JUDGMENT Tapen Sen, J. 1. Head Mr. A. Allam, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.K. Bhowmik, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner, in the instant case, has prayed for quashing Annexure-7, which is the order dated 21.03.1995, issued by the Senior Divisional Manager informing the petitioner that since he had failed to achieve the target on all counts, his services as Probationary Development Officer stood terminated retrospectively on and from 23.10.1994. The petitioner has also prayed for release of his salary from January 1995, till date as according to him, he has been paid his salary till December, 1994 and therefore he prays that after quashing the order of termination, he be paid his regular salary on and from January 1995 together with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. According to the petitioner, an advertisement was published by the respondents for appointment of Development Officer whereafter he was called for interview and after having been selected, he was medically examined and by letter dated 18.01.1992, he was appointed on the post of Apprentice Development Officer for a period of 9 (nine) months with effect from 23.01.1992 on payment of stipend at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month. The aforementioned appointment was made by Annexure-1 appended to the Writ Application. 3. From a perusal of the aforementioned appointment letter as contained at Annexure 1, it is apparent that by Clause 2 thereof the petitioner was informed that he would initially be taken as an apprentice for a period of 9 (nine) months commencing on and from the same day. After completion of 3 (three) months training, he would be put for field training for 6 (six) months at a Centre which would be intimated later on. It was further intimated at paragraph 7 that on completion of the apprenticeship period, if his work was found to be satisfactory then he would be appointed as a Development Officer on probation on a monthly basic pay of Rs. 1,350/- (Rupees one thousand three hundred fifty) and such other allowance as are admissible in accordance with Staff Regulation. It was further intimated at paragraph 7 that on completion of the apprenticeship period, if his work was found to be satisfactory then he would be appointed as a Development Officer on probation on a monthly basic pay of Rs. 1,350/- (Rupees one thousand three hundred fifty) and such other allowance as are admissible in accordance with Staff Regulation. Thus, from a perusal of paragraph 7 of Annexure-1, it is evident that respondents at least admit that the petitioner, upon attaining the status of a Probationary Field Officer, was to be guided in accordance with the Staff Regulations meaning thereby the Development Officers (Revision of Certain Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1989. 4. The petitioner has further stated that subsequently his training having been completed and his services having been found to be satisfactory, the respondents issued a letter of appointment dated 11.01.1993 as contained at Annexure-5 appointing the petitioner as a probationary Development Officer, Clause 2 and Clause 11 of the said appointment are relevant to be taken note of. Clause 2 and 11 respectively read as follows :-- "(2) Probation Period:--you shall be on probation initially for a period of 12 (Twelve) months from the date of your joining duties as a probationer, but the Corporation may, in its sole discretion, extend your probationary period provided that the total probationary period, including the extended probationary period, shall not exceed 24 months counted from the commencement of the probationary appointment. During the probationary period (which includes extended probationary period, if applicable), you shall be liable to be discharged from service of the Corporation without any notice and without any cause being assigned. (11) Confirmation and Increments:--(1) On your satisfactorily completing the period of probation and your observance and compliance with all conditions set out in this letter of appointment, you will be confirm in the services of the Corporation in Class-II. Your confirmation will depend inter alia upon the fulfillment of the minimum business guarantee set out in Para (1) above and upon your record of past sales service to the Corporations Policy holders and other functions performed by you in the area allotted to you to the satisfaction of the competent Authority. (ii) The grant of increments to you shall be governed by regulation 56 of L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, read with schedule-III as amended from time to time." 5. (ii) The grant of increments to you shall be governed by regulation 56 of L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, read with schedule-III as amended from time to time." 5. From a perusal of Clause 2 it is evident that there is a clause for extension of the period of probation. It is also evident from that clause that total period of probation including the extension period shall not exceed 24 (twenty four) moths counting from the commencement of the probationary appointment. Clause 11 on the other hand stipulates that on satisfactorily completing the period of probation, the probationer will be confirmed in the services of the Corporation in Class II. 6. In the instant case power under Clause 2 was exercised on the expiry of the first probationary period by letter dated 13.01.1994 (Annexure-6) by which the first probationary period which was for the period 23.10.1992 to 22.10.1993 was extended for a fresh period of one year, i.e., from 23.10.1993 to 22.10.1994. The period of the second extended probationary period came to an end on 22.10.1994. No order was passed by the respondents informing the petitioner that the period of probation shall not ultimately culminate in confirmation. On the contrary, as is evident from paragraph 14 of the Writ Application, the petitioner continued working and he was paid salary till December 1994 and he was allowed to work up to May 1995 at the Chirkunda Branch Office. During all this period i.e., upto 21.03.1995, the respondents never informed the petitioner that his services" had not been confirmed and that he was still in a probationary period. In any event the period of probation could not have been extended under any circumstances beyond 22.10.1994 as per Clause 2 of the letter of appointment dated 11.01.1992 in which itself it was clearly stated that the total probationary period shall not exceed 24 (twenty four) months. 