PRADIP KUMAR BISWAS, J. ( 1 ) PARTIES are present before me and heard them. Since common questions of law are involved in both the cases, they are being taken up for disposal analogously by a single order. ( 2 ) THE petitioners, Smt. Prativa Devi (Mukherjee) and two others have come with this application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to quash the proceeding in complaint case No. C-359/02 pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Barasat, North 24-Parganas under sections 417/420/120b of the Indian Penal Code, alleging that the opposite party no. 1 was the father-in-law of the petitioner No. 2 and the marriage was solemnised on 25th January, 2000 between the petitioner No. 2 and the daughter of the opposite party No. l. But due to differences of opinion and mentality, both the petitioner No. 2 and the daughter of the opposite party No. l filed a petition of divorce on mutual consent on 26. 2. 2001 and ultimately, they got a decree of divorce under section 13b of the Hindu Marriage Act on 30-8-2001 and one of the averments that was made in the petition of divorce on mutual consent to the effect that the parties have no claim to each other whatsoever and the petition along with the aforesaid condition has become a part of the terms of the decree of divorce and is binding on both the parties. ( 3 ) AFTER getting the aforesaid decree of dissolution of marriage on 30-8-2001 and in clear breach of the terms thereof, the opposite party No. 1 filed one complaint case, being the present one, under sections 417/420/120b of the Indian penal Code before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Barasat, North 24-Parganas, alleging therein that he received one communication from the superintendent of Police, Durg, M. P. that one Tapan Kumar Mukherjee was married to one Prativa Roy in the year 1966 and was blessed with a son and the said Tapan Kumar Mukherjee filed a divorce suit against his wife before the Court of the learned District Judge, Alipore and got a decree of judicial separation from the learned 2nd Additional District Judge at Alipore on 23rd march, 1973 on the ground of fidelty and subsequently, after receipt of the copy of the aforesaid judgement, he has come up with a petition of complaint before the appropriate Court. ( 4 ) FROM the side of the petitioners, it has been contended that the aforesaid application was filed with a view to harass and humiliate the petitioners and with mala fide intention to wreak vengeance against the petitioners' party and the total materials collected in course of enquiry under section 200 Cr. P. C. do not disclose any offence as alleged in this case. Hence, they have come up with a prayer for quashing. This allegation has been opposed by the opposite party No. l, i. e. the complainant of this case alleging that in the instant case, from the materials collected so far the offence under sections 417/420/120b of the Indian Penal code has clearly been made out and as such there is no point for quashing of the entire proceedings. ( 5 ) I have heard the parties before me at length over this issue. ( 6 ) MR. Sekhar Basu, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners drawing my attention to the petition of complaint, has submitted that the instant complaint was filed not on the basis of the personal knowledge of the complainant, but it was filed on the basis of the personal knowledge-one from the enquiry by the S. P. Durg, and another from the judgement of the matrimonial proceeding. In this connection, he has submitted that the learned Court below at the time of taking cognizance was not justified in placing its reliance on the aforesaid two informations-one being in the nature of a hearsay evidence and another being the judgement of the matrimonial proceeding and although section 41 of the Evidence Act lays down certain relevancy with regard to the existence of any such legal character in connection with a matrimonial proceeding and some other proceedings, yet, from the materials available before this Court and specially when the identity of Prativa Roy has not been established with prativa Rani (Mukherjee) before the concerned court at the relevant time that should not have been accepted by the Court below at the time of taking cognizance and in that, it should be accepted that the materials disclosed before the Court at the time of initial enquiry under section 200 Cr. P. C. were not sufficient enough to take action or cognizance, as has been taken by the concerned Court in connection with this case. P. C. were not sufficient enough to take action or cognizance, as has been taken by the concerned Court in connection with this case. ( 7 ) IN this connection, he has further submitted that the materials collected from the petition of complaint and from the initial deposition do not make out a case as alleged in the petition of complaint and as such, the prayer for quashing should be allowed. ( 8 ) MR. Dastoor, the learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party No. 1/complainant of this case, in opposing the aforesaid contention of Mr. Basu, has submitted before me that the Court is not entitled to go into such deep with regard to the assessment of the validity of the initial ejahar as it is required to be decided on full trial and at this stage, the Court is required to be satisfied itself upon the prima facie evidence adduced by the parties and at this stage identification or discarding the evidence as hearsay evidence could not and did not arise at all, but the action of the Court taken on the basis of the materials collected was legally justified on the available materials. ( 9 ) SO, it has been submitted on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 that quashing, as prayed for, is not permissible