SREEDHAR RAO, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision unfolds interesting questions of law which are still the Grey areas of the amended provisions of the Code of Civil procedure brought into operation by the CPC Amendment Act of 1999 and Amendment Act of 2002 which came into effect from 1. 7. 2002. Under the Amendment, clause (b) to the proviso to Section 115 is deleted, keeping intact the provisions of Section 115 as incorporated by the Amendment Act of 1976. ( 2 ) FOR convenient reference the amended provisions of Section 115 are extracted hereunder- 115. Revision- (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit; provided that the High Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where- (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (2) The High Court shall not, under this Section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. The deleted portion of Section 115 CPC by the Amendment Act of 1999 reads thus: (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made; ( 3 ) IN the light of the amended provision of CPC in this petition the following questions would arise for consideration - (I) whether a revision would lie against an order which allows the party to reopen the case after the evidence is concluded to adduce further evidence, and (II) in view of deletion of sub-rule 4 of Rule 2 Order 18 whether inherent powers could be exercised to allow the party to adduce further evidence after evidence is concluded. ( 4 ) THERE is no difficulty to understand the connotation of the word suit. So also an independent proceeding which is not a part of the suit and not arising out of the suit would come within the phrase other proceedings. In the prosecution of a suit the parties make different applications to secure interim reliefs seeking adjudication of their rights. In respect of every such proceedings and orders passed thereon whether a revision could lie? If not what sort of proceedings would fit into the phrase other proceedings occurring in clause (a) to proviso 115 of CPC, is the pertinent question for scrutiny in this revision. For procedural convenience the Civil rules of practice lays down that any of the offshoot proceedings in the suit have to be nomenclatured as interlocutory applications. But the terminology is deceptive. ( 5 ) THE effect and legal incidence of an interlocutory order has been lucidly explained by the Supreme Court in MADHU LIMAYE vs state OF MAHARASHTRA1 at paras 12,13,14 and 15 has made the following observations- 12 An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgments and merely directs how the declaration of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out is termed interlocutory. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. 13. In S Kuppuswami Rao vs The King 1947 FCR 180: (AIR 1949 FC 1) Kania CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court has referred to some English decisions at pages 185 and 186 (Of fcr): at p3 of AIR Lord Esher M. R. said in their decision, whichever way it is given will if it stands finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, in their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute. I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, in their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute. I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision if given in one ways will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but if given in the other will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory. To the same effect are the observations quoted from the judgment of Fry LJ and lopes J. Applying the said test almost on facts similar to the ones in the instant case it was held that the order in revision passed by the High Court was not a final order within the meaning of Section 205 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. It is to be noticed that the test laid down therein was that if the objection of the accused succeeded, the proceedings could have ended but not vice-versa. The order can be said to be a final order only if in either event the action will be determined. In our opinion if this strict test were to be applied in interpreting the words interlocutory order occurring in Section 397 (2) then the order taking cognizance of an offence by a Court whether it is so done illegally or without jurisdiction, will not be a final order and hence will be an interlocutory one. Even so, as we have said above, the inherent power of the High Court can be invoked for quashing such a criminal proceeding. But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High court conferred on it by Section 397 (1 ). On such a strict interpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chap XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1998 Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1998 Code. In what cases then the High Court will examine the legality or propriety of an order or the legality of any preceding of an inferior Criminal Court? Is it circumscribed to examine only such proceeding which is brought for its examination after the final determination and wherein no appeal lies? Such cases will be very few and far between. It has been pointed out repeatedly vide for examples although the words occurring in a particular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the statute and bring about the real intention of the legislature. On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and on the other it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression interlocutory order as invariably being converse of the words final order. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final. 