7. Mr. A. Allam, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the absence of an order refusing to confirm prior to the date when the period of probation came to an end, and in view of the fact that the petitioner was not only allowed to work right up to the next year, i.e., May 1995, but was also allowed to draw salary, it must be deemed that his services had been confirmed on completion of the period of probation. In the case of Daya Ram Dayal v. The State of M.P. and Anr., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 443 , it has inter alia been held at paragraph 13 that where a maximum period has been prescribed it is a clear indication that the intention is not to treat that officer as being in probation after expiry of the maximum period. Taking this view, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal of Daya Ram Dayal and set aside the order of termination at paragraph 16 and ordered that it will be deemed that the appellants services were confirmed on the expiry of 4 (four) years of probation. Paragraphs 13 and 16 of the aforementioned judgment therefore, needs to be quoted :-- "13. It is, therefore, clear that the present case is one where the rule has prescribed an initial period of probation and then for the extension of probation subject to a maximum, and therefore the case squarely falls within the second line of eases, namely, Dharam Singh case and the provision for a maximum is an indication of an intention not to treat the officer as being under probation after the expiry of the maximum period of probation. It is also significant that in the case before us the effect of the rule fixing a maximum period of probation is not whittled down by any other provision in the rules such as the one contained in Samsher Singh case or in Ashok Kumar Misra case. Though a plea was raised that termination of service could be effected by serving one months notice or paying salary in lieu thereof, there is no such provision in the order of appointment nor was any rule relied upon for supporting such a contention. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed and the judgments of the High Court are set aside and the writ petition of the appellant is allowed. The termination order is set aside and it will be deemed that the appellants services were confirmed on the expiry of 4 years of probation as Civil Judge i.e. w.e.f. 22.5.1990 and the appellant is reinstated into service w.e.f. 22.5.1990 and will be entitled to all arrears of emoluments from the date of termination, namely, 8.11.1993 up to the date of reinstatement and he shall also be entitled to all consequential benefits, in accordance with law. It will be open to the respondents to hold a departmental enquiry and terminate his services or otherwise punish him if charges are proved against him. There shall be no order as to costs." 8. In the instant case, there is neither any order prior to the completion of the final period of probation nor thereafter till the date of passing of the impugned order pointing out to the writ petitioner that he would not be confirmed or that his services were not satisfactory. In that view of the matter, on completion of the period on 22.10.1994, the petitioner must be deemed to have acquired a confirmed status of a Development Officer, Once the petitioner acquired such a status, he automatically therefore come within the purview of the aforementioned rules, i.e., Development Officers (Revision of Certain Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules. 1989. Appendix 1 (Annexure B) of the aforementioned Rules is the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation 1960 - Schedule III -Special Provisions Relating to Class-II Development Officers-Instructions regarding. Regulation 12.1 to 12.4 therein reads as follows :-- "Termination of service in certain cases : 12.1 The service of a Development Officer shall become liable for termination in either of the following contingencies : (a) if the cost ration in any appraisal year is more than 50% and the ratio of the aggregate of the expenses in that year and the two immediately preceding appraisal years to the aggregate of the Schedule First year premium income in those three appraisal years exceeds 50% (b) If as a consequence of he application of the decrement (s) detailed in para 6 of these instructions, the basic pay fails, on a second occasion, to be fixed below the minimum of the scale on which he is borne. 12.2 As soon as it is ascertained that services of a Development Officer are liable to be terminated, the Sr./Divisional Manager shall write to him giving full particulars as regards SFYPI, remuneration, etc, and pointing out to him the relevant provisions of the Regulations under which his services are liable to be terminated. If the reply to that communication discloses any factual in accuracies in the relevant figures, the Divisional Manager will take such appropriate action as is warranted. If the reply to that communication discloses any factual in accuracies in the relevant figures, the Divisional Manager will take such appropriate action as is warranted. 