of care and protection and during the course of such inquiry the juvenile or the child ceases to be such, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the enquiry may be continued and orders may be made in respect of such person as if such persion had continued to be a juvenile or a child." 99. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, taken together on this point, may now be summarized. The Preamble of the Act of 2000 was read out pointing that the Convention of the Rights of the Child had emphasized social re-integration of the child victims, to the extent possible, without resorting to judicial proceeding which Convention having been ratified by the Government of India on 11.12.1992, it was found expedient to reenact the existing law relating to the juveniles wherefor this enactment was made by the Parliament. Sri Mukherjee, learned counsel, pointed out that having ratified the convention on the rights of the child which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nation, now under Article 253 of the Constitution of India, the Central Government was empowered to enact this law as well to frame its rules and since the rules reflected the law, both should be read together. No doubt, the Parliament was empowered under Article 253 of the Constitution of India to re-enact this law but once having enacted the law, all had to follow the law so enacted, including the Government of India. This is In view of submissions made about relevant provisions of the Model Rules framed by the Government of India relating to the Act of 2000. But first a glance over the arguments in this regard before adverting to the question as to whether or not the Model Rules framed by Government of India would be applicable in the State of Bihar. 100. With reference to section 20 of the Act of 2000 it was argued that on the date this Act came into force a proceeding in respect of the appellants, juveniles under the Act of 2000 on the date of occurrence, was pending, hence though that proceeding was to be continued in that court where it was pending but since the court had found that the juveniles had committed an offence, then after recording that finding, instead of passing any sentence, the learned Sessions Judge, Patna was obliged to forward the case of the juveniles to the Board under the Act of 2000 which was empowered to pass orders in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2000. To augment this argument Rule 61 (2) and (3) of the Model Rules aforesaid were pointed out which run as follows: "61 (2). All pending cases which have not received a finality shall be dealt with and disposed of in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. To augment this argument Rule 61 (2) and (3) of the Model Rules aforesaid were pointed out which run as follows: "61 (2). All pending cases which have not received a finality shall be dealt with and disposed of in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. (3) Any juvenile in conflict with law, or a child shall be given the benefits under sub-rule (1) and it is hereby clarified that such benefits shall be made available not only to those accused who was juvenile or a child at the time of commission of an offence, but also to those who ceased to be a juvenile or a child during the pendency of an enquiry or trial." It was argued that, therefore, this provision clarified the intention of the lawmakers under Act of 2000 was that if a case was pending of a person who was a juvenile on the date of occurrence, then even if he had ceased to be a juvenile when the Act of 2000 came into force, he had to be given the benefits of this Act, under section 20 read with Model Rule 62, as also by virtue of section 3 of the Act of 2000. 101 Sri S. D.Yadav, appearing for the State, pointed out section 68 of the Act of 2000 which empowered the State Governments to make Rules to carry out the purposes of the Act of 2000, by issuance of a Notification in the Official Gazette. It was submitted that since on enactment of this Act the power to make Rules was vested in the State Government, the Central Government was not at all competent to make the Rules and if they made the Model rules, that cannot automatically apply to a State particularly when those Model Rules have not been adopted by that particular State to be made applicable in that State, till the State itself made such Rules. 102. Nothing has been brought on record, nor even argued, that State Government had notified adoption of the Model Rules, even till the State Government made its own Rules in this regard. That being so, these Model Rules will not automatically apply to the State of Bihar. 103. 102. Nothing has been brought on record, nor even argued, that State Government had notified adoption of the Model Rules, even till the State Government made its own Rules in this regard. That being so, these Model Rules will not automatically apply to the State of Bihar. 103. In any case, Rules have to conform to what have been laid down in the Act itself and have to be read in harmony with the provisions enshrined in the Act. Therefore, even without going to the Model Rules it can be examined as to whether benefit of section 20 can be given to the appellants even though they were not juveniles under the Act of 2000 on the date this Act came into force. 104. This aspect has been discussed in detail by the learned Sessions Judge who has come to the conclusion that benefit of the Act 2000 could not be given to the appellants since this Act could not have been applied retrospectively. 105. On coming into force of an Act, that becomes applicable prospectively unless by specific provision under that law its application or of some of its provisions, specifically is made retrospectively effective. There is nothing in the provisions of the Act of 2000, even in section 20 of the Act of 2000. to make the same applicable retrospectively. 106. In this regard, Sri Ganesh Prasad Singh, Advocate, as already stated, has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Umesh Chandra (supra) which related to the applicability of Rajasthan Children Act, 1970. It may be stated that section 3 and section 26 of the Rajasthan Children Act correspond, in their wording, to sections 3 and 20 of the Act of 2000. The position was that the Act was not brought into force in Tonk at the time of occurrence. Trial court as well the High Court had found that the accused had not proved that he was below sixteen years of age on the date of occurrence so as to be given benefit of the aforesaid Act. The Apex Court, on a consideration of the materials on the record, held that the appellant was a child on the date of occurrence. The Apex Court, on a consideration of the materials on the record, held that the appellant was a child on the date of occurrence. It was also held that though the aforesaid Act was not applicable to Tonk where the offence was committed but since the Act thereafter had been enforced in the entire State of Rajasthan, that question did no survive bcause of provisions under section 26 of the Act, But facts here are some what different, in that case the Rajasthan Children Act had already been enacted and brought on statute book, and by the Supreme Court it was found that the appellant was below sixteen years of age at the time of occurrence and, therefore, subsequent application of the Act in Tonk could not deprive the appellant from the benefits accruing out the Act in view of section 26. In that case subsequent enhancement in the age of a juvenile was not in question. When an Act is repealed by a new enactment, the old Act becomes non-existent except so far its provisions have been saved under the new Act. If the new enactment contains a new provision, that could be made applicable only from the date on which the new enactment has come into force. The appellants or any of them could have been granted benefits of the Act of 2000 had they/he been, a juvenile within the meaning of the Act of 2000 on the date it came into force, if there was a proceeding pending against the appellants/appellant in any court. Both of these conditions must be fulfilled before the benefits of the Act of 2000 could be given to the appellants. The appellants having already crossed eighteen years of age on the date Act of 2000 came force, benefit of its provisions cannot be given to them. This exactly was not the position in the case of Umesh Chandra (supra). Section 20 of the Act of 2000 makes it clear that it refers to a pending proceeding of a juvenile, i.e., a proceeding pending in any court on the date Act of 2000 came into force of a person who had not completed eighteen years of age on that date as per the definition of "juvenile" under section 2(K) of the Act of 2000. Even what the Model Rules have provided, those must be applied, if those are to be applied, in conformity with section 20 and other provisions of the Act of 2000. 107. Same question arose in the case of Pankaj Kumar V/s. State of Bihar; 2002 (3) P.L.J.R. 652 . A learned single Judge of this court had considered this question and came to the same decision, i.e., the benefits of the Act of 2000 could not be given to an accused who had ceased to be a juvenile on the date the Act of 2000 came into force. 108. Moreover, provision under section 3 of the Act of 2000 would be applicable only in a case in which an enquiry had been initiated against a juvenile in conflict with law, and if in course of such enquiry the juvenile had ceased to be a juvenile. What is an enquiry under the Act has been clarified under section 14 of the Act of 2000 with corresponding provisions under sections 15 and 20 of the 1986 Act. But no such enquiry against any of the appellants was pending under the 1986 Act when the Act of 2000 came into force, hence, also in that view of the matter the benefit of section 3 of 1986 Act could not have been given to any of the appellants. 109. Now the only point that remains to be considered in this regard is the sentence awarded to Arnit Das. On this score, I am of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case, Arnit Das should not have been awarded the extreme punishment of death. He is in the prime of his youth, and as per evidence on record, no criminal antecedent has been proved against him. Moreover, I do not find anything on the records of the case to indicate that, if not eliminated, this appellant would eventually be harmful to the society, or is likely to take up to crimes later. Arnit Das had agreed to be a party to the conspiracy to kill Abhishek, but as per his confession, which has been accepted to be voluntary and true, he was undecided till the last moment about killing Abhishek. As per his confession, appellant Sidharth then approached him and again asked him to kill Abhishek, threatening him that otherwise he himself would be killed. As per his confession, appellant Sidharth then approached him and again asked him to kill Abhishek, threatening him that otherwise he himself would be killed. It was under such circumstances that he had fired the fatal shot. I do not feel that this is one of those rarest of rare cases in which the extreme penalty of death should have been awarded. In my opinion, sentence of imprisonment for life would serve the ends of justice in so far as Arnit Das is concerned. Therefore, his sentence of death is converted into the sentence of imprisonment for life. 110. With the aforesaid modification in the sentence of appellant Arnit Das, all the three Appeals preferred by the three appellants are dismissed. The Death Reference stands answered, accordingly. Braj Nandan Prasad Singh, J. 111 I agree.