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2003 DIGILAW 395 (SC)

P. Manjula v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2003-03-11

ARUN KUMAR, M.B.SHAH

body2003
ORDER : M.B. Shah, J. - Leave granted. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. The respondents filed Writ Petition No. 19800 of 2001 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for declaration that the reservation to the post of President of Mandal Parishad, Singareni in favour of Backward Class women was illegal being contrary to Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act 7 of 1988 and Articles 243-D and 243-M of the Constitution of India and consequently, to declare the election of the appellant as illegal. The original petitioners belonged to Scheduled Tribe category and are residents of village under Singareni Mandal which has got thirteen territorial constituencies. According to them, the entire Singareni Mandal, except Singareni Village falls in the scheduled area. In the petition, it was contended that the post of President of Mandal Parishad ought to have been reserved in favour of the Scheduled Tribes and not in favour of any other class. 4. Admittedly, the respondents have not challenged the validity of the State legislation or Rules framed thereunder. 5. Despite this, the High Court arrived at the conclusion that in view of the provisions contained in Section 4(g) of the Act, reservation in favour of the Scheduled Tribes is a legislative policy, reservation to the post of President could not have been made in favour of Backward Class women. Therefore, the Government order (G.O. No. 140 dated 20-4-2001) providing for reservation cannot be said to have any application whatsoever in the instant case. Consequently, the election to the post of President of Mandal Parishad was held to be a nullity. The High Court also directed that fresh election for the said constituency be conducted in accordance with law declaring the post of President reserved for members of Scheduled Tribes only. That judgment and order passed by the High Court is challenged by filing this appeal. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that in view of Article 243-O of the Constitution, the High Court has committed a patent error in entertaining the petition. 7. In our view, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted for the following reasons: Admittedly in the present case, Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Reservation of Seats and Offices of Gram Panchayats, Mandal Parishads and Zila Parishads) Rules, 2001 were notified on 20-4-2001. 7. In our view, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted for the following reasons: Admittedly in the present case, Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Reservation of Seats and Offices of Gram Panchayats, Mandal Parishads and Zila Parishads) Rules, 2001 were notified on 20-4-2001. On the basis of the said Rules, the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Deputy Election Authority issued a notification determining the number of members for the office of MPTC in all categories, namely, ST, SC, BC, women and unreserved in all mandals of Kothagudem Division. Thereafter, election was notified on 25-6-2001. It took place on 12-7-2001. Election results were declared on 28-7-2001. The writ petition was filed before the High Court on 12-9-2001. Admittedly, Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Election Tribunals in respect of Gram Panchayats, Mandal Parishads and Zila Parishads) Rules, 1995 applies and the election petition ought to have been filed within 30 days from the date of declaration of the result. Therefore, on the date the petition before the High Court under Article 226 was filed, the appellant could not have approached the Tribunal for redressal of his grievance by way of election petition. 8. Apart from the delay in approaching the High Court it is settled law that election dispute could not have been raised in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court in Boddula Krishnaiah v. State Election Commr., A.P., (1996) 3 SCC 416 held that in case of an election dispute, remedy is available at law for its redressal. Therefore, the High Court was not correct in law in giving directions not to declare the result of election or to conduct fresh poll. The Court relied (at SCC pp. This Court in Boddula Krishnaiah v. State Election Commr., A.P., (1996) 3 SCC 416 held that in case of an election dispute, remedy is available at law for its redressal. Therefore, the High Court was not correct in law in giving directions not to declare the result of election or to conduct fresh poll. The Court relied (at SCC pp. 420-21, para 10) upon the following observations of this Court in State of U.P. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti, (1995) Supp (2) SCC 305: "10.'What is more objectionable in the approach of the High Court is that although clause (a) of Article 243-O of the Constitution enacts a bar on the interference by the courts in electoral matters including the questioning of the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purported to be made under Article 243-K and the election to any panchayat, the High Court has gone into the question of the validity of the delimitation of the constituencies and also the allotment of seats to them. We may, in this connection, refer to a decision of this Court in Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 669. In that case, a notification of the Delimitation Commission whereby a city which had been a general constituency was notified as reserved for the Scheduled Castes. This was challenged on the ground that the petitioner had a right to be a candidate for Parliament from the said constituency which had been taken away. This Court held that the impugned notification was a law relating to the delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made under Article 327 of the Constitution, and that an examination of Sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act showed that the matters therein dealt with were not subject to the scrutiny of any court of law. There was a very good reason for such a provision because if the orders made under Sections 8 and 9 were not to be treated as final, the result would be that any voter, if he so wished, could hold up an election indefinitely by questioning the delimitation of the constituencies from court to court. There was a very good reason for such a provision because if the orders made under Sections 8 and 9 were not to be treated as final, the result would be that any voter, if he so wished, could hold up an election indefinitely by questioning the delimitation of the constituencies from court to court. Although an order under Section 8 or 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act and published under Section 10(1) of that Act is not part of an Act of Parliament, its effect is the same. Section 10(4) of that Act puts such an order in the same position as a law made by Parliament itself which could only be made by it under Article 327. If we read Articles 243-C, 243-K and 243-O in place of Article 327 and Sections 2(kk), 11-F and 12-BB of the Act in place of Sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act, 1952, it will be obvious that neither the delimitation of the panchayat area nor of the constituencies in the said areas and the allotments of seats to the constituencies could have been challenged nor the court could have entertained such challenge except on the ground that before the delimitation, no objections were invited and no hearing was given. Even this challenge could not have been entertained after the notification for holding the elections was issued. The High Court not only entertained the challenge but has also gone into the merits of the alleged grievances although the challenge was made after the notification for the election was issued on 31-8-1994." It then concluded: (SCC p. 421, para 11) "11. Thus, it would be clear that once an election process has been set in motion, though the High Court may entertain or may have already entertained a writ petition, it would not be justified in interfering with the election process giving direction to the election officer to stall the proceedings or to conduct the election process afresh, in particular when election has already been held in which the voters were allegedly prevented from exercising their franchise. As seen, the dispute is covered by an election dispute and remedy is thus available at law for redressal." 9. Hence, the High Court committed a patent error in entertaining the writ petition and holding that election was a nullity and directing fresh elections. 10. As seen, the dispute is covered by an election dispute and remedy is thus available at law for redressal." 9. Hence, the High Court committed a patent error in entertaining the writ petition and holding that election was a nullity and directing fresh elections. 10. In the result the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside. 11. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.