12.3 Where the Divisional manager finds that the services of that Development Officer are liable for termination, he shall as soon as may be practicable forward the case to the Zonal Manager with full particulars. 12.4 The Zonal Manager after confirming the position with regard to the liability for termination shall issue a notice to the Development officer to show-cause against the proposed termination of service. The show-cause notice should give all the relevant figures of premium Income and cost ratio. The reply to the show-cause notice should be forwarded by the Divisional Manager with his observations. The Zonal Manager shall consider the reply to the show-cause notice on its merits and pass orders. Where the Zonal Manager does not find any merit in the reply to the show-cause-notice he shall issue the order of termination giving three months notice." 9. The aforementioned regulations are in relation to the procedure to be followed in relation to termination of service in the case of Development Officers who do not perform their job up to the expected mark. This apparently has not been followed in the instant case and by reason of the impugned order which has been passed almost 5 (five) months after final probationary period come to an end, the petitioner has been informed that his performance during the extended period of probation had not been found to be satisfactory inasmuch as he had failed to achieve the target and as such, his services as Probationary Development Officer stood terminated with effect from 23.10.1994 - meaning thereby retrospectively. What should have been done on 23.10.1994 or prior to 23.10.2994 is admittedly being done 5 (five) months thereafter. 10. Mr. P.K. Bhowmik, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a decision delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager L.I.C. etc. reported in (1994) 2 SCC 323 and has submitted that when a Probationary Development Officer fails to achieve necessary target, his termination cannot be held to be paid. This Court respectfully rejects the aforesaid argument of Mr. P.K. Bhowmik in view of the fact that this Court has already, held that the petitioner could not be treated to be a Probationary Development Officer after 22.10.1994. This Court respectfully rejects the aforesaid argument of Mr. P.K. Bhowmik in view of the fact that this Court has already, held that the petitioner could not be treated to be a Probationary Development Officer after 22.10.1994. In fact after 22.10.1994 and in view of Clause 2 of his letter of appointment and in the absence of orders to the contrary the petitioner stepped into the shoes of a confirmed Development Officer and accordingly came to be guided as per the provisions of the aforementioned regulations. That being the position, the order terminating the petitioner and that too retrospectively is held to be bad. 11. Yet another reason for holding the order of termination to be bad is because the order amounts to a stigma and therefore a regular inquiry and opportunity of hearing was sine qua non. In the facts and circumstances of this case prior to terminating the services of the petitioner, he was entitled to an opportunity of hearing. Reference in this context may made to the case of V.K. Ahuja v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 2000 SC 1080 and the case of D.P. Banerjee v. S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta, reported in AIR 1999 SC 983 . The respondents not having complied with the aforementioned principles of natural justice, therefore, must be held to have acted illegally and without jurisdiction. Lastly, Mr. Bhowmik referred to the case of H.F. Sangati v. Registrar General, High Court to Karnataka and others reported in (2001) 3 SCC 117 in support of his contention that affording an opportunity or holding a departmental inquiry before discharging a probationer was not necessary. This Court again respectfully rejects the contention of Mr. Bhowmik inasmuch as the aforementioned pronouncement is in relation to a case of discharge of probationary munsif in the Karnataka Judicial Service guided by the Karnataka Civil Services (Probation) Rules 1977. In the instant case, the petitioner is guided by the regulations quoted above which clearly provides at Clause 12.1 thereto the manner and prpcedure to be followed in relation to termination of service of Development Officers. Moreover, the other reason for rejecting the contention of Mr. Bhowmik is that the petitioner could not be treated to be a probationer after 22.10.1994 whereas the judgments cited by him relates to a probationary munsif. The other judgment cited by Mr. Moreover, the other reason for rejecting the contention of Mr. Bhowmik is that the petitioner could not be treated to be a probationer after 22.10.1994 whereas the judgments cited by him relates to a probationary munsif. The other judgment cited by Mr. Bhowmik, i.e., in the case of High Court of M.P. Through Registrar and Ors. v. Satyanarayan Jhavar reported in (2001) 7 SCC 161 also does not appeal to this Court inasmuch as the facts of that case are totally difference and in that case the situation was that after being found unfit for confirmation during the probationary period, the judicial officer had been given a further opportunity and even thereafter he failed to improve himself and therefore, the Supreme Court held that mere grant of such opportunity did not culminate any deemed confirmation of the probationary Judicial Officer. 12. The facts, therefore, are totally different from the facts involved in the instant case. Consequently, the writ petition must succeed and it is accordingly, allowed to do so. The impugned order is quashed and set aside. The petitioner would be entitled to all consequential benefits. The respondents may, if they so like, proceed afresh in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.