14. The learned Law Lord said with reference to the order under consideration in that case: the effect of the order from which it is here sought to appeal was not to dispose finally of the rights of the parties. It no doubt decided an important, and even a vital, issue in the case, but it left the suit alive, and provided for its trial in the ordinary way. Many a time a question arose in India as to what is the exact meaning of the phrase case decided occurring in Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure. Some High Courts had taken the view that it meant the final order passed on final determination of the action. Many others had, however, opined that even interlocutory orders were covered by the said term. In Baldevdas vs Filmistan Distributors 1. Some High Courts had taken the view that it meant the final order passed on final determination of the action. Many others had, however, opined that even interlocutory orders were covered by the said term. In Baldevdas vs Filmistan Distributors 1. AIR 1978 SC 47 (India) Pvt Ltd, AIR 1970 SC 406 it has been pointed out A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy. 15. Yet for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion after due consideration that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2 ). ( 6 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of BALDEVDAS SHIVLAL and ANOTHER vs FILMISTAN DISTRIBUTORS (INDIA) Pvt. Ltd at para 10 has made the following observations 10. It may also be observed that by ordering that a question may properly be put to a witness who was being examined, no case was decided by the Trial Court. That expression case is not limited in its import to the entirety of the matter in dispute in an action. This Court observed in Major S. S. Khanna vs Brig f. J. Dillon (1964) 4 SCR 409 = AIR 1964 SC 497 that the expression case is a word of comprehensive import; it includes a civil proceeding and is not restricted by anything contained in section 115 of the code to the entirety of the preceeding in a civil Court to interpret the expression case as an entire proceeding only and not a part of the proceeding imposes an unwarranted restriction on the exercise of powers of superintendence and may result in certain cases in denying relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice. But it was not decided in major S. S. Khanna s case (1964) 4 SCR 409 = ( AIR 1964 SC 497 ) (supra) that every order of the Court in the course of a suit amounts to a case decided. But it was not decided in major S. S. Khanna s case (1964) 4 SCR 409 = ( AIR 1964 SC 497 ) (supra) that every order of the Court in the course of a suit amounts to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties is controversy. Every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 7 ) PRIOR to the Amendment Act of 1976, the revisional jurisdiction was very limited. A revision could be entertained only when there is a jurisdictional error and in all the orders on the question of fact unless affects the jurisdiction could not be a subject matter for revision. In other words Clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) to proviso 115 were the only grounds upon which revisional powers could be exercised. The Amendment Act of 1976, incorporated the proviso with Clauses (a) and (b) and in particular Clause (b), provided liberal grounds to invoke revisional jurisdiction apart from the jurisdictional ground envisaged in Clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 115 of CPC whenever there is a failure of justice or irreparable injury on account of order of Subordinate Court, the High Court had an expanded revisional jurisdiction over such matters. Clause (a) was also introduced by the Amendment Act of 1976, since Clause (b) to the proviso afforded lenient opportunities to invoke revisional jurisdiction. Not much of efforts were made on the part of the Bar toexploit the grounds under Clause (a) for invoking the revisional jurisdiction. Now after the deletion of clause (b), there is a substantial shrink in the revisional jurisdiction unless the conditions mentioned under Clause (a) are fulfilled, no revision lies. It is now essential for the petitioner to show that by the result of the order in revision the suit or other proceedings would be finally disposed off. ( 8 ) THE Code of Civil Procedure, envisages several provisions enabling the parties to seek interim reliefs in respect of the subject matter of the suit or in respect of their procedural rights in order to prove the case. ( 8 ) THE Code of Civil Procedure, envisages several provisions enabling the parties to seek interim reliefs in respect of the subject matter of the suit or in respect of their procedural rights in order to prove the case. The reliefs granted on such applications are conveniently called as interim relief, since the application is nomenclatured as interlocutory applications, the reliefs are called otherwise as interlocutory orders. The proceedings in different types of interlocutory applications result in adjudication of rights of the parties. In some cases, the question that arise in the course of adjudication of such interlocutory applications may not arise for consideration at the time of final disposal of the suit and may not be relevant for determination at the time of final adjudication. Although the proceedings in the certain category of applications filed in the suit are termed as interlocutory applications and the orders thereon as interim orders, but in real sense they are intermediate proceedings in other words subordinate and auxiliary to the main proceedings. Any orders granted thereon are intermediate orders. To illustrate an application, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 regarding grant of temporary injunction and appointment of Receiver under Section 40, although for procedural convenience titled as Interlocutory 2. AIR 1970 SC 406 applications, the decisions with reference to the said applications will have a material bearing on the subject matter and the rights of the parties. The property has to be preserved intact during the pendency of the proceedings until the case reaches its logical end. Therefore for preserving properties the Courts are empowered to grant necessary interim reliefs. The questions involved while determining such applications would not be relevant for consideration at the time of final adjudication. ( 9 ) THE provisions under Order 26 Rule 9 for appointment of commissioner, an application under Order 6 Rule 17 for amending the pleadings and an application under Order 1 Rule 10 for impleading the parties, an application to summon the witnesses or documents are also termed as interlocutory applications, any wrong order in that regard by the Trial Court will have a material bearing on the final result. The party aggrieved if denied the right of revision has to get the order corrected only in appeal and many a time it may result in unnecessary remand. The party aggrieved if denied the right of revision has to get the order