in connection with this case. ( 10 ) MR. R. S. Chattopadhyay, the learned Advocate appearing for the State, however, in supporting the contention of the accused petitioners, has submitted that the complaint and the connected materials do not at all disclose any offence whatsoever and as such quashing, as prayed for, should be granted. ( 11 ) I have given my anxious consideration with regard to the submissions made by the parties. ( 12 ) HERE, in this case, apart from taking the above two contentions, it has been alleged by the petitioners that both parties agreed between themselves to sever the marriage tie between the daughter of the complainant and the accused no. 2, yet, in breach thereof for wreaking vengeance and with a mala fide intention opposite party No. 1 has come with the allegation much belatedly although they had such prior information prior to the application filed by the parties before the concerned Court under section 13b of the Hindu Marriage act. 2, yet, in breach thereof for wreaking vengeance and with a mala fide intention opposite party No. 1 has come with the allegation much belatedly although they had such prior information prior to the application filed by the parties before the concerned Court under section 13b of the Hindu Marriage act. ( 13 ) TRUE, it is that High Court retains a plenary power to quash the criminal proceeding if it appears to the Court that continuation of the proceeding would be an abuse of the process of the Court and/or the Court may also quash such a proceeding if it appears to the Court that it is absolutely necessary for the ends of justice. ( 14 ) IT is equally settled that this power of quashing should be exercised by this Court with extreme circumspection and that can only be made in rarest of the rare cases and at this stage of quashing the Court is not entitled to embark upon any sort of enquiry with regard to the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegation and the Court has to accept the allegation as its stand without adding or substracting anything therefrom. ( 15 ) NOW, coming to the contention as has been raised by Mr. Basu that the learned Court below at the time of issuance of process did not take into consideration the fact whether or not that Prativa Mukherjee of the judgement in the matrimonial proceeding is the identical person with accused No. 1 in the petition of complaint, or whether the information furnished by the S. P. , Durg, for his non-examination should have to be regarded as a hearsay evidence and without adverting to that he has accepted the evidence on S. A. on the strength of that issued process against the present petitioners. ( 16 ) BUT in my humble opinion, at the stage of initial enquiry, Court is perhaps not required to probe into that aspect of the matter and at that stage the Court is only required to look into the prima facie, allegation upon available materials before it and perhaps at that stage, scrutiny of such materials for the purpose of accepting it or rejecting it is, quite impermissible in law. ( 17 ) SO, on that count, I find no force in the contention of the petitioners. ( 17 ) SO, on that count, I find no force in the contention of the petitioners. Nevertheless upon the settled parameters, one has to judge, whether or not the materials disclosed at that stage from the petition of complaint and the examination witnesses on S. A. make out the offence alleged or not upon which the Court has initiated his action for issuance of process in the instant case. ( 18 ) NOW, for the purpose of examining the aforesaid materials on the settled parameters of law, I have gone through the contents of the petition of complaint and the initial ejahar and taking those, as they are, I am, of the clear opinion that hardly there is any sufficient material to hold that they do disclose an offence under sections 420/120b of I. P. C. against the present petitioners including Prativa Mukherjee. ( 19 ) THAT being the position, upon total analysis of the materials available before this Court and examining those on the settled parameters of the law, I am satisfied to hold that may be the act complained of is quite unethical, yet, certainly they do not come within the purview of the offence alleged in the instant case. ( 20 ) THAT being the position, I find and hold this is a fit case where the Court should come forward for quashing of the criminal proceeding as instituted against this accused petitioners since continuation of the same should certainly be an abuse of the process of the Court. ( 21 ) THAT being the position, the prayer for quashing stands allowed and consequently, the criminal proceeding being Case No. C-359/2002 pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Barasat, North 24-Parganas under sections 417/420/120b of I. P. C. stands quashed. ( 22 ) IN view of the disposal of the aforesaid revisional application being C. R. R. No. 1971/2002 on its merit, hardly there is any necessity to pass any further order with regard to C. R. R. No. 139/2003 whereby the present petitioners namely, Indranil Mukherjee and Surajit Ray have come forward seeking to set aside the order dated 19-8-2002 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barasat whereby the learned Court below was pleased to reject their prayer under section 205 of Cr. P. C. as the criminal case started against the present petitioners has already been quashed. P. C. as the criminal case started against the present petitioners has already been quashed. Accordingly, there is no necessity of passing any further order in regard to the impugned order, involved in this case and that should-also be treated to be disposed of. ( 23 ) URGENT xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to theparties with utmost expedition. Appeal allowed.