corrected only in appeal and many a time it may result in unnecessary remand. It is a flawed logic to assume that curbing the revision at any cost would solve the problem of delayed disposal. ( 10 ) THEREFORE in the light of the ratio laid down by the Supreme court, it is to be held that in all the sub-ordinate proceedings arising in a suit by way of interlocutory application where the rights of the parties are to be adjudicated and if such adjudication results in final conclusion of such rights and if the said questions involved in the adjudication of rights in the such proceedings do not arise for consideration at the time of final disposal of the suit, necessarily such of the sub-ordinate proceedings should be construed to come within the purview of the phrase other proceedings and in respect of such the orders, a revision would lie. As observed above, the orders passed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, under Order 40, under order 26 Rule 9, under Order 6 Rule 17, under Order 13-belated production of document, under Order 16-belated summoning of witnesses and under Order 18 to reopen the case and to recall the witnesses have the character of an independent subordinate proceedings arising in a suit, not relatable to the question that arise for final adjudication in the suit and any orders thereon in revision would finally conclude the rights of the parties in such proceedings. Therefore a revision would lie. However, allowing the applications under Order 26 Rule 9, under Order 6 Rule 17, under Order 13 belated production of document, under Order 16-belated summoning of witnesses and under Order 18 to reopen the case and to recall the witnesses, may not materially prejudice the rights of the parties, since there would be a scope for the parties to contest at the stage of evidence and also at the stage of arguments to challenge the relevance, veracity and legality of such evidence. ( 11 ) SMT. Vidya Iyer, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of RAMKARANDAS radhavallabh vs BHAGWANDAS DWARKADAS3. ( 11 ) SMT. Vidya Iyer, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of RAMKARANDAS radhavallabh vs BHAGWANDAS DWARKADAS3. It is held that inherent powers have to be exercised by the Court in exceptional circumstances for which the Code does not lay down any procedure and also that the powers under Section 151 cannot be exercised contrary to the express provision. ( 12 ) SRI Shankarappa, learned Counsel for Sri M. T. Nanaiah advocate appearing for the respondent relied on the ruling of the supreme Court in the case of MANOHAR LAL vs SETH HIRALAL4. At paras 20 and 21, the following observations are made- (20) Further, the provisions of Section 151 of the Code made it clear that the inherent powers are not controlled by the provisions of the Code. Section 151 reads: Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court (21) A similar question about the powers of the Court to issue a commission in the exercise of its powers under Section 151 of the Code in circumstances not covered by Section 75 and order xxvi, arose in Padam Sen vs State of Uttar Pradesh, 1961-1 scr 884; ( AIR 1961 SC 218 ), and this Court held that the Court can issue a commission in such circumstances. It observed at page 887 (of SCR): (at p 219 of the AIR) thus: The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be 3. AIR 1965 SC 1144 4. AIR 1962 SC 527 held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the code as has been specifically stated in Section 151 itself. These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the code as has been specifically stated in Section 151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. This restriction for practical purposes,on the exercise of those powers is not because those powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided by the Legislature for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice. ( 13 ) NO doubt the provisions of sub-rule 4 of the Rule 2 is deleted, the amending, the effect of such deletion cannot be construed to abridge the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151. The supreme Court has emphatically laid down and reiterated time and again that the provisions of the Code would not control the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 to meet the ends of justice and to check the abuse of process of law. Notwithstanding the deletion of sub-rule 4, it is to be held that the provision of Section 151 will hold the field to render justice. However, the Court while exercising Section 151 should be more carefully and sparingly exercise the power not to grant the relief for mere asking. In the present case, heavy burden is on the plaintiff invoking inherent power for adducing additional evidence after the stage of evidence to show and demonstrate the valid reasons which prevented the plaintiff from doing so at the appropriate stage. When the court is satisfied that for valid reasons the party was prevented, a relief could be granted under Section 151. Even at this stage of appeal, the party has right to file additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27, allowing an application to adduce additional evidence may not have an irreversible consequence compared to the rejection. The party has to wait to get the illegal order corrected only by an appeal leading to an unnecessary remand - But when such application is allowed there should not be revision over that order. The party has to wait to get the illegal order corrected only by an appeal leading to an unnecessary remand - But when such application is allowed there should not be revision over that order. The evidence adduced is frivolous and inadmissible, the aggrieved party has a scope at the stage of evidence and arguments to show that it is inadmissible or irrelevant and any inconvenience caused by the delay could be compensated by way of costs. ( 14 ) IN the present case the request of the plaintiff has been allowed. May be the defendant is put to some amount of inconvenience on account of delay and procrastination of the proceedings. Therefore a sum of Rs. 1,000/- to be payable to the defendant by the plaintiff before he avails the benefit of leading further evidence as granted under the impugned order. ( 15 ) IN view of the reasons made above, the petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .